Neoliberal Networks & Authoritarian Renewal. A Diverse Case Study of Egypt, Jordan & Morocco by Kreitmeyr-Koska, Nadine
  
 
 
NEOLIBERAL NETWORKS & AUTHORITARIAN RENEWAL 
 
A DIVERSE CASE STUDY OF EGYPT, JORDAN & MOROCCO 
 
 
 
 
 
Dissertation  
zur Erlangung des Doktorgrades 
der Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftlichen Fakultät 
der Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen 
 
 
 
vorgelegt von 
Nadine Kreitmeyr-Koska 
aus Augsburg 
 
 
 
 
 
Tübingen 
2016  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tag der mündlichen Prüfung:    23.08.2016 
Dekan:       Professor Dr. rer. soc. Josef Schmid 
1. Gutachter:      Professor Dr. Oliver Schlumberger 
2. Gutachter:      Professor Dr. Janine A. Clark 
  
  
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .................................................................................................. 1 
LIST OF TABLES & FIGURES ............................................................................................ 4 
1. FRAMEWORK OF THIS STUDY .................................................................................... 5 
1.1 THE PUZZLE ................................................................................................................ 5 
1.2 LITERATURE REVIEW ............................................................................................. 10 
1.2.1 Neoliberalism Beyond Economic Reform ........................................................ 10 
1.2.2 Authoritarian Renewal ...................................................................................... 19 
1.2.3 Networks & Social Embeddedness ................................................................... 28 
1.2.4 Social Entrepreneurship .................................................................................... 34 
1.3 FRAMEWORK OF THE ANALYSIS ........................................................................ 39 
1.4 FINDINGS ................................................................................................................... 49 
1.5 METHODOLOGY ....................................................................................................... 50 
1.5.1 Social Entrepreneurship in the MENA Region & Socio-Economic Issues ...... 50 
1.5.2 Case Selection ................................................................................................... 55 
1.5.3 Sources .............................................................................................................. 56 
1.5.4 Data Analysis .................................................................................................... 57 
1.5.5 Discussion of Validity ...................................................................................... 59 
2. EMPIRICAL STUDY OF EGYPT .................................................................................. 61 
2.1 INTRODUCTION: SOCIO-ECONOMIC REFORM IN EGYPT............................... 61 
2.2 THE SEN IN EGYPT ................................................................................................... 63 
2.2.1 Emergence & Support: Actors, Institutions & Initiatives in the SEN .............. 63 
2.2.2 Relations & Interactions within the Egyptian SEN .......................................... 77 
2.2.3 The Generation of Resources............................................................................ 96 
2.2.3.1 The Generation of Resources through International Ties ............................ 96 
2.2.3.2 The Generation of Resources through Local Ties ..................................... 102 
2.3 CONCLUSIONS: THE EGYPTIAN SEN & AUTHORITARIAN RENEWAL ...... 108 
3. EMPIRICAL STUDY OF JORDAN ............................................................................. 109 
3.1 INTRODUCTION: SOCIO-ECONOMIC REFORM IN JORDAN .......................... 109 
3.2 THE SEN IN JORDAN .............................................................................................. 111 
3.2.1 Emergence & Support: Actors, Institutions & Initiatives in the SEN ............ 112 
3.2.2 Relations & Interactions within the Jordanian SEN ....................................... 126 
3.2.3 The Generation of Resources.......................................................................... 142 
3.2.3.1 The Generation of Resources through International Ties .......................... 143 
3.2.3.2 The Generation of Resources Through Local Ties .................................... 147 
3.3 CONCLUSIONS: THE SEN & AUTHORITARIAN RENEWAL IN JORDAN ..... 154 
  
4. EMPIRICAL STUDY OF MOROCCO ........................................................................ 156 
4.1 INTRODUCTION: SOCIO-ECONOMIC REFORM IN MOROCCO ..................... 156 
4.2 THE SEN IN MOROCCO ......................................................................................... 158 
4.2.1 Emergence & Support: Actors, Institutions & Initiatives in the SEN ............ 159 
4.2.2 Relations & Interactions within the Moroccan SEN ...................................... 171 
4.2.3 The Generation of Resources.......................................................................... 192 
4.2.3.1 The Generation of Resources through International Ties .......................... 193 
4.2.3.2 The Generation of Resources through Local Ties ..................................... 198 
4.3 CONCLUSIONS: THE MOROCCAN SEN & AUTHORITARIAN RENEWAL ... 205 
5. CONCLUSIONS .............................................................................................................. 207 
APPENDICES ...................................................................................................................... 211 
REFERENCES ..................................................................................................................... 230 
 
  
 1 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
AAW  Ashoka Arab World 
ALFA  Ashoka Levant Fellows Assembly 
AMH  Amicale Marocaine des Handicapés 
ASF  Association Solidarité Féminine   
AWSI  Arab World Social Innovators (Synergos) 
AYB  Alashanek Ya Balady Association for Sustainable Development  
A4SE  Alliance for Social Entrepreneurship 
BLACD Better Life Association for Comprehensive Development 
BMCE  Banque Marocaine du Commerce Extérieur 
CAPEE Collectif des Associations Pour l’Education et l’Entrepreneuriat 
CDG  Caisse de Dépôt et de Gestion 
CEO  Chief Executive Officer 
CER  Corporate Entrepreneurship Responsibility 
CESE  Economic, Social and Environmental Council 
CGEM  Confédération Générale des Entreprises du Maroc 
CJD  Centre des Jeunes Dirigeants  
CSR  Corporate Social Responsibility 
ECC  Economic Consultative Council 
ECES  Egyptian Center for Economic Studies 
ECRC  Egyptian Corporate Responsibility Center 
EFE  Education for Employment 
EGP  Egyptian Pound 
ENF  Elia Nuqul Foundation 
ESC  Jordan Economic and Social Council 
EU  European Union 
FGF  Future Generation Foundation 
GAFI  General Authority for Investment and Free Zones 
GAM  Greater Amman Municipality 
GES  Global Entrepreneurship Summit 
GESR  Governorate Economic and Social Revival 
HTM  House of Tales and Music 
ICNL  International Center for Not-for-Profit Law 
 2 
IMF  International Monetary Fund 
INDH  Initiative Nationale pour le Développement Humain 
IYF  International Youth Foundation 
JOD  Jordanian Dinar 
KAAYIA King Abdullah II Award for Youth Innovation & Achievement 
KAFD  King Abdullah Fund for Development 
KWD  Kuwaiti Dinar 
LoT  Leaders of Tomorrow 
MAD  Moroccan Dirham 
MAGG Ministry of General Affairs and Governance 
MCISE Moroccan Center for Innovation & Social Entrepreneurship 
NDP  National Democratic Party 
MENA Middle East and North Africa 
MEPI  Middle East Partnership Initiative 
NWL  New Work Lab 
OCP  Office Chérifien des Phosphates 
OCPEN OCP Entrepreneurship Network 
ONA  Omnium Nord Africain 
OTH  Orascom Telecom Holding 
PoE  Pioneers of Egypt 
PwC  PricewaterhouseCoopers 
QRCE  Queen Rania Center for Entrepreneurship 
QRNEC Queen Rania National Entrepreneurship Competition 
SEN  Social Entrepreneurship Network 
SFD  Social Fund for Development 
SFSD  Sawiris Foundation for Social Development 
SNA  Social Network Analysis 
SNI  Société Nationale d’Investissement 
SNT  Social Network Theory 
SOY  Spirit of Youth Organization 
SWF  Skoll World Forum 
TADE  Together Association for Development and Environment 
TIEC  Technology Innovation and Entrepreneurship Center 
TTI  Trip To Innovation 
UN  United Nations 
USAID United States Agency for International Development 
 3 
USD  US Dollar 
VSB  Villes Sans Bidonvilles 
WEF  World Economic Forum 
WEF-MENA World Economic Forum on the Middle East & North Africa 
  
 4 
LIST OF TABLES & FIGURES 
Table 1: Neoliberal Networks & Authoritarian Renewal ......................................................... 40 
Table 2: Dimension I: Actors, Institutions & Initiatives .......................................................... 42 
Table 3: Dimension II: Types of Social Ties ............................................................................ 44 
Table 4: Dimension III: Types of Resources ............................................................................ 46 
Table 5: Egypt, Socio-Economic Indicators, 2013 ................................................................... 53 
Table 6: Morocco, Socio-Economic Indicators, 2011 .............................................................. 54 
Table 7: Jordan, Socio-Economic Indicators, 2011 .................................................................. 55 
 
Figure 1: Fellows by country in the MENA region 2003-2014 ............................................... 52 
Figure 2: The Egyptian SEN .................................................................................................... 77 
Figure 3: Ties between Support Organizations & Social Entrepreneurs .................................. 78 
Figure 4: Ties between State Institutions & Social Entrepreneurs ........................................... 84 
Figure 5: Ties between Business Actors & Social Entrepreneurs ............................................ 87 
Figure 6: Ties among Social Entrepreneurs ............................................................................. 94 
Figure 7: The Jordanian SEN ................................................................................................. 126 
Figure 8: Ties between Support Organizations & Social Entrepreneurs ................................ 127 
Figure 9: Ties between State Institutions, Social Entrepreneurs & Local Support ................ 133 
Figure 10: Ties between Business Actors, Social Entrepreneurs & Local Support 
Organizations .......................................................................................................................... 136 
Figure 11: Ties among Social Entrepreneurs.......................................................................... 141 
Figure 12: The Moroccan SEN .............................................................................................. 172 
Figure 13: Ties between Support Organizations & Social Entrepreneurs .............................. 173 
Figure 14: Ties between Social Entrepreneurs, State Institutions & Royal Actors ................ 180 
Figure 15: Ties between Business Actors, Social Entrepreneurs ........................................... 184 
Figure 16: Ties among Social Entrepreneurs ......................................................................... 189 
 
  
 5 
1. FRAMEWORK OF THIS STUDY 
1.1 THE PUZZLE 
Social entrepreneurs are a new type of societal actors in the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA). They apply business approaches to the solution of social problems and show a 
‘neoliberal mindset’ emphasizing entrepreneurial thinking, social innovation, sustainable 
change and self-responsibility (Alvord, Brown, and Letts 2004; Seelos and Mair 2005; Dacin, 
Dacin, and Tracey 2011).1 Although the discussions about them and the international 
recognition of social entrepreneurs in the MENA region came into the focus already in the 
early 2000s, it was only after the Arab uprisings of 2011 that we could observe an 
‘entrepreneurship boom’ all across the MENA region.2 This is not surprising given that social 
entrepreneurship addresses the socio-economic issues that have been raised during the 
uprisings: employability and job creation, economic development, community development 
and poverty reduction of marginalized groups in society (Abdou et al. 2010; Blackwood 2012; 
Bibars 2013; Al-Asmar 2015; Jamali and Lanteri 2015). However, not only societal actors 
embrace social entrepreneurship but also authoritarian elites in business and politics explore 
the possibilities this neoliberal phenomenon offers for the establishment of new social ties and 
the transformation of authoritarian rule, while at the same time, fostering socio-economic 
development (Qayyum 2012; Angeles 2015).3 Taken together, those actors who are engaged 
in social entrepreneurship in a given geographical context – namely social entrepreneurs, 
economic and political elites and international actors – can be conceptualized as a social 
entrepreneurship network (SEN).  
The main research question in this thesis is how SENs contribute to authoritarian renewal. 
The main argument is that SENs are novel and innovative networks that draw on neoliberal 
                                                 
1
 For an in-depth discussion of social entrepreneurship, see Sections 1.2.4 and 1.5. 
2
 In comparison, social entrepreneurs have been supported by Ashoka in India since 1981, in Africa since the 
1990s, in South America since the mid-1990s (except for Brazil, 1986), Eastern Europe since the mid-1990s, 
North America since 2000 (except for Mexico, 1987), in Western Europe since 2005 and plans are being 
developed for East-Asian countries and China only recently (see www.ashoka.org/regions). However, social 
entrepreneurship originates in the USA in the 1980s (Lounsbury and Strang 2009). 
3
 The definition of authoritarianism in this thesis follows Linz’s classic definition: ‘Authoritarian regimes are 
political systems with limited, not responsible, political pluralism: without elaborate and guiding ideology (but 
with distinctive mentalities); without intensive nor extensive political mobilization (except some points in their 
development); and in which a leader (or occasionally a small group) exercise power within formally ill-defined 
limits but actually quite predictable ones.’ (Linz 1964: 297).  
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approaches and ideas, and in so doing combine tried-and-tested patterns of relations with new 
ones. However, this new appearance masks patterns and mechanisms of co-optation of a new 
societal constituency and young elites. Therefore, what we see is a new or different 
“packaging” rather than a new content. To put it in neoliberal terms: these networks are 
“incubating” authoritarianism.  
This thesis approaches the main research question through a social network analysis as an 
actor-centered analysis focusing on actors, the social ties among them and on the resources 
generated as an output of these social ties. It builds on the literatures on neoliberalism, 
authoritarianism, social networks and social entrepreneurship. The literature on authoritarian 
renewal and neoliberalism is predominantly regime-focused and mostly neglects the agency 
and the role of societal actors in these processes. In particular, it focuses on how regimes and 
elites capitalize on neoliberal reforms to maintain authoritarian rule and their privileges (e.g. 
Heydemann 2004; Schlumberger 2007; Guazzone and Pioppi 2009; Hertog, Luciani, and 
Valeri 2013).  Only few studies take into account how societal actors adapt to these changes 
(e.g. Berriane 2010; Ruiz de Elvira and Zintl 2012; Cavatorta 2013; Bergh 2014). Although 
this strand of the literature addresses the restructuring of state-business-society relations and 
the prevalence of divide-and-rule politics and co-optation, the emergence of new mechanisms 
and patterns of co-optation is largely under-theorized (Albrecht and Schlumberger 2004; Bank 
2004; Gandhi and Przeworski 2006; Cavatorta 2007; Ruiz de Elvira and Zintl 2012; Wong 
2012; Gerschewski 2013; Josua 2014). The literature on social entrepreneurship, on the other 
hand, is largely uncritical, supporting the promotion of a ‘utopian’ image of social 
entrepreneurship (for exceptions, see Dey and Steyaert 2010; Dey and Steyaert 2012; Dey 
2014; Dey, Schneider, and Maier 2014; Horn 2013). Furthermore, little research has been 
conducted on social entrepreneurship in authoritarian systems (Mair and Marti 2009; Smith 
and Nemetz 2009; Abdou et al. 2010; Kirby and Ibrahim 2011; Horn 2013; Jamali and Lanteri 
2015) mainly overlooking how it relates to authoritarian renewal and co-optation.  
 
Authoritarian Renewal &Neoliberalism 
Authoritarianism has changed noticeably in the past two decades due to political, economic 
and social changes. Across the Middle East and North Africa, reforms have been undertaken, 
inter alia, of the electoral system, the economy and the avenues of political participation 
(Heydemann 2004; Schlumberger 2007; Lust-Okar and Zerhouni 2008; Gandhi and Lust-
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Okar 2009; Cavatorta 2013). This has led, on one hand, to an overestimation of the 
democratic potential of these transformations, and, on the other hand, to the emergence of a 
body of the literature on authoritarian resilience and renewal4 (Heydemann 2007; see also 
Schlumberger 2007; Valbjorn and Bank 2010).5 The latter line of research interprets changes 
in authoritarian governance strategies as changes within regimes rather than changes of 
regimes.6 The Arab uprisings of 2011 highlight the need to address political, economic and 
social issues once more. Demands for ‘social justice’, ‘dignity’, and ‘freedom’ have been 
raised in the entire MENA region. These demands and underlying issues pose a challenge to 
the regimes in the MENA region in many respects and goes far beyond questions of the well-
being of citizens. The Arab uprisings pinpoint crises of legitimacy, strategies of political rule 
and the relation between the state and society. While these uprisings have led to regime 
changes in some few cases, they have predominantly resulted in changes within regime, 
hence, in authoritarian survival and renewal rather than democratization (Bellin 2012; Rosiny 
2012; Hertog, Luciani, and Valeri 2013; Josua 2014; Valbjorn and Volpi 2014).  
The general contention of the literature on authoritarian renewal states that regimes initiate 
change for the sake of preserving the status quo of authoritarian rule, i.e. they seek ‘to exploit 
rather than resist broad social, political, and economic trends both to blunt the challenges they 
might contain and to generate political resources that bolster regimes’ hold on power’ 
(Heydemann 2007: 5; see also Albrecht and Schlumberger 2004; Bank 2004; Schlumberger 
2007). As a consequence, political and economic liberalization; international linkages; 
technological innovation; the pluralization and diversification of actors are features that define 
the processes of authoritarian renewal (Heydemann 2007; Valbjorn and Bank 2010; Zintl 
2012). The limited and controlled opening goes hand in hand with the inclusion and exclusion 
of political, societal and economic actors and the application of both coercive and facilitative 
strategies of interaction with these actors. Thus, authoritarian renewal aims to reconfigure 
patterns of interaction and domination of the authoritarian regime over society and economy 
(Heydemann 2007). The main focus of this field of research is on the strategies and patterns 
of authoritarian rule, following largely a top-down perspective. In so doing, the response and 
                                                 
4
 Resilience, stability, durability, renewal and upgrading of authoritarianism are often used synonymously. The 
notion ‘authoritarian renewal’, however, has been chosen to account for the changes of authoritarian rule rather 
than an evaluation of its stability.     
5
 For a discussion of the literatures on democratization and on authoritarian resilience with regard to the Arab 
uprisings, see also Teti (2012); Valbjorn (2014) and Cavatorta (2015). 
6
 A regime is defined as ‘the formal and informal organization of the center of political power, and of its 
relations with the broader society. A regime determines who has access to political power, and how those who 
are in power deal with those who are not.’ (Fishman 1990: 428). 
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adaptation of society to these changes largely go unnoticed. As opposed to this perspective, 
Francesco Cavatorta (2013: 2) highlights that authoritarian renewal leads to social 
transformations and the emergence of new societal actors and demands which, in turn, has 
repercussions on the regimes’ behavior and governance strategies. Similarly, Ray Hinnebusch 
(2012) points out that, as a side-effect of the inclusion of new actors in politics, economy and 
civil society, these actors become empowered. Having said this, the ruling regimes seek to 
confine participation and empowerment to circumscribed spaces of socio-economic action 
that do not pose a risk to them (see also Ruiz de Elvira and Zintl 2012; Aarts and Cavatorta 
2013).  
Neoliberalism has proven to play a vital role in processes of authoritarian renewal, in 
particular in the economic and social spheres. Economic and social reforms have been 
implemented that aim, on the one hand, at liberalizing and integrating Arab economies into 
global markets and generating the required human and financial capital to do so, and, on the 
other hand, at securing the continuing control of the elites over these processes (Heydemann 
2004; Cammett 2007; Guazzone and Pioppi 2009; Henry and Springborg 2010; Hertog, 
Luciani, and Valeri 2013). In so doing, Arab regimes seek, above all, to enhance economic 
and social opportunities for regime-loyal economic and societal actors while, at the same 
time, offloading socio-economic responsibilities on to them in order to capitalize on reforms. 
and thus to reinforce authoritarian rule.7 Through the renegotiation processes of these 
arrangements, long-established ties between business elites and regimes have been reaffirmed 
but also new segments of the private sector and civil society co-opted (Bellin 2002; Bank 
2004; Heydemann 2004; Schlumberger 2004; Heydemann 2007; Ruiz de Elvira and Zintl 
2012; Hertog, Luciani, and Valeri 2013; Hinnebusch 2015). The turn of international 
organizations from structural adjustment towards a more inclusive neoliberal approach with a 
strong emphasis on joint action of state, business, civil society and communities in economic 
development and poverty reduction further facilitates this development (Craig and Porter 
2006; Bergh 2014; Isleyen 2014a). Through the neoliberal emphasis on entrepreneurship as a 
profession and a guiding principle of social life societal actors are called upon to become 
active, self-responsible and competitive entrepreneurial citizens. Thus neoliberal ideas and 
practices are not confined to the economic sphere but extent to ‘all spheres of social life and 
its “mainstreaming” into the psychology and social interactions of its subjects’ (Kurki 2011: 
353; see also Gooptu 2009; Weidner 2009).   
                                                 
7
 Similar tendencies to exploit neoliberalism as a strategy for authoritarian renewal can be observed in other 
regions, see, for example Ong (2006); Hefferan, Adkins, and Occhipinti (2009); Springer (2009); Wong (2012).   
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Authoritarian renewal and neoliberalism have resulted in a restructuring of the relation 
between state, business and society. They have opened new opportunities for the co-optation 
of actors by the regimes and ruling elites. Co-optation can be defined as a non-coercive 
strategy to gain or strengthen regime support and acceptance and silence dissent through the 
selective inclusion of strategically relevant actors or social groups (Bertocchi and Spagat 
2001; Gerschewski 2013). Co-optative mechanisms are manifold; they range from resource 
allocation, granting privileges, building clientelistic relations to the inclusion in institutions 
(e.g. parliaments, parties and associations) and the making of policy concessions (Gandhi and 
Przeworski 2006; Cavatorta 2007; Wong 2012; Gerschewski 2013; Josua 2014). Having said 
this, patterns of co-optation are not static. Albrecht and Schlumberger (2004) demonstrate 
how in the wake of shrinking resources for allocation in the late 1980s, co-optative 
mechanisms shifted towards inclusionary mechanisms. Bank (2004), on the other hand, shows 
that the ‘economization’ of participation, public discourses and actions has become a key 
characteristic of co-optation in the early 2000s. While these mechanisms enable the regimes to 
co-opt select actors they also serve to broaden the social base of the regimes. In addition, 
through the ‘economized’ discourse, regimes establish linkages to international actors and 
discourses. In so doing, they enhance their standing abroad and garner international 
(im)material support (see also Ruiz de Elvira and Zintl 2012; Wong 2012).  
It is in the context of authoritarian renewal, inclusionary neoliberalism and socio-economic 
crisis of the past decade that the emergence of social entrepreneurship and its increasing 
popularity in the MENA region is rooted. This being said, the literature on social 
entrepreneurship rarely pays attention to the implications of different political systems for 
social entrepreneurship. The peculiarities of social entrepreneurship in authoritarian systems 
and the political objectives beyond socio-economic development have been overlooked 
(Alvord, Brown, and Letts 2004; Seelos and Mair 2005; Mair and Marti 2009). As a result, 
despite the proliferation of social entrepreneurs in Africa, Latin America, Asia, Africa and the 
MENA region in recent years, we do not know much about social entrepreneurship in 
authoritarian systems (Seelos and Mair 2005; Short, Moss, and Lumpkin 2009; Abdou et al. 
2010; Dacin, Dacin, and Tracey 2011; Kirby and Ibrahim 2011; Dey 2014; Jamali and Lanteri 
2015).  
This thesis seeks to address some of the gaps outlined above. The following section provides 
an in-depth discussion of the different strands of the literature on neoliberalism, authoritarian 
renewal, social networks and social entrepreneurship.  
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1.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
This section elaborates on the different strands of the literature and on their weaknesses with 
regard to the contribution of SENs to authoritarian renewal that have been outlined in the 
previous section. It will situate the research question of this thesis within the literatures on 
neoliberalism, authoritarianism, social networks and social entrepreneurship.  
This section is divided into four parts. The first part reviews the literature on neoliberalism 
and shows that neoliberalism is a multifaceted phenomenon that can be understood as an 
economic, development, social and political project. The second part discusses the literature 
on authoritarian renewal. It lays a focus on patterns of authoritarian renewal with regard to 
neoliberalism and state-business-society relations. Thereafter, the third part focuses on the 
literature on social networks and social ties in the MENA region. The final part, then, shows 
that research on social entrepreneurship in general, and in the MENA region in particular, 
largely neglects the political context in which it is embedded.    
Overall I demonstrate that these four different strands of the literature poorly discuss the state-
business-society relations in the context of authoritarian renewal and neoliberalism.      
 
1.2.1 Neoliberalism Beyond Economic Reform 
Research on neoliberalism has demonstrated that it is a phenomenon that proliferates in the 
economic, political and the social sphere. It promotes innovation, risk taking, competition and 
self-responsible entrepreneurial action as the rationalities guiding actors’ behavior in all 
spheres of social life (Harvey 2005; Kurki 2011). In this thesis, I argue that the approaches to 
neoliberalism neglect the complex interplay of different types of actors, relations and 
contexts. Therefore, the conceptualization of neoliberalism this thesis proposes, takes 
neoliberalism as a project one step further. Neoliberalism is not merely an economic, a 
development or a socio-political project that promotes market rationalities in all spheres of 
social life but it encompasses all these different facets at the same time. It interlinks 
economic, development and socio-political issues, spheres and actors in a given spatial and 
temporal context. It is, thus, embedded in particular contexts in which it manifests as a result 
of the interaction of a universal market rationality and local structures. 
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Neoliberalism as an Economic and a Development Project 
This section argues that despite the turn towards more ‘inclusive’ neoliberal approaches since 
the late 1990s, research on societal actors and how they adapt to these changes has been 
limited; it mostly consists in single case studies highlighting the shortcomings of this 
approach. Thus, a careful analysis that studies societal actors’ adaptations to ‘inclusive’ 
neoliberal approaches is highly warranted.   
Neoliberalism has a plethora of, often contradictory, facets. The early 1960s were marked by 
vivid discussions about theoretical and philosophical reflections on neoliberalism, and 
different schools of thought developed at universities in the USA and Europe (see, inter alia, 
Hayek 1960; Friedman 1960; Eucken 1990). The 1970s and the 1980s brought about the 
transformation and adoption of neoliberal ideas by governments, policy-makers and 
developmental agencies in addressing market reforms and economic development on a global 
scale (Teichman 2001; Knight 2001; Harvey 2005)8. In this period, neoliberalism was mainly 
understood as a package of economic reform policies including, inter alia, liberalization, 
privatization, deregulation and public spending cuts, and have been carried out in developed 
and developing countries alike (Craig and Porter 2006; Ward and England 2007; Boas and 
Gans-Morse 2009). They have been accompanied by a transfer of ownership and 
responsibilities/functions from the state to private actors. Among the most known programs 
associated with the understanding of neoliberalism as an economic project are the Structural 
Adjustment Policies (SAPs) of the 1980s and the Washington Consensus (1989)9, which have 
been implemented in a great number of countries in South America, Africa, the Middle East, 
Asia and Europe since then. These programs aimed to achieve economic growth, development 
and integration into the global market but largely disregard the particular political, economic 
and social context of the respective country (Williamson 1990a; Tetzlaff 1996; Glassman and 
Carmody 2001; Ward and England 2007). Furthermore, the conviction prevailed that through 
the facilitation of economic growth and development, ultimately, a transition to democracy 
would follow, or would be facilitated later on. A plethora of studies has addressed the link 
                                                 
8
 For a detailed overview from the development of the first reflections on neoliberalism in the 1920s to the 
change in the application of the term in the 1960s and the 1980s and until today, see Harvey (2005); Boas and 
Gans-Morse (2009); Mirowski and Plehwe (2009); Peck (2010). 
9
 The Washington Consensus is a list of ten policy prescriptions for the economic development of Latin America 
presented by the economist John Williamson at a conference in Washington, in 1989. It includes inter alia policy 
prescriptions on fiscal discipline, public expenditure, trade liberalization, privatization and deregulation. 
Although Williamson distances himself from equating the consensus with neoliberalism, both terms are 
commonly used interchangeably. For further details and critical comments, see Williamson (1990b), (2004); 
Naim (2000); Craig and Porter (2006); Peck (2010).   
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between economic development and political transformation in many world regions since 
then. Many display a similar normative approach as the research on civil society and 
transition. However, some of these studies offer a more nuanced and critical view not only on 
the dynamics of economic reform, but also on the role of the economy in political 
transformation (see e.g. Rueschemeyer, Huber, and Stephens 1992; Maxfield and Schneider 
1997; Schneider 2004; Handley 2008; Brown 2009; Hertog, Luciani, and Valeri 2013).10  
Neoliberalism also refers to a development strategy that reaches beyond the economy. This 
conceptualization of neoliberalism has become even more widespread in the late 1990s and 
the 2000s. By the mid-1990s, international financial institutions (IFIs), e.g., the World Bank 
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), broadened their focus beyond economic growth 
and uniformly-applied policy prescriptions. They shifted emphasis on direct poverty reduction 
programs and on the ownership of the respective country in reform and development 
processes. Not only economic growth but also poverty reduction measures have been 
identified as crucial factors for the success of development and need to be addressed 
simultaneously. This change in the approach has been labeled as the Post-Washington 
Consensus, with the Comprehensive Development Framework and Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Papers (PRSPs) as examples of programs (Pender 2001; Klugman 2002; Craig and 
Porter 2006; Ruckert 2006; Joseph 2010a; Lauermann and Davidson 2013). This has resulted, 
on paper, in the consideration of the particular context in the respective country as well as a 
diversification of actors and programs. The heretofore top-down and one-size-fits-all 
approach has now been countered with bottom-up elements, in order to initiate ‘joined-up’ 
engagement of the key stakeholders in the economy, state and society in reform processes, 
and to render the neoliberal project more ‘inclusive’. This has resulted in a shift in discourse 
and has been accompanied by the consideration of issues such as institution building, good 
governance, community, welfare and urban order in developing countries, Europe and North 
America alike (Craig and Porter 2006: 63-94; see also Peck and Tickel 2002; Schlumberger 
2008; Mills and McCreary 2013; Carroll and Jarvis 2015). Craig and Porter (2006) critically 
discuss the change towards more inclusive strategies in detail, nevertheless, they focus on the 
inclusion of local governments and the interplay between those and IFIs in developing and 
implementing poverty reduction strategies. In their presentation of the findings on inclusive 
neoliberalism in four country studies (Vietnam, Uganda, Pakistan and New Zealand), they 
                                                 
10
 See also section two of this literature review on authoritarian renewal (1.2.2). 
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repeatedly emphasize the inclusion of societal actors, yet they don’t offer an in-depth 
investigation of these.  
 Having said that, multiple studies demonstrate that ‘inclusive’ neoliberalism is less 
participative and locally-driven in practice than on paper and does not result, for the most 
part, in the anticipated goals of inclusion, empowerment and development (see, e.g., Li 2007; 
Lazarus 2008; Ruckert 2009; Golooba-Mutebi and Hickey 2010; Klak et al. 2011). Many 
studies conclude that ‘inclusive’ neoliberal practices go well together with depolitization, a 
strengthening of authoritarian patterns and clientelistic relations and the selective inclusion of 
actors (Craig and Porter 2006; Hickey 2010; Klak et al. 2011; Bergh 2012a; Carroll and Jarvis 
2015). Thus, while socio-economic problems and the solution to them are framed differently 
they do not signify a substantial departure from earlier neoliberal approaches. This 
perspective is also reflected in the existing research on societal actors, poverty reduction and 
neoliberalism (see inter alia Larner and Craig 2005; England and Ward 2007; Hefferan, 
Adkins, and Occhipinti 2009; Berriane 2010; Ismail 2011; Klak et al. 2011; Springer 2011; 
Menza 2012a; Bergh 2014).11 Although these studies address societal actors and their 
response and adaptation to neoliberalism in specific spatial and temporal contexts, they 
largely focus on single case studies. They merely engage in comparisons on a broader basis.   
In addition to the conceptualizations of neoliberalism as a package of economic reform 
policies, or as a development strategy, neoliberalism also includes the re-organization of the 
market, state and society and the role of different actors in them. Hence, neoliberalism can 
also be understood as a state form. As opposed to the association of neoliberalism with the 
retreat of the state (‘roll-back’) in the 1980s, scholars have increasingly concluded that a 
change in the role of the state, its visibility and patterns of interaction has taken place (‘roll-
out’) but this does not necessarily mean that it plays a diminished role (Peck and Tickel 2002; 
Hibou 2004; Ward and England 2007; Peck 2010; Carroll 2012). In the words of Peck and 
Tickel ‘[…] the neoliberal project itself gradually metamorphosed into more socially 
interventionist and ameliorative forms’ (2002: 388). Accordingly, neoliberalism has 
increasingly been considered as a phenomenon present in most aspects of social life (Larner 
2000; England and Ward 2007; Centeno and Cohen 2012). Therefore, it can be argued that 
neoliberalism is not only an economic and a development project but also a socio-political 
project.  
                                                 
11
 See also the special issue ‘The Government of Chronic Poverty’ in the Journal of Development Studies (47: 7, 
2010) with contributions inter alia by Golooba-Mutebi and Hickey, Green, Hickey, Masaki  and Mosse . 
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Neoliberalism as a Socio-Political Project 
The different perspectives and approaches scholars have chosen when studying neoliberalism 
show that neoliberalism cannot be reduced to a political-economic project but also has to be 
understood as a socio-political project. Research on neoliberalism as a socio-political project 
increasingly looks beyond political-economic questions at the effects of neoliberalism on 
socio-political changes. While these studies illustrate important aspects of neoliberalism as a 
socio-political project, they nevertheless neglect the perspective on societal actors, i.e., how 
these actors adapt to neoliberalism and interact with the state, economy and international 
actors. The analysis of SENs as neoliberal networks including these different actors offers a 
consistent approach to delineate such adaptations and interactions.  
Marxist and Foucauldian approaches to neoliberalism explicitly focus on the restructuring of 
social relations and ultimately power in the economy, politics and society. Harvey (2005; 
2006), one of the most renown representatives of the Marxist reading of neoliberalism, 
particularly stresses that neoliberalism serves above all the restoration of class power of the 
ruling elites and the formation of a capitalist class at the expense of the lower classes. Harvey 
describes this as a ‘process of accumulation of dispossession’ (Harvey 2006: 148-155). In this 
narrative, neoliberalism is construed as an ideology aiming at the reconfiguration of power 
relations and thus of the interaction of state, business and society. Studies that conceptualize 
neoliberalism as ideology address class or elite struggles on the national, regional and 
international level and put a strong emphasis on (discursive) struggles over domination and 
hegemony (e.g. Duménil and Lévy 2001; Robinson 2004; Saad-Filho and Johnston 2005; 
Plehwe, Walpen, and Neunhöffer 2006; Ruckert 2007; Bogaert 2011b; Selwy and Miyamura 
2014). Mueller (2011), for example, examines the IMF’s role as a proponent of neoliberalism 
and its hegemony. She states that an important aspect is the co-optation of elites by 
international actors and the creation of a transnational class who promotes and implements 
neoliberal ideas. Similarly, research on development assistance finds that international actors 
such as the EU promote neoliberalism through its programs and policies towards developing 
countries and new member states (e.g. Veltmeyer and Petras 2005; Bohle 2006). These studies 
enable a profound insight into the promotion of neoliberal ideas by international actors; yet, 
they analyze only selected cases. Dey (2010; 2014) is among the few scholars critically 
analyzing neoliberalism and social entrepreneurship.12 In their study on social 
                                                 
12
 For further elaboration on the state of social entrepreneurship research and neoliberalism, see section four of 
this literature review (1.2.4). 
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entrepreneurship in Austria, Dey et al. (2014) argue that Austrian support organizations 
‘hegemonize’ social entrepreneurship and create a utopia of social change. The authors 
differentiate three ‘fantasies’ that have been created: the fantasy of inclusiveness, of social 
change and of pragmatic solutions (Dey, Schneider, and Maier 2014: 15). While the authors 
present a critical in-depth case study of social entrepreneurship in Austria, there is a lack of 
case studies on international actors who support (social) entrepreneurship such as the WEF, 
Ashoka and the Schwab Foundation. 
Another strand of the literature, by contrast, concentrates on those who are disadvantaged or 
dispossessed by these class struggles, e.g., lower classes, workers and artists. While some of 
the literature on this aspect depicts the dispossessed as rather passive and losers in these 
struggles, others highlight the resistance of the disposed against the elites (e.g. Boito 2007; 
Spronk and Webber 2007; Walker, Kathy Le Mons 2008; Adduci 2009; Angelis 2010). Only 
few scholars analyze to what extent and how societal actors adapt to and exploit neoliberalism 
as a strategy to overcome the challenges they face (e.g. Bieler 2007; Changfoot 2007). 
Changfoot (2007) and Bieler (2007) make a strong case for the complex, multifaceted and 
overlapping processes of adaptation and resistance to neoliberalism. Changfoot highlights 
how cultural workers in Canada adopt neoliberal practices and discourses on citizenship in 
order to gain visibility and funding. In so doing, they are able to claim space and pursue their 
goals instead of being isolated and marginalized. Bieler, on the other, demonstrates that 
European trade unions follow a dual strategy of participation and contestation. They accept 
the general framework of the EU but use their position to strongly counteract neoliberal 
restructuring. Although these studies offer a starting point for research on how societal actors 
not first and foremost oppose neoliberalism but also participate in the promotion of neoliberal 
practices and discourses, further research is necessary. In particular the interaction among 
different actors and cases from authoritarian regimes are crucial but under-researched.   
Research on neoliberalism that is inspired by Foucault’s concept of governmentality, by 
contrast, defines neoliberalism as ‘a set of governmental practices’ (Weidner 2009) that are 
not confined to the political or economic sphere but that determine social conduct. Actors are 
a central aspect in this conceptualization of neoliberalism. Joseph stresses that an “extension 
of the norms and values of the market to other areas of social life, as reflected in the 
widespread application of such terms as competition, initiative, risk-taking and prudence 
across various social domains” takes place (Joseph 2010b: 228). In the same vein, Kurki 
states that neoliberal ideas and practices are not confined to the economic sphere but extend to 
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‘all spheres of social life and its “mainstreaming” into the psychology and social interactions 
of its subjects.’ (Kurki 2011: 353; see also Ferguson and Gupta 2002; Lemke 2007; Gooptu 
2009). According to this, active, self-responsible, entrepreneurial actors take on the 
responsibility for their own actions and well-being, and constitute the (human) capital 
neoliberalism builds on. Even more, actors are involved in the production and promotion of 
neoliberalism (Katz 2005; Ward and England 2007; Ferguson 2009; Rose and Miller 2010; 
Cotoi 2011; Gershon 2011; Gane 2012). Inherent in this conceptualization of neoliberalism is 
an understanding of power that sharply contrasts with Marxist conceptualizations of 
neoliberalism. In contrast to the perception of power relations as domination of one actor over 
another, power in neoliberal governmentality approaches is productive, dispersed and 
relational. Power is indirectly at work through rationalities and techniques, such as the 
promotion of self-responsible, entrepreneurial actor that guide thinking and behavior 
(Foucault 1983; Dean 2008; Rose and Miller 2010; Springer 2012).  
A similar perspective is also reflected in the programs and discourses on poverty reduction, 
empowerment and development (see also Li 2007; Ruckert 2009; Colvin, Robins, and 
Leavens 2010; Joseph 2010a; Bogaert 2011b). Studies on the European Union (EU) for 
example address the neoliberal ideas inherent in the EU’s development discourse, policies and 
programs. Isleyen, for instance, underscores that not only policies and discourses but also the 
selection of partners and project evaluation schemes follow along the idea of neoliberal 
governmentality. Accordingly, local partners have to demonstrate their ability to act as 
entrepreneurial actors who further apply the EU’s evaluation schemes that entail quantifiable 
indicators, benchmarks and impact measurement (Isleyen 2014; see also Kurki 2011; Tagma, 
Kalaycioglu, and Akcali 2013). Yet, these authors do not offer insights into how local actors 
adapt to these new practices and patterns of interaction; their analyses remain focused on the 
EU and its policies instead of on entrepreneurial actors.        
 
The Contextual Embeddedness of Neoliberal Projects 
It has become apparent in the sections above that studies increasingly scrutinize the variety of 
neoliberal forms of appearance and practices that develop in specific temporal and spatial 
contexts and networks. While the literature underlines the embeddedness of neoliberalism in 
existing structures and practices, it offers only limited insight into the networks among actors 
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beyond the elite-level and how these actors adapt to neoliberalism as a strategy to alter their 
position and relation to other actors.  
Brenner and Theodore devote most of their research to the contextual embeddedness of 
neoliberal projects and introduce the notion of ‘actually existing neoliberalism’. According to 
that notion, a contested interaction of neoliberal practices with the pre-existing local 
landscape takes place (Brenner and Theodore 2002: 361, 368). Thus, neoliberalism 
 […] enforces market rule over an ever wider range of social relations throughout the 
world economy […]. Accordingly, the notion of actually existing neoliberalism is 
intended not only to encompass the immediate impact of neoliberal political 
programs upon social, political, and economic relations, but also to characterize their 
more “subversive” role in transforming the broad geoeconomic and geopolitical 
fields within which struggles over the future shape of capitalist social relations are 
currently being fought at a range of spatial scales (Rhodes 1995). […] actually 
existing neoliberalism is intended to illuminate the complex, contested ways in which 
neoliberal restructuring strategies interact with pre-existing uses of space, 
institutional configurations, and constellations of sociopolitical power. (Brenner and 
Theodore 2002: 361)  
A similar pattern of argument is followed by Peck and Tickel in their work on ‘local 
neoliberalisms’ and the adaptive and transformative character of neoliberalism (2002; 2007).13 
Both approaches consider the concept of ‘creative destruction’ as central to understand 
neoliberalism. Moments of destruction and moments of creation can be distinguished and 
shown how they are interlinked with each other and with the local landscapes they are part of. 
When studying a case of neoliberalism in a specific temporal or spatial context, we can, thus, 
assume to see particular local phenomena, and also can identify broader patterns and general 
features (Peck and Tickel 2002: 392f.). This has implications for the social and economic 
restructuring in a given context, including the landscape of actors, their relative position and 
patterns of interaction.  
In her study on gender and economic competitiveness in Malaysia, Elias shows that in 
Malaysia, women are depicted as ‘productive market actors driving economic success’, 
resources and entrepreneurs with ‘productive capacity’ on the government’s ‘market-building 
agenda’. At the same time, traditional and religious values about the social role of women and 
the family are integrated into the agenda that turn the family into ‘a site for the (re)production 
of good market-citizens’ (Elias 2015: 347f.). Thus, the neoliberal notion of the entrepreneurial 
                                                 
13
 Brenner, Theodore, Peck and Tickel have extensively published together on neoliberal urbanism and spatial 
transformation (Brenner and Theodore ([Antipode Special Edition 34 (2002)] 2002); Brenner and Theodore 
(2005); Peck and Tickel (2007); Peck, Theodore, and Brenner (2009); Brenner, Peck, and Theodore (2010); 
Theodore and Peck (2011); Brenner, Peck, and Theodore (2011); Peck and Theodore (2012)). 
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actor merges here with pre-existing understandings of women, family and religion. Rankin 
and Shakya (2007), on the other hand, show that, in the case of micro-finance in Nepal, 
neoliberal restructuring in rural areas is not simply embedded in the local context. 
Asymmetrical and hierarchical networks of donors, state representatives, associations and 
recipients of micro-finance have engaged at the same time in both the fostering of neoliberal 
hegemony, and critical, alternative, and sometimes also contentious action. Holmes (2011) 
also looks at the role of networks, but focuses on transnational networks. He considers 
transnational elite networks as 
a well-connected and networked elite shaping […] discourses and practices. It draws 
its membership from across NGOs, states, corporations, science, and the media and it 
works through personal contacts. (Holmes 2011: 1) 
Holmes underlines the importance of personal ties and the interaction of elite actors from 
diverse backgrounds for the dissemination and domination of neoliberal projects on a 
transnational scale. Nevertheless, he neglects the specific backgrounds of these actors in the 
network and does not consider local societal actors. Similarly, Carroll and Carson (2006) 
conduct an analysis of the global network of corporations with certain policy groups such as 
the WEF, the International Chamber of Commerce, and the World Business Council for 
Sustainable Development. They show how, through interlocking directorates, a global elite 
network has formed, which is marked by a neoliberal ‘moving elite consensus’ on global 
issues that these actors promote (Carroll and Carson 2006: 67). These studies reveal the 
significance of global networks and how these networks promote neoliberalism as an 
economic, a development and a socio-political project. Although the authors acknowledge that 
different views exist, the literature on global neoliberal networks does not account for the 
contextual embeddedness of neoliberalism. Leitner and Sheppard (2002), by contrast, 
emphasize the discrepancy between neoliberal network discourses and ‘really existing 
networks’. This is due to the local embeddedness of networks in pre-existing structures of 
power, hierarchies and uneven development and the inequality among actors, institutions and 
cities within networks. In a case study of EU-financed interurban networks, the authors show 
how interurban networks at the same time disseminate neoliberalism and contentious action 
and resistance to neoliberalism (on networked cities see also Das 2015). In the same vein, 
England and Ward state that we have to look beyond elite networks and the ‘homo 
davosiensis’ at networks of ‘ideas, knowledge, technology, trade, money, people, policies, and 
programs’ (Ward and England 2007: 17) and the interest of the actors engaged in networks in 
different places and contexts.   
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Furthermore, the perspectives outlined above relate to the debate on neoliberalism’s crisis and 
death (in particular since 2008) versus its reconfiguration and successful survival (Brand and 
Sekler 2009; Birch and Mykhnenko 2010; Brenner, Peck, and Theodore 2010; Cahill 2011; 
Crouch 2011; Duménil and Lévy 2011; Aalbers 2013; Springer 2015). With the exception of 
those following the idea of ‘post-neoliberalism’ (see e.g. Challies and Murray 2008; Brand 
and Sekler 2009), there seems to be a consensus that neoliberal practices continue to prevail. 
A mix of tried-and-tested and new elements constitutes the approach to solving the crisis, i.e. 
neoliberal practices are applied to the solution of the neoliberal crisis. Thus, neoliberalism 
survives with a new livery. As has been outlined in the introduction and will be elaborated 
further in the last part of this literature review, social entrepreneurship is a case of 
neoliberalism with a new livery. Although social entrepreneurship seeks to address those 
socio-economic issues that have been caused by neoliberalism, it promoted at the same time 
neoliberal ideas and practices as the solution to these issues.  
 
1.2.2 Authoritarian Renewal 
This part reviews the literature on authoritarian renewal. After discussing strategies and 
patterns of authoritarian renewal, this section lays a focus on patterns of authoritarian renewal 
(i) in terms of state-business-society relations, and (ii) in terms of neoliberalism. This order, 
first the discussion of the seemingly narrower section and then the discussion of the broader 
one, is due to the fact that the former plays a key role in the interplay of neoliberalism and 
authoritarian renewal. Having said this, research on authoritarianism and authoritarian 
renewal takes on predominantly a top-down perspective and overlooks the adaption and the 
role of societal actors.  
 
Strategies & Patterns of Authoritarian Renewal 
Even though studies addressing the processes of authoritarian renewal stress important and 
interlinking areas in which renewal takes place, they do not offer a comprehensive framework 
for the analysis. Moreover, with few exceptions, they largely follow a top-down perspective 
on authoritarian renewal focusing on the regime-side. In so doing, the response and the 
adaptation of society to these changes have been neglected and reduced to acceptance versus 
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opposition to the incumbent regime (for exceptions see Pierret and Kjetil 2009; Ruiz de Elvira 
and Zintl 2012; Haugbølle and Cavatorta 2012; Cavatorta 2013; Teets 2014; Werenfels 2014). 
The study of authoritarianism has experienced several shifts in the last two decades. In the 
course of the “third wave” of democratization in Latin America and Eastern Europe, political 
and economic reforms in authoritarian countries were enthusiastically welcomed as signs for 
political change, i.e. the transition to democracy (Carothers 2002; Anderson 2006). Across the 
MENA region, reforms of key institutions (inter alia of the electoral system, the economy and 
avenues of political participation) have been undertaken. This has led, on the one part, to an 
overestimation of the democratic potential of these changes, and, on the other part, to the 
emergence of a body of studies on authoritarian durability. 14 As opposed to focusing on why 
democratic regimes are absent, these studies look at the factors that can explain the nature and 
durability of authoritarianism. Those studies cover a wide range of issues including political, 
economic, social and cultural factors focusing, inter alia, on institutions, regime types, 
legitimacy and repression (Brumberg 2002; Albrecht and Schlumberger 2004; Bellin 2004; 
Pripstein Posusney 2005; Hinnebusch 2006; Gandhi and Przeworski 2007; King 2007; 
Schlumberger 2007; Valbjorn and Bank 2010).15  
Durability does not imply that authoritarian regimes do not change; the opposite holds true. 
Research has shown that authoritarian regimes actively engage in reformism to secure 
survival. Thus, authoritarian renewal, or in the words of Heydemann ((2007) ‘authoritarian 
upgrading’, takes place.16 
Authoritarian upgrading consists […] not in shutting down and closing off Arab 
societies from globalization and other forces of political, economic and social 
change. Nor is it based simply on the willingness of Arab governments to repress 
their opponents. […] authoritarian upgrading involves reconfiguring authoritarian 
governance to accommodate and manage changing political, economic, and social 
conditions. (Heydemann 2007: 1) 
In this endeavor, authoritarianism  
[…] combines tried-and-true strategies of the past – coercion, surveillance, 
patronage, corruption, and personalism – with innovations that reflect the 
                                                 
14
 Several terms are used, often synonymously, in the literature for this phenomenon: durability, persistence, 
resilience, stability, survival.  
15
 An in-depth discussion of these different issues is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
16
 Contrary to Heydemann’s definition of these processes as ‘authoritarian upgrading’ the notion ‘authoritarian 
renewal’ has been chosen to account for the changes in the characteristics of authoritarianism without implying 
necessarily an improvement compared to previous ones.     
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determination of authoritarian élites to respond aggressively to the triple threat of 
globalization, markets, and democratization. (Heydemann 2007: 3) 
From this perspective, authoritarian regimes constantly undergo processes of adaptation, 
innovation and renewal, not only to fend off threats but also to exploit new opportunities that 
emerge on the local and international level. In particular, they convert neoliberal approaches 
and calls for democratization into political resources. The Post-Washington Consensus with 
its emphasis on good governance, poverty reduction and the engagement of society in reform 
processes can be considered such an opportunity. It provides, among others, access to 
international resources and support; facilitates new forms of social ties and initiatives and 
introduces new discourses regimes can capitalize on. Innovative and ‘tried-and-true’ coercive 
and facilitative strategies aim at reinforcing patterns of domination of the authoritarian regime 
over society (Bank 2004; Heydemann 2007; Baylouny 2008; Schlumberger 2008; Hinnebusch 
2012b; Tsourapas 2013). Notwithstanding the variance concerning the strategies, speed and 
extent of processes of authoritarian renewal across different authoritarian regimes, 
Heydemann identifies five patterns that characterize these processes:  
1. Appropriating and containing civil societies; 2. Managing political contestation; 3. 
Capturing the benefits of selective economic reforms; 4. Controlling new 
communications technologies; 5. Diversifying international linkages. (Heydemann 
2007: 5) 
In the same vein, Albrecht and Schlumberger (2004) identify five core strategies of regime 
adaptation with regards to structures, procedures and the composition of socio-economic 
elites: Structures of legitimacy and strategies of legitimation; elite change; ‘imitative’ 
institution building; co-optation; external influences. Contrary to Heydemann who ascribes 
authoritarian renewal a responsive, unplanned and contextual nature (Heydemann 2007: 1, 
27), Albrecht and Schlumberger explicitly refer to a pool of (often interlinked) flexible 
strategies that vary in timing, scope and degree across regimes (Albrecht and Schlumberger 
2004: 375f., 385f.).17    
Authoritarian renewal also takes place in authoritarian regimes in other world regions such as 
South East Asia and Africa (e.g. Tripp 2004; Springer 2009; Heilmann 2010; Levitsky and 
Way 2010; Wong 2012; Teets 2014). Yet, the literature on authoritarian durability and renewal 
is dominated by research on the MENA region. In particular the Arab uprisings of 2011 have 
                                                 
17
 For similar accounts and elaborations on the patterns and strategies described, see also Bank (2004); 
Heydemann (2004a); Lust-Okar and Zerhouni (2008); Pierret and Kjetil (2009); Albrecht (2010); Valbjorn and 
Bank (2010); Cavatorta and Haugbølle (2012). 
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resulted in a renewed debate among scholars on the explanatory power and shortcomings of 
theories on authoritarianism and democratization, and on the way we study politics in the 
MENA region more broadly (e.g. Bellin 2012; Brynen et al. 2012; Teti 2012; Stepan and Linz 
2013; Diamond and Plattner 2014; Valbjorn and Volpi 2014; Cavatorta 2015). Despite the 
implications of these uprisings for the study of authoritarian rule, with few exceptions (inter 
alia Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, Libya and Yemen) changes have been limited. Therefore, it is even 
more crucial to understand the patterns and processes of authoritarian renewal and how 
regimes and society manoeuvre (Hinnebusch 2012b; Zintl 2012).  
 
Authoritarian Renewal, Neoliberalism & the State- Business-Society Triangle in the 
Middle East & North Africa 
This section shows that an emerging body of research that overcomes the predominant top-
down perspective on state-society-business relations in authoritarian regimes has emerged. It 
takes account of the impact of neoliberalism on the economy, politics and society.   
Notwithstanding the contribution of this literature, it has focused, for the most part, either on 
state-business or state-society relations overlooking the interaction of all three of them. Thus, 
more work is necessary to reveal the different patterns of interactions among these actors and 
to relate them to the broader context of authoritarian renewal and neoliberalism.  
State-society relations are predominantly described as being dichotomous, either marked by 
confrontation and coercion, or by cooperation and co-optation18 neglecting the responses and 
patterns of interaction in-between these extremes. This is due to the fact that, from a regime-
centered perspective, the main area of inquiry is how regimes secure their survival, i.e. gain 
legitimacy and other political resources and manage society (e.g. Albrecht and Schlumberger 
2004; Bank 2004; Josua 2014). From a society-centered perspective, however, the question 
arises as to how societal actors operate in authoritarian contexts. Arts and Cavatorta for 
instance state that we have to challenge the prevailing assumptions on the nature and the role 
of societal actors and analyze how these actors react to processes of authoritarian renewal and 
to what extent they facilitate authoritarian renewal (Aarts and Cavatorta 2013: 6-11). 
                                                 
18
 Co-optation can be defined as a non-coercive strategy to gain or strengthen regime support and acceptance and 
to silence dissent through the selective inclusion of strategically relevant actors or social groups (Bertocchi and 
Spagat 2001; Gerschewski 2013; Josua 2014). For further elaboration, see also part three of this review on social 
networks (1.2.3).  
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Furthermore, Cavatorta (2013) highlights that authoritarian renewal leads to social 
transformations and the emergence of new societal actors and demands which, in turn, has 
repercussions on the regimes’ behavior and governance strategies. Similarly, Hinnebusch 
(2012a) points out that, as a side-effect of the inclusion of new actors in politics, economy and 
civil society, these actors become empowered. The ruling regimes seek to confine 
participation and empowerment to circumscribed spaces of socio-economic action that do not 
pose a risk to them. Yet, authoritarian renewal may also produce unintended outcomes and 
challenges to the regime (see also Haugbølle and Cavatorta 2012; Ruiz de Elvira and Zintl 
2012). Thus, state-society relations in authoritarian regimes are much more complex and 
nuanced than often portrayed and our understanding of these relations is still very limited.   
 Having said that, there is an emerging literature on authoritarian renewal and societal actors 
that gives more nuanced insights into state-society dynamics in authoritarian regimes (see e.g. 
Foster 2001; Heydemann 2004a; Perinova 2005; Jamal 2007; Pratt 2007; Cavatorta and 
Dalmasso 2009; Ziegler 2010; Giersdorf and Croissant 2011; Haddad 2012; Ruiz de Elvira 
and Zintl 2012; Lewis 2013; Teets 2014). With regard to research on formal actors several key 
aspects can be identified that are commonly addressed. First, a plethora of studies takes 
account of the restructuring of state-society-business interaction that has taken place in the 
past two decades. These studies inquire into the nature of these interactions and contribute to a 
refined understanding of cooperation, co-optation and confrontation under authoritarianism 
(Foster 2001; Gandhi and Przeworski 2006; Pierret and Kjetil 2009; Cavatorta 2013; Lewis 
2013; Teets 2014). Pierret and Selvik (2009) focus on the agency of actors and show that 
interdependencies and mutual cooperation between state and society exist. They illustrate that 
in the case of the Syrian Zayd movement and the Assad regime, neither co-optation nor 
repression characterizes the relation between the regime and Zayd. Zayd, as a societal actor 
with a strong social base and resources, does not openly oppose the regime but lends it 
passive support and in so doing broadens its own room for manoeuvre. The regime tolerates 
this movement due to its dependency on the private welfare Zayd provides to the Syrian 
society (Pierret and Kjetil 2009). Albrecht and Schlumberger explain this move towards 
‘inclusionary co-optation’ and the change of patterns of co-optation with the shrinking of 
financial resources available for co-optation since the late 1980s. As a consequence of the lack 
of allocative capabilities, regimes have engaged for example in ‘imitative institution building’ 
which resulted inter alia in a proliferation of associations including government-organized 
ones (GONGOs) (Albrecht and Schlumberger 2004: 382f.; see also Carapico 2000; 
Heydemann 2007; Kawakibi 2013; Lewis 2013). Foster (2001), on the other hand, 
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demonstrates that societal actors do not necessarily resent but seek to be co-opted, and thus, 
challenges the negative connotation associated with co-optation and emphasizes the 
opportunities that emanate from co-optation. Although this means a loss of autonomy and 
more constraints for societal actors, it nevertheless facilitates goal attainment and access to 
new networks and benefits which may outweigh the constraints (Foster 2001: 85; see also 
Cavatorta 2007: 191; Clark 2013).  
In addition to exercising control over co-optees, states can also foster local and social 
development through engaging with societal actors and transferring tasks to them (Foster 
2001: 89-97; see also Hibou 2005; Teets 2014). De Elvira and Zintl (2012) term this 
phenomenon ‘outsourcing of social responsibility’ in their study on societal and business 
actors in Syria. These actors bear an increasing share of the costs and responsibility for the 
implementation of social policies, which also results in a strengthening of the sectors of 
engagement related to socio-economic issues (e.g. development, education and employment) 
and the emergence of new societal and business constituencies. Furthermore, the boundaries 
between societal and business actors and spheres are blurring in the MENA region (and 
beyond). Business actors set up associations, provide financial resources through corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) schemes and partner with societal actors (Jamali and Sidani 2012; 
Hertog 2013; Schroeder 2013; Selvik 2013; Eweje 2014). How societal actors adapt an 
entrepreneurial mindset and borrow business approaches to develop their organizations and 
programs, by contrast, is under-studied, and the literature on this topic is scarce as discussed 
above. Furthermore, the ‘state-society-business triangle’ is mainly neglected and research 
focuses on either state-society or state-business relations (Bendell 2000; Gold 2004; Yaziji 
and Doh 2009; Bakker 2012; Sater 2002). There are several exceptional cases. Zintl’s 
analyzes foreign-educated Syrian entrepreneurs and their societal and political actions as part 
of the authoritarian renewal of the Syrian regime (Zintl 2012; Zintl 2013). Parker and 
Debruyne (2012), on the other hand, offer insights into private-led development in Jordan and 
show how state, business and societal engagement can overlap and render it difficult to clearly 
draw the boundaries between them.  
 
Authoritarian Renewal & Neoliberalism 
This section demonstrates that neoliberalism manifests in and impacts on processes of 
authoritarian renewal in the economy, politics and society. The restructuring of state-business 
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and state-society relations constitutes an inherent component in these processes; however, 
most studies pay only minor attention to the agency and role of societal actors.     
Research on neoliberalism in authoritarian systems in the MENA region dates back to the late 
1980s and the early 1990s when neoliberal reforms were first implemented in the region. 
Since then, a plethora of studies has addressed neoliberalism that is understood as policy 
reforms, development strategies, an ideology, a state form and governmentality. Whereas 
earlier studies linked questions of economic reforms to a political change towards 
democratization, recent research enquires into neoliberalism and authoritarian renewal.  
The literature of the late 1980s and the early 1990s mainly conceptualized neoliberalism as 
economic policy reforms and a development strategy. Studies addressed questions of 
economic crises in the MENA region and aimed at assessing the dynamics of reforms. These 
studies are predominantly descriptive single case and single issue studies (e.g. Harik and 
Sullivan 1992; Niblock and Murphy 1993; Piro 1998). Since the early 2000s, the focus has 
shifted towards the deficiencies of economic reforms and towards reforms without 
democratization. The literature has become more critical and, similar to the turn in research on 
politics in the MENA region, increasingly links questions of neoliberalism to authoritarian 
durability (Mitchell 1999; Mitchell 2002; Kienle 2001; Kienle 2003; Bellin 2002; 
Schlumberger 2004; Schlumberger 2008; Harrigan, El-Said, and Wang 2006; Richards and 
Waterbury 2008; Saif and Choucair 2010).  
Neoliberalism has proven to play a vital role in processes of authoritarian renewal, in 
particular in the economic and social spheres.19 Economic and social reforms have been 
implemented that, on the one hand, aim at liberalizing and integrating Arab economies into 
global markets and generating the required human and financial capital to do so, and on the 
other hand, aim at securing the continuing control of the regime elites over these processes 
(Heydemann 2004a; Cammett 2007; Guazzone and Pioppi 2009; Henry and Springborg 2010; 
Hertog, Luciani, and Valeri 2013).20 In so doing, Arab regimes seek, above all, to generate 
new resources and to enhance economic and social opportunities for regime-loyal economic 
and societal actors, while at the same time, offloading socio-economic responsibilities on to 
them in order to capitalize on reforms and thus to reinforce the incumbent regime. Thus, 
                                                 
19
 Similar tendencies to exploit neoliberalism as a strategy for authoritarian renewal can be observed in other 
regions, see for example Ong (2006); Springer (2009); Wong (2012).   
20
 On Arab elites and authoritarian renewal in various Arab countries see also the contributions in Perthes (2004).   
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neoliberalism in the MENA region is an economic, a social and a political project. Hibou 
(2005) argues that the transfer of responsibilities does not indicate a retreat of the state but 
rather a change in its role and modalities of interaction.   
Studies on state-business relations and neoliberalism elaborate in detail how the political and 
business elites have benefitted and captured on neoliberalism in the MENA region in order to 
secure their privileges. Through the renegotiation processes of these arrangements, long-
established ties between business elites and the state have been reaffirmed (Bellin 2002; Bank 
2004; Heydemann 2004a; Schlumberger 2004; Heydemann 2007; Henry and Springborg 
2010; Hertog, Luciani, and Valeri 2013; Hinnebusch 2015). Although these studies mention 
that also new actors emerged and that the private sector has taken on new socio-economic 
responsibilities, only few examine these issues in depth (for exceptions see Wils 2003; 
Cammett 2007; Hertog, Luciani, and Valeri 2013). An example of this is Zintl’s (2013) 
research on foreign-educated Syrian entrepreneurs. Zintl shows that these entrepreneurs have 
been co-opted by the Syrian regime and established as new social elite. Their educational 
background, local and international contacts as well as financial resources convey the 
impression of a modernizing Syria while in fact facilitating neoliberalism and authoritarian 
renewal. Together, these studies suggest that the inclusion of new actors may increase 
struggles and competition among business actors but contributes to authoritarian renewal 
rather than challenging it. Likewise, Selvik (2013), Jamali (2014) and Jamali and Sidani 
(2012) show how the global discourse on corporate social responsibility (CSR) has been 
adapted by business actors in the MENA region.21 Selvik explicitly analyzes the link between 
CSR as a means to increase the reputation and legitimacy of business actors and the regime. 
Jamali and Sidani, on the other hand, overlook the political implications of CSR and focus on 
the challenges emanating from political systems for the development of CSR. Yet, these 
studies neglect societal actors and how these respond to CSR, the restructuring of service and 
welfare provision as well as the roles they play in these processes.  
The turn from structural adjustment towards a more ‘inclusionary’ neoliberal economic and 
development approach with a strong emphasis on joint action of state, business, civil society 
and communities in economic development and poverty reduction has facilitated the further 
diffusion of neoliberalism beyond the economy. A number of authors have explored neoliberal 
practices and discourses in development aid, state agencies and initiatives, among (micro-
                                                 
21
 For a discussion of CSR and neoliberalism beyond the MENA region, see inter alia Hanlon (2011); Jamali and 
Sidani (2012); Eweje (2014). 
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)entrepreneurs, associations and communities (Elyachar 2005; Bergh 2010; Bergh 2012a; 
Berriane 2010; Gertel 2011; Tagma, Kalaycioglu, and Akcali 2013; Zovighian 2013; Isleyen 
2014). Elyachar (2002; 2005), for example, analyzes associations of craftsmen and 
unemployed youth set up in Cairo through social funds and micro loans and support by 
international actors and the Egyptian state to empower and include poor people as micro-
entrepreneurs into markets. However, she concludes that micro-enterprises and empowerment 
have not always succeeded in the anticipated ways and have been accompanied by processes 
of dispossession. Berriane (2010), on the other hand, illustrates with a case study of the 
Moroccan National Initiative for Human Development (INDH) how neoliberal subject 
formation of societal actors takes place on the local level and results in the selective inclusion 
of actors at the expense of others. Moreover, Bergh (2012a) and Clark (2015) demonstrate 
that, despite the emphasis on decentralization and local governance, INDH fosters regional 
patronage networks and thus undermines local governments vis-à-vis the central state.  
Other studies on local governance and neoliberalism in the MENA region focus in particular 
on the role of local elites in reform processes. They highlight how neoliberal ideas and 
practices have been adapted to the specific local contexts and exploited by local elites to 
advance their own political interests and foster patron-client networks (Bergh 2010; Bergh 
and Jari 2010; Bouziane 2010; Bergh 201422; Clark 2015). Research covers a multitude of 
actors, themes and spaces covering issues such as local elections (Bouziane 2010; Bouziane, 
Harders, and Hoffmann), the role of municipalities in poverty reduction and participation 
(Canesse 2010; Sabri 2010; Clark 2012), privatization (Allès 2012; Saadi 2012) and the socio-
economic and political role of lesser notables in local communities (Menza 2012a; Menza 
2012b).23 While these studies provide insights into ‘actually existing neoliberalism’ and how 
authoritarian renewal takes place on the local level, research on societal actors such as 
associations and not-for-profit organizations, their engagement in the mentioned processes 
and the ties between local elites and societal actors is still deficient.  
Research on neoliberalism and urban space in the MENA region, by contrast, puts a strong 
emphasis on the diversity of actors and spaces of neoliberal contestation in processes of 
                                                 
22
 The contributions in this edited book were first published as a special issue on neoliberal reforms and local 
governance in the MENA region in Mediterranean Politics (17: 3, 2012) with contributions inter alia by Bergh, 
Clark, Menza, Allès, and Grabher and Stark, the authors emphasize the lack of in-depth research on the subject.  
23
 For a discussion of local governance and neoliberalism beyond the MENA region see e.g. Crook (2003); 
Goldfrank and Schrank (2009); Geddes (2010); Geddes and Sullivan (2011); Guarneros-Meza and Geddes 
(2010). 
 28 
authoritarian renewal. The interaction between various social groups and communities with 
state agencies in the implementation of neoliberal projects (Elyachar 2005; Ismail 2006; 
Ismail 2011), resistance against state hegemony (Singerman 2011) and consumption behavior 
and life style (Singerman and Amar 2009; Schwedler 2010; Schwedler 2012; Peterson 2011) 
features prominently among studies on urban space. Overall, these studies highlight that urban 
space is a key arena of processes of authoritarian renewal. Studies on the restructuring of city 
space, for instance, demonstrate that market-oriented ‘urban renovation’ serves several goals: 
the creation of high-end business and leisure facilities, the relocation and marginalization of 
poor population groups and the formation of active, neoliberal, entrepreneurial subjects 
(Elyachar 2005; Singerman and Amar 2009; Singerman 2011; Parker 2009; Parker and 
Debruyne 2012; Bogaert 2011a; Bogaert 2011b; Zemni and Bogaert 2011). Bogaert (2011b), 
for example, provides an in-depth analysis of socio-economic change and urban politics in 
Morocco. He argues that neoliberalism has to be understood as a dynamic locally embedded 
political project that links local and global elite interests and serves authoritarian renewal. 
Having said this, several scholars demonstrate that we cannot simply assume the total 
exclusion and marginalization of certain social groups. Certainly, research demonstrates that 
neoliberalism and authoritarian renewal foster elite struggles and patterns of accumulation and 
redistribution, yet a growing number of studies highlight that actors from the diverse social 
backgrounds turn into entrepreneurial actors who are made to take on self-responsibility (see 
inter alia Mitchell 2002; Kienle 2003; Elyachar 2005; Guazzone and Pioppi 2009; Ismail 
2011; Singerman 2011; Zemni and Bogaert 2011; Bogaert 2012; Hanieh 2013; Hertog, 
Luciani, and Valeri 2013).  
 
1.2.3 Networks & Social Embeddedness 
Social network research offers a multitude of approaches to study social relations and 
structures. However, the review of the literature reveals that questions of power and informal 
ties have either been implicitly studied or overlooked. This is surprising as social network 
theory emphasizes the social embeddedness of networks. The literature on social ties in the 
MENA region, by contrast, focuses exactly on those issues social network research neglects. 
However, only few studies bring these two strands of the literature together. Similar to the 
literature on authoritarian renewal and neoliberalism, it only pays limited attention to societal 
actors and state-business-society relations are hardly taken account of. Related to that, new 
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patterns and mechanisms of social relations that emerged in the context of authoritarian 
renewal and neoliberal reforms, have not been addressed thoroughly.     
  
Social Networks 
The study of social networks dates back to the 1930s and has gained increasing popularity 
since the 1970s. It offers approaches to the study of social structures and the characteristics 
and patterns of social relations (Emirbayer, Mustafa, and Goodwin 1994; Borgatti and Halgin 
2011).  
This thesis employs the definition of social networks by Borgatti, who states that  
[a] network is a set of actors connected by a set of ties. The actors […] can be 
persons, teams, organizations, concepts, etc. Ties connect pairs of actors and can be 
directed […] or undirected […] and can be dichotomous […] or valued […]. 
(Borgatti and Foster 2003: 992) 
Actors do not necessarily need to be directly connected. Ties can also indirectly link two 
actors through ties to a third actor to whom both are connected (Borgatti and Halgin 2011). 
These different types of ties influence the structure of a given network, e.g. its density, 
cohesion, fragmentation and the centrality of actors in it.   
A plethora of theories exists for the analysis of the dynamics in social relations and networks 
that link the rather methodological field of social network analysis (SNA) to social network 
theory (SNT).24 Granovetter (1973; 1983) is not only one of the founding fathers of SNT with 
his theory of the ‘strength of weak ties’ but has also largely contributed to the development of 
(economic) sociology. In Granovetter’s theory ties are central and decide upon the structure of 
networks and the position of actors in them. Similarly, Burt’s (1992) ‘structural holes’ theory 
focuses on the structure, on the position, and on flows in networks. Both theories are still 
prevailing in SNA to date. The literature on social capital, by contrast, enquires into the values 
of social ties and how they matter in society, politics and economy (see e.g. the classical 
studies by Bourdieu 1980; Coleman 1988; Putnam 1993; Putnam 2000; and newer studies by 
Baron, Field, and Schuller 2000; Edwards, Foley, and Diani 2001; Harriss 2002; Radcliffe 
2004). This literature mainly focuses on social relations as enabling resources for actors and 
for the quality of the political system (i.e. democratic governance), policy planning and 
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 For a discussion of SNA and the approaches used in this thesis, see Section 1.5 on methodology. 
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economic development. Social relations can also be disabling and can result in exclusion 
(Field 2008: 3, 79-99) and, as Roßteuter has demonstrated, social capital can also foster 
authoritarianism (Roßteutscher 2009; see also Jamal 2007; El-Said and Harrigan 2009; Saber 
2010). The latter aspect is particularly important but is largely under-studied by social 
network scholars.  
Parkhe et al. emphasize the social embeddedness of networks in local contexts and that 
networks are shaped by these very contexts (Parkhe, Wasserman, and Ralston 2006: 563). 
Approaches in economic sociology, in particular, put an emphasis on the impact of underlying 
social structures on the interaction of actors. Although they are primarily interested in the 
social embeddedness of economic actions, they nevertheless take also social and political 
actions into account. Social network approaches in economic sociology content that economic 
action, as action in any other field, is ‘embedded in the broader systems of social relations’ 
(Granovetter 1985: 495; see also Granovetter 1992; Granovetter 2005; Smith-Doerr and 
Powell 2005). Thus, economic and social relations are interwoven; and so are those of 
political, civil society actors and donors with the prevailing social structure. From this 
perspective, social relations are not considered solely an epiphenomenon to the economic or 
political sphere but a determining factor for interactions between actors within and between 
these spheres (Borgatti and Foster 2003: 994; see also Knoke 1990; Hafner-Burton, Kahler, 
and Montgomery 2009). Having said this, networks can enable and constrain actors and are a 
‘source of reward and punishment’ (Granovetter 2005; see also Granovetter 1992; Emirbayer, 
Mustafa, and Goodwin 1994). This implies that networks may internally be either fragmented 
or cohesive and externally feature tendencies to selectively include some actors and exclude 
others (Granovetter 1992). 
Important issues such as informal ties and questions on power and hierarchy in social 
networks have been either studied implicitly, through for example the analysis of centrality 
and key actors in a network, core and periphery, or have been overlooked (for exceptions see 
inter alia Harriss 2002; Murphy 2003; Radcliffe 2004; Roßteutscher 2009; Wilshusen 2009; 
Smith et al. 2014). As opposed to this short-coming in the literature on social networks, area 
experts in social sciences have produced a plethora of studies on social relations in 
authoritarian regimes, such as neo-patrimonialism, clientelism and patronage in the MENA 
region, Africa and Asia (e.g. Gellner and Waterbury 1977; Eisenstadt and Lemarchand 1981; 
Pawelka 1985; Sharabi 1988; Cunningham and Sarayrah 1993; Bratton and Van de Valle, 
Nicolas 1994; Roniger and Günes-Ayata 1994; more recently Wils 2003; Clark 2004a; 
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Heydemann 2004a; Schlumberger 2004; Springer 2011; Menza 2012b; Haddad 2012; Wong 
2012). These studies offer insights into informal, hierarchical ties and questions on power 
relations.    
     
Social Ties in the Middle East & North Africa 
Research on social ties in authoritarian regimes such as those in the MENA region has shown 
that vertical ties dominate. The reliance inter alia on personalism, informal decision-making, 
patron-client relations and patronage – to name only some examples – play a key role not only 
in politics but also dominate the economy and society. Inherent in these studies, there is an 
emphasis on the asymmetry, informality and personalims of relations (e.g. Scott 1972; 
Lenczowski 1975; Gellner and Waterbury 1977; Eisenstadt and Lemarchand 1981; Eisenstadt 
and Roniger 1984; Pawelka 1985; Roniger and Günes-Ayata 1994).  
The work on neo-patrimonialism focuses on political rule with the ruler as the central actor in 
an informal hierarchical networks surrounded by several circles of competing subordinates 
and their subordinates linked to each other through clientelistic ties (Eisenstadt 1973; Pawelka 
1985). Schlumberger stresses that the formal office an actor holds in the political system does 
not necessarily reflect the position this actor occupies in the neo-patrimonial network: 
‘Rather, it is the strength or weakness of personal ties to the ruler that determines the actual 
influence on decision-making any individual can enjoy.’ (Schlumberger 2004: 37). This 
implies not only that social ties may change and accordingly actors but also that it is difficult 
to assess for sure who has which position in these flexible networks. The same holds true for 
other forms of social interactions such as co-optation and clientelism. While this literature 
enriches our knowledge of the political systems and authoritarian rule in the MENA region, it 
nevertheless, does not capture how societal actors who are, for the main part, excluded from 
these neo-patrimonial networks react. To be clear, the literature on neo-patrimonialism 
explicitly focuses on the political level and a top-down perspective and hence does not claim 
to address societal actors.         
Co-optation is a non-coercive strategy to gain or strengthen regime support and acceptance 
and silence dissent through the selective inclusion of strategically relevant actors or social 
groups (Bertocchi and Spagat 2001; Gerschewski 2013). Co-optative mechanisms are 
manifold; they range from resource allocation, granting privileges, building clientelistic 
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relations to the inclusion in institutions (e.g. parliaments, parties and associations) and the 
making of policy concessions (Gandhi and Przeworski 2006; Cavatorta 2007; Wong 2012; 
Gerschewski 2013; Josua 2014). Having said this, patterns and mechanisms of co-optation are 
not static. Albrecht and Schlumberger (2004) demonstrate how in the wake of shrinking 
resources for allocation in the late 1980s, the patterns of co-optation shifted towards 
inclusionary mechanisms. Bank (2004), on the other hand, shows that the ‘economization’ of 
participation, public discourses and action has become a key characteristic of co-optation in 
the early 2000s. While these mechanisms enable the regimes to co-opt select actors they also 
serve to broaden the social base of the regimes. In addition, through the ‘economized’ 
discourse linkages are established to international actors and discourses. In so doing, regimes 
enhance their standing abroad and garner international (im)material support (see also Ruiz de 
Elvira and Zintl 2012; Wong 2012). While research on co-optation makes an important 
contribution to our understanding of state-society relations under authoritarianism, it 
overlooks important issues. Co-optation is a broad concept, considering any form of 
interaction between state and society that is not confrontational as co-optative. In so doing, it 
subsumes strategies for the silencing of dissident actors along with those targeting actors who 
seek to be co-opted or elites. Furthermore, state-society relations are not solely about 
persuading societal actors to acquiesce the incumbent regime but also about their active 
contribution to authoritarian renewal. This includes the construction of shared discourses, 
joint action, the generation of new resources and the opportunities to engage in the creation of 
a new social base. Related to this, we observe changes in patterns of co-optation in the past 
three decades (see for example Albrecht and Schlumberger 2004; Bank 2004; Wong 2012), 
yet a systematic analysis of these changes and the role neoliberalism plays in this 
development is still pending. Also, there is a need for critical engagement with the 
implications of the broadening of the repertoire of co-optation for authoritarian renewal and 
international cooperation.     
The literature on patronage and clientelism, on the other hand, describes an unequal dyadic 
social relation between actors of different socio-economic status, a patron and a client. It is 
not confined to the political sphere but permeates society. These clientelistic ties are 
characterized by reciprocal, mutually beneficial and voluntary exchange of benefits and 
protection for support and loyalty (Gellner and Waterbury 1977; Eisenstadt and Roniger 1984; 
Roniger and Günes-Ayata 1994; Clark 2004a; Lust 2009; Menza 2012b). While studies on 
clientelism focus on the vertical ties between patrons and clients, Clark (2004a) demonstrates 
in her study of Islamic social institutions that horizontal ties are crucial for the mobilization 
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and recruitment of actors from the Islamist and non-Islamist middle class. In particular, they 
facilitate ‘[…] the expansion and strengthening of middle-class networks, predominantly 
those of the educated or professional middle class.’ (Clark 2004b: 933). Thus, despite the 
dominance of vertical ties in the MENA region, it should not be forgotten that horizontal ties 
matter, as well. They are essential in process of network formation and growth as the literature 
on social movements proves (see e.g. Diani and McAdam 2003; Della Porta and Diani 2006; 
Tarrow 2011).      
To date, studies bringing together SNA and the literature on the MENA region are scarce. In 
Heydemann’s (2004a) edited book ‘Networks of Privilege’ the authors apply SNT to the study 
of state-business networks and economic reforms in several countries in the MENA region 
(contributions inter alia by Cammett; Cassarino; Haddad; Heydemann; Kienle; Sfakianakis; 
Wils; Zerhouni). This book contributes to a better understanding of agency and patterns of 
interaction and bargaining in economic reform processes which have not been addressed 
thoroughly before. In particular, it assesses the dynamics between established actors who seek 
to secure their privileges and emerging actors (see for example Cammett 2004). Haddad 
(2012), on the other hand, applies SNT to the study of state-business networks, economic 
reform and authoritarian renewal in Syria. Similar to the ‘Networks of Privilege’ this study 
focuses on questions of agency and the outcomes of economic reform processes. In contrast to 
the focus on economic networks, Menza (2012b) analyzes patronage networks in Egypt with a 
focus on ‘lesser notables’ and their socioeconomic and political roles as intermediaries 
between state and society.  
SNT, thus, facilitates a refined study of the different levels of social relations and of cross-
sector interaction. Despite the important contributions to the study of social ties in the MENA 
region, these works neglect to consider societal actors. In particular, the state-business-society 
triangle is under-studied and marginalized compared to state-business but also state-society 
relations. Furthermore, they mostly do not account for horizontal ties that link like-minded 
actors. As a consequence, the question how these actors raise claims, engage in bargaining 
and contribute to processes of economic reform and authoritarian renewal remains open. 
Exceptions to this, inter alia, are the works of Clark (2004a) and Cammett (2004).     
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1.2.4 Social Entrepreneurship 
This section argues that neoliberalism and the political context are crucial issues to address 
when exploring social entrepreneurship but have been overlooked, both by the literature on 
social entrepreneurship in general and by the few studies that exist on social entrepreneurship 
in the MENA region. In so doing, these literatures fail to analyze social entrepreneurship in 
relation to the respective economic, political and social context it is embedded in. As a 
consequence, they contribute only to a limited extent to the further development of social 
entrepreneurship research.    
    
Social Entrepreneurship Research: About Utopia & Heroes 
Research on social entrepreneurship originated predominantly in business and management 
studies in the late 1990s and has only recently increased and concomitantly attracted the 
interest of other disciplines, inter alia economics, management, sociology and political 
science (Short, Moss, and Lumpkin 2009; Desa 2010; Bacq and Janssen 2011; Dacin, Dacin, 
and Tracey 2011).Taken as a whole, the field of social entrepreneurship research is still in its 
infancy. It features a lack of conceptual clarity, overly positive depictions of social 
entrepreneurship at the expense of constructive criticism, and is in general still rather a 
descriptive and atheoretical field that focuses on case studies (Short, Moss, and Lumpkin 
2009; Bacq and Janssen 2011; Dacin, Dacin, and Tracey 2011; Choi and Majumdar 2013). 
Following Gregory Dees, a leading scientist in social entrepreneurship research, this thesis 
defines social entrepreneurship as bringing together  
[…] the passion of a social mission with an image of business-like discipline, 
innovation, and determination […]. (Dees 1998: 1) 
A great deal of attention has been given to definitional issues. As Choi et. al. (2013) discuss, 
research on social entrepreneurship is characterized by conceptual fuzziness and variation in 
definitions of social entrepreneurship. Thus, social entrepreneurship can be defined as a new 
means to create tangible resources through business activities to render non-profit 
organizations financially more sustainable, as  a strategy to help the poor through 
entrepreneurial activity, or as an innovative approach to solve social issues (Choi and 
Majumdar 2013: 2). This also includes the question whether social entrepreneurship is a field 
in its own right or a sub-category of entrepreneurship; the characteristics of social 
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entrepreneurs and their organizations; organizational and institutional issues such as structure, 
sustainability and impact measurement (Dees 1998; Peredo and McLean 2006; Nicholls 2008; 
Bornstein and Davis 2010; Hockerts, Mair, and Robinson 2010; Choi and Majumdar 2013). In 
the course of these fundamental concerns other important aspects have been of minor interest 
and still need to be further explored. This concerns not only theoretical and methodological 
issues but also epistemological and ontological ones.  
In general, research on social entrepreneurship, for the most part, adopts a normative 
perspective and promotes social entrepreneurship as sui generis a positive phenomenon. 
Accordingly, problematic aspects and failed cases of social enterprises have been neglected in 
favor of success stories. With regard to neoliberalism this short-coming becomes particularly 
apparent. The assumption is that social entrepreneurs take on responsibility and fill the void 
caused by state withdrawal in welfare provision and address socio-economic problems that 
emerged in the context of the implementation of neoliberal policies. That social entrepreneurs 
are at the same time actors who promote neoliberalism has largely been ignored; only few 
scholars follow this line of thinking so far (Cook, Dodds, and Mitchell 2003; Craig and Porter 
2006; Grenier 2008; Dey and Steyaert 2012; Dey 2014). For Cook for example the literature 
on social entrepreneurship is ‘indistinguishable from neo-liberalism’ (Cook, Dodds, and 
Mitchell 2003: 68). Similarly, Dey argues that social entrepreneurship is ‘a tactic of neoliberal 
governmentality’ in that it  
[…] turns the social into a space of competition, individual responsibility and self-
organization by demanding entrepreneurial virtues and behaviors from people who 
until recently were not envisioned as entrepreneurs […]. (Dey 2014: 55ff.) 
These studies imply that through social entrepreneurship neoliberalism comes back through 
the backdoor and under a new cover. In this regard, analyzing social entrepreneurship in 
greater depth also contributes to the debate on the death and rebirth of neoliberalism.  
Dey, one of the pioneers of critical research on social entrepreneurship, also sheds light on 
questions of ideology and discourse. From a Marxist rather than governmentality perspective, 
social entrepreneurship does not only provide solutions to social problems but forms part of 
the ‘ideological hegemonic project’ of the ruling and business elites. Thus, discourses and 
narratives depict socio-economic issues as technical rather than political issues and suggest 
self-responsible, entrepreneurial action as the solution (Dey and Steyaert 2010; Dey 2010; 
Dey 2014; Dey, Schneider, and Maier 2014). Ruebottom, on the other hand, reminds us that 
discourses and narratives also serve to gain support and legitimacy and fend off challenges 
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and resistance (Ruebottom 2013). Thus, social entrepreneurship is not simply an instrument of 
the elites but social entrepreneurs are involved in bargaining processes.         
Since the vast majority of studies are rooted in business management studies, they tend to 
overlook political factors in their analyses. With regard to the context of social 
entrepreneurship and the processes that take place, this results in the almost absence of 
evaluations of for example the variance of social entrepreneurship in different political 
contexts, the political implications of networks and partnerships for the relations between 
state, business and civil society, discourses and the politics of social entrepreneurs. Although a 
large number of social entrepreneurs exist in developing countries in Africa, Latin America, 
the Middle East and Asia, research focuses for the most part on democracies, particularly on 
the USA and the UK, and rarely pays attention to the implications of authoritarian political 
systems for the scope and mode of action, practices and partnerships of social entrepreneurs. 
The main interest of these studies is, on the one hand, on the question how social 
entrepreneurs address socio-economic problems and the empowerment of the poor and, on the 
other hand, on questions of the legal status, organizational models and income-generating 
activities (e.g. Alvord, Brown, and Letts 2004; Seelos and Mair 2005; Mair and Marti 2009; 
Abdou et al. 2010; Parker and Debruyne 2012). Alvord, Brown and Letts (2004), for instance, 
analyze the potential of and requirements for societal transformation. They focus on the 
characteristics of innovations, leadership and organizations and the scaling up as crucial 
characteristics that determine the impact of social transformations. Important questions about 
the particularities social entrepreneurship features in authoritarian states and the opportunities 
and threats it faces remain open. Closely related to the omission of differentiating between 
different political systems in the countries in which social entrepreneurs work is the fact that, 
for the most part, the state, ruling and business elites have been approached in a one-
dimensional way in research on social entrepreneurship. The state, ruling and business elites 
are assessed by the extent to which they create a positive environment for the development of 
social entrepreneurship via policies, funding and the like, while social entrepreneurs are 
assessed by the extent to which they empower the poor, and create social impact (Mulgan 
2008; Nicholls 2008: 21ff.). This is surprising as research on the characteristics and social 
background of social entrepreneurs has shown that there is an overemphasis on the ‘hero 
individual’ (Nicholls 2008: 26) and elitist discourses while at the same time downplaying the 
fact that many social entrepreneurs are well-educated with a middle-/upper-class background 
(see also Dacin, Dacin, and Tracey 2011; Dey and Steyaert 2012). Questions targeting the 
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political objectives of social entrepreneurs beyond socio-economic development have been 
neglected by this one-dimensional view.  
Related to this aspect, research on networks and partnerships between social entrepreneurs, 
donors and actors from the private sector and the state displays similar shortcomings. Social 
entrepreneurship research considers support as crucial for social entrepreneurs, yet most 
studies content themselves with mapping support or the lack of it. In so doing, important 
aspects of network dynamics go unnoticed (Dacin, Dacin, and Tracey 2011; Dey 2014). As 
outlined in the previous section networks are characterized inter alia by horizontal and vertical 
ties, informal and formal relations, key actors and isolated ones. Considering these aspects 
would contribute to a better understanding of social entrepreneurship and (political) bargains 
in authoritarian and democratic regimes alike.    
     
Social Entrepreneurship & the Middle East & North Africa 
There is hardly any academic research on social entrepreneurship in the MENA region. 
Existing publications can be divided into two categories: academic articles and books and 
practitioners’ reports. In contrast to the growing number of practitioners’ reports, academic 
articles hardly exist.  
Academic studies on social entrepreneurship in the MENA region have been published 
between 2011 and 2015. These studies inquire into the potential of social entrepreneurship to 
initiate social change in particular after the Arab uprisings of 2011. Obstacles and challenges 
are predominantly discussed with regards to legal and regulatory issues such as legal status, 
taxation and funding and the lack of knowledge and skills in the field of social 
entrepreneurship (Kirby and Ibrahim 2011; Buckner, Beges, and Khatib 2012; Blackwood 
2012). Seelos and Mair (2007) for example offer an overview of the development of the 
Egyptian social business SEKEM; yet they do not consider the political and social context in 
Egypt. Similarly, Abouleish and Abouleish (2008) describe rather than analyze SEKEM.  
Jamali and Lanteri (2015), to my knowledge, have edited the first book (in two volumes) on 
social entrepreneurship in the MENA region. The contributions aim to document the current 
state of social entrepreneurship. They address issues such as the peculiarities of social 
entrepreneurship in the region, the social impact and change, business models, funding and 
incubation. Some authors are academics, but several contributions are written by practitioners 
or social entrepreneurs bringing together regional dynamics and detailed case studies. 
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Although some of the contributions to these edited volumes touch upon the economic and 
political context, they fail to embed social entrepreneurship in these and to delineate its 
economic, social and political role. 
In sum, academic research on social entrepreneurship in the MENA region is scarce, 
descriptive and biased towards the promotion of social entrepreneurship rather than 
contributing to a critical analysis.  
Practitioners’ reports display similar weaknesses as the academic literature on social 
entrepreneurship in the MENA region. They offer insights into the current state of social 
entrepreneurship in the MENA region and promote social entrepreneurship. The first report on 
social entrepreneurship in the MENA region was published in 2010 by Abdou et al.. In this 
report, Abdou et al. give a detailed description of the emergence, models and legal status of 
social entrepreneurship in the MENA region; the characteristics of social entrepreneurs; the 
sectors of engagement and the landscape of actors who support social entrepreneurs. To date, 
this report is the most comprehensive assessment of social entrepreneurship in the MENA 
region. Furthermore, Abdou (2010) authored a practitioner’s guide for social entrepreneurs in 
the MENA region. Bailey et al. (2011) analyze social entrepreneurship in three countries in 
the MENA region: Egypt, Jordan and Palestine. They focus on several actors and aspects and 
how these impede or facilitate social entrepreneurship: government, academia, civil society 
and the private sector; funding, education, culture, technology and revolution. While this 
report includes network mappings, these are simplified and general visualizations and are not 
based on a SNA. In general, although the report covers multiple issues and compares them in 
the countries under study, it does not offer an in-depth analysis. In addition, there are multiple 
country reports inter alia on Egypt (El Abd 2012), Morocco (Chung and Jonsdottir 2014) and 
Lebanon (Feghali, Abuatieh, and Dandan 2012) and case studies of social enterprises such as 
the Egyptian Alashanek Ya Balady (El Ebrashi 2013) and Nahdet El Mahrousa (Dajani and El 
Skarkawy 2014). All these reports highlight the current status of social entrepreneurship 
including opportunities, challenges and actors involved in social entrepreneurship. Yet, none 
of them considers the political and social context; these studies do not discuss the political 
system, patterns of social interactions (e.g. clientelism) or the question to what extent those 
actors that promote social entrepreneurship are actually linked to the regime.      
While research on social entrepreneurship offers an overview of the state of social 
entrepreneurship in the MENA region, it displays the same weaknesses as the social 
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entrepreneurship literature in general. First, it is biased and focuses on the potential of social 
entrepreneurship to initiate socio-economic change and neglects critical perspectives. Second, 
it ignores the political and social context and the possibility that social entrepreneurship may 
contribute to authoritarianism and neoliberalism. Thus, the existing studies do not offer a 
starting point for the question this thesis addresses but this thesis contributes to a more refined 
understanding of social entrepreneurship in authoritarian regimes and the MENA region in 
particular.     
 
1.3 FRAMEWORK OF THE ANALYSIS 
This section presents the framework of the analysis that links SENs as neoliberal networks to 
authoritarian renewal. At the core of this framework, there are three dimensions and their 
interlinkages: actors (dimension I), the social ties that connect them (dimension II) and the 
resources that become available as the output of social ties (dimension III). These dimensions 
render it possible to look at the power dynamics within a network but also at the 
embeddedness of a network in the wider political, economic and social context. As we will 
see in more detail below, this thesis conceptualizes power in relational terms; power is 
understood not solely as domination or control, but it includes both the exercise of power and 
the access to power.          
It has become apparent in the preceding sections that processes of authoritarian renewal 
constitute a response and adaptation to political, economic and social changes and, in the end, 
aim at regime maintenance. Similarly, the different strands of the literature on neoliberalism, 
social networks and social entrepreneurship emphasize and address changes in particular with 
regard to actors, social ties and resources in the economic, political and social sphere. 
However, the review of the literature has demonstrated that they focus on some aspects at the 
expense of others and do not offer a comprehensive approach. The network approach 
proposed in this thesis helps overcome several of these issues. Choosing a network approach 
implies that actors and social ties as building blocks of a network are the key dimensions to 
look at in order to understand the power dynamics. Yet, this perspective is not merely limited 
to an analysis of actors and the types of ties that exist between them. Social ties are also a 
good source for resources, tangible and intangible ones, and have implications for the power 
of actors within and beyond networks. Thus, SNA links these three dimensions with each 
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other and takes account of the network outputs and outcomes. Furthermore, research on 
neoliberalism and authoritarian renewal has emphasized that changes are based on a mélange 
of tried-and-tested elements and innovations and are contextually embedded. Innovations and 
the sources of innovation are the key issues to look at in order to understand neoliberal 
networks and authoritarian renewal (Heydemann 2007). As has been outlined in the 
discussion of the literature on authoritarian renewal, innovations have been introduced in the 
MENA region with regard to actors, the interaction among different types of actors, forms and 
areas of actions and resources. Furthermore, although democratization, globalization and 
neoliberalism are considered a threat, they constitute also the sources of innovation. In this 
context, innovations can be new approaches and types of actors, e.g. social 
entrepreneurs(hip); new mechanisms or manifestations of ties (e.g. mentoring and fellowship) 
instead of tried-and-tested ties; or new types of resources (e.g. stipends). These innovations 
are not necessarily new per se, the innovative element can also consist in introducing and 
adapting mechanisms in a specific context that have been used in a different context before.    
Therefore, this framework proposes a two-leveled analysis of the three dimensions. First, it 
focuses on the characterization of neoliberal networks, i.e. the adaptation of neoliberal 
approaches and ideas, and their interaction with tried-and-tested patterns of social relations in 
networks. It links neoliberal networks to authoritarian renewal, in particular in reference to 
how these dimensions resonate with strategies of authoritarian renewal.   
Table 1: Neoliberal Networks & Authoritarian Renewal 
Independent Variable Dependent Variable 
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Dimension I: Actors, Institutions & Initiatives 
As discussed before, a plethora of actors and institutions engages in neoliberal projects in 
authoritarian regimes. In this thesis, SENs that are composed of actors who engage in social 
entrepreneurship are conceptualized as examples of neoliberal networks in the MENA region. 
These are mainly state institutions, rulers, international and local support organizations, 
business actors and social entrepreneurs. 
Although several studies address agency, questions of actors and agency have been under-
researched. Consequently, some actors and institutions have been studied in depth, such as 
business and political actors, while others (e.g. societal actors) have been under-researched 
and often portrayed as powerless actors. This is not surprising given the role political and 
business actors play in authoritarian regimes and in the implementation of neoliberal projects, 
yet it presents an incomplete picture of authoritarian renewal and the role and the contribution 
of societal actors. In addition, some actors have frequently been analyzed jointly, such as 
business actors and state institutions/representatives, or international actors and state 
institutions (e.g. Heydemann 2004a; Pierret and Kjetil 2009; Cavatorta 2013; Hertog, Luciani, 
and Valeri 2013; Selvik 2013a; Bergh 2014; Isleyen 2014). In so doing, the broad range of 
actors, institutions and the initiatives they have launched and their different institutional and 
juridical backgrounds have not been systematically integrated into a comprehensive 
framework for the study of authoritarian renewal. The same holds true for the characteristics 
of these actors, i.e. whether they are international or local actors; whether they are economic, 
political or societal actors; and whether they are new or established ones. Instead of 
considering these various actors in isolation from each other, this study approaches them as a 
network of actors. Thus, dimension I (see Table 2 below) considers different types of actors, 
institutions and initiatives rather than focusing on one or few actors and institutions. As the 
focus of this study is on SENs and social entrepreneurs, these have priority and determine 
which actors compose the networks in the cases analyzed in the empirical chapters on the 
SENs in Egypt, Morocco and Jordan.   
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Table 2: Dimension I: Actors, Institutions & Initiatives 
Type of actor, institution & 
initiative 
 
Societal actors Social entrepreneurs 
International support 
organizations & initiatives 
 
Regional & local support 
organizations & initiatives 
 
Private sector & initiatives  
State institutions, actors & 
initiatives 
 
 
Dimension II: Social Ties 
Although a mapping of actors and, in the case of this study, a mapping of the actors in the 
SENs in the MENA region are in itself an insightful endeavor, alone dimension I does not 
offer insights into power dynamics in SENs and the contribution of these actors to processes 
of authoritarian renewal. The analysis of social ties among actors adds another dimension 
(dimension II) to the framework of the analysis. It delineates the network these actors 
compose and the different types of social ties that link the different types of actors. A social tie 
is a connection, a relation (such as business partners), an interaction (such as co-participation 
in an event), or flows of information between two actors (Borgatti, Everett, and Johnson 2013; 
see also Table 3 below).  
As has been highlighted in the review of the literature on neoliberalism and authoritarian 
renewal, a change and renegotiation of power relations among political, economic and 
societal actors has taken place in the MENA region. This concerns not only the establishment 
of new ties among actors or the dissolution of existing ones but also the establishment of 
social ties among different types of actors who had not been linked previously and now have 
gained access to power. The turn of international actors towards more ‘inclusive’ development 
approaches, the emergence of new societal and business constituencies and the ‘outsourcing 
of social responsibility’ (Ruiz de Elvira and Zintl 2012), for instance, indicate that not only 
new ties have developed between different types of actors but also that innovations in types of 
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ties have appeared. Thus, actors can draw on new mechanism of relations. CSR and 
mentoring, as innovative manifestations of support and advice ties, for example, are recent 
phenomena in the MENA region.25 Contrary to the attention practitioners in development 
projects have paid to mentoring (Lonsdale 2011; Pompa 2012; ASI 2015), academic research 
on CSR and mentoring in authoritarian regimes and the MENA region in particular is scarce 
(for an exception, see Selvik 2013b; Selvik 2013a; Eweje 2014). Not only with regard to 
mentoring, as a concrete example of the manifestation of an innovative social tie, but also 
with regard to innovations in types of social ties in general the question arises as to whether 
these innovations are truly new types of ties or rather new labels that obscure tried-and-tested 
ties. Thus, innovations in types of social ties and their manifestations need to be taken into 
account. This aspect closely relates to two additional issues. It is important to consider both 
horizontal/vertical and formal/informal manifestation of social ties. Social ties within a 
network are not confined to ties among equal actors but cut across institutional or juridical 
boundaries and hierarchies as the example of mentoring illustrates. Furthermore, they can be 
formal and informal (Powell 1990; Heydemann 2004b; Borgatti et al. 2009). With regard to 
the MENA region, these issues have been discussed in particular in the literature on 
patronage, clientelism and co-optation, and have been predominantly linked to questions of 
power and authoritarian durability.  
With the help of the analysis of social ties among actors in a network, the position of actors in 
a network can be determined, and hence, the key (powerful) actors in a network can be 
identified. In SNA, power is often approached through an analysis of the position of an actor 
in a network (coreness and centrality) and the potential to access other actor’s resources, or to 
control other actors and the latter’s access to resources (Borgatti et al. 2009; Borgatti, Everett, 
and Johnson 2013; Smith et al. 2014).  
 
 
 
                                                 
25
 In mentoring relations, an experienced and well-established actor takes on the role of the mentor for a less 
experienced actor and offers guidance, advice and access to his networks (St-Jean and Audet 2013). 
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Table 3: Dimension II: Types of Social Ties 
Type of Social Tie Manifestation 
RELATIONAL STATES 
‘Tried-&-tested’  
Innovations 
Support 
Organizations  
support 
 
 
advice 
 
 
Business 
support 
 
 
advice 
 
 
Collegial 
support 
 
 
advice 
 
 
RELATIONAL EVENTS  
Interaction 
 
 
 
 
In sum, dimension II renders it possible to visualize network structures, including inter alia 
the links among different types of actors, different types of social ties as well as the 
identification of key actors (Borgatti, Everett, and Johnson 2013). Although dimension II is 
summarized as a simplified table here, in the empirical analysis in Chapters 2-4, social ties 
among actors are presented in the form of a network graph.26  In the case of SENs in the 
MENA region as examples of neoliberal networks, the visualization and the analysis of social 
ties helps show the relations between social entrepreneurs and state institutions, business 
actors and support organizations. It furthermore highlights who among these actors are the 
key actors in the SENs, and who is in a marginalized position. Moreover, a closer look at the 
key actors in the SENs, and in particular at the links between the key social entrepreneurs and 
authoritarian elites, is crucial to demonstrate that SENs are spaces relevant for authoritarian 
politics and play a role in processes of authoritarian renewal.          
 
                                                 
26
 On SNA, see the section on methodology in this chapter. 
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Dimension III: Resources 
While the analysis of the types of social ties among actors in politics, the economy and 
development reveals important characteristics of the structure of a network, social ties are also 
sources for resources. The elaboration on networks and power has emphasized this aspect. 
Thus, dimension III adds to the analytical framework the perspective on what social ties are 
used for, i.e. the output of social ties. This dimension includes different types of resources. 
These can be differentiated into whether they are tangible or intangible resources and whether 
they are local (i.e. generated or provided by local actors), or international resources (i.e. 
generated or provided through international ties); see also Table 4 below. Similar to the 
innovations in types of social ties discussed above, innovations also have to be considered 
with regard to types of resources. Thus, these aspects draw attention to both new mechanisms 
and patterns of relations and of authoritarian renewal.             
Social ties are sources for resources and include the generation of and access to resources. To 
begin with, the different types of resources can be differentiated into tangible and intangible 
resources. Tangible resources are mainly financial means such as grants, donations, stipends 
and cash prizes. However, they can also consist in the appropriation or construction of office 
space, in taking over the costs for the purchase of special equipment or in in-kind 
contributions. Visibility, linkages and recognition, on the other hand, are examples of 
intangible resources. As set out above in dimension I, the neoliberal networks are composed 
of local, regional and international actors. In consequence, resources can be generated and 
provided through local and international ties.  
Although many of the examples of resources are not new or innovative at first sight, a closer 
examination reveals the innovative character inherent in these resources. The specific 
fellowships and awards exclusively available to social entrepreneurs to support and grow their 
enterprise, for example, can be regarded as innovative resources that only developed in the 
MENA region in the early 2000s. Contrary to grants and donations, these fellowships and 
awards usually include a stipend or a cash prize in addition to access to national and 
international actors and skill development programs. Thus, they go beyond the resources 
commonly provided through donor ties. 
 
 46 
Table 4: Dimension III: Types of Resources 
Source Resources 
International 
(by int. actors) 
 tangible intangible 
Awards   
Fellowships 
 
 
 
 
Local 
(by reg./local 
actors) 
Awards   
Fellowships   
CSR/corporate 
giving 
  
Advisor/mentor   
 
Power Dynamics ‘behind’ Social Ties 
This thesis conceptualizes power in relational terms. Thus, power manifests in the interaction 
between actors. Power is not limited to the exercise of power (i.e. control and domination), 
but includes the access to power (i.e. inclusion and participation). In the context of this thesis, 
this conceptualization renders it possible to analyze how societal actors adapt to patterns of 
authoritarian renewal and contribute to their functioning and development. From this 
perspective, power relations can have an enabling or a constraining effect on actors and on the 
generation of resources as the output of social ties (Digeser 1992; Hafner-Burton, Kahler, and 
Montgomery 2009).27  
The operationalization of power is based on a qualitative (and not a quantitative) approach in 
order to analyze the processes of authoritarian renewal and the contribution of SENs to the 
mentioned processes. Interviewees and public sources, for the most part, do not disclose 
information explicitly on whether and how actors strategically work towards renewing 
authoritarianism and preserving the authoritarian regime. The same holds true for co-optation 
and whether and who accomplishes co-optation. Therefore, it is impossible to present 
                                                 
27
 On definitions of power, see also Dahl (1957) and Lukes (2005). 
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measurable proves. Instead, this thesis proposes several indicators for the measurement of 
whether and how power manifests in SENs and contributes to authoritarian renewal, and thus, 
disaggregates authoritarian renewal into the strategies and patterns that characterize 
authoritarian renewal: actors and institution building (societal constituencies, elites), 
appropriation and co-optation of actors, discourse and legitimation, international linkages and 
resources.    
Research on authoritarian renewal has highlighted several strategies and patterns that 
characterize processes of authoritarian renewal and thus a restructuring of power relations. 
First, it has to be shown that social entrepreneurs are new societal constituencies who support 
the authoritarian regime. This indicator relates to appropriating civil society and building 
‘imitative’ institutions as strategies of authoritarian renewal. This can be approached by 
delineating the actors who are present in a SEN and their links to the regime. With regard to 
social entrepreneurs, we can assume that they contribute to authoritarian renewal if they 
engage with the above-mentioned actors and institutions and participate rather than isolating 
themselves or being isolated. Another way to look at this aspect is through co-optation as 
another strategy of authoritarian renewal. As discussed in the literature review, co-optation is 
defined as a non-coercive strategy to gain and strengthen regime support and acceptance by 
means of (im)material rewards, privileges and inducements for selected actors or social 
groups. Following this, initiatives and mechanisms of support for social entrepreneurs 
launched by the authoritarian ruler, or by the regime elites, constitute channels of co-optation. 
The acceptance of support through these channels then is an indicator for co-optation; the 
rejection and overall abstinence of social entrepreneurs from using these channels is a sign of 
failed co-optation (see also Foster 2001; Gandhi and Przeworski 2006; Cavatorta 2007; 
Pierret and Kjetil 2009; Lewis 2013).  
Second, another significant indicator for the contribution of SENs to authoritarian renewal is 
whether an inclusion of social entrepreneurs into elite creation takes place or not (on Arab 
elites, see also Wils 2003; Bank 2004; Bank and Schlumberger 2004; Heydemann 2004a; 
Perthes 2004; Zerhouni 2004; Benhaddou 2009; Boukhars 2011). Hence, social entrepreneurs 
as new societal constituency may not only be linked to authoritarian elites and state 
institutions as a social group but the selected actors may also be co-opted as a new generation 
of societal leaders. As demonstrated inter alia by Foster (2001) as well as by Pierret and 
Selvik (2009) co-optation is not necessarily looked upon as a negative phenomenon but actors 
may actually seek to be co-opted. An indicator highlighting this aspect of ‘happy co-optees’ is 
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the existence of a close web of ties of the selected social entrepreneurs in a SEN to members 
of authoritarian elites that are accompanied by the active engagement of social entrepreneurs 
in the initiatives launched by elites as role models and figureheads. The empirical analysis 
then should show that these social entrepreneurs are the key actors in a SEN, while others 
with fewer ties to elites are not.    
Third, although the actors in a SEN do not necessarily agree on every policy and on its mode 
of implementation, they share the regime’s agenda in general. Therefore, the reproduction of 
and the contribution to official discourses and initiatives promoted by authoritarian regimes, 
and the initiation of activities that are in line with and support the agenda of the regime are an 
indication of the contribution of a SEN to authoritarian renewal (see also Bank 2004; 
Heydemann 2007; Zintl 2012). Related to this, processes of authoritarian renewal aim to 
create internationally the image of regimes undergoing a transition process led by reform 
agents. Social entrepreneurs presenting themselves as such reform agents and young dynamic 
leaders, who are committed to socio-economic development and their country, may reinforce 
this image. This aspect also relates to strategies of legitimation and reputation building and 
furthermore enables access to international linkages and support. Accordingly, an indicator for 
their contribution to authoritarian renewal consists in their ability to secure or diversify 
international linkages and support. In light of the fact that authoritarian regimes have been 
facing a shrinking of resources at their disposal since the 1980s, international support plays a 
crucial role (Albrecht and Schlumberger 2004). Thus, the generation of new resources 
indicates a contribution of SENs to authoritarian renewal.  
Taken together, the framework of the analysis developed in this section links neoliberal 
networks to authoritarian renewal through three dimensions and their interlinkages: actors, 
social ties and resources. Although the three dimensions have been introduced separately, the 
interlinkages between them have been underlined. The literatures on neoliberalism, 
authoritarian renewal and social networks lay emphasis on the contextual embeddedness and 
the specific characteristics of these phenomena in a given place and time. This framework 
accounts for this embeddedness and variance insofar as it renders it possible to study a single 
network or to compare different networks with regard to the manifestation of each of the three 
dimensions and the network outcomes, i.e. how and to what extent they contribute to 
authoritarian renewal.  
 
 49 
1.4 FINDINGS 
The analysis of the SENs in Egypt, Morocco and Jordan reveals the peculiarities of each SEN 
and their embeddedness in the respective local political, economic and social context. 
Consequently, we can see that SENs vary in terms of the composition of the core group of 
actors and of the key actors, the manifestation of innovative types of ties and in terms of the 
generation of resources as an output of the ties among the actors in the SEN.  
The analysis of the Egyptian SEN shows that although it is the largest network, its 
contribution to authoritarian renewal has been limited. Nevertheless, social entrepreneurship 
constitutes a political and development tool benefitting a small number of actors in the SEN. 
With regard to the composition of the Egyptian SEN, we see that international support 
organizations exclusively focusing on social entrepreneurship and their local representatives 
dominate the SEN. By contrast, state institutions, the rulers and business actors play a 
marginal role and are neither among the core nor among the central actors. Related to that, the 
manifestation of support and advice ties varies considerably. While innovative support and 
advice ties that have been introduced by international support organizations (e.g. fellowships 
and awards) are well-developed in the SEN, ties between social enterprises and entrepreneurs 
and other actors in the SEN are weak. In the latter case, they are predominantly support ties, 
and in many cases, tried-and-tested ties prevail over innovative ones. However, the analysis 
shows that several business actors who had been closely allied to the Mubarak regime exploit 
the Egyptian SEN and innovative ties to demonstrate and underline their commitment to 
socio-economic change in the post-Mubarak era in order to reconcile with Egyptian society. 
Examples are the organization of competitions over project funding, instead of internally 
evaluating project proposals, which would attract much less attention to their engagement. 
Thus, these actors benefit from the output of innovative ties.      
The Moroccan SEN, by contrast, is a small network but owing to its close alignment to the 
regime’s socio-economic agenda, it contributes to authoritarian renewal. Like the other two 
cases, a small group of central actors dominates the SEN. In addition to a number of social 
enterprises and entrepreneurs, two key business actors play a crucial role at the core of the 
SEN. State institutions, the King and international support organizations exclusively focusing 
on social entrepreneurship are among the core actors. From this it follows that while 
international actors introduce novel approaches, and in so doing, contribute to the 
development of a SEN, they do not play a decisive role in how a SEN becomes politically 
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embedded. With regard to the manifestations of ties, in particular, competitions and mentoring 
stand out as innovative ties and have been promoted by social enterprises and entrepreneurs, 
local support organizations and business actors across Morocco. In so doing, they seek to 
reach out to youth in the broader society and to mobilize them to become self-responsible, 
entrepreneurial actors instead of turning their back on the regime. Thus, social 
entrepreneurship constitutes a development and a political tool in Morocco. While social 
entrepreneurship as an approach and the novel mechanisms and patterns of relations it 
introduces are the same, their manifestations and outputs differ considerably.   
As opposed to the Egyptian and the Moroccan SEN, the Jordanian SEN has not only been 
aligned to the political agenda of the regime but it also enjoys the explicit support and 
engagement of the King. As a result, a small number of actors, including social entrepreneurs, 
business actors and the King through the initiative he launched, dominate the Jordanian SEN. 
Unlike the key actors in the Moroccan SEN, the Jordanian key actors create a new generation 
of socio-economic leaders and close allies to the King and his entourage, and thus, focus on 
the co-optation of the selected individuals rather than social groups in the broader society. 
Even more than it is the case in the Moroccan SEN, we can see the manifestation of a plethora 
of innovative ties. In particular, business actors draw on a combination of innovative and 
tried-and-tested ties engaging for example in mentoring relations and sit on the board of social 
enterprises. As a result, the outputs of these ties are equally diverse and turn social 
entrepreneurship in Jordan into a development and a political tool.  
 
1.5 METHODOLOGY 
1.5.1 Social Entrepreneurship in the MENA Region & Socio-Economic Issues 
This section provides an overview of social entrepreneurship and its emergence in the MENA 
and of the major socio-economic issues that have been plaguing Egypt, Morocco and Jordan 
in order to enable a better contextualization of the SENs in these countries. It shows that the 
international recognition of social entrepreneurs varies considerable across the MENA region.  
The key areas of engagement of social enterprises and entrepreneurs address the major socio-
economic issues countries in the MENA region have been facing in the past decade. The 
 51 
overview of the respective situation and socio-economic issues in Egypt, Morocco and Jordan 
highlights that unemployment, social inequality and poverty as well as the quality of 
education/the education system are among the most pressing issues in all three countries. 
  
Social Entrepreneurship & its Emergence in the Middle East & North Africa 
Social entrepreneurship as a phenomenon emerged in the late 1970s and has been promoted 
by international support organizations such as Ashoka or Synergos that have been focusing 
exclusively on social entrepreneurs since then. So far, four major international support 
organizations focus exclusively on social entrepreneurship and offer social entrepreneurship 
programs to social entrepreneurs in the MENA region: Ashoka (founded in 1980)28, Synergos 
(founded in 1986)29, the Schwab Foundation for Social Entrepreneurship (founded in 1998)30 
and the Skoll Foundation (founded in 1999)31. Furthermore, annual global fora, notably the 
World Economic Forum (WEF, founded in 1971), closely collaborate with these 
organizations.32 These international actors started working in the MENA region in 2003; the 
former two also have country representatives in the MENA region, in Egypt and Palestine, 
while the others are based abroad in the US, UK and Switzerland.33  Out of, approximately, 
19834 internationally recognized social entrepreneurs in 10 countries in the MENA region who 
have been recognized between 2003 and 2014, the vast majority are Egyptian social 
entrepreneurs, followed by Jordan, Palestine, Lebanon and Morocco (see also Figure 1 
below). 
                                                 
28
 For further details, see www.ashoka.org [06.01.2015]. 
29
 For further details, see www.synergos.org [06.01.2015]. 
30
 For further details, see www.schwabfound.org [06.01.2015]. 
31
 For further details, see www.skollfoundation.org [06.01.2015]. 
32
 The WEF nominates ‘social entrepreneurs of the year’ in cooperation with the Schwab Foundation; see 
www.schwabfound.org and www.weforum.org/events/world-economic-forum-middle-east-and-north-africa 
[06.01.2015]. 
33
 Moreover, a plethora of international and local events and initiatives was launched to support (social) 
entrepreneurs. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to provide information on local initiatives beyond the cases 
under study in this thesis. 
34
 This calculation does not include social entrepreneurs recognized by regional or local support organizations. 
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Figure 1: Fellows by country in the MENA region 2003-2014 
 
Legend: Calculations made by the author based on information provided by Ashoka, Synergos, the Schwab Foundation and 
the Skoll Foundation on their fellows 
Social entrepreneurship comprises the individual engagement of an actor, of a group of actors 
and social enterprises. Thus, it can be a ‘one-man-show’ or a team project. Therefore, a social 
entrepreneur refers to an individual who is either the founder or co-founder of a social 
enterprise.   
Social enterprises and entrepreneurs work on sustainable socio-economic development of 
people and places. The key activities and sectors of engagement of social enterprises and 
entrepreneurs are mainly located in the areas of education/skill development, economic 
development and income generation/job creation, information and communication 
technology, culture and arts, environment/waste management and community 
development/civic engagement. Their target groups are predominantly marginalized groups 
within society, such as children, youth, women, the disabled and the poor, in urban and rural 
areas (Abdou et al. 2010; see also Skoll Foundation 2009; Ashoka Arab World 2011; Synergos 
2013).  
 
Socio-Economic Situation in Egypt, Morocco & Jordan 
As opposed to the modest economic growth between 2000-2011 (an annual average of 5%), 
and a decrease in poverty (below 2 USD/day) from 18,5% (2005) to 15,4% (2008) the period 
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following the uprising of 2011 and the end of the Mubarak regime, Egypt witnessed a 
deterioration of its social and economic conditions. As a consequence of instability, 
uncertainty and stalemate (political, economic and security) the challenges – many of which 
had already existed prior to 2011 – further aggravated. High unemployment, a low job 
creation rate, the quality of education/education system, social inequality and public debt are 
among the most pressing issues. Unemployment among youth and educated youth is 
particularly high (Table 5 below). Although the access to education has improved, the 
education system does not provide the skills demanded on the labor market, i.e. a lack of 
quality and a skill mismatch prevail. Moreover, with regard to education, employment and 
poverty inequality between rural and urban areas and men and women exists which further 
exacerbates the situation (UNDP 2010; World Bank 2013; IMF 2014; IMF 2015; ILO 2015).   
 
Table 5: Egypt, Socio-Economic Indicators, 2013 
Population (in million, 2014) 89, 6 (44% living in urban areas) 
Population aged 15-24 (2014) 17,8% 
Labor Force (2014) 29,6 million 
Unemployment rate/ youth unemployment/share 
youth unemployment in total unemployment 
13,2% / 35,8% / 50,2% 
Unemployed youth with secondary degree or higher 50,1% (secondary) / 26,6% (tertiary) 
Adult literacy rate /youth literacy (2012) 68,1% / 89,3% 
Completed primary education (2010) 98% 
Human Development Index (HDI) rank 110 (value 0,662) 
Public expenditure on education (2010) 3,8% (GDP) / 11,9% (tot. gov. expend.) 
Sources: World Bank (2014); ILO (2015)  
Morocco faces similar socio-economic issues. In spite of a modest economic growth rate 
between 2000 and 2011 (GDP growth, on average, 4,8%) and a decrease in poverty (below 
2$/day) from 24,3% (2001) to 14% (2007), Morocco faces several socio-economic 
challenges. Among the most pressing issues are youth unemployment, the quality of 
education/education system and social inequality. Unemployment in Morocco is particularly 
high among youth and educated youth (Table 6 below). The education system does not 
provide the skills that are needed by the labor market, i.e. there is a lack of quality education 
and a skill mismatch despite improvements in education completion and literacy. Inequality 
with regard to education, employment and poverty between rural and urban areas, as well as 
male and female, further exacerbate the situation (World Bank 2013; ILO 2015).   
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Table 6: Morocco, Socio-Economic Indicators, 2011 
Population  32,3 Mio. (57% living in urban areas) 
Population aged 15-24 17,4% 
Labor Force 11,5 Mio. 
Unemployment rate/ youth unemployment/share youth 
unemployment in total unemployment (2007-2010) 
10% / 19% / 38,6% 
Unemployed youth with secondary degree or higher  18% 
Literacy rate /youth literacy (2005-2010) 67% / 79% 
Completed primary education/transition to secondary (2010) 85% / 80-84% 
Human Development Index (HDI)  rank 130 (value 0.582) 
Public expenditure on education (2010) 5,4% (GDP) / 25,7% (tot gov. expend.) 
Sources: UNDP (2011); World Bank (2013); ILO (2015) 
In Jordan, poverty, youth unemployment and the quality of education/education system are 
among the most pressing socio-economic issues at the beginning of King Abdullah’s reign and 
up to the present day (UNDP 2013). The issue of youth unemployment is coupled with a 
mismatch of labor market needs and education skills. Public sector employment has been 
decreasing in the past three decades; yet the education system does not provide the skills 
necessary to find employment in the private sector (World Bank 2008; WEF 2012; Brown et 
al. 2014). Moreover, there has been a cleavage between Transjordanians35 and Palestinians in 
Jordan with regard to public and private sector employment for several decades. Whereas 
Transjordanian tribes, as the regime’s main social base, have dominated the public sector for 
decades, Palestinians have done so in the private sector and some of them have developed into 
influential business actors (Wils 2003; Ryan 2004; Yom 2009).  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
35
 Transjordanians are Jordanians that are originally from within the boundaries of the Hashemite Kingdom of 
Jordan. Since 1948, when Israel was founded, several migration flows have taken place. While official sources 
estimate the Palestinian population in Jordan at, approximately, 50%, it is widely assumed to be at around 70%. 
While most of them are Jordanian citizens and well-integrated in Jordanian society, there are still many refugee 
camps. For further details on Palestinians in Jordan and Palestinian-Jordanian relations, see Layne (1994); Wils 
(2003); Yom (2014).     
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Table 7: Jordan, Socio-Economic Indicators, 2011 
Population  6,77 million (83% living in urban areas) 
Population aged 15-24 (2014) 20,4%  
Labor Force  1,8 million 
Unemployment rate/ youth unemployment/share youth 
unemployment in total unemployment 
12,9% /  32,4% / 44,9% 
Unemployed youth with secondary degree or higher 54,3% 
Literacy rate /youth literacy   95,9%  / 99,1% 
Completed primary education (2010) 86%  
Human Development Index (HDI) rank 95 (value 0.698) 
Public expenditure on education  n.a.  
Sources: UNDP (2011); World Bank (2014); ILO (2015)  
 
1.5.2 Case Selection 
In order to explore social entrepreneurship in the MENA region and the contribution of SENs 
to authoritarian renewal, this thesis has chosen a diverse case study approach looking at the 
SENs in Egypt, Jordan and Morocco. In a diverse case study, cases are selected in terms of 
their variation along the relevant dimensions of the respective study (Gerring 2007: Chap. 5). 
As Seawright and Gerring explain  
It requires the selection of a set of cases – at minimum, two – which are intended to 
represent the full range of values characterizing X,Y, or some particular X/Y 
relationship. The investigation is understood to be exploratory (hypothesis seeking) 
when the researcher focuses on X or Y and confirmatory (hypothesis testing) when 
he or she focuses on a particular X/Y relationship. (Seawright and Gerring 2008: 
300)   
In the context of this thesis, diversity can be best understood in terms of the size of the SENs 
(i.e. the number of international recognitions) and of the type of state (monarchy or republic). 
Variation with regard to the state type as the second dimension has been chosen in order to 
explore whether the contribution of SENs to authoritarian renewal manifests differently in 
monarchies compared to republics, or whether patterns emerge across state types.  
As shown at the beginning of this methodology section (Figure 1), only few countries in the 
MENA region have a significant number of internationally recognized social entrepreneurs to 
actually observe SENs. These are, listed according to size, Egypt, Jordan, Palestine, Lebanon 
and Morocco. In this sample, Egypt has the highest number of social entrepreneurs, and 
 56 
Morocco has the smallest number; while the other cases lay in-between these extremes. At the 
same time, they represent a republic (Egypt) and a monarchy (Morocco). With regard to the 
selection of a third case, Lebanon and Palestine have been excluded owing to the fact that 
they are fragile states and different dynamics are at play. In Lebanon, sectarianism dominates 
social relations, while in Palestine, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the occupation strongly 
influence social relations and the regime.36 Therefore, the SENs in Morocco, in Jordan and in 
Egypt represent the maximum variation with regard to such diversity.  
 
1.5.3 Sources  
For the analysis of SENs, several different types of data have been collected. These are 
primary sources such as reports, webpage information and newspaper articles published by 
the actors in the SENs. Furthermore, qualitative semi-structured interviews have been 
conducted with actors of all different types in each SEN – social entrepreneurs, international 
and local support organizations and business actors – and thus, include the perspective of 
these key actors. These sources have been complemented by secondary materials such as 
expert interviews, reports, newspaper articles and other published material by actors who are 
not part of the SEN. Together, these different kinds of data allow for data triangulation.  
Data collection in Egypt, Morocco and Jordan has taken place during several field trips 
between November 2011 and September 2013. A selected number of follow-up interviews 
were conducted via Skype in spring 2015. Interviews were conducted mostly in English. In 
few exceptional cases they were conducted in Arabic or French. In order to respect the wish 
for anonymity of several actors, I decided not to disclose their names but only the type of 
actor they represent. In total, 69 interviews were conducted; 25 in Egypt, 28 in Jordan and 16 
in Morocco.     
Concerning the identification of actors who are present in each SEN, three strategies were 
employed. Internationally recognized social entrepreneurs are listed on the webpages of each 
support organization (i.e. Ashoka, Synergos, the Schwab Foundation and the Skoll 
Foundation) and are showcased in reports. I tried to get the highest number of interview 
partners as possible; in Jordan and Morocco, with few exceptions, interviews were conducted 
with every internationally recognized social entrepreneur. In Egypt, by contrast, due to the 
                                                 
36
 On the political history of Lebanon and Palestine, see e.g. Traboulsi (2012); Asseburg (1999). 
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large number of social entrepreneurs, this was impossible. In order to include the greatest 
variety of social entrepreneurs, I contacted internationally recognized social entrepreneurs that 
were selected in various years and by different international support organizations. 
Furthermore, I relied on the snowballing technique to identify additional actors who are 
present in the SENs (i.e. local support organizations, social entrepreneurs, business actors and 
state institutions).37 During interviews actors were asked who and how they interact with 
other actors in the SEN. Moreover, also in reports and on their webpages actors refer to other 
actors they partner with. Through these different strategies, it was possible not only to gather 
information on the ties between actors but also to ensure to keep missing ties at a minimum 
level.38  
 
1.5.4 Data Analysis 
This thesis is an inductive qualitative, comparative, diverse case study that applies social 
network analysis (SNA), and is complemented by a qualitative data analysis in order to 
analyze the contribution of SENs to authoritarian renewal. As has been outlined in the review 
of the literature, SNA aims to uncover social structures, characteristics and patterns of 
relations their impact on social relations among actors (Granovetter 1992; Wasserman and 
Faust 1994; Parkhe, Wasserman, and Ralston 2006; McCulloh, Armstrong, and Johnson 
2013). Freeman summarizes the four features that define SNA as follows: 
1. Social network analysis is motivated by a structural intuition based on ties linking 
social actors, 
2. It is grounded in systematic empirical data, 
3. It draws heavily on graphic imagery, and  
4. It relies on the use of mathematical and/or computational models. (Freeman 2004: 
3)         
Therefore, SNA is more than highlighting that actors (in SNA, referred to as nodes or 
vertices) have social ties (in SNA, referred to as links or edges) to other actors in a network 
(in SNA, referred to as graph) (Borgatti, Everett, and Johnson 2013).39 Analyzing the 
                                                 
37
 On snowball sampling, see e.g. Burnham et al. (2004): Chap. 4. 
38
 On missing data, see also the following section on validity. 
39
 There are several more possible ways of sorting data, inter alia depending on the level of analysis, i.e. whether 
the focus is on the dyadic, node or network level, and whether the data is 1-mode (e.g. actor-by-actor matrix) or 
2-mode (e.g. actor-by-event matrix). For further information on network basics and the mathematical 
foundations of different concepts in SNA, see Freeman (2004); Borgatti, Everett, and Johnson (2013); 
McCulloh, Armstrong, and Johnson (2013).  
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empirical data with regard to the existence of actors and ties is only the first step in SNA and 
is complemented by a qualitative analysis of the characteristics of actors and the patterns of 
social relations. In the case of the SENs under study, it consists in preparing a symmetric, 
non-valued adjacency matrix for each SEN that includes the actors and ties of the respective 
SEN. This means that the rows and columns in the matrix are identical and that the cells 
contain binary data, i.e. they are non-valued and nodes are either connected (value ‘1’) or not 
connected (value ‘0’).40 Furthermore, as this thesis focuses on reciprocal ties among actors, 
the graphs are undirected. With the help of SNA computer programs, in the case of this study 
UCINET and Netdraw, the data matrix then can be analyzed and translated into a graph to 
visualize the SENs in each case. Let alone, these graphs allow only for limited statements 
about the ties among actors (micro-level) and the network structure and characteristics 
(macro-level). A plethora of theories and concepts exist in SNA to analyze networks with 
regard to different research questions, focusing for instance on structural holes, the strength of 
ties or key actors (Granovetter 1973; Freeman 1979; Bonacich 1987; Burt 1992).  
In the context of this thesis, the emphasis lays on the power in and beyond networks 
approached through the ties and the position of actors in a network, and the outputs and 
outcomes of these. The relational structure through which power manifests, and is exercised, 
is of interest (Knoke 1990).41 The position of actors in a network and their power are 
commonly addressed through concepts of ‘coreness’ and ‘centrality’ with regard to a network 
as a whole (the network level) and the centrality of actors in a network (the actor level). On 
the network level, coreness measures help to identify the core-periphery structure of a 
network. Thus, they enable the differentiation of a core group of actors from peripheral actors 
based on their coreness values. Coreness is closely related to centrality. While actors with 
high coreness scores are commonly also very central, the opposite is not always true. Thus, 
peripheral actors can be central in a network despite their peripheral position (Borgatti, 
Everett, and Johnson 2013: 159-162, 223-229). Three major concepts of centrality and its 
measurement are used in this study: Degree centrality, Eigenvector centrality and betweenness 
centrality. These different concepts focus on different aspects of centrality and power. While 
degree centrality focuses on the number of ties a node has within a network, Eigenvector 
centrality measures the connections of a node to other well-connected ones in a network. 
Betweenness centrality, however, takes into account how often a node is situated on the 
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 Self-loops are excluded, i.e. actors do not have a tie to themselves. Thus, the graphs are non-reflexive. 
41
 On the conceptualization of power, see also Section 1.3. 
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shortest path between the two other nodes, i.e. functions as a broker, intermediary or boundary 
spanner (Hanneman and Riddle 2005; Bono 2007; Borgatti, Everett, and Johnson 2013: 
chapter 10; McCulloh, Armstrong, and Johnson 2013: Chapter 2).42 The results of the 
measurement of coreness and centrality can be used in two ways. They can be directly 
evaluated or, in addition, visualized and accentuated in the graph of each SEN with the aid of 
e.g. colors, shapes and size of nodes, node labels and node rims. All measures are normalized 
which means the scores range from zero (no coreness or centrality) to 1 (the highest coreness 
or centrality value).     
Although the centrality measures can be used individually, they are often applied jointly in 
order to overcome the limitations of each measure and to analyze the key actors with regard to 
the network structure as a whole. Also, an actor can be central with regard to more than one of 
the above mentioned centrality measures.43 In the context of this study, it is of particular 
interest to identify not only those actors who have many ties to other actors in the SEN 
(degree centrality) but also well-connected actors in each SEN who form an elite group 
(Eigenvector centrality). Thus, Eigenvector centrality gives insights into who an actor is 
connected to, instead of only looking at the total number of ties an actor has. Finally, it is of 
interest to identify those actors who function as brokers between different groups or types of 
actors (betweenness centrality).  Actors can be engaged in multiplex relations. In the case of 
this study, actors in the SEN are connected through support and advice ties. Therefore, 
coreness and centrality are measured for both separately, and in a second step, measured 
jointly, i.e. a tie counts if an actor has either or both types of ties to another actor (Hanneman 
and Riddle 2005).   
 
1.5.5 Discussion of Validity  
There are some challenges any researcher that is conducting SNA could face. On the first of 
these, given that information on the existence or absence of ties is the basis of any network 
analysis, missing data may challenge the results and may lead to a different interpretation of 
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 These concepts of centrality are based on the seminal work of Bonacich (1972; 1987) and Freeman (1979) in 
this field and have been further developed to capture specific aspects. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to 
discuss these and their mathematical foundations in detail.  
43
 In UCINET, these different centrality measures can be selected individually or computed jointly in a single 
step. Although it is possible to visualize these different measures in a single graph in Netdraw, adding too many 
attributes makes the graph less reader-friendly.   
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network structures.44 In order to minimize this challenge, data triangulation has been 
undertaken, and thus, data on the same sets of ties among actors have been collected from 
different sources.            
Another challenge that is worth mentioning is that in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings of 
2011, conducting interviews with certain actors was not possible. While this was not a major 
obstacle in Jordan, in particular in the case of the Egyptian SEN, business actors and 
representatives of state institutions were reluctant to give interviews. However, as has been 
discussed before, interviews were only one source among several sources. For example, social 
entrepreneurs discussed their relations to other actors during interviews. Also, press releases 
and sustainability reports published by business actors provide information on ties to other 
actors. Therefore, despite these challenges, the findings of this thesis are valid and robust.   
  
  
                                                 
44
 On missing data and centrality, see for example Borgatti, Carley, and Krackhardt (2006); Borgatti, Everett, 
and Johnson (2013): 73-76. 
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2. EMPIRICAL STUDY OF EGYPT  
2.1 INTRODUCTION: SOCIO-ECONOMIC REFORM IN EGYPT 
The beginning of the neoliberal restructuring of Egypt’s economy dates back to the 1970s – 
Sadat’s policy of economic opening (Infitah) – and have been further supported through 
economic reforms in the course of structural adjustment since 1991. However, it was not until 
the last decade of Hosni Mubarak’s rule that business actors played an increasingly visible 
role in Egypt’s economy and politics. Mubarak did not lay a strong focus on socio-economic 
development. The increasing engagement in politics and in economic reform of Mubarak’s 
son Gamal as well as the formation of a new and more technocratic cabinet under then Prime 
Minister Ahmed Nazif in 2004, enforced this development (Sfakianakis 2004; Demmelhuber 
and Roll 2007; Osman 2011; Springborg 2013).  
This chapter argues that the Egyptian SEN is predominantly a network of international 
support organizations exclusively focusing on social entrepreneurship, and on Egyptian social 
enterprises and entrepreneurs. The Egyptian regime has not capitalized on (social) 
entrepreneurship as the Moroccan and Jordanian regimes have. Thus, in contrast to the huge 
size of the Egyptian SEN, its contribution to authoritarian renewal is limited. Nevertheless, 
social entrepreneurship constitutes a development and a political tool that has been explored 
by Egyptian business elites as a means to demonstrate their commitment to socio-economic 
development as opposed to personal enrichment, especially since 2011.  
Business actors and technocrats closely linked to Gamal Mubarak became politically well-
connected in the Egyptian neo-patrimonial regime since the early 2000s. In 2005, six 
ministers had an economic background and, approximately, 100 business actors entered 
parliament. Some examples are Rachid Mohamed Rachid (Minister of Trade and Industry, 
2004-2011), Ahmed Maghraby (Minister of Housing, 2005-2010) and Ahmed Ezz who held a 
central role in parliament and in the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP). The Policies 
Secretariat of the NDP, headed by Gamal Mubarak, was created in 2002, and aimed to 
modernize the NDP and, in this endeavor, to propose new policies addressing education, 
economics, youth participation, women’s issues and health care. In general, the creation of 
institutions served the strengthening of Gamal Mubarak’s political position. The inclusion of 
his cronies as new elite actors in politics and their dominance in certain sectors of the 
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economy furthermore represented a neoliberal economic course led by a new generation of 
actors. Similarly, the Egyptian Center for Economic Studies (ECES), founded in the 1990s as 
an advisory body for economic reforms inter alia by Gamal Mubarak, comprised leading 
business elites closely linked to the regime and to Gamal Mubarak personally. The Future 
Generation Foundation (FGF), by contrast, was established by Gamal Mubarak in the late 
1990s as an association to promote entrepreneurship, leadership and technology innovation 
among youth. As the other institutions, the FGF’s board of directors encompassed Gamal 
Mubarak’s cronies and together with the above-mentioned advisory bodies and business 
actors in politics resulted in the growing political influence of Gamal Mubarak.45 
Furthermore, several of these business actors were the presidents of the American Chamber of 
Commerce in Egypt (AmCham), e.g. Iskandar Shalaby in the early 1990s and Mohamed 
Mansour (1999-2003) or the members of it and thus also created international linkages of 
support between Egyptian business elites and the USA.46 Several more business actors, 
individuals and families benefitted largely from these reforms. The Mansour family (inter alia 
banking, automotive, machinery, consumer goods, IT), Sawiris (telecommunications, 
construction, real estate and hotels), Sewedy (electrical equipment) and Khamis (textile) are 
examples of a growing private sector and the prevalence of crony capitalism in Egypt (ICG 
2003; Schlumberger 2004; Demmelhuber and Roll 2007; Albrecht 2008; Soliman 2011; 
Menza 2012: 112; Roccu 2013; Roll 2013; Springborg 2013).47  
With the overthrow of the Mubarak regime in 2011, Egypt entered a turbulent political, social 
and economic period marked by a deteriorating economic situation and instability. Despite 
these changes since 2011, the perception of ‘Mubarakism without Mubarak’ (Adly 2014: 3) 
and the rehabilitation of many of the political and economic actors prevail. While several of 
Gamal Mubarak’s cronies faced persecution and investigations (Ezz, Rachid, Maghrabi) 
others survived relatively trouble-free (Sawiris, Mansour, Alfi) (Roll 2013; Springborg 2013; 
Hinnebusch 2015). In June 2014, Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, the Chief of the Egyptian Armed 
Forces, came to power as the new Egyptian President. Although it is too early to draw 
conclusions about Sisi’s socio-economic agenda, it becomes clear that the immediate 
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 Among them were Ahmed Ezz, Moataz Al Alfi (Americana/ Egypt-Kuwait Holding) and Mohamed Farouk 
Hafeez (Americana). The FGF was not shut down after the uprisings of 2011: it still exists albeit under the name 
Professional Development Foundation (PDF). For further details, see www.pdf-eg.org/node/50 [15.12.2015].   
46
 www.amcham.org.eg/about_us/?P=10 [05.12.2015]. 
47
 Many of these actors had established themselves well before 2004, the Sawiris for instance in the 1970s, but 
they benefitted significantly from the reforms during the 1990s and 2000s. For a detailed analysis of the 
Egyptian business actors and their economic and political roles, see Schlumberger (2004); Sfakianakis (2004); 
Alissa (2007b); Rutherford (2008); Demmelhuber (2009); Wurzel (2009).  
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priorities are mega projects, e.g. the Suez Canal expansion, and some big international events 
to attract foreign investment such as the Egypt Economic Conference, March 2015, (in which 
(social) entrepreneurship has not got a mention) (El Dahshan 2014b; Roll 2014).48   
 
2.2 THE SEN IN EGYPT 
This section is divided into three parts, each of which addresses one of the three dimensions 
outlined in the analytical framework. The first part (dimension I) outlines the development of 
the Egyptian SEN between 2003 and 2014, and the actors, institutions, and initiatives that 
form the Egyptian SEN. It shows that, owing to the strong presence and dominance of 
international support organizations exclusively focusing on social entrepreneurship and their 
local representatives, the Egyptian SEN has developed into a large network. The second part 
(dimension II) focuses on the structure of the Egyptian SEN, as well as on the social ties 
among actors and their role and position. It reveals that in spite of its large size, a small 
number of actors dominates the SEN and entertains innovative support and advice ties, which 
are well-developed. Building on dimension II, the third part (dimension III) analyzes the 
generation of tangible and intangible resources through these ties. It shows that resources 
generated through international ties are strong and diverse, whereas resources generated 
through local ties are poorly developed.  In the final section, the findings of the analysis of the 
Egyptian SEN and its contribution to authoritarian renewal are summarized. 
    
2.2.1 Emergence & Support: Actors, Institutions & Initiatives in the SEN 
Social entrepreneurship support programs by international support organizations were 
introduced in Egypt in 2003. Egyptian social entrepreneurs were the first ones in the MENA 
region receiving international recognition, and Egypt has developed into a social 
entrepreneurship stronghold since then. This development has been triggered further by the 
uprising of 2011. To date, Egypt has the highest number of internationally recognized social 
enterprises and entrepreneurs in the MENA region, and a plethora of actors – local support 
organizations, social enterprises and entrepreneurs, and state institutions and business actors – 
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 For further details on this conference, see www.egyptthefuture.com/ [15.12.2015]. 
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constitute the Egyptian SEN. This section (dimension I of the analytical framework) 
demonstrates that despite the presence of a multitude of different types of actors, within-type 
main actors, institutions and initiatives, and the international support organizations 
exclusively focusing on social entrepreneurship dominate the SEN. In Morocco and Jordan, 
by contrast, regime elites and local actors play a crucial role in the SEN.   
 
International & Local Support Organizations 
Since 2003, the Egyptian SEN has undergone three waves of development. They can be 
broadly differentiated into a foundation phase between 2003 and 2007, a period of continuous 
growth between 2008 and 2011, and a social entrepreneurship boom that started in 2012 
manifesting itself in a sharp increase in new actors and support initiatives in the SEN. As the 
following analysis points out, during these waves, the major international support 
organizations exclusively focusing on social entrepreneurship started to engage in social 
entrepreneurship support in Egypt. Moreover, numerous local support organizations have 
emerged. In contrast to their limited presence in Morocco, and in Jordan, international support 
organizations exclusively focusing on social entrepreneurship play a key role in the Egyptian 
SEN. They recognized more Egyptian social enterprises and entrepreneurs in each of the three 
waves of the development of the SEN than they did in most other countries in the MENA 
region in total. 
During the first wave, international support organizations exclusively focusing on social 
entrepreneurship established themselves in Egypt and recognized the first Egyptian social 
entrepreneurs. In 2003, Ashoka Arab World (AAW) was launched as Ashoka’s regional 
MENA office in Cairo on the initiative of Iman Bibars, an Egyptian development expert.49 
She has been the Director of AAW since then and has shaped social entrepreneurship in Egypt 
and in the MENA region. Also, she is a member of the global Ashoka senior team, connecting 
AAW to Ashoka Global and to the latter’s networks.50 Between 2003 and 2007, Ashoka 
awarded fellowships to 25 Egyptian social entrepreneurs, selecting annually between three to 
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 In order to receive support in identifying Egyptian social entrepreneurs the representative of Ashoka’s 
International Selection Committee in charge of the MENA region and Central Asia approached Bibars in 2002. 
Bibars had been working with international organizations for nearly two decades at that time. Soon afterwards, 
this endeavor turned into opening AAW. See also www.eacharab.com/2012/05/10/iman-bibars-and-wise-
women-entrepreneurs-interview-by-aslan-media/ [05.12.2015]. 
50
 Until 2007, Ashoka selected predominantly Egyptian fellows, and then expanded to other countries in the 
MENA region (Ashoka Arab World 2013). 
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seven new fellows (Ashoka Arab World 2008).51 Until 2006, Ashoka was the only 
international support organization in the field of social entrepreneurship that was present in 
the emerging Egyptian SEN. The Schwab Foundation elected its first Egyptian fellows in 
2006 during the WEF-MENA which took place in Egypt.52 In late 2007, Synergos decided to 
launch a social entrepreneurship program in the MENA region, the Arab World Social 
Innovators (AWSI) program, and recruited Hisham El Rouby, one of the first Egyptian 
Ashoka fellows, to facilitate the development and the implementation of this program. Rouby, 
based in Cairo, subsequently became also the representative for Egypt, Morocco and 
Lebanon. Synergos created the Regional Advisory Committee composed of nine actors from 
the MENA region who not only have decided on the final selection of social entrepreneurs but 
also have provided guidance and local connections to Synergos and its fellows (Synergos 
2010b). As representatives of Egypt, AAW Director Iman Bibars and Mona Zulficar, the 
Chairperson of EFG Hermes, were among the committee members. Thus, AAW was 
consulted and influenced the implementation of the AWSI program.53         
Ashoka and Synergos as international actors emphasize the broader context in which socio-
economic problems are embedded. Ashoka’s vision is ‘to advance an Everyone a 
Changemaker [sic!] world, where anyone can apply the skills of changemaking to solve 
complex social problems’.54 In particular, AAW aims to  
[…] empower marginalized groups across the Arab world: youth, women, street 
children, and individuals from rural communities. Initiatives focused on enhancing 
the participation and development of these marginalized groups are crucial for the 
overall prosperity of the region. (Ashoka Arab World 2013: 6) 
Both organizations search for social entrepreneurs who work towards systemic change and do 
not address problems in isolation (Ashoka Arab World 2013; Synergos 2014b). As Synergos 
puts it  
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 These fellows are inter alia Hisham Rouby and Ehaab Abdou (Nahdet El Mahrousa) who developed into key 
actors in the Egyptian SEN shortly after. 
52
 The WEF-MENA took place in Sharm El-Sheikh in 2006 and 2008. The Schwab awardees are Laila Iskander 
(CID) and Maher Boushra (Better Life Association for Comprehensive Development, BLACD). The latter was 
recognized by Ashoka two years earlier; see also www.schwabfound.org/entrepreneurs [05.12.2015]. 
53
 Furthermore, Synergos has a program representative for Jordan and Palestine who is based in Ramallah and a 
Director Middle East and North Africa based in New York; personal interviews, Cairo/Amman, March 
2012/March 2013; see also www.synergos.org/08/socialinnovatorssought.htm [18.02.2015]. 
54
 www.ashoka.org/visionmission [18.02.2015]; see also Ashoka Arab World (2011) and Ashoka Arab World 
(2013). 
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[…] improving the lives of people in poor and marginalized communities requires 
systemic change. Such change can only happen when individuals work in meaningful 
partnership with other citizens, institutions and sectors of society, to address the root 
causes of poverty and inequality.55  
During this foundation phase of the Egyptian SEN, the well-established and the new social 
enterprises that had been founded between the 1970s and the early 2000s became part of the 
SEN.56 Moreover, the regional and the international social enterprises working in the field of 
entrepreneurship and employability launched a branch in Egypt. These are Injaz (2003)57 and 
Education for Employment (EFE, 2007)58 which are the central actors in the Jordanian and 
Moroccan SENs.59 While Injaz first established itself in Jordan and subsequently in Egypt, 
EFE opened its first office in the MENA region in Jordan and Morocco (2006). Furthermore, 
Enactus (2004)60 expanded at the same time to Egypt and Morocco. Thus, although Egypt is 
the first country in the MENA region that has been internationally recognized for its social 
entrepreneurs, it is not the first country in the region where social enterprises were founded or 
established local branches. 
In the very same year, in which Ashoka opened AAW in Cairo, the first local support 
organization exclusively focusing on social entrepreneurship, Nahdet El Mahrousa, was 
launched by Ehaab Abdou and his acquaintances. In the following year, in 2004, Abdou was 
recognized by Ashoka. Nahdet El Mahrousa aims to  
[…] make a positive and lasting impact on Egypt’s cultural, economic, and social 
development by activating and engaging young professionals. By leveraging the idea 
and power of social innovation, NM [Nahdet El Mahrousa] engages social 
entrepreneurs to solve some of Egypt’s toughest development challenges. (Nahdet El 
Mahrousa 2012: 3)  
These organizations focus explicitly on both the promotion of social entrepreneurship as a 
new development tool and the support of early stage social enterprises (Nahdet El Mahrousa 
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 www.synergos.org/socialinnovators/overview.htm [18.02.2015]. 
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 These work predominantly in the field of health, learning and education, economic development (Ashoka Arab 
World 2008). 
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 Injaz was founded in 1999 in Jordan; after its expansion to Egypt in 2003, it established a regional operations 
center in 2005 in order to plan and administer its expansion to additional countries in the MENA region (Injaz 
Al-Arab 2010). For further details on Injaz, see also Chapter 3 on Jordan. 
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 EFE operates in six countries in the MENA region; several branches were launched in 2006 (Jordan, Morocco, 
Palestine), followed by EFE Egypt in 2007, and EFE Yemen and Tunisia in 2008 and 2012 respectively. The 
founder Ron Bruder is a US entrepreneur. For further details, see www.efe.org [18.02.2015].  
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 See Chapters 3 and 4 on Jordan and Morocco. 
60
 Enactus is based in the USA, was established there in 1975 under the name SIFE (Students In Free Enterprise), 
and has nearly 40 branches across the world. It operates local branches in three countries in the MENA region: 
Morocco, Egypt and Tunisia; see also www.enactus.org [05.12.2015]. 
 67 
2012; Dajani and El Skarkawy 2014). While it shares with the international support 
organizations the interest in developing an Egyptian SEN and creating an enabling 
environment, Nahdet El Mahrousa does not target the established actors. Thus, international 
and local support organizations complement each other.  Between 2003 and 2007, nearly 30 
social enterprises and entrepreneurs were recognized by international and local support 
organizations.  
At the end of the first wave, also a regional award for social entrepreneurship was created. 
King Abdullah II of Jordan launched the King Abdullah II Award for Youth Innovation and 
Achievement (KAAYIA) in 2007 under the umbrella of the King Abdullah II Fund for 
Development (KAFD). KAAYIA takes place in Jordan biennially, usually during the WEF-
MENA, and recognizes Arab youth (KAAYIA 2015). The first recognition of social 
entrepreneurs, however, took place in 2009.61    
The selection of the first Synergos fellows in 2008 marks the beginning of the second wave of 
the development of the Egyptian SEN. Between 2008 and 2011, the SEN underwent a period 
of continuous growth and the number of social enterprises and entrepreneurs increased 
considerably. In fact, the number of recognitions has more than doubled. Not only were six 
Egyptians among the Synergos fellows but also Ashoka, the Schwab Foundation and Nahdet 
El Mahrousa recognized additional Egyptian social entrepreneurs. Similarly, four Egyptians 
were among the winners and finalists of KAAYIA in 2009 and 2011. Raghda Ebrashi, who 
had been awarded a Synergos fellowship in the previous year, was among them.62 Moreover, 
Synergos named Rouby senior fellow in 2010, and thus, further intensified its local ties and 
the social enterprise Endeavor63 opened an Egyptian branch in 2008 after it had launched its 
Jordan office a year earlier. The number of recognitions of social entrepreneurs and 
enterprises during this wave amounts to more than 40, increasing the total number of 
recognitions by international and local support organizations to more than 70.64 Having said 
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 For further details on KAAYIA, see Chapter 3 on Jordan. 
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 Ebrashi is the founder of Alashanek Ya Balady Association for Sustainable Development (AYB), founded in 
2002; for further details, see www.ayb-sd.org [15.12.2015]. 
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 Endeavor was founded in 1997 in the USA by Linda Rottenberg and Peter Kellner and has country offices 
across the world. Between 2007 and 2014, it established itself in six countries in the MENA region: Jordan, 
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www.endeavor.org [18.02.2015].    
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 For details on the ten new Ashoka fellows see Ashoka Arab World (2008) and Ashoka Arab World (2011). 
The three Schwab awardees are Ghaly (TADE), Sherif Ghamrawy (Basata) and Ibrahim Abouleish (Sekem). The 
former two awardees are Ashoka fellows, as well. Nahdet El Mahrousa selected nearly 30 social enterprises 
(Nahdet El Mahrousa 2011). 
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this, seven of the social enterprises and entrepreneurs who had been selected for an Ashoka 
fellowship during the first wave, received another fellowship or award during the second 
wave. Similar to Jordan and Morocco, the number of recognitions gives only limited insights 
into the size of a SEN as multiple recognitions are not exceptions. 
The Egyptian SEN entered its third wave of development in late 2011/2012. We see an 
expansion of the SEN due to the emergence of new initiatives and of numerous local support 
organizations that considered the uprisings of 2011 an opportunity for entrepreneurial action. 
In the cases of the Moroccan and the Jordanian SEN, the boom is strongly related to the 
emergence of local actors, whereas in the case of the Egyptian SEN, we see that international 
support organizations have played an important role. Synergos, for instance, selected two 
more classes of fellows in 2011 and in 2013, including seven Egyptians. Moreover, it 
launched its new program Pioneers of Egypt (PoE) as a country program. With this new 
country program Synergos aims to make  
[…] an investment in the new leaders of Egypt who have a key role to play in 
building the future of their country as this generation has the capacity to bring 
economic prosperity to their country. (Synergos 2013: Appendix L, p.4)   
Between 2012 and 2014, this program recognized 52 established social entrepreneurs and 
supported more than 200 startups to turn their ideas into social enterprises. Furthermore, it 
included volunteer trainings and placements. This significant increase of actors within only 
three years sharply contrasts with Synergos’s recognition of 13 social entrepreneurs between 
2008 and 2013.65 Rouby has taken a leading role in the development of this program and the 
selection of social entrepreneurs; he also became the Regional Director in charge of the 
MENA region (Synergos 2011; Synergos 2012; Synergos 2014a). Moreover, under the 
leadership of Synergos and USAID, the Alliance for Social Entrepreneurship (A4SE), an 
alliance between Ashoka and Synergos (and at the beginning, also the Schwab Foundation) 
was established in 2011. This three-year program aims to foster the creation of enabling 
environments for social entrepreneurship in the MENA region, Asia and Africa. In order to do 
so, it seeks to strengthen the engagement of the public and private sector in the SENs, and to 
raise awareness about the obstacles and constraints in the respective SEN. A4SE’s major 
achievements consist in bringing together the key actors in the Egyptian SEN and in 
evaluating the development of the SEN between 2003 and 2012 (see e.g. El Abd 2012; 
Synergos and Ashoka Arab World 2012). Owing to these developments, Synergos has 
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consolidated its presence in the Egyptian SEN, and has developed into a central support 
organization alongside, and in close cooperation with AAW. Ashoka selected eight fellows 
between 2012 and 2013. Compared to the development of the SENs in Jordan and Morocco, 
the Egyptian SEN increased more in size during each wave than each of the other two SENs 
in total until 2014. 
This stronger presence of these international organizations on the Egyptian SEN has been 
accompanied by the emergence of local support organizations. While Nahdet El Mahrousa 
was the only local support organizations focusing on social entrepreneurship between 2003 
and 2011, in 2012 and 2013, multiple new local support organizations emerged, most of them 
focusing on entrepreneurship in general but with a focus on entrepreneurship education, 
technology, environmental issues, social development or arts, and thus, including social 
entrepreneurship. In particular, co-working spaces that provide a mix of office space and 
opportunities for exchange and learning with peers proliferated in Cairo and Alexandria. The 
District was the first Egyptian co-working space opening its doors in 2012; by the end of 
2013, the number increased to seven including IceCairo, IceAlex and AlMaqarr (Manga 2013; 
Gabr 2013a; Mostafa 2015). As opposed to other support organizations these co-working 
spaces are open to everyone who is interested in entrepreneurship, thus they are reaching out 
to a broader audience than those support organizations that focus on a select number of actors. 
Furthermore, two local support organizations that offer social entrepreneurship programs were 
launched. Realizing Innovation Through Social Entrepreneurship (RISE Egypt), founded in 
2013 offers a two-year fellowship program to help social enterprises to scale up. In 2014, 
RISE selected five fellows, among which Educate-Me has been recognized also by KAAYIA 
and Synergos.66 The initiative Governorate Economic and Social Revival (GESR) was 
launched by the Misr El-Kheir Foundation in 2013, as well.67 GESR offers support for social 
enterprises that use technology to address issues in the field of energy, water, health, food and 
education. Nine winners were selected through a competition in 2014 for a six-month 
incubation program. GESR aims to establish incubators in all 28 governorates of Egypt to 
promote and support entrepreneurship, and thus, ‘to achieve Governorate Economic and 
Social Revival (GESR)’.68 Al Fanar is another support organization, founded in 2004, that 
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 For further details, see www.riseegypt.org [05.12.2015]. 
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 The Misr EL-Kheir Foundation is a development organization founded in 2007; for details, see 
www.misrelkheir.org/[15.12.2015]. 
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 It is not clear who is involved in the selection of the winners, whether these are employees of Misr El-Kheir 
Foundation who administer GESR or also external actors; for further details, see www.gesr.net/en [15.12.2015]. 
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works with social enterprises and startups in Egypt, Lebanon and Libya. It does not offer 
fellowships, awards, or incubation programs, but as a ‘venture philanthropy organization’ 
invests in social enterprises and provides advice in management issues (Alfanar 2014).69 
Social enterprises and entrepreneurs also received recognition at international events in fields 
related to social entrepreneurship. Several Egyptian social enterprises such as TADE, Alwan 
Wa Awtar and EFE were among the Takreem awardees (in 2013 and 2014), and Synergos 
fellow Perihan Abou Zeid and RISE Egypt fellows Jozour were among the finalists of the 
MIT Arab Startup Competition in 2011-12 and in 2013-14.70 Furthermore, Sekem was 
awarded the Right Livelihood Award in 2003 which is known as the ‘Alternative Nobel 
Prize’.71 Thus, Egyptian social enterprises and entrepreneurs are known and recognized 
beyond the international social entrepreneurship community. 
 
Social Enterprises & Entrepreneurs 
Social enterprises and entrepreneurs in the Egyptian SEN differ significantly. As the following 
analysis demonstrates, they can be characterized with regard to the type of social enterprises, 
to the sector of engagement and to the social background of entrepreneurs. They are not a 
homogenous group of actors; at the same time, they do not form subgroups or generations as 
it is the case in Morocco.  
In Egypt, social enterprises can register as associations, not-for-profit companies or as for-
profit companies. Although the latter becomes increasingly popular, there are many 
associations and even social enterprises that have not registered officially but are affiliated to 
other actors; e.g. to the local support organization Nahdet El Mahrousa. 
Egyptian social enterprises operate in several areas, ranging from education/skill 
development, economic development and income generation/job creation, information and 
communication technology, health, agribusiness and environment, culture and arts to 
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community development/civic engagement. They do not address socio-economic issues 
isolated from each other; i.e. most of them operate across multiple fields. Marginalized groups 
of society (e.g. women, youth, rural and urban poor and people with disabilities) are the target 
groups of most of these enterprises. Social enterprises in Egypt work in both urban and rural 
areas across Egypt but are predominantly based in Cairo. Smaller numbers of social 
enterprises are also located in Alexandria, Minya, Siwa and Sinai. While this concentration of 
social enterprises in major and capital cities is also the case in Jordan and Morocco, it is less 
problematic in these countries than in Egypt due to the smaller size of the countries and thus 
the shorter distances to reach target groups, support organizations and other social 
entrepreneurs.72 As a consequence, social enterprises are isolated in some regions of Egypt, or 
simply, they do not establish enterprises in remote areas. 
Although many social enterprises have been founded since 2003, and especially since 2011, 
as has been discussed in the previous section, there are also enterprises that date back to the 
period between the 1970s and the 1990s like CID Consulting, Basata and Sekem.73 Similarly, 
and to some extent related to that, the age of social entrepreneurs varies considerably. It 
ranges from 20 to nearly 80 years. While many are beyond the age of 45 (Sekem founder 
Abouleish is in his late 70s), the age group 30 to 45 is also represented and actively engaged 
in social entrepreneurship in Egypt. The latter age group consists in particular of social 
entrepreneurs who founded their enterprises during the first and the second wave of the 
development of the Egyptian SEN. Examples are the founders of Nahdet El Mahrousa, AYB 
or Gudran.74 Thus, contrary to the Moroccan SEN where the age group 30 to 45 is largely 
absent, it plays a strong role in the Egyptian SEN and in the Jordanian SEN. This can be 
explained by the fact that Ashoka and Synergos predominantly focus on the age group 30 and 
older. However, the age group 20-30 is equally active in the Egyptian SEN as their peers in 
Morocco and Jordan and got engaged in social entrepreneurship predominantly since 2011. A 
stark generational gap between an older and a younger generation of social entrepreneurs as in 
Morocco, however, does not exist in Egypt. 
With regard to the educational background and experience abroad, social entrepreneurs differ 
less. Among the older social entrepreneurs, there are some that are from marginalized 
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communities they target with their enterprise, and thus, neither attended university nor had 
substantial experience abroad when they were recognized as social entrepreneurs by 
international support organizations exclusively focusing on social entrepreneurship. The 
majority of social entrepreneurs, and especially the ones below the age of 45, have a 
university degree. They are also aware of social entrepreneurship as a concept and explicitly 
seek to combine entrepreneurial activity and social engagement. Similar to Jordan and 
Morocco, the social entrepreneurs aged 45 and above first got to know social entrepreneurship 
in the course of their application process for a social entrepreneurship support program.75    
Egyptian social entrepreneurs were not loyal supporters of Mubarak regime. Yet, for the most 
part, they tried not to cross the red lines determined by the regime in order to be able to work. 
Thus, they have not been politically apathetic but tried to balance criticism on socio-economic 
policies and issues and the tacit consent of authoritarian rule. Only few acted more resolutely 
albeit not openly working against the regime. This has not changed fundamentally since 2011.  
 
State Institutions & the Ruler 
State institutions in Egypt do not play a supportive role in social entrepreneurship. Under the 
Mubarak regime, state institutions engaged, only rarely, with social enterprises and 
entrepreneurs. This has not changed much in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings of 2011. 
State institutions have not developed policies and regulations specifically for social 
entrepreneurship. Furthermore, neither Mubarak nor his successors paid attention to social 
entrepreneurship between 2003 and 2014. 
Between 2003 and 2014, only few state institutions were present in the Egyptian SEN in 
addition to those ministries where social enterprises register their enterprise; i.e. the Ministry 
of Social Solidarity or the Ministry of Investment/GAFI. The Ministry of Education, the 
Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Culture and the National Youth Council are among 
those ministries who supported select social enterprises and entrepreneurs.76  
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Chahine and Mowafi (2015). 
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In the field of entrepreneurship in general, state institutions have shown interest and have 
founded initiatives and institutions, albeit these are few and mainly support small- and 
medium-sized enterprises and enterprises focusing on information and communication 
technology (ICT). In addition to the Social Fund for Development (SFD)77 which was 
established in 1991, the Bedaya Center for Entrepreneurship & SMEs Development, affiliated 
to the General Authority for Investment and Free Zones (GAFI/Ministry of Investment) 
established in 2010 offers training, funding and competitions to support existing enterprises, 
and to promote entrepreneurship as a career path.78 The Technology Innovation and 
Entrepreneurship Center (TIEC), affiliated to the Ministry of Communications and 
Information Technology, was also founded in 2010. TIEC aims to foster entrepreneurship and 
innovation.79 Social entrepreneurship has not explicitly been addressed in the programs 
offered by TIEC and Bedaya, yet enterprises with a social impact have not been excluded 
either.  
Social enterprises in Egypt, as in the MENA region in general, have not been recognized by 
the state as independent legal entities, and therefore, a legal and regulatory framework for 
social entrepreneurship does not exist. In most cases, social enterprises have registered either 
as not-for-profit associations or companies, or as for-profit companies.80 Thus, the 
registration, operational activities, tax and labor regulations as well as revenue generation are 
subject to the respective regulations and laws. Although a hybrid status, combining the 
generation of income with a public benefit status does not exist, several Egyptian social 
enterprises have circumvented this challenge by founding two legal entities, one non-profit 
and one for-profit, that closely work together.81      
As this section reveals, Egyptian state institutions and the regime have not shown a particular 
interest in social entrepreneurship; only few ministries have engaged in social 
entrepreneurship, and thus, supportive regulations and policies have not been developed.  
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Business Actors & Initiatives 
Egyptian business actors have shown a very limited interest in social entrepreneurship in the 
past decade. As we will see in the analysis below, although numerous business actors have 
been present in the Egyptian SEN prior to and after 2011, they have not engaged with social 
enterprises and entrepreneurs on a large scale let alone launched (social) entrepreneurship 
programs. Thus, the Egyptian business elites play a minor role in the Egyptian SEN. In that 
respect, the Egyptian case differs significantly from the Jordanian and Moroccan cases where 
business actors constitute core actors in the SENs.    
While many of these business actors are family businesses comprising at least two generations 
in the past decades, they are not a grown business elite with a long history of regime ties such 
as it is the case in Morocco. Rather, comparatively short-lived ties to the ruler prevailed, 
based on ‘networks of privilege’ and, as Springborg argues, a lack of an institutional legacy 
and power in state institutions, in civil society, or in broader society (Springborg 2013: 
247f.).82 As a consequence, these business actors benefitted from the rise of Gamal Mubarak 
in Egyptian politics in the early 2000s, but were also affected by the uprising of 2011 and the 
overthrow of Hosni Mubarak. They were subjected to harsh criticism by the Egyptian 
protestors and to prosecution, and many fled temporarily abroad. Having said this, the 
majority of them did not face major consequences in the medium- and long-term (Nakhoul 
2011; Roll 2013; Springborg 2013; Ahmed 2015). 
This fact also manifests in the case of the Egyptian SEN. This analysis shows that while 
individual business actors who fell into disgrace in 2011 withdrew from their engagement in 
the SEN, for the most part, the presence of business actors in the SEN has not changed 
considerably. Those business actors who faced persecutions and were criticized for their 
economic enrichment and close ties to the Mubarak regime, such as Ahmed Ezz, are largely 
invisible in the SEN, and have maintained a low profile in politics, the economy and society 
between 2011 and 2014. Actors within the SEN are reluctant to disclose information on their 
previous ties to these actors. The Sawiris family, the Mansours and EFG Hermes83 (banking), 
and Americana and Egypt-Kuwait Holding (Moataz Al Alfi, Mohamed Farouk Hafeez) by 
contrast, have made efforts to demonstrate their commitment to the Egyptian society and to 
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socio-economic development.84 They have been present in the Egyptian SEN prior to and 
after 2011. The latter two have also been at the board of directors of Gamal Mubarak’s FGF 
and later, on the PDF.85 Yet, similar to the lack of strategies, initiatives and programs on 
(social) entrepreneurship by state institutions and rulers, also business actors have not 
engaged in developing such initiatives and programs. The Sawiris family is one of the richest 
Egyptian families and the owners of Orascom Group. They founded the Sawiris Foundation 
for Social Development (SFSD) in 2001, which is active in the field of health, education for 
employment and community development. SFSD launched 172 initiatives and projects in 22 
governorates.86  
Our mission is to contribute to Egypt’s development, create sustainable job 
opportunities, and empower citizens to build productive lives that realize their full 
potential. (Sawiris Foundation for Social Development 2011: 6) 
Moreover, Iskandar Shalaby, a close associate of Naguib Sawiris and strongly involved in 
Mobinil and Orascom Telecom Holding (OTH), has personally been engaged in the Egyptian 
SEN since the early 2000s.87 In Orascom, executives and local CSR practitioners plan CSR 
activities. Similarly, the Mansour Group and EFG Hermes promote ‘corporate citizenship’ and 
support initiatives in the field of infrastructure, human and economic development. Both 
business actors established foundations, through which they implement and support 
initiatives. The Mansour Foundation for Development, founded in 2001, distanced itself from 
charity work in 2009, emphasizing now knowledge transfer, stakeholder engagement and 
corporate investment in community.88 EFG Hermes established the EFG Hermes Foundation 
in 2006 and targets people and institutions that face ‘financial, educational and health-related 
challenges’ with a focus on poverty alleviation, disease prevention and youth development in 
Upper Egypt. Moreover, in 2013, EFG Hermes initiated a restructuring process of its bank 
including its CSR strategy. It formed a sustainability committee, composed of employees of 
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the company and the foundation, and published its first sustainability report in 2013 (EFG 
Hermes 2014).89  
In addition to the engagement of these powerful business actors, a multitude of other business 
actors is present in the Egyptian SEN. They have been engaged in SEN on a case-by-case 
basis in specific areas of interest, and have focused on several few social enterprises. 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), ExxonMobil, Vodafone, Procter & Gamble, Americana 
(Mohamed Farouk Hafeez & Moataz Al Alfi) and Egypt-Kuwait Holding (Moataz Al Alfi) are 
some examples of actors who engage with social enterprises as part of their CSR activities. 
Although business actors engage in socio-economic development and emphasize the 
importance of CSR activities, CSR strategies and reporting are poorly institutionalized. 
Approximately 60 companies have expressed their commitment to CSR since 2003; yet, only 
few issue reports on their CSR strategy, activities, partners and spending (e.g. EFG Hermes 
2009; EFG Hermes 2014; OTH 2011; Americana 2012; Mobinil 2012; Egypt-Kuwait Holding 
2014; PwC 2015). In 2008, the Egyptian Corporate Responsibility Center (ECRC) was 
founded by the Ministry of Investment, the Egyptian Institute of Directors and the UNDP with 
the aim to raise awareness about CSR and to provide the knowledge and support as to how to 
develop a CSR strategy and reporting standards.90 Similar to Morocco, CSR is confined to the 
elite level; major local business actors and multinational companies such as Mobinil, 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, Procter & Gamble, AmCham or Citibank have been involved in 
CSR activities, and in many cases, CSR is understood as a PR strategy to whitewash the 
reputation of a company.91         
Finally, Ahmed Alfi, an investor and an entrepreneur is worth mentioning. He founded several 
organizations and enterprises since 2010, and is a strong supporter and promoter of 
entrepreneurship in Egypt. Flat6Labs, Sawari Ventures and Nafham are his most known 
initiatives. Furthermore, Alfi opened the GrEEK Campus as technology and innovation space 
in downtown Cairo on the old Campus of the American University in 2013. Trainings, office 
space, networking and Cairo’s major entrepreneurship events (e.g. Rise Summit, and Wamda 
Mix ‘n Mentor) take place there (Curley 2013; Mustafa 2013). Thus, similar to Morocco – 
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and contrasting with Jordan – a younger generation of business actors who actively engage in 
(social) entrepreneurship support hardly exists.   
 
2.2.2 Relations & Interactions within the Egyptian SEN 
As the previous section has demonstrated, the Egyptian SEN is comparatively large. A 
plethora of actors – international and local support organizations, state institutions, business 
actors as well as social enterprises and entrepreneurs – are present in the SEN and linked 
through social ties. However, the analysis of the ties within the Egyptian SEN (dimension II 
of the analytical framework) demonstrates that in contrast to the huge number of actors, there 
are only few central actors in the SEN. In fact, their number is not larger than that in the 
Moroccan or the Jordanian SEN. These are international and local support organizations 
exclusively focusing on social entrepreneurship, and on several few social enterprises and 
entrepreneurs. Neither state institutions nor business actors are core or central actors (Figure 2 
below, Appendix A1). While state institutions are also absent in the case of the Moroccan and 
the Jordanian SEN, the complete absence of business actors among the core and central actors 
marks a sharp contrast.  
 
Figure 2: The Egyptian SEN 
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Legend: coreness (color); degree (node size); eigenvector (label size); betweenness (rim size)  
The following elaboration on the ties among the different types of actors and the within-type 
main actors in the Egyptian SEN provides also a detailed analysis of the types of ties. It 
demonstrates that innovative ties, and in particular innovative support ties, are most prevalent. 
 
Ties between Support Organizations & Social Entrepreneurs 
Owing to the strong presence of international support organizations exclusively focusing on 
social entrepreneurship, both innovative support and advice ties are well-developed in the 
Egyptian SEN. As we will see, alongside these strong actors, other support organizations and 
the support and advice they provide appear small. The only exception is Nahdet El Mahrousa 
which established itself as one of the three most central support organizations in the Egyptian 
SEN (Figure 3 below and Appendix A1). However, this section reveals that while the capacity 
to recognize large numbers of social enterprises and entrepreneurs contributes to the dominant 
role and position of Ashoka and Synergos in the Egyptian SEN, the choice of well-connected 
Egyptian representatives contributes as much, if not more, to this development.  
Figure 3: Ties between Support Organizations & Social Entrepreneurs 
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The international support organizations exclusively working in the field of social 
entrepreneurship are not equally strongly present in the Egyptian SEN. While Ashoka (IN1; 
the lower left part) and Synergos (IN2; the upper part) are among the most central actors at 
the core of the Egyptian SEN, the Skoll Foundation (IN4; the lower right part) and the 
Schwab Foundation (IN3; the lower part) are neither core nor central actors (Appendix A1). 
This is due to the fact that the latter two organizations focus on social enterprises at the 
growth stage which have a track record of significant social impact and therefore, like in 
Jordan and Morocco, only few social enterprises meet their eligibility criteria.92  
Fellowships manifest as innovative support and advice ties in the Egyptian SEN and are the 
key component of the social entrepreneurship programs of Ashoka and Synergos. With regard 
to the program design (e.g. the selection criteria, duration, the combination of support and 
advice), there is no variance across the MENA region. The implementation of these programs, 
however, varies considerably. What differentiates Egypt in this respect from Morocco and 
Jordan is the accessibility and visibility of Ashoka and Synergos in the SENs in these 
countries. As we discussed in Section 2.2.1, Ashoka and Synergos have local representatives 
in Egypt who administer their social entrepreneurship programs in the MENA region. 
Moreover, these representatives are Egyptians who are embedded in the Egyptian business 
and social communities. As a consequence, these representatives have an overview over the 
dynamics and actors in the field of social entrepreneurship and are known by Egyptian social 
entrepreneurs. Especially Ashoka is well-known in Egypt among societal and business actors 
owing to its international reputation as a provider of the most prestigious social 
entrepreneurship fellowship and to Bibars’ efforts to promote AAW in Egypt since 2003. 
Synergos, by contrast, increased its visibility and strengthened its presence in Egypt with the 
launch of PoE.93 Although Ashoka is still more central than Synergos in the Egyptian SEN, 
the differences are minimal. While Synergos is connected to a larger number of actors in the 
SEN than Ashoka, the latter is connected to more well-connected actors than Synergos 
(Appendix A1 and A2).   
This local embeddedness affects not only the selection process of social entrepreneurs for 
fellowships but also the fellowship support and advice ties, including the frequency of 
meetings and events as well as the access to capacity building and to the network of partners 
                                                 
92
 For further details on the selection criteria, see www.skoll.org/about/skoll-awards and 
www.schwabfound.org/content/selection-process [15.06.2015]. 
93
 Personal and skype interviews with social entrepreneurs, representatives of support organizations and experts, 
Cairo, November 2011-March 2012/March-May 2015. 
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of Ashoka and Synergos. Although self-nominations for an Ashoka fellowship are possible, 
Ashoka lays emphasis on the crucial role of a strong network of nominators in the MENA 
region. More than 60% of all applications for an Ashoka fellowship in the MENA region were 
facilitated by a nominator in 2012 (Ashoka Arab World 2012; see also Ashoka Arab World 
2011; Ashoka Arab World 2013). In the case of Egyptian fellows nominators are international 
and local partners of the social enterprises (e.g. business actors, international support 
organizations and senior fellows) and also representatives and employees of Ashoka itself. In 
the AAW team, one person is in charge of identifying potential candidates for a fellowship.94 
Synergos, by contrast, relies on the application of social entrepreneurs themselves, the 
recommendations of the ‘Regional Advisory Committee’ and the personal engagement of 
Rouby. Among the AWSI fellows, several reported that Rouby approached them and 
encouraged them to apply for the Synergos fellowship. He is also the person who conducts the 
field visits and first evaluations of candidates. In fact, everyone in the SEN recommended 
Rouby as the first person to contact and meet due to his expertise of the knowledge of 
actors.95 Figure 3 above underlines Rouby’s (SE17, the upper middle part) central role in the 
Egyptian SEN. He is the most central actor in the SEN who knows nearly everyone, the 
young and mature social enterprises as well as the key business actors and support 
organization. Related to that, he is also strong as a broker who connects different parts of the 
network (Appendix A1 and A2).  The Schwab Foundation also consults actors who know the 
Egyptian SEN and observes whom Ashoka and Synergos select as fellows. Three out of five 
Schwab awardees already had been recognized by Ashoka or Synergos or both at the time the 
Schwab Foundation recognized them. In general, multiple fellowships are pervasive in the 
Egyptian SEN. While the recognition by international support organizations after having been 
supported by a local support organization is the aim in order to facilitate the growth of social 
enterprises and to connect them internationally, this also holds true for AAW and Synergos 
fellows. Approximately one third of all Egyptian Ashoka fellows are also Synergos fellows 
and the four Egyptian social entrepreneurs of the last class of AWSI fellows (2013-2105) are 
also PoE. Thus, the number of fellowships and awards and the number of social enterprises 
and entrepreneurs are not congruent. The SEN is smaller than it first appears and many ties 
overlap.  
                                                 
94
 AAW consists of a team of 15 people in charge of the fellowship selection and support, the organization of 
events, donor ties and the like; personal interviews with social entrepreneurs, a former Ashoka employee and 
Rouby, Cairo, November 2011-March 2012. 
95
 Personal interviews, Cairo, November 2011-March 2012. 
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Ashoka and Synergos both provide a mix of trainings and workshops (e.g. IT, 
monitoring/evaluation, business plan development) and pro-bono services (directly or by one 
of their partner organizations) to their fellows and also frequently organize meetings and 
event participation. The combination of these benefits for fellows, rather than each alone, 
turns fellowships into innovative manifestations of ties. This is what differentiates them from 
ties between other international actors and social entrepreneurs in the SEN; e.g. the Drosos 
Foundation or MEPI which provide institutional and project-linked grants to social 
enterprises.96 While support and advice ties are also components of the social 
entrepreneurship programs in other countries in the MENA region, they are denser in Egypt 
due to the proximity between the international support organization’s regional offices in Cairo 
and Egyptian social entrepreneurs. In particular Ashoka has organized a plethora of meetings 
and events. It offers services that are tailored to the individual needs of a fellow (e.g. proposal 
writing for a grant application, legal assistance in disputes with state institutions) and others 
that initiate partnerships among few fellows or that bring together larger groups of fellows 
(e.g. focused trainings and meetings). Moreover, Ashoka launched several collaborative 
platforms to foster joint action in specific areas of engagement; e.g. street children, education 
and health. They connect entrepreneurs working in the same field and other actors such as 
business actors and associations.97 As one social entrepreneur stated 
[…] the way Ashoka works is that it has a huge network of social entrepreneurs. So 
for me personally, I think, what has been most beneficial is touching base with 
likeminded people […]. I think it is good to see all the things that are happening on 
the ground and all the success stories and to learn from other people’s experiences 
and to build on them […].98 
Similarly, Synergos lays strong emphasis on peer learning, mentoring and regional networks 
and regularly organizes meetings; e.g. the regional AWSI meetings or focus meetings inter 
alia for female social entrepreneurs. The AWSI fellows who were selected between 2008 and 
2013, for instance, function as mentors for PoE. Furthermore, Synergos, and also Ashoka, 
send their fellows to international events to showcase their enterprises. In this context, Ebrashi 
participated in SWF and several fellows traveled to New York for meetings, or attended WEF 
in Egypt and Jordan (Ashoka Arab World 2011; Ashoka Arab World 2013; Synergos 2010a).99  
                                                 
96
 www.drosos.org/about/#organisationsentwicklung [15.12.2015]. 
97
 Personal interviews with social entrepreneurs and an Ashoka representative, Cairo, November 2011-March 
2012; see also Ashoka Arab World (2011); Ashoka Arab World (2013); Ashoka Arab World (2014). 
98
 Personal interview, Cairo February 2012. 
99
 Personal interview, Cairo, March 2012; see also www.etijah.org/pioneers-of-egypt/[15.12.2015]. 
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KAAYIA (IN6, the lower left part), by contrast, constitutes a relational event including few 
days of training and outsourced mentoring for the finalists in addition to a cash prize.100 
Egyptian social entrepreneurs do not ascribe more importance to KAAYIA than to other, 
similar regional events such as the MIT Arab Startup Competition (IN17, the upper left 
part).101 As a result, in sharp contrast to its key role in the Jordanian SEN, KAAYIA is a 
marginal actor in the Egyptian SEN. Alfanar (IN16, the left part), by contrast, is not a 
relational event but offers a mix of financial support and managerial advice as part of a long-
term relationship. However, similar to the other international support organizations and 
initiatives, Alfanar plays a marginal role in the Egyptian SEN (Appendix A1 und A2).         
As we see in Figure 3 above, Nahdet El Mahrousa is the only local support organization 
among the core and the most central actors in the Egyptian SEN (LO1, the lower right). In 
fact, it is one of the four most central actors in the SEN in Egypt in general. Nahdet El 
Mahrousa is well connected to international support organizations and business actors alike, 
and owing to that, fulfils a bridging role between different parts of the SEN (Appendix A1 
und A2). In this respect it is even more central than Ashoka or Synergos in the Egyptian SEN. 
Six of its incubated social enterprises subsequently became PoE (Nahdet El Mahrousa 2011; 
Nahdet El Mahrousa 2012).102 Nahdet El Mahrousa offers similar support and advice services 
as Ashoka and Synergos albeit for social enterprises in the startup phase. The social 
enterprises selected through a competition receive trainings, technical support, access to 
Nahdet’s networks in the Egyptian SEN and mentoring. Moreover, for two years social 
enterprises are part of the organizations; i.e. Nahdet El Mahrousa constitutes their legal 
umbrella. Through this innovative manifestation of a tie social entrepreneurs can focus on the 
development of their ideas and minimize their interactions with state institutions. The 
incubation program is accompanied by a plethora of events such as the ‘Monthly Mondays’ 
meetings and ‘Salon El Mahrousa’ where social entrepreneurs, business actors and support 
organizations can discuss, exchange ideas and present their work. Frequently, the idea for an 
event and its organization is done by social entrepreneurs and business actors, and is not the 
sole responsibility of Nahdet El Mahrousa. At the end of the two years, social enterprises 
                                                 
100
 For further details on KAAYIA, see Chapter 3 on Jordan. 
101
 Personal and Skype interview with Egyptian KAAYIA fellows, Cairo/Amman, November 2011-March 
2011/March-April 2013. 
102
 See also www.nahdetelmahrousa.org/social-enterprises and www.synergos.org/pioneers/list.htm 
[15.12.2015]. 
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participate in a final event that aims to attract investors and help social enterprises to establish 
themselves independently from Nahdet El Mahrousa.103   
Other local support organizations such as RISE (LO4, between SE20 and SE17) and GESR 
(LO7, the upper right part) are relatively new and therefore still play a minor role in the 
Egyptian SEN (Appendix A1and A2). Certainly they contribute to the development of a 
vibrant entrepreneurial environment through the support of several few social enterprises and 
the organization of events and workshops. RISE, for example, supports five successful social 
enterprises that have received several more recognitions, local and international ones, such as 
Educate-Me (SE15) which received KAAYIA (IN6) in 2013, and is among the ‘Pioneers of 
Egypt’ (IN2).104 RISE offers a two-year fellowship to support the scale-up process of social 
enterprises through tailored capacity building, mentoring and international linkages to experts 
and investors. Like Nahdet El Mahrousa, RISE focuses on the social enterprise and thus on 
the team of decision makers within the enterprise rather than solely on one person. However, 
their target group differs, and thus, they complement each other rather than being competitors. 
Finally, as mentioned in the previous section, numerous co-working spaces are present in the 
Egyptian SEN. They are also peripheral actors and do not play a central role in the SEN, 
however, they offer a space to meet, learn and exchange for everyone who conducts projects 
related to the focus area of the respective co-working space and not just recognized (social) 
entrepreneurs. The co-working space IceCairo, for example, values collaboration, team work 
independent from social, religious or political background, and rejects competition.105 As we 
see in Figure 3 above, IceCairo (LO2, next to LO1) has ties to Nahdet El Mahrousa and 
several other actors, including Ashoka. Hence, while not a core or central actor and following 
a different approach to social entrepreneurship support, IceCairo and other local support 
organizations are not isolated actors in the Egyptian SEN.     
 
 
 
                                                 
103
 Skype  interview with one of the co-founders, April 2012; for further details, see also Nahdet El Mahrousa 
(2012); Dajani and El Skarkawy (2014), www.nahdetelmahrousa.org/our-events [05.12.2015]. 
104
 For further details on the RISE fellowship, see www.riseegypt.org/entrepreneurs [15.12.2015]. 
105
 Skype interview with one of the co-founders, May 2015; see also www.icecairo.com/membership 
[15.12.2015]. 
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Ties between State Institutions, the Ruler & Social Entrepreneurs 
State institutions and the ruler(s) are not among the core actors in the Egyptian SEN. Support 
and advice ties are weak, and relational events prevail. Yet state institutions affect the SEN to 
a great extent, namely through restrictive measures as the following elaborations will 
demonstrate. Thus, social enterprises and entrepreneurs have not simply been ignored or 
neglected by state institutions, but have been harassed. This has been the case during 
Mubarak’s rule and has not changed since his overthrow in 2011.   
Figure 4: Ties between State Institutions & Social Entrepreneurs 
 
The interactions and relations between state institutions and social enterprises and 
entrepreneurs constitute relational events rather than relational states. The most central state 
institutions in the Egyptian SEN are the Ministry of Education (SI1), the Ministry of Health 
(SI11) and the SFD (SI12) (marked in circle in Figure 4 above, Appendix A1). This being 
said, these ministries have not necessarily shown a greater interest in social entrepreneurship 
but they are linked to numerous social enterprises and entrepreneurs who are working in the 
field that the respective state institution is in charge of.   
In the majority of cases, social entrepreneurs interact with state institutions to get the approval 
to implement specific projects, and to receive funding. In order to run projects at schools, for 
example, the approval of the Ministry of Education (SI1) is necessary. State institutions 
interfere to a considerable degree in the routine business of social enterprises and local 
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support organizations. As one founder of a social enterprise and a local support organization 
summarized the strategy of many social enterprises 
Social entrepreneurs have a contentious relation with ministries, especially with 
those that supervise associations and companies. Therefore, social entrepreneurs try 
to reduce the interaction with them to a minimum, trying to be invisible in order to be 
able to work.106    
Examples of interferences are numerous. They range from withholding approvals for activities 
or foreign funding, frequent interrogations by the state security to temporarily closing a social 
enterprise under the pretext of, for instance, missing permits, illegal activities or insufficient 
security precautions.107 For the most part, particularly sustainable, self-relying enterprises as 
well as the social entrepreneurs that have been politically active, or that encourage critical 
thinking, faced problems. In an article on entrepreneurship in Egypt in Foreign Policy 
(2014a), Mohamed El Dahshan asked whether ‘Egypt’s New Leaders Hate Entrepreneurs’ and 
concluded that restrictions and interferences are 
[…] symptomatic of a regime that finds the spirit of initiative threatening, and 
considers free thinking a public enemy. This government will not be a partner in 
developing and strengthening a fertile entrepreneurial environment. (El Dahshan 
2014a) 
Also, social entrepreneurs that have been well-connected and included in consultative 
meetings (e.g. to develop new policies in certain areas), and that have introduced new 
procedures and curricula (e.g. in state hospitals and schools), were not spared from state 
interference and chicanery, albeit these have not included threats to close down their 
enterprises.108 There are only few examples of social enterprises who escaped major 
interferences between 2003 and 2014. Thus, ties between state institutions and social 
enterprises and entrepreneurs have tended to be negative and despite several reforms to ease 
the registration process for companies since 2004, entrepreneurs suffer from unsupportive 
legal and regulatory frameworks and practices.109  
Another social entrepreneur sees the roots for the challenges in the lack of knowledge of 
social entrepreneurship: 
                                                 
106
 Skype interview, April 2012. 
107
 Personal interviews with social entrepreneurs and experts, Cairo/Alexandria, Nov. 2011-March 2012; selected 
follow-up Skype interviews, March-May 2015. 
108
 Personal interviews with social entrepreneurs, Cairo/Alenxandria, Nov. 2011-March 2012.  
109
 On this issue, see also www.thisisafricaonline.com/Analysis/Empowering-NGOs-in-Egypt-the-need-for-a-
new-legal-framework?ct=true [05.12.2015]. 
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So, the relationship between the social entrepreneur and the state is still in Egypt or 
the region it is not clear. […] suppose the state has to benefit from the idea, the ideas 
fellows have, because they have a solution, they propose a problem and they propose 
a creative solution. So this type of solution has to be adopted all over the country.  I 
think this healthy relationship has to exist. I hope this will happen, maybe not now in 
Egypt because we have a lot of basic needs in the country. You know about illiteracy, 
poverty, so most of the people want to concentrate on the basic needs of the people. 
And then we can see the creative ideas or creative ideas for social justice. But we are 
an asset for any country. […] In our country, in our region, we appreciate more the 
business entrepreneur because with the business entrepreneur very much directly 
there are benefits for the country. They have jobs, they offer jobs for people, they 
offer a lot of business opportunities, so this kind of relationship is very clear. If we 
have a business entrepreneur he or she will help the country to open new jobs or 
build a factory or build whatever business. But the relationship between the social 
entrepreneur and the country is not clear.110   
In another case, a social enterprise faced considerable challenges by the quasi-governmental 
organization FGF prior to 2011. That foundation first tried to co-opt and incorporate the 
aforementioned social enterprise and its programs into the foundation and when this attempt 
failed the social enterprise experienced frequently controls, interrogations by the state security 
and attempts to close down the whole enterprise.111  
There are also positive examples of ties between state institutions and social enterprises and 
entrepreneurs. The social entrepreneur Laila Iskander (CID Consulting, SE25) served as a 
minister in the Egyptian government (Minister of Environment, 2013, and subsequently 
Minister of Urban Development, 2014). She has been supporting social enterprises and 
entrepreneurs, especially in the field of waste management (e.g. SOY, SE3) and the 
formalization of garbage collection workshops into small companies (Kingsley 2014; 
Esterman 2014). In the latter case, several approvals from different institutions are necessary: 
a report by the Ministry of Environment stating that the workshops of garbage collectors that 
are to be registered as a formal company in a certain area meet the environmental standards, 
the approvals by the Ministry of Investment/GAFI and the Ministry of Finance. Although this 
endeavor resulted in the formal registration of numerous companies and in the formation of a 
syndicate of garbage collectors, Iskander was a minister only for a short period of time. Thus, 
this is an exceptional case.112  
Finally, SFD (SI12, the middle part) and the Bedaya Center (SI13, the lower left part) 
constitute support initiatives launched by state institutions, and thus, play a different role. 
                                                 
110
 Personal interview with a social entrepreneur, Cairo, March 2012. 
111
 Personal interview with the founder, Cairo, March 2012. 
112
 Personal interview with a social entrepreneur working in this field, Cairo, March 2012. 
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While SFD predominantly provides financial support to enterprises and finances job-creating 
projects, Bedaya offers similar competitions and support programs for entrepreneurs as other 
support organizations.  
 
Ties between Business Actors & Social Entrepreneurs 
The Egyptian business actors introduced in the preceding section are connected to social 
enterprises and entrepreneurs in the Egyptian SEN through both support and advice ties. 
Notwithstanding that, ties between business actors and social entrepreneurs develop 
predominantly on a case-by-case basis, and advice ties are weak. As this analysis reveals, 
business actors are neither core nor key actors in the Egyptian SEN, and play a minor role 
beyond individual ties to social enterprises and entrepreneurs. This contrasts sharply with the 
role of business actors in the Jordanian and Moroccan SEN.  
Figure 5: Ties between Business Actors & Social Entrepreneurs 
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SEN nor are they central actors (see also Appendix A1). A considerable number of business 
actors are present in the SEN, but none of them has laid a strong focus on (social) 
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enterprises and entrepreneurs in the Egyptian SEN, this has led to a weak presence of business 
actors. 
This being said, four business actors stand out among the business actors in the SEN: 
Vodafone (BS5), Sawiris (BS2), and EFG Hermes (BS33) (marked in circle in Figure 5). A 
closer look at the centrality measures of these actors shows that they are engaged in support 
stronger than in advice. They have predominantly ties to key players in the SEN including 
central social entrepreneurs and enterprises, such as AYB (SE4), TADE (SE6), BLACD 
(SE8), CORD (SE20), Injaz (SE28) and Ashoka (IN1), Synergos (IN2) and Nahdet El 
Mahrousa (LO1), as well as Enactus (SE22) and EFE (SE23) (Appendix A1 & A2).    
Support ties cover a wide range of interactions. Financing events, projects or social 
entrepreneurs participating in an event are part of the partnerships between business actors 
and social enterprises. Many of these ties are tried-and-tested manifestation of support ties. In 
the majority of cases, business actors and social entrepreneurs engage in longer-term 
partnerships that were formed several years before. Mobinil (BS6), for instance, is a founding 
partner of Enactus Egypt (SE22) and since then has been supporting this social enterprise. The 
relationship between Vodafone (BS5) and AYB (SE4) also dates back several years when 
Vodafone started its Youth Leadership Initiative. In this innovative relationship initiated by 
Vodafone employees as volunteers, conduct leadership trainings at universities in partnership 
with AYB to increase the employability of Egyptian youth. Similarly, Injaz (SE28) engages in 
strategic partnerships with business actors. It draws on employee volunteering for 
entrepreneurship education, and for employment training for a job in the private sector at 
schools and universities; i.e. business actors implement Injaz’s programs and function as 
trainers, role models and mentors. Injaz has over 30 partnerships with business actors, among 
which are Vodafone, Mobinil, Orascom Construction, ExxonMobil, PwC, Delta Holdings, 
HSBC Bank and AmCham. Compared to Injaz Al-Maghrib that has approximately 80 
partnerships with business actors (among which are several members of the business elite 
actively promoting Injaz), this is a rather modest result.113 Given the large number of 
Egyptian social enterprises that are present in the Egyptian SEN, business actors can choose 
partners among a plethora of actors. Furthermore, contrary to Injaz Al-Maghrib, the CEO of 
Injaz Egypt does not have a business background and thus cannot draw on previous business 
ties but needs to convince companies and compete with other social enterprises for support. 
                                                 
113
 Personal interview, Cairo, December 2011; see also Injaz Al-Maghrib (2014) and www.injaz-egypt.org 
[05.12.2015]. 
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Contrary to Injaz, AYB and EFE address Egyptians who are currently unemployed and seek 
employment rather than preparing pupils and university students for the future transition. 
They closely cooperate with business actors and tailor skills training programs (e.g. Training 
for Employment) to the job market needs of certain sectors and of specific companies. In this 
way, they seek to ensure that the youth they train find employment. Thus, while some 
business actors support the work of AYB and have known the social enterprise since it was 
founded, many others are actually its clients.114 In general, ties between business actors and 
social enterprises that work in the field of entrepreneurship education and employability such 
as Enactus, Injaz and EFE tend to be long-term relationships that are mutually beneficial 
rather than philanthropy. Yet, business ties can also be contentious. This holds true in 
particular when CSR is understood as a PR strategy. In one case, a company and a social 
enterprise wanted to set up a joint project. Before a contract was signed and a feasibility study 
conducted the said company already started a PR campaign introducing this new project to 
help Cairo’s poor communities. In so doing, that company pressured the social enterprise and 
the latter faced difficulties to back out of the project.115 
Another way of designing support ties in innovative ways consists in partnership programs 
designed by business actors and social entrepreneurs together to address specific issues. EFG 
Hermes (BS33), for instance, engaged in a three-year partnership with TADE, a social 
enterprises working in Upper Egypt, in 2008 to implement the Roy’a Sustainable 
Development Project. This project was implemented in an impoverished community in Upper 
Egypt and aimed to foster human, infrastructural as well as economic development of an 
entire community. As we see in Figure 5 above, TADE (SE6) is one of the most central social 
enterprises in the Egyptian SEN. The Egyptian Cabinet of Ministers’ Social Contract Center 
recognized Ro’ya in 2009 as a role model for corporate engagement in development (EFG 
Hermes 2009; EFG Hermes 2014). The CEO of EFG Hermes Foundation, Hanaa Helmy, 
herself is a social entrepreneur and was recognized by Ashoka in 2005. This being said, she is 
the only exceptional case where a business actor is at the same time a social entrepreneur.116  
                                                 
114
 AYB first negotiates with business actors, bargains for the number of employees and qualifications they need, 
and then trains youth. Business actors pay for these trainings and have to provide a minimum wage and work 
contract while AYB makes sure the employees have the skills, work discipline and ethics. Personal interview 
with representatives from AYB, Cairo, December 2011/March 2012; see also AYB-SD (2011). 
115
 Personal interview with the social entrepreneur, Cairo, March 2012. 
116
 www.efghermesfoundation.org/Pages/people.aspx [05.12.2015]. 
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Other business actors who have engaged in project partnerships do not have a social issue as 
the primary target, but as a business opportunity, or a challenge. Nahdet El Mahrousa (LO1), 
in cooperation inter alia with Mobinil (BS6) and Sadko (BS34), annually organizes the Young 
Innovators Award in science and technology. In 2014, for instance, they held a prototype 
competition and Sadko (owned by the Ghabbour family; home appliances) expressed several 
very specific issues in its own field of work it wanted applicants to address (e.g. a prototype 
of a rechargeable solar/electrical fan or an air-water generator).117 Similarly, Procter & 
Gamble (BS32), a multinational consumer goods company, engaged in a partnership with CID 
(SE25) and SOY (SE3), both working on waste management. Procter & Gamble, like other 
companies in Egypt, faced brand name fraud in the late 1990s that not only resulted in 
financial losses but also threatened its reputation as counterfeit products were of inferior 
quality and costumers often could not differentiate the original from the counterfeit (American 
Chamber of Commerce Egypt 2009). In 2000/01, CID and Procter & Gamble entered a 
partnership that SOY took over in 2005. They established the Moqattam Recycling School 
and following the motto ‘learning by earning’ children from the area got to learn recycling 
techniques and at the same time earned money for every bottle they collected and recycled.118 
Hence, both sides benefit from these relations.     
In addition to tried-and-tested manifestations of support ties, the Sawiris family (BS2) also 
engages in innovative support ties. SFSD organized four Job Creation Competitions between 
2004 and 2010. In 2010 SFSD targeted associations and projects in the field of (vocational) 
training of youth and microcredit and awarded project grants to 28 projects amounting in total 
to nearly 30 million EGP. Among the winners, there were several social enterprises, inter alia 
AYB (SE4), Nahdet El Mahrousa (LO1) and TADE (SE6) (Sawiris Foundation for Social 
Development 2011: 50-55). Thus, SFSD has transformed grant application procedures into a 
competition with winners instead of solely evaluating grant applications and either approving 
or rejecting them.  
Finally, support ties between business actors and social enterprises also manifest as relational 
events. PwC (BS1), for instance, conducted trainings for social entrepreneurship (skills) at 
                                                 
117
 www.nahdetelmahrousa.org/our-events/shaghal-yia-prototype-competition-2nd-round [05.12.2015]. 
118
 Personal interview with the Director of SOY, Cairo, March 2012; see also Shaker (2014) and 
http://cidconsulting.com/award-winning-recycling-project-the-inclusion-of-the-informal-sector-in-solid-waste-
management/ [05.12.2015]. 
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Nahdet El Mahrousa in 2013.119 Also, the Mansour Foundation for Development (BS3) 
provided a grant for a mapping study on the situation of social entrepreneurship in Egypt.  
Compared with the diversity of support ties, the analysis of advice ties demonstrates that 
advice ties are less prevalent in the Egyptian SEN (Appendix A2). This finding is not 
surprising given the limited interest of business actors in (social) entrepreneurship in general. 
Nevertheless, different types of advice ties, both tried-and-tested ones and innovative 
manifestations of advice ties, exist. As has been outlined above, social enterprises working in 
the field of entrepreneurship education and employability attract the interest of business actors 
in the Egyptian SEN. In particular Injaz, Enactus, EFE and Endeavor seek strong partnerships 
with business actors, not only their branches in Egypt, Morocco and Jordan but in all 
countries of operation. Their boards of directors are formed by local business actors and 
representatives of multinational companies. Compared to the boards of Endeavor in Jordan 
and Morocco, Endeavor Egypt’s board does not include many high-ranked business actors. 
However, Hassan Abdalla (Arab African International Bank, BS31), who was the Chairman of 
the Economic Committee of the National Democratic Party and a member of the party’s 
General Secretariat and the Political Secretariat/Policies Committee (Roll 2008), has been on 
the board since Endeavor was launched. Previously, also Tarek Mansour (PwC, BS1) and 
Naguib Sawiris were board members, though their resignation was not related to the uprisings 
of 2011. In 2011, Sawiris’ turn as the Chairman of the board ended (Endeavor 2011).120 
Similarly, no major changes have taken place in the composition (individuals and companies) 
of Injaz’s board since 2007, and hence, also not in the aftermath of the uprising of 2011(Injaz 
Al-Arab 2008; Injaz Al-Arab 2010; Injaz Al-Arab 2014).121 In addition, many board members 
of Injaz are also board members of Enactus, and so interlocking directorates occur. Shalaby 
(Mobinil/Orascom, BS6/BS2), Heba Iskander (Orascom, BS2) and Farouk Hafeez 
(Americana, BS13), for instance, play a key role in the board of Injaz and Enactus. 
Representatives of ExxonMobil (BS8) and the Citi Group (BS10) also sit on the boards of 
both social enterprises.122 The majority of social enterprises, however, have hardly any or no 
business actors among their board members. AYB and SOY, for example, include 
                                                 
119
 Skype interviews, April 2012/March 2015. 
120
 For further details on Endeavor Egypt, see www.endeavoreg.org [05.12.2015]. 
121
 An exception worth mentioning is Ghada Waly who left the board in 2014 and became Egypt’s Minister of 
Social Solidarity. Prior to that, she was the Managing Director of SFD between 2011 and 2014. She promotes 
entrepreneurship innovation and microfinance and describes herself as the ‘minister of the poor’ (Waly (2015); 
see also Ahram Online (2014)).  
122
 For further details, see www.injaz-egypt.org/?page_id=18 and www.enactus.org/country/Egypt [05.12.2015]. 
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representatives of the communities they work with in their boards.123 Similar to social 
enterprises in Morocco, also Egyptian social enterprises seek to minimize external influence 
unless it is a component of their organizational or business model.124 On the other hand, 
having well-known actors as board members also opens opportunities for the establishment of 
ties to new actors and access to resources.  
I think there is no one who actually has a famous name on our board. And all the 
NGOs concentrate on that because it is easier for the funding. Yani, for example 
[social enterprise X] has the chairman of [company X] on the board it's a big name 
and that's why they get all the funds.125 
These findings suggest that these ties are relatively stable and that the uprisings of 2011 did 
not affect them negatively. On the contrary, the Egyptian SEN experienced continuity and 
growth rather than setbacks since 2011. 
More innovative manifestations of advice ties constitute the engagement of business actors as 
jury members, or members of a selection committee for competitions and incubation 
programs. In Egypt, competitions are largely confined to competitions within social 
enterprises and local support organizations which then determine who will be included in an 
incubation program, or who receives seed funding. Cairo Startup Cup and Rise Up Summit 
were established in 2012 and in 2013 respectively and are exceptions. Cairo Startup Cup is a 
business-plan competition including six months mentoring until final winners are selected. 
Rise Up Summit, by contrast, is an annual three-day event. It brings together actors from 
diverse sectors, investors, business actors and (social) enterprises such as Flat6Labs, Google, 
PwC, Mobinil, MIT Enterprise Forum for the Pan-Arab Region, Injaz and Endeavor. This 
summit offers discussions, workshops and matching sessions to link business actors, investors 
and enterprises through ‘speed dating’.126 Thus, contrary to competitions where a limited 
number of winners are selected by a jury, this relational event provides a space where 
entrepreneurs and business actors meet and decide individually on a partnership (Kalan 2013; 
Farid 2013).   
Longer-term programs such as local and international incubation programs in the field of 
(social) entrepreneurship commonly include mentoring as an advisory component. Injaz and 
                                                 
123
 Personal interviews, Cairo, December 2011/March 2012; see also AYB-SD (2013). 
124
 Personal interviews with social entrepreneurs, Cairo, November 2011-March 2012/February-May 2015. 
125
 Personal interview, Cairo, December 2011. 
126
 www.blog.flat6labs.com/post/101100319404/rise-up-summit-2014 [05.12.2015]. 
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Endeavor, for instance, match entrepreneurs with business actors as mentors over a period of 
few weeks up to 18 months. While in the case of Injaz these are business actors based in 
Egypt who mentor students, Endeavor also provides access to its international network of 
Endeavor mentors, and thus, enables potential high-impact entrepreneurs to connect to actors 
who are experienced and not embedded in the Egyptian ‘networks of privilege’.127 Likewise, 
PwC mentors social entrepreneurs, and supports further development of their enterprises. 
PwC established the ‘Egypt Sustainovation Hub’ for social enterprises in the field of 
environment. In addition to employee engagement as mentors, experts and judges, PwC also 
includes external actors in this project. PwC, in cooperation with Procter & Gamble and IBM, 
launched the online platform Sharek. This platform matches corporate sector volunteers with 
associations. Sharek (SE37) participated in Nahdet El Mahrousa’s incubation program, and 
thus, is an example of a tie through which mentoring and advice work in both directions.128    
 
Collegial Ties among Social Entrepreneurs 
Ties in the Egyptian SEN do not only exist between social enterprises and entrepreneurs and 
support organizations, state institutions and business actors but also among social 
entrepreneurs. They are predominantly advice ties such as co-participation in events and 
exchange of ideas but also partnerships among social enterprises. The analysis of collegial ties 
among social entrepreneurs reveals that with the considerable increase in recognized social 
entrepreneurs since 2011, ties predominantly exist between actors who are supported by the 
same support organization, who work in the same field, or who are central actors. However, 
compared to the SENs in Morocco and Jordan, there are not more central social enterprises 
and entrepreneurs in Egypt but simply more peripheral ones.  
                                                 
127
 For further details, see www.endeavoreg.org/model/ [05.12.2015]. 
128
 Skype interview with a representative of PwC, March 2015; see also (PwC (2015)) and 
www.nahdetelmahrousa.org/social-enterprises/sharek [05.12.2015]. 
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Figure 6: Ties among Social Entrepreneurs 
 
Figure 6 above shows that there are four groups of social entrepreneurs in the SEN. While 
three of them are the groups of peripheral social enterprises and entrepreneurs (the upper 
middle part, the right part and the lower right part) the fourth one consists of a group that 
includes all 23 core social enterprises and entrepreneurs (the left part). The most central social 
enterprises and entrepreneurs are Rouby (SE17), TADE (SE6), AYB (SE4) closely followed 
by AwA (SE2), BLACD (SE8), Educate-Me (SE15) and CORD (SE20) (Appendix A1). These 
social enterprises and entrepreneurs are well-connected within the core group of the SEN and 
to a number of peripheral actors. Furthermore, they hold one or multiple fellowships and 
awards, among which there is either an Ashoka or Synergos fellowship, or both. With the 
exception of Educate-Me and CORD, these actors became part of the SEN prior to 2011 and 
were among the first social enterprises and entrepreneurs Ashoka and Synergos recognized. 
Thus, they have been instrumental in the development of the Egyptian SEN. Rouby, for 
instance, is the most central actor in the SEN owing to his involvement in Synergos and 
Ashoka (AWSI, PoE, A4SE) as the regional representative, a fellow and a mentor. As a 
consequence, this central role manifests in particular with regard to advice ties (Appendix 
A2). TADE (SE6), however, is the social enterprise that received most international 
recognitions and owing to that is connected to many actors and many well-connected ones 
(Appendix A1 and A2). Furthermore, TADE is one of the few and established social 
enterprises based in Upper Egypt working on socio-economic development and therefore is an 
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advisor and a project partner for social enterprises that are based in other regions but operate 
in Upper Egypt. AYB and TADE, for instance, have been partners for several years.129  
Linked to the core social enterprises and entrepreneurs, there are also peripheral social 
enterprises and entrepreneurs. The majority of peripheral actors are either relatively new 
actors in the SEN, e.g. PoE (SE64-104, the upper middle part), GESR fellows (SE139-147, 
the right part) or are marginal due to geographic distance, the field of specialization or low 
productivity.130 Injaz (SE28), Enactus (SE22), EFE (SE23) and Endeavor (SE24) are 
exceptional cases. Contrary to their central position in Morocco and Egypt, they are not core 
actors in the Egyptian SEN. Yet, they are connected to a number of central and well-
connected actors in the SEN who contribute to the further development of the Egyptian SEN 
as social entrepreneurs and experts. Among them, there are actors like Rouby (SE17) and 
AYB (SE4) who regularly participate in events alongside Injaz and Endeavor and are 
showcased as role models and success stories. Moreover, Injaz is also a client of AYB’s 
graphic design business Tafanin and purchases its brochures, business cards and the like from 
them.131 Similarly, CID (SE25) and SOY (SE3) partners since the establishment of SOY in 
2004, although the CEOs of both enterprises have been partners in several projects since the 
late 1990s.132 Due to the size the Egyptian SEN has reached since 2011, it is impossible for all 
actors to know each other by name and sector of engagement let alone personally. Thus, ties 
often exist among social entrepreneurs who participate in the same support programs and 
events as we see in Figure 6 above. The collaborative platforms established by Ashoka in 
Egypt since 2011 in the field of health, street children and education have also facilitated 
contacts among social entrepreneurs who work on similar socio-economic issues (Ashoka 
Arab World 2011). This being said, in many cases social entrepreneurs are also linked through 
friendship ties; e.g. they worked together before, or attended the same university.133   
It is also common among social enterprises to refer to other social enterprises during 
interviews. This holds true not only for social enterprises that work in the same field as the 
                                                 
129
 Personal interview, Cairo, March 2012; see also AYB-SD (2013). 
130
 Personal interviews with social entrepreneurs and representatives of support organizations, Cairo, November 
2011-March 2012. 
131
 Personal interview with representative of Injaz and of AYB, December 2011/March 2012; see also 
www.tafanin.org/ [15.12.2015]. 
132
 Personal interviews, Cairo, March 2012; on this issue, see also the previous section on ties between business 
actors and social entrepreneurs. 
133
 Personal interviews, Cairo/Alexandria, November 2011-March 2012.  
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interviewed social enterprise but interviewees frequently mention social enterprises and 
entrepreneurs that they consider as successful or well-known ones and role models. 
Accordingly, several few social enterprises receive considerable mentions albeit not in all 
cases this appreciation is reciprocal. Some social entrepreneurs do this in order to benefit from 
the central position and visibility of other social enterprises, and appear more central and 
well-connected in the Egyptian SEN than they are.134      
 
2.2.3 The Generation of Resources 
The different types of social ties and their manifestation in the Egyptian SEN generate 
resources (dimension III of the analytical framework). These are tangible resources such as 
stipends, cash prizes, seed funding and equipment, and intangible ones such as visibility, 
recognition, the outsourcing of social responsibility and control. Although these resources are 
outputs of the ties among the different types of actors and within-type actors in a SEN, in 
particular intangible resources have implications beyond the Egyptian SEN. On the one hand, 
they are a manifestation of the SEN’s connection to the international social entrepreneurship 
community and related fields. On the other hand, they signify the embeddedness of the SEN 
in the local political, economic and social context. As this section demonstrates due to the 
strong presence of international support organizations in the Egyptian SEN, the generation of 
resources through international ties is strong and resources are diverse. The local dimension of 
resource generation, by contrast, is poorly developed. Apart from the presence of several local 
support organizations and selected business actors, the Egyptian regime has not conveyed 
interest in social entrepreneurship. As a consequence, tangible and intangible resources are 
not as diverse as in the Moroccan and Jordanian SEN.  
 
2.2.3.1 The Generation of Resources through International Ties 
Owing to international ties several kinds of tangible and intangible resources become 
available in the Egyptian SEN. These serve individual actors but also the Egyptian SEN as a 
whole and fulfil several functions as the following section will reveal. They introduce social 
entrepreneurship and novel support mechanisms such as fellowships, incubation and 
                                                 
134
 Personal interviews with social entrepreneurs, Cairo/Alexandria, November 2011-March 2012.  
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mentoring, provide the financial means to implement these programs and they facilitate the 
development of the Egyptian SEN. Yet, as has been demonstrated in the previous section, the 
regional representatives of Ashoka and Synergos occupy a powerful position in the Egyptian 
SEN.      
 
Tangible Resources 
Tangible resources generated through international ties are intended for the development of 
social entrepreneurs and social enterprises. Fellowships and awards include stipends, cash 
prizes and additional funds (e.g. for the participation in events or for equipment). The Schwab 
Foundation does not provide a cash prize and the Skoll Foundation has not recognized an 
Egyptian social entrepreneur. The other two international support organizations exclusively 
focusing on social entrepreneurship, Synergos and Ashoka, vary widely concerning the kind 
and the extent of tangible resources they provide to social enterprises and entrepreneurs, 
depending on their budgets, on the number of fellows and the duration of the core fellowship, 
as well as on the need of the fellows and on the country in which the social entrepreneur is 
based.  
Synergos and Ashoka both provide stipends to their fellows. In the case of Synergos’ AWSI 
and PoE, the stipend ranges from 24.000-34.000 USD for a period of two years. The Ashoka 
stipend, by contrast, amounts to an average of 135.000 USD for a period of three years 
depending on the need of the respective Ashoka fellow; i.e. it is not a fixed sum but 
negotiable. Although the stipend provided by Synergos constitutes only a fraction of what 
Ashoka offers, it is not restricted and thus Synergos fellows can freely decide how to use the 
money. Depending on the development stage of the respective enterprise these are allocated 
inter alia to rent office space, to cover operating costs, to launch new projects and as expense 
allowance or a salary.135 Thus, these stipends are meant to enable the social entrepreneurs to 
fully focus on their enterprises instead of working to earn a living at the same time (Ashoka 
2008; Synergos 2013).136 Several Egyptian social entrepreneurs stated that the financial 
                                                 
135
 Fellows have to account for their activities and expenditures and submit biannual reports; personal interviews, 
March-May 2013. 
136
 The Pioneers of Egypt receive 24.000 USD; with regard to AWSI fellows, the stipend amounted to 34.000 
USD when the program started in 2008; for the third group of fellows (2013-15) the financial support was 
decreased to 25.000 USD. Personal interview with social entrepreneurs and Synergos representatives, 
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component of the Ashoka or Synergos fellowship is of minor importance to them as opposed 
to the intangible resources. They are content with accepting travel expenses to join meetings 
and international events.137 However, the majority of social enterprises in Egypt either do not 
generate revenues or these are not sufficient to cover the expenses of their enterprises. 
Therefore, for most social enterprises, stipends and additional funds are important resources 
to sustain their enterprises. The lack of a legal and regulatory framework for social enterprises 
that would enable them to generate revenues and enjoy the benefits of a public benefit status 
further cements the dependency on funding (see also Abdou and El Ebrashi 2015; Chahine 
and Mowafi 2015). A stipend is not a huge sum; yet, taking account of the large numbers of 
Egyptian fellows who receive stipends by Ashoka and Synergos, these two international 
support organizations allocate a considerable amount of tangible resources to the Egyptian 
SEN.     
In addition to the generation of tangible resources through ties to Ashoka and Synergos, the 
recognition by regional support organizations and initiatives provides access to tangible 
resources, as well.  KAAYIA, launched by the Jordanian King, includes a cash prize of 50.000 
USD per winner, including 10.000 USD for trainings. Although technically only three winners 
receive this cash prize, between 2009 and 2013 all ten finalists were remunerated.138 
Furthermore, the MIT Pan-Arab Forum organizes annually the Arab Startup Competition for 
startups including social enterprises. The cash prizes for the winners range from 5.000 to 
50.000 USD per enterprise as well as scholarships to participate in international events and 
programs.139 Alfanar’s investments in 2014 per enterprise did not exceed 180.000 GBP (ca. 
250.000 USD). Educate-Me, for instance, received 14.000 GBP (ca. 20.000 USD) (Alfanar 
2014). 
International support organizations that do not exclusively work in the field of social 
entrepreneurship also provide tangible resources. The governments of the United States, 
Canada and Germany and also the World Bank and various agencies affiliated to the United 
Nations are present in the Egyptian SEN. For example, EFE received 900.000 USD program 
support by the US Department of State through MEPI in 2011. In 2013, the Egyptian-
                                                                                                                                                        
Cairo/Amman, November 2011-March 2012/April 2013; see also Synergos (2010b); Gabr (2013b); Solayman 
(2013b).   
137
 Personal interviews with social entrepreneurs, Cairo, November 2011-March 2012. 
138
 Personal interviews with social entrepreneurs in Egypt and Jordan and program managers at 
KAFD/KAAYIA, November 201-March 2012 & April 2013; see also Chapter 3 on Jordan. 
139
 For further details, see www.mitarabcompetition.com [15.12.2015]. 
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American Enterprise Fund was established to support the growth of small- and medium- sized 
enterprises and startups, and thus, also to support the growth of social enterprises. It aims to 
reach 300 million USD in three years. Furthermore, the US spent, through its various 
government agencies, approximately, 250 million USD annually between 2009 and 2013 
(EFE 2011; Solayman 2013a; Sharp 2016).140    
 
Intangible Resources 
In addition to providing tangible resources, international ties also serve to generate intangible 
resources, namely inclusion, access, visibility and recognition. The strong presence of 
international support organizations, in particular Ashoka and Synergos, has resulted in the 
generation and the provision of diverse intangible resources as this section will show. Given 
that the presence of local support organizations, business actors and state institutions is weak, 
international ties and their resource outputs play a crucial role for the Egyptian SEN. 
International fellowships, awards and competitions are a means to select social enterprises and 
entrepreneurs and thus imply the inclusion of these actors in the local SEN and in the 
international social entrepreneurship community. In 2003, when AAW was established and 
selected its first Egyptian fellows, and thus the first fellows in the MENA region, social 
entrepreneurship as a concept was unknown and a network did not exist. For that reason, 
fellowships and awards served to introduce social entrepreneurship in Egypt and to create a 
local SEN. As demonstrated in the previous section, Bibars and Rouby have played a 
powerful role in this development and in deciding who is a social entrepreneur and which 
ideas are worth supporting. At the same time, they have also personally benefitted in that they 
dominate the SEN with regard to inclusion and access of social enterprises and entrepreneurs 
and receive broad visibility internationally as representatives of both Ashoka and Synergos 
and of Egyptian social entrepreneurship. Moreover, PoE has closely been affiliated to Rouby’s 
social enterprise Etijah since 2012. This further cemented his central position in the Egyptian 
SEN. In fact, social entrepreneurs frequently identified the organizations with their 
representatives giving the impression that Ashoka and Synergos are at the same time 
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international support organizations, local initiatives and actors. Personalism appears as a 
strong feature.141           
As a direct consequence of the strong presence of Ashoka and Synergos in the Egyptian SEN, 
not only inclusion and recognition constitute intangible resources but also international access 
and visibility to actors, events and resources. The Schwab Foundation which recognizes social 
enterprises and entrepreneurs during the WEF equally provides international visibility. As this 
recognition constitutes a relational event rather than a longer-term relationship its contribution 
is short-lived. 
As one of the first Egyptian Ashoka fellows stated, 
Ashoka is a very prestigious organization, being an Ashoka fellow gives me a lot of 
visibility inside Egypt and outside Egypt, maybe outside more. If you are in an 
international meeting and people know that I am an Ashoka fellow, people treated me 
differently, they ask me to contribute more, sometimes they give me a session just to 
talk about my ideas. And so being part of this group of civil society leaders puts you 
on a different level of learning and exchange.142 
Similar statements were made by many other social entrepreneurs albeit emphasizing the 
weak local visibility even more despite an increase in media coverage of social 
entrepreneurship since 2011. Social entrepreneurship as a concept does not reach broader 
society. Thus, similar to the Moroccan and Jordanian SENs, the Egyptian SEN, despite its size 
and the engagement of various actors, is an exclusive network.143      
Fellows do not equally benefit from fellowships. With regard to access to actors and events 
abroad, some fellows are showcased more regularly at international events than others. This is 
particularly the case for core actors in the Egyptian SEN who are presented as success stories 
and role models with regard to e.g. approaches to socio-economic change, social impact and 
policy change. In Bibar’s words ‘[Social entrepreneurs are] the best ambassadors to the West. 
By just identifying these people in an international way, the leading social entrepreneurs will 
be the best ambassadors.’ [brackets in original].144 Although it emphasizes ‘Everyone A 
Changemaker’, in practice Ashoka – and also the other international support organizations 
exclusively working on social entrepreneurship – focuses on a selected group of actors as well 
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as on a single social entrepreneur rather than the social enterprise and the team leading it.145  
This becomes apparent in the fact that fellowships and awards are given to one person and not 
to the team, and that the name of the fellow is much more visible than the name of the 
enterprise.146  
While inclusion, international visibility and access are important resources generated through 
international ties, so is the local dimension of these ties. Recognized social entrepreneurs are 
also presented as role models and success stories in the Egyptian and the MENA context. 
From this perspective, social entrepreneurship constitutes a development tool and opens new 
opportunities.  
The second impetus [for doing this kind of work was to show that] young people in 
Egypt and Middle East are local heroes and despite the darkness around us there is 
light. I can identify local heroes who are not talking big words and are doing real 
work. It was a time when everyone in the Middle East was depressed – the high time 
of when Mubarak and his people were decadent and there was no hope among the 
young people. [brackets in original]147 
Despite the fact that the Egyptian regime prior to 2011 and since then has not taken an active 
interest and role in social entrepreneurship, not to mention co-opting the SEN and exploiting 
it for authoritarian renewal, it nevertheless has benefitted in several ways. Social 
entrepreneurship as a development tool contributes to problem-fixing of pressing socio-
economic issues and social entrepreneurs from various backgrounds are involved. The 
previous section has shown that international support organizations, to a considerable degree, 
have financed the development of the SEN and in doing so have relieved the state which was 
no longer capable of providing social welfare alone.148 Furthermore, international visibility 
has also benefitted the regime such that it has linked the Egyptian SEN to the international 
discourse on socio-economic development and entrepreneurship. Against all odds, Egypt is 
considered an entrepreneurial hot-spot in the MENA region.149  
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2.2.3.2 The Generation of Resources through Local Ties 
Similar to the generation of resources through international ties, local ties also serve to 
generate tangible and intangible resources. However, due to the weak presence of local actors 
in the Egyptian SEN, resource generation through local ties is limited and confined to a small 
number of actors, both with regard to the types of actors and within-type actors. Nevertheless, 
as this section shows, tangible and intangible resources generated through local ties facilitate 
not only the development of the Egyptian SEN but serve in particular business actors as a 
development and political tool to demonstrate their commitment to socio-economic change in 
the Mubarak era and the post-Mubarak era alike. Thus, they have capitalized on social 
entrepreneurship albeit on a much smaller scale than it is the case in Morocco and Jordan.    
    
Tangible Resources 
Tangible resources generated through local ties can be differentiated according to the actors 
who are involved. Local support organizations and business actors are the main local actors 
present in the Egyptian SEN. They provide seed funding, grants or the financial means to 
develop and test prototypes.  
Nahdet El Mahrousa, GESR and the Bedaya Center for Entrepreneurship & SMEs 
Development are among the local support organizations that provide tangible resources to 
social enterprises and entrepreneurs. RISE, by contrast, does not provide financial support but 
focuses on intangible resources. This being said, it covers the travel cost for social 
entrepreneurs and mentors to meet in Egypt or abroad.150     
Nahdet El Mahrousa offers grants that do not exceed 150.000 EGP (ca. 25.000 USD) per team 
that joins its incubation program. These grants aim to support the establishment of a social 
enterprise or the scaling process depending on the stage of the respective social enterprise. In 
order to facilitate this development process and to ensure that social entrepreneurs fully focus 
on their enterprises, parts of the fund can be used as a stipend or salary. This being said, grants 
are not available to every incubated project but are awarded through a competitive evaluation 
process. In this respect, we see that Nahdet El Mahrousa combines the Ashoka model 
(stipend) with funding models by other international support organizations (grants) and 
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entrepreneurship competitions. Furthermore, it provides equipped office space and thereby 
contributes to a reduction of the ongoing expenses of social enterprises (e.g. rent, utilities and 
the like) (Nahdet El Mahrousa 2012: 5).  
GESR, by contrast, provides up to 2000.000 EGP (ca. 30.000 USD) in equity investment to 
each of the top 15 finalists of its competition. GESR then becomes a shareholder of, 
maximum, 10% in each enterprise that received the full amount of investment.151 This 
investment is non-compulsory, thus social enterprises decide whether they need it or not. 
GESR applies the model of entrepreneurship incubators to social entrepreneurship and seeks 
the proximity to business rather than social actors. 
A startup is like a plant that needs the perfect environment to grow. GESR has a 
distinguished location in the middle of the GREEK campus; putting our incubated 
startups in the heart of Cairo’s new technology center […].152 
Similarly, the Bedaya Center offers a maximum of 15 million EGP (ca. 2 million USD) in 
equity investment per enterprise through the Bedaya Fund. Furthermore, as part of its 
incubation program, it finances the development of prototypes so that enterprises can test their 
ideas and can further improve them.153  
Equity investment in social enterprises does not exist in the Moroccan and Jordanian SEN. In 
these SENs social enterprises are either established as a partnership from the beginning (e.g. 
the Jordanian social enterprise Ruwwad or Injaz Al-Maghrib in Morocco), or receive grants, 
cash prizes or stipends.  
Business actors also provide tangible resources. Despite their emphasis on CSR, most 
business actors do not disclose detailed information on the budget they spend annually on 
socio-economic development, and thus, on social entrepreneurship. Commonly, they list the 
number of partners or beneficiaries on their webpages and in their annual reports, which look 
impressive but tell little about the social impact and the actual contribution of the respective 
business actor. Therefore, available information on business actors’ financial support to the 
SEN provides insights into the dimensions of financial support rather than estimating and 
presenting the overall provision of tangible resources.       
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EFG Hermes and the Sawiris family are the biggest contributors of tangible resources to the 
Egyptian SEN. Taken together, these two business actors have spent more than 70 million 
USD on socio-economic projects between 2001 and 2014. As we have seen in Section 2.2.2, 
EFG Hermes and Sawiris have engaged in innovative relations with social enterprises. These 
relations generated considerable tangible resources. The EFG Foundation allocated 53 million 
EGP (ca. 7,5 million USD) between 2006 and 2014. Out of that, 28 million EGP (ca. 4 million 
USD) were spent for Ro’ya, a sustainable development project implemented in partnership 
with TADE in Upper Egypt between 2008 and 2010. That project and TADE founder Ghaly 
were recognized by the Schwab Foundation in 2011.154 Furthermore, the EFG Hermes 
Foundation supported Enactus with 1,6 million EGP for a period of four years to implement 
its programs in Egypt and to participate in the Enactus World Cup as well as BLACD with 2 
million EGP for a period of three years. Many other societal actors received between 250.000 
EGP and 3 million EGP for a period of two to four years during the same period (EFG 
Hermes 2014). The Sawiris family spent nearly ten times more to socio-economic 
development projects through SFSD than EFG Hermes, albeit over a period of ten years 
between 2001 and 2011. Nearly 400 million EGP (ca. 65 million USD) in grants, donations, 
awards and scholarships were allocated to a plethora of actors and projects including social 
enterprises. That translates into an annual budget of, approximately, 10 million USD. SFSD 
regularly engages in partnerships involving societal actors, business actors and state 
institutions. These are usually competitions, and the funds are restricted to the implementation 
of a specific endeavor; e.g. a project or the development of a prototype. An example is the 
Egypt Development Marketplace Competition for social enterprises and entrepreneurs in 
Upper Egypt in 2012 to which SFSD contributed 250.000 USD. This competition was 
initiated by the World Bank and implemented in partnership with support organizations, 
business actors and state institutions. The 34 winners each received 25.000 USD.155 
Moreover, SFSD has supported Nahdet El Mahrousa’s annual YIA since 2010 with 500.000 
EGP. Other supporters of YIA are ExxonMobil, Mobinil and Sadko (SFSD 2011: 65).156 Since 
2004, SFSD has organized four Job Creation Competitions. The 28 winners of the 2010 
competition, for example, had access to in total 28 million EGP (ca. 4 million USD). Among 
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the winners, there were two social enterprises, TADE and AYB, which received 1,5 million 
EGP and 500.000 EGP, respectively. The local support organization Nahdet El Mahrousa was 
also among the winners of the competition, and was given 1,5 million EGP (SFSD 2011: 50-
55). 
Similarly, Mobinil spent nearly 200 million EGP (ca. 30 million USD) on CSR activities 
between 1997 and 2012. Injaz and Enactus have been among the long-term recipients. 
Mobinil has sponsored several competitions and events, and contributes to the ongoing 
expenses of these social enterprises. Also, in May 2010, Mobinil was a sponsor of Ashoka’s 
Arab World Social Innovation Forum (AWSIF).157 Egypt-Kuwait Holding and Americana also 
provide tangible resources to Injaz and Enactus. While they do not disclose information on 
how much they exactly give to these social enterprises, Egypt-Kuwait Holding invested 
annually between 50.000 and 320.000 USD from 2012 to 2014 in Egypt whereas Americana 
allocated, in total, between 350.000 and 460.000 KWD (1,2-1,6 million USD) annually for 
CSR activities from 2011 to 2014, in the MENA region and Kazakhstan (Americana 2012; 
Americana 2014; Mobinil 2012; Egypt-Kuwait Holding 2012; Egypt-Kuwait Holding 
2014).158   
 
Intangible Resources 
In addition to generating tangible resources, local ties within the Egyptian SEN also generate 
intangible resources. Compared to international actors, all local ones except for Nahdet El 
Mahrousa play a minor role in the Egyptian SEN as has been discussed in the previous 
section. Nevertheless, they complement the work of international support organizations in 
several ways. Nahdet El Mahrousa, in particular, promotes social entrepreneurship in Egypt as 
a career path and development tool and helps to turn social entrepreneurial ideas into the 
establishment of social enterprises. Through recognition and access to support and advice 
local support organizations facilitate the inclusion of new actors in the Egyptian SEN. Related 
to that, they shape the way social entrepreneurship is adapted to the Egyptian context and 
decide which ideas and social entrepreneurs are worth including and how to support them. 
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Contrary to the selection processes of international support organizations, however, local ones 
predominantly organize competitions and look for teams of social entrepreneurs rather than a 
single social entrepreneur. That is, they generate visibility for social enterprises and 
entrepreneurs from the beginning, and in so doing, facilitate the access to other actors in the 
SEN. Several social enterprises that had been incubated by Nahdet El Mahrousa, for instance, 
subsequently became PoE. Having said this, owing to the strong presence and embeddedness 
of Ashoka and Synergos in the Egyptian SEN, and specifically PoE with its focus on both 
established and the early-stage social enterprises, local support organizations are not the sole 
and the main actors who introduce new actors.  
In light of the weak presence of state institutions and business actors in the Egyptian SEN, the 
recognition of social entrepreneurship beyond the Egyptian SEN, and in particular its 
contribution to authoritarian renewal, has been limited. This does not imply that social 
entrepreneurship in Egypt does not function as a political tool. Members of the business elite 
and businesses that had been closely linked to the Mubarak regime have capitalized on social 
entrepreneurship. As has been shown above, business actors provide considerable tangible 
resources to the Egyptian SEN. With regard to intangible resources, differences are apparent 
between the Mubarak era and the period since 2011. During the former, business actors 
selectively engaged in the Egyptian SEN and participated in the decision-making processes of 
several social enterprises and local support organizations. These were predominantly 
enterprises and organizations in the field of entrepreneurship education and support as well as 
employability (e.g. Injaz, EFE, Enactus, Endeavor, Nahdet El Mahrousa). As board members, 
sponsors, jury members or mentors, business actors influenced the development of these 
actors, their programs and the selection of new social enterprises. Moreover, the engagement 
in entrepreneurship, employability and youth corresponded to Gamal Mubarak’s agenda as 
exemplified by FGF and the interlocking directorates of Injaz, Enactus and FGF in several 
cases (e.g. Shalaby/Mobinil, Iskander/Orascom, Hafeez/Americana, Al Alfi/Egypt Kuwait 
Holding).  
Furthermore, local ties resulted in local and international visibility. The Ro’ya project by EFG 
Hermes in partnership with TADE is the most noted example of local and international 
visibility, but there are more examples of cases where the Egyptian SEN gained visibility 
owing to the engagement of business actors. Enactus Egypt’s participation in the Enactus 
World Cup in 2009 and 2010, financed by Egyptian business actors, also resulted in 
international visibility. Two years in a row the Egyptian Enactus team was the winner of this 
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international competition.159 Thus, through these success stories, the Egyptian SEN has 
appeared as a vibrant entrepreneurial network.160 
In the post-Mubarak time, their engagement in the Egyptian SEN has served to demonstrate 
that they are socially committed actors who address pressing socio-economic issues, and thus, 
contribute to problem-fixing as opposed to personally enriching themselves. From that 
perspective, social entrepreneurship constitutes both a development and a political tool. This 
strategy seems to work successfully, as many social entrepreneurs and experts consider, for 
instance, the Sawiris family, notably Naguib Sawiris, as an example of a business actor who is 
committed to socio-economic development. One interviewee even compared Naguib Sawiris 
to the Jordanian business actor Fadi Ghandour, the founder of Aramex and the social 
enterprise Ruwwad and closely linked to King Abdallah II.161 
Ghandour is a prime example of an entrepreneur and private sector actor who 
engages in the ecosystem development. There is not really an Egyptian equivalent to 
him but the closest example are the Sawiris, mainly Naguib and to a lesser extent 
Sameh.162      
Similarly, with very few exceptions, all those business actors who were board members of 
social enterprises prior to 2011 have kept their positions. The same holds true for long-term 
partnerships between business actors and social enterprises and support organizations. Thus, 
the Egyptian SEN features continuity and growth instead of radical change. Despite the fact 
that social entrepreneurship addresses pressing socio-economic issues, in particular 
employability, job creation, and entrepreneurship as a catalyst for development, it has not 
explicitly been aligned to the official political agenda. Neither under Mubarak’s rule, when 
the need to address these issues had already been the subject of public debate, nor since 2011 
when this was further underlined by the uprisings and their political, economic and social 
consequences, the Egyptian regime has explored social entrepreneurship.  
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2.3 CONCLUSIONS: THE EGYPTIAN SEN & AUTHORITARIAN RENEWAL  
Since the recognition of the first Egyptian social enterprises and entrepreneurs by Ashoka in 
2003, the Egyptian SEN has developed into a large and strong network dominated by a small 
number of international and local support organizations and social entrepreneurs. By contrast, 
state institutions and business actors play a marginal role. Also, neither Mubarak nor his 
successors paid attention to social entrepreneurship between 2003 and 2014. Owing to the 
lack of support and interest by the Egyptian regime, the Egyptian SEN has contributed to a 
much more limited extent to authoritarian renewal than the Moroccan or the Jordanian SEN. 
This being said, the ties among actors in the SEN reveal that social entrepreneurship 
constitutes a development and a political tool. Thus, social entrepreneurship serves two main 
purposes. As a development tool, social entrepreneurship addresses socio-economic issues 
and reaches out to youth in the broader society. It mobilizes them to become entrepreneurial 
actors who contribute to problem-fixing, and thus, take on social responsibility. International 
support organizations exclusively focusing on social entrepreneurship strongly support this 
development and their approaches have inspired actors in the SEN. Hence, competitions, 
incubation programs, fellowships and mentoring are the predominant ties that determine the 
inclusion and interaction of actors in the Egyptian SEN. The Egyptian SEN portrays itself 
locally and internationally as a vibrant entrepreneurial network composed of Egyptian actors 
from various backgrounds who foster socio-economic change. However, Ashoka and 
Synergos represent simultaneously international actors who provide the Egyptian SEN with 
international linkages to actors, approaches and discourses and the local priorities and 
personal ties of their Egyptian regional representatives.             
As a political tool, the engagement in the SEN forms part of a restructuring of business-
society and state-society relations. Key business actors, who have been linked to the Mubarak 
regime, have not only been present in the SEN prior to 2011 but most of them have retained 
their position in the SEN as supporters, board members, mentors and social actors after the 
overthrow of Hosni Mubarak. They seek to demonstrate their commitment to socio-economic 
development in Egypt as opposed to personal enrichment.  
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3. EMPIRICAL STUDY OF JORDAN 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION: SOCIO-ECONOMIC REFORM IN JORDAN  
With his accession to the throne in 1999, King Abdullah II of Jordan has declared economic 
and social development a priority on his political agenda. Although the neoliberal 
restructuring of the economy dates back to the introduction of the SAPs in the late 1980s, the 
succession of Abdullah II marks a turning-point in the neoliberal restructuring of Jordan. 
Jordan has embarked on a large-scale reform process, led by the King and the new generation 
of globalized elites he has appointed. This process aimed at transforming the country into an 
economic success model in the MENA region and at introducing political change gradually. 
However, evaluations of the first 15 years of Abdullah’s reign, including the Arab uprisings of 
2011, attest only limited change. Ambiguous reform outcomes coupled with the interest of the 
Jordanian regime to preserve the status quo of power relations have fostered authoritarianism 
and have aggravated socio-economic problems rather than initiating socio-economic change 
(Knowles 2005; Harrigan, El-Said, and Wang 2006; Yom 2009; ICG 2012; Schwedler 
2012).163  
This chapter argues that the Jordanian regime has capitalized on social entrepreneurship as a 
development and a political tool for authoritarian renewal. It is a strong network of 
international and local support organizations, the key business actors and a selected number of 
social entrepreneurs. In contrast to the Egyptian and Moroccan SENs where the rulers have 
not explicitly addressed social entrepreneurship, the Jordanian King has launched an initiative 
to support young social entrepreneurs across the MENA region and has aligned it to his 
political agenda. As a consequence, the Jordanian regime has exploited social 
entrepreneurship in innovative ways to create a new generation of socio-economic leaders. 
Upon his succession, Abdullah II, as a neo-patrimonial ruler, has aligned a number of new 
elite actors to the Jordanian regime through formal and informal ties and, in so doing, has 
restructured Jordan’s neo-patrimonial system and consolidated his rule. Most famously in this 
context is the Economic Consultative Council (ECC; 1999, 2001), created by the King to 
create a new generation of loyal, technocratic and business-savvy elites. He appointed 
aspiring loyal entrepreneurs to the ECC, such as Karim Kawar, Ghassan Nuqul and Fadi 
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Ghandour, and aligned them to his political agenda.164 These actors share many characteristics 
with Abdullah:  they belong to the same age group, have a similar educational background 
and experience abroad and are successful entrepreneurs. Furthermore, many of them belong to 
privileged Jordanian families that have supported Hashemite rule for decades. Thus, the ECC 
also serves as a mechanism for elite co-optation by the King (Wils 2003: 157-206; Bank and 
Schlumberger 2004; Bank 2004; Schlumberger 2004: 132-158; Alissa 2007).165 The role of 
these actors extends into society and international politics, as well, enhancing Jordan’s 
reputation and the image of fundamental change: 
They [‘Generation Abdallah’] represent Jordanian economic ‘success stories’, 
symbolizing young, self-confident ‘winners’ in globalization and have internalized 
the currently fashionable neoliberal jargon. (Bank and Schlumberger 2004: 41)  
King Abdullah II has launched multiple initiatives to address these socio-economic issues. In 
the wake of a lack of natural resources and of aid-dependency, Jordan bets on human capital 
formation, entrepreneurship and information and communication technologies (ICT). As a 
consequence, the King has identified these as the key areas for Jordan’s major capital and as 
source for socio-economic development. In this context, entrepreneurship has been promoted 
as a career path among Jordanian youth irrespective of the social background, by King 
Abdullah II, business actors, state institutions and international actors.166 In 2001, the King 
Abdullah II Fund for Development (KAFD) was founded by royal decree. It covers human 
capital development, infrastructure development and entrepreneurship and functions as an 
umbrella for a multiplicity of initiatives involving civil society, the public and the private 
sector. In the words of King Abdullah II:  
We asked to establish a special fund to serve as the institutional umbrella that 
contributes to supporting efforts at all levels; developmental, social and educational. 
This fund is to stimulate comprehensive development through projects that tie 
together our people’s potentials, direct them towards productivity and creativity […]. 
(Speech by King Abdullah II, 2001)167 
Thus, contrary to the ECC, KAFD targets Jordan’s broader society and especially youth. It 
strongly draws on a neoliberal discourse, emphasizing the active participation and the 
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contribution of Jordanian citizens to socio-economic development. Two of KAFD’s initiatives 
are outstanding attracting the interest of entrepreneurs throughout the MENA region and of 
international support organizations. The King Abdullah II Award for Youth Innovation and 
Achievement (KAAYIA), an award for social entrepreneurs in the MENA region, was 
launched at the World Economic Forum on the Middle East and North Africa (WEF-MENA) 
at the Dead Sea in 2007.168 It aims to reward and support social entrepreneurs that contribute 
to local and economic development (KAAYIA 2015).169 The second initiative, Oasis500, a 
seed investment company for entrepreneurs, was launched in 2011. Its main aim is to help 
innovative entrepreneurs in the field of ICT to start and grow their businesses and in so doing 
facilitate the development of ‘a strong solid generation of Arab entrepreneurs, consequently 
adding to a better future for the MENA region.’170 The ‘Generation Abdallah’ (Bank and 
Schlumberger 2004: 41) is strongly involved in implementing the King’s agenda and plays an 
active role in these institutions and initiatives as board members, advisors or sponsors.171  
 
3.2 THE SEN IN JORDAN 
This section is divided into three parts, each of them addressing one of the three dimensions 
outlined in the analytical framework. The first part (dimension I) outlines the development of 
the Jordanian SEN between 2006 and 2014 with a focus on the actors, institutions and 
initiatives that compose the SEN. It demonstrates that all the different types of actors are 
present in the SEN and form a strong network around the King who plays an active role in 
social entrepreneurship. The subsequent part (dimension II) presents the analysis of the 
structure of the SEN and its key actors. It inquires into the different types of social ties that 
and shows that the actors in the SEN draw on a multitude of innovative support and advice 
ties. The third part (dimension III) focuses on the different types of resources that become 
available as an output of international and local ties. As a result of the presence of all different 
types of actors and the innovative manifestation of ties in the Jordanian SEN, multiple 
resources have been generated both through international and local ties. In the final section, 
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the findings of the analysis of the Jordanian SEN and its contribution to authoritarian renewal 
are summarized.  
 
3.2.1 Emergence & Support: Actors, Institutions & Initiatives in the SEN 
Jordan is among the early-risers and the strongholds of social entrepreneurship in the MENA 
region with regard to the size of its SEN, the lengths of time it exists and the support it 
receives. The first social entrepreneurs were internationally recognized in 2006; since then the 
SEN has continuously increased and a plethora of actors has joined: international and local 
support organizations, the King and Queen, state institutions and business actors (dimension I 
of the analytical framework) (Abdou et al. 2010; Ashoka Arab World 2013; Jamali and 
Lanteri 2015; KAAYIA 2015). This section shows that these actors form the core of the SEN. 
The key business elites and the Jordanian King are particularly present, surrounded by a small 
number of social entrepreneurs. In Morocco and Egypt, by contrast, either international 
support organizations or business actors play a marginal role, and thus, not all types of actors 
are at the core of the SEN. 
 
International & Local Support Organizations & the King 
In Jordan, the development of the SEN between 2006, when the first social entrepreneurs 
were internationally recognized, and 2014 experienced three waves. These can be broadly 
categorized into a foundation phase between 2006 and 2008; a growth period between 2008 
and the Arab uprisings of 2011 and a ‘boom’ period that started in the aftermath of the 
uprisings. This boom manifests in the upsurge in recognitions of social entrepreneurs. It will 
be shown that while international support organizations exclusively focusing on social 
entrepreneurship have contributed greatly to the development of the Jordanian SEN, local 
initiatives have come to play the key role in the SEN.  
During the first wave, between 2006 and 2008, international support organizations exclusively 
supporting social entrepreneurs entered Jordan and introduced social entrepreneurship as a 
new approach to socio-economic development. At that time, only few people had heard of 
social entrepreneurship; these were mainly those globalized elites and young entrepreneurs 
who participated in international events, such as the biennially WEF-MENA at the Dead Sea. 
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It is not surprising that it was during the WEF-MENA that the Schwab Foundation recognized 
the first Jordanian social entrepreneur, Soraya Salti172, along with the Egyptian social 
entrepreneur Laila Iskandar173 in 2006. In the same period, the first local initiative in support 
of young social entrepreneurship was launched – again at the WEF-MENA. KAAYIA was 
launched by the Jordanian King under the umbrella of KAFD at the WEF-MENA in Jordan in 
2007.174 It aims to support those youth  
[…] who have pioneered innovative solutions to urgent social, economic and 
environmental challenges [in their communities]” and “[…] to promote creative 
problem-solving and cross-border dialogue and cooperation among Arab youth. 
Through shining a much-needed spotlight on youth-led social change, the KAAYIA 
seeks to encourage present and future generations of Arab youth to assume their roles 
as active citizens. (KAAYIA 2013: 2) 
The Jordanian regime got actively involved in social entrepreneurship in the MENA region 
through KAAYIA, and King Abdullah II linked social entrepreneurship to his agenda on 
socio-economic change. In fact, Abdullah II made entrepreneurship one of the King’s 
priorities, and called upon the participants at the WEF-MENA to join and to support this 
endeavor. As a consequence, social entrepreneurship gained momentum in Jordan and 
attracted, on the one hand, the interest of international support organizations and of members 
of the Jordanian elites and, on the other hand, the interest of young Jordanians eagerly 
exploring entrepreneurship.175  
Only at the end of this period, and after KAAYIA had been launched, two more international 
support organizations recognized Jordanian social entrepreneurs: Synergos (2007) and Ashoka 
(2008). For Synergos it was the start of AWSI and among the 22 fellows it selected to the 
class 2008-2010, three were Jordanian.176 Among the members of the Synergos Advisory 
Committee who decided on the final selection of social entrepreneurs were two Jordanian 
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 Soraya Salti founded Injaz in 1999 as a social enterprise working in the field of entrepreneurship education 
and support in Jordan; in 2004 Salti transformed it into a regional social enterprise, Injaz Al-Arab, and opened 
branches across the MENA region. For further details see www.injazalarab.org/home/ [18.02.2015].  
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 For further details, see Chapter 2 on Egypt. 
174
 The International Youth Foundation (IYF) also supported the launch of KAAYIA. Although KAAYIA had 
been launched in 2007, the first awardees were awarded in 2009.  
175
 Personal communication with a project manager, KAFD/KAAYIA, Amman, April 2013; interviews with 
several KAAYIA finalists, Amman, March/April 2013.   
176
 These are Zeinab al-Momani (Zakhrah Women’s Cooperative), Rabee’ Zureikat (Zikra Initiative), Rana 
Dajani (We Love Reading).  
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women, Deema Bibi (CEO of Injaz Jordan) and Samar Dudin (Takween Open Spaces).177 
Moreover, the Synergos program was supported by two local representatives for the MENA 
region.178 For Ashoka, the election of its first Jordanian fellow constituted a broadening of its 
program beyond Egypt, and thus, the true beginning of Ashoka Arab World (AAW) (Ashoka 
Arab World 2008).179 Also in 2008, the Schwab Foundation selected its second Jordanian 
social entrepreneur, Zeinab al-Momani; she also had been selected as Synergos fellow during 
that period. In addition to the international recognition of Jordanian social entrepreneurs, 
international social enterprises working in the field of entrepreneurship and employability 
started to engage in the Jordanian SEN. The American social enterprise Education for 
Employment (EFE) opened a Jordanian branch in 2006 and a year later Endeavor announced 
the opening of Endeavor Jordan. In both cases, the Jordanian SEN constituted (one of) the 
first SENs in the MENA region in which international social enterprises established a 
branch.180  
During the second wave that lasted from 2009 until 2011, the Jordanian SEN further 
developed. While the concept had not been well-known beyond those actors who had been 
involved in the Jordanian SEN during the first wave, by the end of the second wave social 
entrepreneurship had taken root in Jordan. Although the continuous recognition of social 
enterprises and entrepreneurs by international support organizations focusing on social 
entrepreneurship facilitated this development, KAAYIA, and thus, the personal engagement 
of the Jordanian King, constituted the main driving force. In 2009, the first social 
entrepreneurs were selected by KAFD and ten finalists received the KAAYIA award by King 
Abdullah II and Queen Rania at the WEF-MENA. Among them were two Jordanians, Rawan 
Abu al Failat181 and Rabee’ Zureikat.182 Two years later, in 2011, four out of 10 KAAYIA 
winners were Jordanians (KAAYIA 2009; KAAYIA 2011; KAAYIA 2015).183  
                                                 
177
 Samar Dudin served as a member of the Amman City Council (2003-2006) and became the Regional Director 
of the social enterprise Ruwwad, established by Aramex in 2004, in 2010. Personal communication, Amman, 
April 2013.  
178
 Hisham El Rouby is the Regional Director for the MENA region and in charge of Egypt, Lebanon and 
Morocco and is based in Cairo. Husam Jubran is based in Palestine and is the Program Representative for 
Palestine and Jordan. For further details, see Chapter 2. 
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 The first Jordanian fellow, Raghda Butros, is the (co-)founder of two social enterprises: Ruwwad and Hamzet 
Wasel working in community development in Amman. 
180
 For further details, see www.efe.org and www.endeavor.org [18.02.2015]. 
181
 This fellow changed her surname in 2011 to Rawan Barakat. Her social enterprise Raneen produces audio 
books for children. 
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In addition, the Skoll Foundation, Ashoka, the Schwab Foundation and Synergos recognized 
additional social entrepreneurs from Jordan, and reinforced their presence in the Jordanian 
SEN. Salti, the first internationally recognized Jordanian social entrepreneur, received, as the 
first Arab women, the Skoll Award for Social Entrepreneurship at the Skoll World Forum 
(SWF) in 2009.184 Contrary to the modest contribution to the introduction of social 
entrepreneurship in Jordan, Ashoka caught up with the other major international support 
organizations and awarded four Jordanian social entrepreneurs between 2009 and 2010 
(Ashoka Arab World 2011).185 Taken together with the work of the Schwab Foundation186 and 
Synergos187 in this period, 17 awards and fellowships were given to Jordanian social 
entrepreneurs. Notwithstanding that, a closer look at the SEN reveals that the increase in 
international presence in the Jordanian SEN and in the number of awards for Jordanian social 
entrepreneurs give a misguided impression of the actual inclusion of social entrepreneurs in 
the SEN. Although a total of 23 awards and fellowships were granted between 2008 and 2011, 
these were given to only 16 social enterprises and entrepreneurs. Thus, several social 
entrepreneurs were recognized by more than one support organization.   
In the aftermath of the Arab uprisings of 2011, a social entrepreneurship ‘boom’ developed 
and introduced the third wave of social entrepreneurship development in Jordan, and in the 
MENA region in general. As a consequence of the socio-economic issues that had been raised 
during the protests, social entrepreneurship was even more forcefully praised by local actors 
in the SEN. They have promoted social entrepreneurship as a novel approach to address 
socio-economic issues and to include marginalized social groups (Knowledge Wharton 2012; 
Al-Asmar 2015b; Al-Wakeel 2015). Surprisingly, despite this boom and buzz of social 
entrepreneurship at the international, regional and local level, the major international support 
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 Zureikat is also a Synergos fellow (class 2008-2010). The other winners were from Palestine (1), Lebanon 
(2), Egypt (2), Kuwait (1), Sudan (1) and Somalia (1). 
183
 These were Kamel Al-Asmar (Nakhweh), Ahmad Al Dahoud (Loyalty), Abdel Razzaq Al Muhtaseb (For 
You Initiative) and Nuseibah Momani (Al-Yasmin Herbal Project). The other winners are from Palestine (2), 
Lebanon (1), Egypt (2) and Yemen (1). 
184
 For further details, see www.skollworldforum.org/contributor/soraya-salti/ [01.06.2015]. 
185
 These fellows were Zeinab al-Momani, Rabee’ Zureikat, Samar Dudin and Mohammed Abu Amerah (Harra 
Initiative). 
186
 The Schwab Foundation awarded Ziad Al Refai (Tamweelcom, 2009) and Curt Rhodes (Questscope, 2011); 
see also www.schwabfound.org/entrepreneurs [18.02.2015]. 
187
 Synergos selected Rawan Barakat, Rabeea Al Nasser (House of Tales and Music) and Ramez Habash 
(IDEAL for Developing Cultural and Tourism Routes) (AWSI class 2011-2013) and also recognized Deema 
Bibi as senior fellow (2011); see also www.synergos.org/socialinnovators/list.htm and 
www.synergos.org/bios/dbibi.htm [15.06.2015].  
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organizations Ashoka, Synergos, the Skoll Foundation and the Schwab Foundation did not 
award more social entrepreneurs in Jordan than they had done during the second wave: 
Ashoka selected three social entrepreneurs (in 2012 and 2014)188, Synergos included three 
Jordanian social entrepreneurs in its third AWSI class (2013-2015)189, the Schwab Foundation  
recognized one social entrepreneur190 and the Skoll Foundation none. By contrast, local 
support organizations became more active in the SEN. In 2013, three Jordanian social 
entrepreneurs were among the KAAYIA winners (KAAYIA 2013; KAAYIA 2015).191 
Furthermore, two new support organizations emerged in the SEN. The Queen Rania Center 
for Entrepreneurship (QRCE), that had been working on entrepreneurship for several years, 
included social entrepreneurship/social innovation as a new category in its Queen Rania 
National Entrepreneurship Competition (QRNEC) in 2012.192 Two social entrepreneurs won 
the QRNCE in this category in 2012.193 Thus, not only King Abdullah II but also his wife is 
among the actors in the Jordanian SEN. More interesting with regard to new actors supporting 
social entrepreneurs, however, is the initiative BADIR. BADIR was launched by IYF Jordan 
in fall 2011 and supported by Starbucks.194 In the words of the Regional Communications and 
CSR Manager of Starbucks MENA:  
[…] we chose to focus on social entrepreneurship as a means to empower the next 
generation of community leaders. BADIR will take the aspirations and hard work of 
civic-minded Jordanian young men and women and provide them with the tools they 
need to think even bigger. (cited in Albawaba 2012b) 
BADIR targets less experienced and younger social entrepreneurs than those targeted by the 
major international support organizations and by KAAYIA. Moreover, 50% of their fellows 
are from the North and the South of Jordan and live in communities that are part of Jordan’s 
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 These were Kamel Al-Asmar (Nakhweh), Sami Hourani (Leaders of Tomorrow) and Rawan Barakat; see also 
Ashoka Arab World (2012); Ashoka Arab World (2013); Ashoka Arab World (2014)).  
189
 These were Saeed Abu El Hassan (Irbid Youth Volunteers), Hussam Bahou (Art for Human Rights), Ehab 
Shanti (Alhoush).   
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 Although the Americans Ronald Bruder and Jamie McAuliffe founded EFE, its geographic area of impact is 
the MENA region (Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, Yemen and Palestine). Therefore, they are listed here. 
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 These were Saeed Abu El Hassan (Irbid Youth Volunteers), Amir Shihadeh (YARA) and Nedaa Kharoub 
(Trip to Innovation); the other winners are from Palestine (1), Egypt (3), Lebanon (1), Yemen (1) and Sudan (1). 
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 QRCE was established in 2004 and aims to support the development of entrepreneurship in Jordan, in 
particular in the field of technology. For details, see also www.qrce.org [18.02.2015]. 
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 These two social entrepreneurs, however, did not implement their projects and in the following year no social 
entrepreneurs were selected. Personal interview with the Executive Director of QRCE, Amman, March 2013. 
194
 BADIR is the biggest social entrepreneurship initiative launched so far by a business actor in cooperation 
with a support organizations in Jordan.  
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‘poverty pockets’. Between 2012 and 2014 BADIR recognized 45 social entrepreneurs (IYF 
2012; IYF 2013).195  
Taken together, the engagement of local support organizations resulted in a noticeable growth 
of the Jordanian SEN. Whereas the development of the SEN in the first two waves from 2006 
until 2011 was mainly driven by international support organizations exclusively focusing on 
social entrepreneurship and the royal initiative KAAYA, the third wave was dominated by 
local support organizations, in particular by KAAYIA and BADIR. They awarded 50 out of 
the 57 awards and fellowships that were given to Jordanian social enterprises and 
entrepreneurs between 2012 and 2014. Since 2006, a total of 79 awards and fellowships were 
given to 67 Jordanian social entrepreneurs. This being said, Jordanian social enterprises and 
entrepreneurs also received recognition at international events in fields related to social 
entrepreneurship and are visible beyond the international social entrepreneurship community. 
In 2010, Zureikat won the World Travel Market Global Award, Rana Dajani was a finalist in 
the Library of Congress Literacy Awards in 2013 and Asmar was among the Takreem 
awardees (2014).196 
 
Social Entrepreneurs 
Social enterprises and entrepreneurs in the Jordanian SEN vary significantly. Similar to those 
in the Egyptian and Moroccan SENs, they can be characterized with regard to type of social 
enterprise, sector of engagement and the social background of the entrepreneur.  
Jordanian social enterprises can register as associations, non-profit companies or for-profit 
companies. The majority of registered social enterprises have the legal status of an 
association. This being said, in particular the younger generation of social entrepreneurs, e.g. 
the BADIR fellows, often have not registered their enterprises. This is due to the fact that 
their enterprises are still at an early stage of development, i.e. they are often ideas and projects 
rather than established social enterprises.197 Furthermore, the analysis reveals that 
international and local support organizations lay a strong emphasis on the social entrepreneur 
instead of the enterprise and the team initiative. They recognize and celebrate the individual 
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 Personal interview with the Senior Program Manager, IYF/BADIR, Amman, April 2013. 
196
 Personal interviews, Amman, March-April 2013. 
197
 Personal interviews with social entrepreneurs, Amman/Irbid, March-April 2013. 
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social entrepreneur and his or her achievement as a role model through awards and 
fellowships. As a consequence, unlike Moroccan social enterprises, Jordanian social 
enterprises are predominantly ‘one-man-shows’.198 As we will see in Sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3, 
this focus on the individual directly relates to the creation of a new generation of socio-
economic leaders as an output or a resource generated through the international and local ties 
among actors in the Jordanian SEN.    
The social enterprises and entrepreneurs who are in the Jordanian SEN operate in several 
areas, ranging from entrepreneurship support and education (e.g. Injaz, Endeavor, TTI), 
education/skill development (e.g. HTM, WLR, Questscope), economic 
empowerment/employability (e.g. EFE, Sakhra), community development/civic engagement 
(e.g. LoT, IYV, Ruwwad, Zikra, Harra) to arts/culture (Art for Human Rights, Alhoush). 
Many of these social enterprises operate across multiple fields with a focus on youth, women, 
children and refugees in urban and rural communities. Alhoush, for instance, works on 
income generation and arts.199 Many social enterprises and entrepreneurs work in rural areas, 
especially in Jordan’s ‘poverty pockets’ in the South or in the Irbid governorate; however, the 
majority are based in Amman. Like in Egypt, support organizations and actors are 
predominantly based in the capital city and nearly all events take place there. Therefore, social 
entrepreneurs in other parts of the country are isolated and need to travel to Amman for 
meetings, trainings and the like.    
Unlike Morocco and Egypt where some social enterprises date back to the period between the 
1970s and the 1980s, only few recognized Jordanian social enterprises were established prior 
to the early 2000s.200 The majority of internationally recognized social enterprises were 
founded between 2004 and 2009, i.e. when social entrepreneurship started to be promoted in 
the MENA region. A considerable number of enterprises were also established during the third 
wave of the development of the Jordanian SEN, when BADIR was launched. Thus, Jordanian 
social enterprises are much younger than the social enterprises in Morocco and Egypt. Related 
to that, social entrepreneurs are also younger. Their age ranges from below 20 to over 60; 
several few are also above that age. However, they can be grouped into a younger generation 
of social entrepreneurs who is between 20 and, approximately, 30 years old, and an older one 
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 Personal interviews with social entrepreneurs and experts, Amman, March-April 2013. 
199
 For further details, see www.alhoush.com [15.06.2015]. 
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 These are Questscope (founded in 1988), Tamweelcom (founded in 1999) and Injaz (founded in 1999). 
Furthermore, Endeavor was founded in 1997, but opened a Jordanian branch only in 2007. On this issue, see also 
Section 3.2.1.  
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that is in its late 20s to late 50s. This is partly due to the selection criteria of support 
organizations. While the international support organizations focus on social entrepreneurs 
who are their late 20s and older, the local support organizations target younger social 
entrepreneurs. KAAYIA winners, for instance, are between 26 and 30 years old while Badir 
fellows are rarely older than 25. The age group 26 to 45 is most active in the Jordanian SEN. 
In that respect, Jordanian social entrepreneurs resemble Egyptian social entrepreneurs.       
Only few social entrepreneurs were not aware of social entrepreneurship as a concept when 
they applied for a fellowship or an award. Especially since the Arab uprisings and the 
entrepreneurship ‘boom’, social entrepreneurship has been well-known. In particular younger 
Jordanians underlined that they wanted to become a social entrepreneur, giving the impression 
that social entrepreneurship is a profession and social entrepreneur the job title.201 
 The majority of Jordanian social entrepreneurs have a university degree and experience 
abroad (studies, trainings, work). Although some of them do not have a university degree and 
are from marginalized areas in the South and North of Jordan, social entrepreneurship is 
largely a phenomenon of the educated middle- and upper-class. While tribalism and the 
cleavage between Transjordanians and Palestinians play an important role in Jordanian 
society, politics and the economy in general, it is not very visible in the SEN.202 The analysis 
shows that several social entrepreneurs are from major Jordanian tribes, such as Zeinab Al-
Momani from the Al-Momani tribe which is based in Ajloun; yet, tribalism is not a topic of 
discussion. Similarly, social entrepreneurs can be found among Transjordanians and 
Palestinians alike, but this also does not constitute a subject of discussion. As has been 
mentioned above and will be discussed in more detail in the following section (3.2.3), social 
entrepreneurs are connected to the ‘Generation Abdallah’ and not to the traditional elites.203   
Related to that, social entrepreneurs have a critical attitude towards state institutions but 
admire King Abdullah II and his socio-economic agenda. Many social entrepreneurs explicitly 
state that since the Arab uprisings of 2011 they have turned into political activists observing 
what the government and state institutions do and, more importantly, fail to do with regard to 
socio-economic development in Jordan. At the same time, they dream of meeting the King 
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 Personal and Skype interviews with social entrepreneurs and representatives of support organizations, 
Amman, March-April 2013/May 2013. 
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 For a more detailed discussion of these cleavages, see Wils (2003).  
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 On the social background of social entrepreneurs in the MENA region, see also Abdou et al. (2010). 
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personally.204 Several of them also imitate the dressing-style of King Abdullah combining a 
suit, as a symbol of modernity, with the Keffiyeh, the traditional headscarf, symbolizing the 
Jordanian heritage and tradition.205 Al-Asmar, for instance, dressed in that way when he 
received the Takreem award in 2014.206 
 
State Institutions 
In contrast to the support by King Abdullah II, Jordanian state institutions show a limited 
interest in social entrepreneurship and play a minor role in the Jordanian SEN. They engage 
with actors in the SEN on a case-by-case basis, mainly driven by individuals within the state 
institutions. The lack of strategic engagement and becomes particularly evident with regard to 
regulations, laws and policies. To date, there are no regulations, laws and policies specifically 
addressing social entrepreneurship. Thus, it becomes apparent that state institutions, at best, 
pay lip service to social entrepreneurship in Jordan.  
Social enterprises have not been recognized as independent legal entities in Jordan. They can 
register either as associations, non-profit companies or for-profit companies. Depending on 
the choice, they fall under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Social Development or the 
Ministry of Industry and Trade. The majority of social enterprises are registered either as 
association or as a non-profit company; a for-profit company status is not common among 
Jordanian social enterprises as this status entails procedures and payments which social 
enterprises that generate only limited revenues cannot afford. Like in Egypt and in Morocco, a 
mixed legal status combining the generation of income with a public benefit status does not 
exist in Jordan and thus an important element that differentiates social enterprises from 
associations cannot be used.207 Having said this, non-profit companies are allowed to generate 
revenues to sustain the work of the company including activities and operating costs. 
However, the scope of revenue generation is limited, i.e. companies cannot completely freely 
decide how to spend them. Moreover, the amendments of 2007 and 2010 have further 
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 The KAAYIA winners among them already met the King during the KAAYIA award ceremony. 
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 Personal interviews with social entrepreneurs, Amman/Irbid, March-April 2013; on this issue see also Layne 
(1994).  
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 www.kermittheblog.net/kamel-al-asmars-bio/ [15.06.2015]. 
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 Personal interview with the Executive Director of the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL) 
Jordan, Amman, March 2013; for further details on these regulations and laws, see HRW (2007); ICNL (2015). 
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restricted the applicability of these regulations so that only certain types of actors can register 
as non-profit companies, mainly in the field of social or humanitarian work and 
environmental, educational, cultural or athletic services (Art.5, Reg. 60/2007).208  
It is noteworthy that only few social enterprises experienced state interference in their 
operational activities.209 Thus, similar to Morocco, discussions on social entrepreneurship take 
place albeit contrary to Moroccan state institutions Jordanian ones have not expressed the 
interest to elaborate a regulatory and legal framework. 
There are several examples of ministries engaging on a case-by-case basis with social 
enterprises that goes beyond registration processes and reporting. The Ministry of Social 
Development, Ministry of Labor, Ministry of Education, Ministry for Agriculture as well as 
the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation are among those ministries that that 
have supported select social enterprises and entrepreneurs between 2007 and 2014. Also, the 
Ministry of Municipal Affairs and the Greater Amman Municipality (GAM) are present in the 
Jordanian SEN.    
 
Business Actors & Initiatives 
Business actors are another type of actor present in the Jordanian SEN. Individuals and whole 
companies engage in social entrepreneurship. As the following elaborations highlight, several 
members of the business elite and the ‘Generation Abdallah’ are present in the Jordanian SEN. 
Complying with the King’s agenda on socio-economic development, these business actors 
have played an active role in the development of the Jordanian SEN since the first social 
enterprises and entrepreneurs were recognized in the early 2000s. 
In the early 2000s and particularly since 2006, business actors have increasingly emphasized 
their interest in supporting social causes beyond onetime donations. In particular under the 
term CSR companies have developed strategies to address social issues.210 Similar to Egypt 
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 Private Societies Regulation, Law 22 of 1997, amended by Regulation 60 of 2007 and the regulations 32 and 
73 of 2010. 
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 It is noteworthy that only few social enterprises experience state interference in their operational activities. 
The majority does not scratch or cross the regime’s red lines; personal interviews with social entrepreneurs, 
Amman, March/April 2013.   
210
 These are predominantly multinational companies originating in Jordan or the MENA region and several ones 
that have their headquarters in North America or Europe.  
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and Morocco, CSR is still not well-developed in Jordan and by many actors mistaken for 
charity or constitutes a marketing strategy to further their reputation and public relations 
(Bailey et al. 2011; CSR Watch Jordan 2014a).211 For many business actors, engagement in 
socio-economic development is merely part of their marketing or CSR strategy and is not 
grounded in a deeper interest in social entrepreneurship. For other actors, social 
entrepreneurship is a field of strategic interest. In particular members of the well-established 
business elites and the high-ranking employees in their companies are present in the SEN in 
Jordan. These actors engage in (social) entrepreneurship through their companies, foundations 
and the social enterprises they established themselves. They promote private sector-led 
development with a focus on entrepreneurship, employment and empowerment. In so doing, 
they reproduce the neoliberal approach to development that has been advocated by 
international actors in the past decade and that also characterizes the socio-economic agenda 
of King Abdullah II. As Ihab Hinnawi, CEO of Umniah, stated in an interview concerning the 
impact of the King’s view of the development of ICT and entrepreneurship as drivers of 
socio-economic development on the major telecommunications operators in Jordan: 
To be honest, we are following our King’s footsteps, not just because he is head of 
government, but we are so confident in his leadership.212 
This statement reflects the attitude of many business actors in the Jordanian SEN. Yet, 
according to various actors in the SEN, without King Abdullah’s involvement and call for 
action many initiatives would fail due to competition among actors or the lack of serious 
commitment and action.213   
As a second category, there are companies that support social entrepreneurs among other 
actors. The telecommunication companies Umniah and Zain are examples of companies that 
are known among social entrepreneurs in Jordan for supporting youth and entrepreneurship. 
However, these companies do not have a fully developed, inclusive CSR strategy and their 
engagement depends largely on the effort of corporate communications managers and the 
interests of the executives (CSR Watch Jordan 2014c).214 Contrary to the deficiencies with 
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 Personal interviews with social entrepreneurs, corporate communications managers and PR/marketing 
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 Personal interviews with business actors, social entrepreneurs, support organizations and experts, Amman, 
March-April 2013. 
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 Personal interview with the Corporate Communications Manager of Umniah, Amman, April 2013. 
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regard to CSR, both companies are strong supporters of entrepreneurship development in 
Jordan and contribute to initiatives in that field (Jordan Business 2014; Wamda 2015). The 
CEOs of Umniah and Zain, Ihab Hinnawi and Ahmad Al Hanandeh respectively, are actively 
involved in several entrepreneurship initiatives such as Wamda215 and Oasis 500.216 Al 
Hanandeh also implements the concept Corporate Entrepreneurship Responsibility’ (CER), 
which has been introduced by Fadi Ghandour, the founder of the logistics company Aramex 
(Rahal 2014).217 Similarly, Hazem Malhas (Karma Investments, Al-Hima) supports select 
social entrepreneurs and has been engaged in socio-economic development initiatives for 
several years. 218 Several more business actors of the ‘Generation Abdallah’, including several 
members of the ECC, and Jordanian business families who have dominated the private sector 
for several decades and also held ministerial offices are present in the Jordanian SEN. Some 
of these actors and their companies, such as Karim Kawar219 (Kawar Group), Sabih al-Masri 
(Arab Bank, Zara Investment Holding), Saad Muasher220 (Jordan Ahli Bank) and Samih 
Darwazeh221 (Hikma Pharmaceutics) do not focus on social entrepreneurship per se but 
support individual social enterprises that work in the field of entrepreneurship development.  
Those members of the business elite who have been actively engaged in the SEN and in the 
promotion of social entrepreneurship are mainly three actors: Fadi Ghandour222 (Aramex, 
Wamda), the Nuqul family (Nuqul Group) and Maher Kaddoura223 (Accenture Middle East, 
Hikmat Road Safety). Fadi Ghandour, in particular, is considered the pioneer in CSR, CER 
and private sector-led development in Jordan and the MENA region in general and was 
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Jordan. This includes inter alia financial support, mentoring and education (Ghandour 2013; Rahal 2014).  
218
 Malhas was Chief Operating Officer of Aramex between 1986 and 2000 and the Minister of Environment 
between 2009 and 2010; personal interview, Amman, March 2013 
219
 Former Ambassador to the United States and Mexico, 2002-2007. 
220
 Several members of the Muasher family also served as ministers and Rajai Muasher as Deputy Prime 
Minister in 2010. 
221
 Minister of Health, 2003-2006. 
222
 Ghandour retired as CEO of Aramex in 2012 and is the Executive Chairman of Wamda Capital. 
223
 Kaddoura retired as Managing Partner of Accenture Middle East; see also www.maherkaddoura.org/ar 
[18.02.2015]. 
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among the first to promote these ideas and invest in the ‘next generation of entrepreneurs’ 
(Aramex 2006; Aramex 2011; Aramex 2013; Aramex 2014; Derhally 2012; CSR Watch 
Jordan 2014b).224 He has been involved in a plethora of initiatives supporting 
entrepreneurship since the early 2000s, such as KAAYIA, Oasis 500 and Wamda and there is 
hardly any initiative in which he is not involved. Furthermore, he is the co-founder of 
Ruwwad, a private sector-led social enterprise founded in 2005 and operating in Jordan, 
Egypt, Lebanon and Palestine. In Ghandour’s words, 
[p]rivate enterprise, job creation, youth empowerment are things that I think is what 
the Arab Spring is all about. […] Yes, political freedom and political expression are 
important. [But] without economic vibrancy, in any country, democracy becomes an 
empty promise. […]. In today’s world you don’t need to be a politician to make a 
difference, […]. In fact, it’s the other way around: if you are in politics you are 
limited in what you are going to be able to do. (Peel 2012)    
On another occasion, he adds 
I think entrepreneurship, and having a generation that creates companies, a 
generation that employs rather than looks for employment is probably one of the 
biggest ways of solving productivity in the Arab world. That’s why I think 
entrepreneurship is essential. (Derhally 2012)   
This being said, Ghandour has been a close supporter of the Jordanian regime since King 
Abdullah’s accession and served in the ECC. Despite his reservation towards politicians and 
politics, Ghandour has to be considered a political actor as he exerts considerable influence on 
entrepreneurship, economic development and business politics in Jordan in general (see also 
Wils 2003; Bank and Schlumberger 2004; Alissa 2007).   
Ghassan Nuqul is another ECC member and key actor in the Jordanian business elite who is 
present in the Jordanian SEN. Through the Nuqul Group and the Elia Nuqul Foundation 
(ENF, founded in 2008) the Nuqul family engages in social development and social 
entrepreneurship with a focus on al-Koura district, a ‘poverty pocket’ in Northern Jordan. 
They aim at ‘giving back to our community’ and at ‘accomplishing positive impact in society’ 
(Albawaba 2011a; see also Nuqul Group 2009; Nuqul Group 2012; Nuqul Group 2013; Ernst 
& Young 2015).225 Furthermore, Ghassan Nuqul is also involved in several councils and 
initiatives, among them Oasis 500. Similarly to the actors discussed above, Maher Kaddoura 
is an influential Jordanian business actor and a major supporter of social entrepreneurship in 
                                                 
224
 Personal interview with the Chief Sustainability Officer of Aramex, Amman, April 2013. 
225
 Personal interview with the Director of the Elia Nuqul Foundation, Amman, April 2013. 
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Jordan. He is involved in a multitude of initiatives and social enterprises and describes 
himself as a social entrepreneur, investor and businessman. In 2010, he launched Start 
Alliance, an initiative to bring together actors in Jordan who support entrepreneurship 
development and encourage cooperation and the exchange of ideas.226 Furthermore, he is the 
founder of New Think Theater, the Jordanian version of the TED talks227, and most famously 
Hikmat Road Safety, an initiative that received broad support by the political and business 
elites, ministries and the royal family, launched in 2008 (Wamda 2010; Anabtawi 2012; 
Philanthropy Age 2013).  
In addition to the presence of well-established members of the business elites in the Jordanian 
SEN, there is also a younger generation of actors who are either high-ranking employees or 
the offspring of the actors discussed above. They rose to high-ranking positions in the past 
decade. In particular three actors are noteworthy in this context: Reem Khouri228 (Aramex, 
Kameen), Dina Shoman229 (Arab Bank, Abdul Hameed Shoman Foundation) and Valentina 
Qussisiya (Abdul Hameed Shoman Foundation). These three actors have been actively 
involved in the promotion of (social) entrepreneurship in Jordan and enjoy considerable local, 
regional and international recognition as a young generation of socio-economic leaders. 
Shoman, for example, was listed by Forbes among the Top 100 Most Powerful Arab Business 
Women in Listed Companies (2012) and Khouri was among the 100 Most Powerful Arabs 
under 40 (2015) by Arabian Business (Forbes Middle East 2012; Arabian Business 2015). 
Thus, in contrast to Morocco and even more to Egypt, a number of Jordanian business actors 
and elites are strongly present in the SEN.    
 
                                                 
226
 Yet, this alliance has been characterized by competition and lack of initiative among its members from the 
beginning and has not produced any output. Personal interview with several actors who participated in this 
alliance, Amman, March/April 2013. 
227
 TED talks are events where short talks on diverse topics are presented to exchange ideas. For further details, 
see www.ted.com/ [01.06.2015]. 
228
 Khouri worked for Aramex as the Manager of CEO Operations from 2007 until 2013 and then left the 
company to establish her own social enterprise, Kameen; personal interview, Amman, April 2013. 
229
 The Arab Bank established the Abdul Hameed Shoman Foundation as a private-led organization in 1978 to 
support scientific research and culture. Dina Shoman left both her position at the Arab Bank and at the Abdul 
Hameed Shoman Foundation in 2012 and established her own enterprise. For further details on the foundation, 
see www.shoman.org [15.06.2015]. 
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3.2.2 Relations & Interactions within the Jordanian SEN  
This section focuses on the social ties and interactions among the actors in the Jordanian SEN 
introduced in the previous section and on the overall network structure of the SEN (dimension 
III of the analytical framework). A closer look at the Jordanian SEN reveals that the SEN 
consists of two main groups, a core group and less well-connected peripheral actors (Figure 7 
below). Both the core and periphery include international and local support organizations, 
social enterprises and entrepreneurs as well as business actors. However, these actors vary 
considerable with regard to their centrality in the SEN. While international support 
organizations exclusively focusing on social entrepreneurship are among the core and the 
central actors in the Jordanian SEN, BADIR and KAAYIA as local initiatives play a key role 
in the SEN. Furthermore, as it is also the case in the Egyptian and Moroccan SENs, state 
institutions are not among the core actors and play a minor role in the Jordanian SEN. 
Overall, the analysis demonstrates that a small group of actors closely allied to the King 
dominates the Jordanian SEN.   
Figure 7: The Jordanian SEN 
 
Legend: coreness (color), degree (node size), eigenvector (label size), betweenness (rim size) 
 
 
BS1
BS10
BS11
BS2
BS3
BS4
BS5
BS6
BS7
BS8
BS9
IN1
IN2
IN3
IN4
IN5
IN6
IN7
IN8
IN9LO1
LO2
RA1
RA2
RA3
SE1
SE10
SE11
SE12
SE13
SE14
SE15
SE16
SE17
SE18
SE19
SE2
SE20
SE21
SE22
SE23
SE24
SE25
SE26
SE27
SE28
SE29
SE3
SE30
SE31
SE32
SE33
SE34
SE35SE36
SE37
SE38
SE39
SE4
SE40
SE41
SE42
SE43
SE44
SE45
SE46
SE47
SE48
SE49
SE5
SE50
SE51
SE52
SE53
SE54
SE55
SE56
SE57
SE58
SE59
SE6
SE60
SE61
SE62
SE63
SE64
SE65
SE66
SE67
SE7
SE8
SE9
SI1
SI2
SI3
SI4
SI5
SI6
SI7
SE: social enterprise 
BS: business actor 
IN: int. support org. 
LO: local support org. 
SI: state institution 
RA: royal actor 
 
 
 127 
Ties between Support Organizations & Social Entrepreneurs 
The international and local support organizations at the core of the Jordanian SEN that 
exclusively focus on social entrepreneurship are not equally powerful. As we can see in 
Figure 8 below, Ashoka (IN1, the upper right part) and Synergos (IN2, the upper right part) 
are central actors in the SEN who are linked through innovative support and advice ties to 
social enterprises and entrepreneurs. However, contrary to the Moroccan and Egyptian SEN, 
the Schwab Foundation (IN3, the middle part) is the most central international support 
organization (Appendix C1). 230 This is due to its close involvement in the local, royal 
initiative KAAYIA (RA1, the middle part). Moreover, similar to Egypt and Morocco, at least 
one local support organization (BADIR, LO1, the left part) exists that identifies and supports 
a younger generation of social enterprises and entrepreneurs, both in terms of the 
development stage of the social enterprise and the age of the social entrepreneurs. This section 
shows that, like the international support organizations, they entertain innovative support and 
advice ties to social enterprises and entrepreneurs in the Jordanian SEN.   
Figure 8: Ties between Support Organizations & Social Entrepreneurs 
 
                                                 
230
 The Skoll Foundation (IN4, the lower right part) is a peripheral actor in the Jordanian SEN and does not play 
a role beyond the direct social tie to its only awardee. 
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Fellowships and awards manifest as innovative support and advice ties in the Jordanian SEN 
and are the key components of social entrepreneurship programs of international and local 
support organizations. In Jordan, international support organizations implement the same 
programs as in Egypt, Morocco and the MENA region in general. While there is little variance 
in the design of these programs, their implementation varies depending on the presence or 
absence of local representatives. This becomes apparent in particular with regard to the 
selection of social enterprises and entrepreneurs and the accessibility of these organizations.  
In most cases, social entrepreneurs who got recognized by Synergos or Ashoka reported that 
they got encouraged to apply for a fellowship by one of the key actors in the SEN, namely 
Fadi Ghandour (BS1, the middle part), Deema Bibi (SE7, the lower right part) or Samar 
Dudin (SE4, the upper right part). Towards the end of the second wave of the development of 
the Jordanian SEN this changed. Several fellows at the core of the SEN, both the most central 
and less central core actors, engaged in the selection process by drawing attention to social 
enterprises and entrepreneurs they considered successful. In several cases, social 
entrepreneurs were also directly approached by representatives of one of the international 
support organizations. However, these social entrepreneurs had already received awards or 
fellowships before and thus were already present in the SEN.231 
Ashoka and Synergos vary slightly with regard to their visibility and accessibility to Jordanian 
social enterprises and entrepreneurs. While Synergos’ Program Representative for Jordan and 
Palestine, who is based in Palestine, frequently travels to Jordan, Ashoka is less visible and 
accessible.232 As a consequence, Synergos has stronger support and advice ties to its fellows 
in the Jordanian SEN (Appendix C2). As one interviewee put it 
Synergos is very accessible, not like Ashoka or KAAYIA or the other organizations. 
For the application you fill out the application documents and send them. Then they 
come and visit your project, then I got an email that I was selected. KAAYIA and 
Ashoka are similar in a way: for both you fill out a long application with many 
questions. But for me Synergos is more credible because Synergos are the only ones 
who visit the projects. They like to visit the projects and see that the community is 
really benefitting. Others watch only the applications; so you might be a big liar in 
fact.233     
                                                 
231
 Personal and Skype interviews with social entrepreneurs and representatives of support organizations, 
Amman, March-May 2013. 
232
 Personal interview, Amman, March 2013. 
233
 Personal interview with a social entrepreneur who received several fellowships and awards, Amman, March 
2013; other social entrepreneurs who also received more than one fellowship or award made similar statements.  
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Similarly, another social entrepreneur remarked that 
Ashoka is difficult to reach for social entrepreneurs. Their application process is very 
complicated and long. I know several people who didn’t hear anything from them for 
several months after they sent their application. Their application got lost or 
something was missing, I don’t know. So it is important to have someone who helps 
you. In my case, several people nominated me for a fellowship.234    
Moreover, the Synergos Program Representative has traveled to Jordan on a monthly basis to 
meet the Synergos fellows. He describes his role as one with multiple facets that is based on 
personal contact and relationships as key tenets. He has been involved in the selection process 
of new fellows and has functioned as a mentor, trainer, a network facilitator, event organizer 
and a guest in the activities the fellows run. Jordanian Synergos fellows largely agree with this 
balanced combination of support and advice.235 Also, the annual AWSI meetings in 2009 and 
2010, for instance, were held in Jordan (Synergos 2010b; Synergos 2011; Synergos 2012). 
Thus, despite the lack of a local representative, Synergos is present in the Jordanian SEN. 
This is very different to the presence of Synergos in the Moroccan SEN where field visits 
have been rare between 2007 and 2014.236 
As part of the fellowship Ashoka engages through support and advice ties with Jordanian 
social enterprises and entrepreneurs and offers a mix of personal meetings, workshops,  
technical advice and networking (Ashoka Arab World 2008; Ashoka Arab World 2013). In 
consequence of the Arab uprisings of 2011 that strongly affected Egypt, and thus also 
Ashoka’s work, regional selection panels and retreats were more often held in Jordan instead 
of Cairo. In addition, the Ashoka Levant Fellows Assembly (ALFA) in 2011 and 2013 took 
place in Jordan. These assemblies served not only to better connect fellows to each other and 
to Ashoka but also to facilitate contacts between fellows and business actors. Maher Kaddoura 
and Fadi Ghandour are among those business actors Ashoka partners with in Jordan (Ashoka 
Arab World 2011; Ashoka Arab World 2012; Ashoka Arab World 2013). This has resulted in a 
strengthening of Ashoka’s presence in the Jordanian SEN.    
Nevertheless, the analysis reveals that the Schwab Foundation (IN3, the middle part in Figure 
8 above) is the most central international support organization in the Jordanian SEN 
(Appendix C1). This is due to its ties to well-connected actors in Jordan, including not only 
                                                 
234
 Personal interview, Amman, March 2013. 
235
 Personal interview, Amman, March 2013; see also Appendix C2. 
236
 On this issue, see also Chapter 4. 
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key business actors but also King Abdullah II through the WEF, and its close involvement in 
the King’s initiative KAAYIA.237 Thus, the Schwab Foundation plays a central role owing to 
this involvement and not owing to its own social entrepreneurship award.  
KAAYIA (RA1, the upper middle part) and BADIR (LO1, the left part) are the major local 
actors to name in the Jordan SEN.238 Support and advice ties manifest predominantly in 
awards and fellowships that include competitions, trainings, networking and mentoring.  Both 
initiatives establish not only social ties to and among social entrepreneurs but also link the 
latter to key actors in Jordan and the in the SEN (Figure 8 above, Appendix C1). Despite the 
paramount importance of international support organizations in the field of social 
entrepreneurship at an international level, KAAYIA and BADIR are the stepping stones for 
Jordanian social entrepreneurs to draw attention to themselves and to establish social ties to 
key actors in the Jordanian SEN. KAAYIA supports social entrepreneurs through an award 
that is accompanied by training, networking and mentoring (KAAYIA 2015). This being said, 
KAAYIA as an award is a relational event and does not entail a long-term relationship. In fact, 
following the selection process mentoring and training of the finalists and the winners are 
‘outsourced’.239 For example, Mowgli Foundation (IN5) as an expert in mentoring and mentor 
matching partnered with KAFD in 2013 and has undertaken this task since then. Also, owing 
to the linkages between KAAYIA and BADIR, KAAYIA finalists receive the same trainings 
as the BADIR fellows.240 These trainings aim to enhance the skills of the social entrepreneurs 
and the impact of their work. They cover issues such as social innovation, management, 
monitoring and evaluation.241 Moreover, in order to facilitate the visibility of KAAYIA 
finalists, KAFD produces short videos featuring the social enterprises and entrepreneurs and 
awards the winners at a ceremony during the WEF-MENA in the presence of the Jordanian 
                                                 
237
 The Schwab Foundation and the WEF-MENA are not only the hosts of the award ceremony for KAAYIA but 
their founder Klaus Schwab is also on the Board of Trustees of KAAYIA. For further details, see KAAYIA 
(2009).  
238
 Due to the fact that the two winners of the QRNCE in the social innovation category did not implement their 
projects, it is impossible to further discuss QRCE with regard to social ties and resources. Although QRCE has 
ties to several social entrepreneurs in the Jordanian SEN, this is mainly the result of the social entrepreneurs’ 
engagement as business entrepreneurs prior to or simultaneously to engaging in social entrepreneurship. Personal 
interview with social entrepreneurs and the Executive Director of QRCE, Amman, March-April 2013.     
239
 Personal interview with KAAYIA finalists, Amman, March/April 2013; telephone interview with the 
Program & Operations Manager of Mowgli Foundation, May 2013. 
240
 In 2013, two out of three Jordanian KAAYIA finalists were also BADIR fellows. Although 2015 is beyond 
the time period analyzed in this thesis, it is worth mentioning that all four Jordanian KAAYIA finalists in 2015 
had previously been selected as BADIR fellows. This suggests that the ties between KAAYIA and BADIR are 
stronger than both admit; see also IYF (2013); IYF (2015); KAAYIA (2015). 
241
 Personal interviews with the Senior Program manager IYF/BADIR and program managers at 
KAFD/KAAYIA, Amman, March/April 2013. 
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King (KAAYIA 2009; KAAYIA 2015). As we discussed before, the partnership between 
KAFD and the Schwab Foundation under the patronage of the Jordanian King turns KAAYIA 
into an innovative, high-profile relational event and award (Appendix C1).    
BADIR, on the other hand, is designed as a fellowship program that includes training, 
mentoring and competitions. Over the course of the one-year core-fellowship, social 
entrepreneurs receive several trainings to further develop their skills and enterprises, intensive 
mentoring and access to BADIR’s network. Furthermore, BADIR organizes competitions for 
follow-up funds among its fellows to support and engage fellows beyond the duration of the 
core-fellowship.242 In this respect, BADIR varies slightly from other fellowship programs for 
social entrepreneurs. Similar to the ones offered by Ashoka and Synergos, BADIR fellowships 
are designed as relations and draw on a close engagement of the fellows with the selection 
committee and the ‘Friends of BADIR’ (IYF 2013).243 If we look at Figure 8 above, we can 
see that these are different types of actors who provide support and advice to the BADIR 
fellows and the overall initiative. Among them are the Mowgli Foundation (IN5), Kamel Al 
Asmar (SE1), Endeavor (SE6), Jordan Ahli Bank (BS9), Hikma Pharmaceutics (BS10), 
KAFD (RA1), QRCE (RA2) and the Ministry of Social Development (SI1). In fact, BADIR is 
the most central actor in the Jordanian SEN with regard to its bridging function between 
young social entrepreneurs from across Jordan and key actors in the Jordanian SEN 
(Appendix C2). Thus, BADIR is an access point and stepping stone into the Jordanian SEN 
and enables fellows get the opportunity to establish contacts to key actors within the SEN. As 
Figure 8 reveals, one fellow, Saeed Abu EL Hassan (SE9, the middle part) has come play a 
central role. Following his selection as BADIR fellow he was among the winners of KAAYIA 
in 2013 and expanded his ties to actors in the Jordanian SEN. Furthermore, El Hassan was 
recognized by Synergos and thus received an award and two fellowships within a period of 
less than 2 years (IYF 2012; KAAYIA 2015).244 He is an example and success story of what 
the Senior Program Manager of IYF/BADIR describes as BADIR’s mission: 
We want to encourage them [young social innovators] to apply and to take the project 
to the next level so that they can be able to apply to the global program or to KAFD 
or Ashoka. It is a constant development process for these fellows and they should go 
                                                 
242
 Personal interview with the Senior Program Manager of IYF/BADIR, Amman, April 2013. 
243
 For further details on the friends, partners and the selection committee, see also www.badir.jo [15.06.2015]. 
244
 See also www.synergos.org/bios/saeedabualhassan.htm [15.06.2015]. 
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through all of these processes and learn as much as they can, grow and be able to 
benefit, themselves and the beneficiaries they are working for.245  
Fellowships, awards, networking events and mentoring also manifest in the SEN in Jordan as 
innovative social ties between support organizations and social entrepreneurs. They are the 
dominant manifestations of social ties linking support organizations and initiatives to social 
entrepreneurs. Similar to the Egyptian SEN, the organization of competitions beyond the 
competitive selection processes for fellowships and awards are not pervasive in the Jordanian 
SEN. In both cases, international support organizations focusing exclusively on social 
entrepreneurship are present as core actors in the SENs and local support organizations 
emerged that offer fellowships and incubation rather than competitions as relational events. 
However, incubation programs for social enterprises and entrepreneurs as well as co-working 
spaces do not exist in the Jordanian SEN. 
With regard to those international support organizations that are not exclusively focusing on 
social entrepreneurship, only US government agencies, in particular MEPI and USAID, are 
among the core actors (IN8, the middle part in Figure 8 above). This is due to their ties to 
central and well-connected actors. They focus on economic development, entrepreneurship 
and women empowerment and thus offer opportunities for support and engage with several 
social enterprises and entrepreneurs such as Questscope (SE5), Injaz (SE7) and EFE 
(SE12).246 This being said, ties are mainly tried-and-tested support ties (e.g. project grants and 
trainings) and are hardly innovative (Appendix C2). Thus, similar to Egypt where 
international and local support organizations focusing exclusively on social entrepreneurship 
are also present and play a key role, other international support organizations are less 
involved.  
      
Ties between State Institutions & Social Entrepreneurs 
As we discussed before, state institutions do not play a major role in the Jordanian SEN. This 
analysis demonstrates that only few state institutions engage in the Jordanian SEN and that 
both support and advice ties are not well developed. With few exceptions, relational events 
prevail over relation states. Thus, state institutions are not actively facilitating social 
                                                 
245
 Personal interview, Amman, April 2013. 
246
 Personal interview with the MEPI Specialist of the US Embassy in Jordan, Amman, March 2013; see also 
www.mepi.state.gov/med-region/jordan/ and www.usaid.gov/jordan [01.12.2015]. 
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entrepreneurship despite the engagement of King Abdullah and Queen Rania in (social) 
entrepreneurship in Jordan.       
Figure 9: Ties between State Institutions, Social Entrepreneurs & Local Support 
 
Figure 9 above demonstrates that, similar to their presence in the SENs in Egypt and 
Morocco, the Ministry of Education (SI4, the right part) and the Ministry of Labor (SI2, the 
lower left part) are also present in the Jordanian SEN and constitute peripheral actors. In 
addition, several more state institutions are involved that are noteworthy, namely the Ministry 
of Social Development (SI1, the lower left part), the Ministry of Municipal Affairs (SI3, the 
upper right part) and the Greater Amman Municipality (GAM, SI5, the right part) (Appendix 
C1). For the most part, the contribution of these state institutions consists in authorizing social 
enterprises and entrepreneurs to access public institutions and places such as schools, 
universities or squares in the city center to implement programs there or organize events. Injaz 
(SE7) and Raneen (SE10), for instance, implement programs at schools and therefore 
regularly interact with the Ministry of Education. In fact, Injaz and the ministry have a public-
private partnership. However, there is little involvement of the ministry beyond the assigning 
of schools.247  
GAM, the Ministry of Municipal Affairs and local municipalities play a role in the SEN with 
regard to the use of public squares and spaces for projects. In one case, a social enterprise 
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organized a big campaign to motivate residents to clean their streets. A large number of 
volunteers engaged in this event but then was stopped by the local municipality. It did not 
want to allow residents to clean their own streets. After discussions and several phone calls 
finally the volunteers were allowed to continue with their work and the municipality started to 
half-heartedly support this initiative by providing drinkable water.248 As one interviewee 
summarized the position of state institutions towards social entrepreneurship: 
The government is interested in what social entrepreneurs do but remains passive. It 
does not promote social entrepreneurship. High-level officials join events and speak 
positive but the lower-level employees in the ministries are the problem. They do not 
help us unless they get the order to do so from their bosses.249        
Thus, while state officials follow the royal discourse with regard to promoting (social) 
entrepreneurship, they do not follow up their words with action. As a consequence, social 
enterprises and entrepreneurs face challenges, unless they have personal connections in the 
ministries. This holds true for both central social enterprises and entrepreneurs and marginal 
ones.250  
However, there are also exceptional cases where ties between state institutions and social 
enterprises and entrepreneurs are closer. EFE Jordan (SE12), for instance, is well-connected to 
the Ministry of Labor. Owing to the initiative of a former minister of labor, EFE was affiliated 
to the Ministry’s National Labor Centre, i.e. EFE’s office is located there. Also, Samir Murad, 
former Minister of Labor (2010-2011) is the Chairman of EFE’s board of directors and has 
played a supportive role in the growth of EFE.251 The engagement of the Ministry of Social 
Development (SI1, the lower part) with BADIR (LO1) is another example of a closer 
connection. The ministry distributes information about BADIR in the 70 offices it maintains 
throughout Jordan and thus promotes social entrepreneurship and BADIR across Jordan. In so 
doing, BADIR can reach out to youth from the broader society who would otherwise not get 
access to the Jordanian SEN.252 As has been discussed before, BADIR is the most central 
actor in the Jordanian SEN with regard to its bridging role connecting youth to actors in the 
SEN. The support by the Ministry of Social Development largely contributed to that. 
                                                 
248
 Personal interview with several social entrepreneurs who were involved in this event, Amman, March-April 
2013. 
249
 Personal interview with a social entrepreneur, Amman, April 2013; similar findings are also presented in 
Abdou et al. (2010); Bailey et al. (2011). 
250
 Personal interviews with social entrepreneurs, Amman, March-April 2013. 
251
 Personal interview with the CEO of EFE Jordan, Amman, March 2013; see also 
www.jefe.jo/index.php/en/who-we-are/meet-our-board-and-staff [01.06.2015]. 
252
 Personal interview with the Senior Program Manager, IYF/BADIR, Amman, April 2013. 
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In addition to the (social) entrepreneurship initiatives the King and Queen established, in 
particular Queen Rania (RA3, the lower right part) regularly attends opening ceremonies and 
events of central social enterprises and entrepreneurs in the Jordanian SEN (Appendix C1 and 
C2). Thus, ties between the royal family and social enterprises and entrepreneurs are, with one 
exception, relational events. For example, in 2014 Queen Rania attended an event organized 
at a school by Queen Rania’s Madrasati initiative in partnership with the social enterprise 
Raneen and talked to its founder Rawan Barakat (SE10, the right part). Similarly, she visited 
several more social enterprises and entrepreneurs, among them Zureikat/Zikra Initiative in 
2011 (SE2, the upper right part) and Zeinab Al-Momani/Sakhra in 2004 (SE11, the upper 
right part), and discussed with the beneficiaries of these enterprises. This being said, Queen 
Rania has been strongly engaged in the social enterprise Injaz (SE7, the lower right part). 
Injaz was launched under the patronage of the Queen in 1999 and since then she has 
supported Injaz through both support and advice ties. Queen Rania regularly attends events 
organized by Injaz, meets and discusses with alumni and even conducts trainings for Injaz.253 
Thus, compared to all other social enterprises, Injaz receives considerable royal attention. 
This is not only an exceptional case in the Jordanian SEN; neither in Morocco nor Egypt have 
the rulers personally supported social enterprises and entrepreneurs.    
 
Ties between Business Actors & Social Entrepreneurs 
The Jordanian business actors and elites introduced in the previous section are connected to 
social entrepreneurs and other actors in the Jordanian SEN through both support and advice 
ties. Connections exist both on the organizational and on the individual level linking the 
whole company and individuals to social enterprises and entrepreneurs. Despite the presence 
of a number of key business actors in the Jordanian SEN only few play a central role in the 
SEN. These few actors are linked to the key social entrepreneurs and form an exclusive group 
of actors who are running the show. In fact, this is similar to Morocco where a very limited 
number of business actors closely linked to the King and the regime are the dominant business 
actors in the SEN who are linked to the central social enterprises and entrepreneurs.   
                                                 
253
 Personal interviews with the founders of Zikra and Raneen as well as with the Director of Injaz’s 
Entrepreneurship and Employment Program, Amman, March 2013; for details, see also Queen Rania Al 
Abdullah of Jordan (2011); The Jordan Times (2014a) and www.queenrania.jo/en/media [15.06.2015]. 
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Figure 10: Ties between Business Actors, Social Entrepreneurs & Local Support Organizations 
 
If we look at Figure 10 above, we can see that only one business actor (BS1, the right part), 
Fadi Ghandour/Aramex, is at the core of the Jordanian SEN and plays a central role with 
regard to the number of ties and ties to well-connected actors in the SEN (Appendix C1). As 
discussed before, Ghandour is considered a pioneer and role model in (social) 
entrepreneurship support. Therefore, his central role in the Jordanian SEN is hardly 
surprising. Only four more business actors play a noteworthy role: the Arab Bank (BS11), the 
Nuqul Group (BS3), Kaddoura (BS8) and Umniah (BS3). All five are linked to social 
entrepreneurs through support and advice ties; however, the analysis reveals that advice ties 
are stronger than support ties (Appendix C1 and C2). This means, that these business actors 
are not content with sponsoring social enterprises and entrepreneurs but take an active role in 
shaping the development of the SEN.  
Aramex (BS1) seeks to establish long-term, cross-sector ‘sustainability partnerships’ through 
Aramex and its private-led social enterprise Ruwwad (SE4, the upper right part)254: 
We aim to establish mutually beneficial partnerships, rather than form simple donor 
or sponsor relationships. We evaluate every potential partnership against our 
sustainability guidelines to ensure compliance with our sustainability policy. This has 
enabled us to create effective partnerships with communities, social entrepreneurs, 
governments, NGOs and corporations. We approach sustainability projects through a 
vision of partnership and shared value. (Aramex 2014: 49)         
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 For an overview of the sustainability policy of Aramex, see Aramex (2006). 
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These partnerships cover various areas, inter alia community development, education, youth 
empowerment and entrepreneurship, and include support and advice. Examples are the 
provision of funds, scholarships, internship opportunities, training and capacity building as 
well as mentoring.255 As Figure 10 above highlights, those social entrepreneurs who benefit 
from ties to Aramex and Ghandour personally are not only core actors in the Jordanian SEN 
but are the most central ones who have received several international and local recognitions: 
Asmar (Nakhweh, SE1), Zureikat (Zikra, SE2), Endeavor (SE6), Injaz (SE7), Hassan (IYV) 
and Barakat (Raneen, SE10). Moreover, Ghandour was in the committee that selected the 
KAAYIA winners of 2009 (KAAYIA 2009). Zureikat and Barakat were among the winners of 
2009 and have been linked to Ghandour since then. Along with the ties to other key actors in 
the SEN – international and local support organizations as well as business actors – these 
actors form an exclusive group of actors who dominate the Jordanian SEN (Appendix C1 and 
C2).   
The Arab Bank (BS11) follows a similar strategy as Aramex and seeks long-term partnerships 
with societal actors, including social entrepreneurs like Asmar (SE1), Barakat (SE10) or the 
social enterprise Injaz (SE7). These partnerships include support in the form of sponsoring 
and funding of projects and events or of conducting workshops and trainings, for example as 
volunteers for Injaz. In particular until 2012 when Dina Shoman was still actively involved in 
the Arab Bank and the Abdul Hameed Shoman Foundation, the bank and the foundation were 
also linked to several actors in the SEN through advice ties. Dina Shoman represented the 
Arab Bank on the boards of advisors of Nakhweh, Raneen and Injaz (Arab Bank 2011; Arab 
Bank 2013; Arab Bank 2014).256 Moreover, the Abdul Hameed Shoman Foundation, and in 
particular its CEO Valentina Qussisiya, are engaged in the Jordanian SEN. The foundation 
regularly hosts events on diverse topics, inter alia on social entrepreneurship, and Qussisiya 
has been actively involved in promoting social entrepreneurship in Jordan. Like Ghandour 
and Shoman, she is also one of Al-Asmar’s mentors.257 The analysis of the ties of the Arab 
Bank and the Abdul Hameed Shoman Foundation in the Jordanian SEN underlines that, as a 
result of this strong personal engagement, the advisory ties are much stronger than the support 
                                                 
255
 Aramex describes this engagement as behaving as ‘socially responsible, active corporate citizen’. Personal 
interview with the Manager of CEO Operations and the Chief Sustainability and Compliance Officer, Amman 
April 2013; see also Aramex (2010); Aramex (2011); Aramex (2013); Aramex (2014): 49-69.  
256
 Also after 2012 she has continued her advisory role in Nakhweh and Injaz albeit as a consultant (Injaz Al-
Arab 2014).  
257
 Personal interview with Al-Asmar, Amman, March 2013; see also Al-Asmar (2015a). 
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ties (Appendix C2). This implies that these business actors influence social entrepreneurs and 
their decision-making processes.   
The Nuqul Group (BS3), by contrast, channels its CSR activities and support in initiatives that 
work in a specific geographic area. It has focused on Al Koura district in Northern Jordan and 
has been implementing projects to refurbish whole communities with regard to economic 
development, education, health and culture since 2004. These aim ‘to cater to the basic needs 
of residents in regards to their socio-economic development, education, culture, food security 
and legal issues’ (Nuqul Group 2014: 28). In this context, the Nuqul Group and its foundation, 
the ENF, partners not only with state institutions and business actors but also with select 
social entrepreneurs (Nuqul Group 2009; Nuqul Group 2012; Nuqul Group 2014; see also 
Aloul 2014).258 As a consequence, its support of initiatives and actors in other geographic 
areas and sectors of engagement is limited and accounts for Nuqul’s marginal role in the 
Jordanian SEN (Appendix C1 and C2). This being said, Nuqul occasionally engages with a 
number of social entrepreneurs and is also represented in Injaz’s board of directors since 2007 
(Injaz Al-Arab 2008). In 2011 and 2012, for example, Nuqul supported Zikra (SE2). It 
provided advice and access to one of its automotive service centers to a group of Zikra’s 
beneficiaries (Albawaba 2012a).259 Furthermore, the ENF regularly organizes joint events 
with key social entrepreneurs and enterprises; in particular the entrepreneurs Kamel Al-Asmar 
(SE1) and Rabee’ Zureikat (SE2) are close partners. As the Director of the ENF explained  
Kamel and Rabee’ are considered role models and pioneers for the youth ENF 
supports. They can look up to them and get inspiration, ideas and dreams for their 
own lives.260    
Also Rawan Barakat (RE10) and Ruwwad (RE4) are among the actors in the Jordanian SEN 
with who the Nuqul Group and the ENF interact. Thus, although their ties in the SEN are not 
numerous, the Nuqul Group and the ENF are connected to central social entrepreneurs and 
enterprises in the SEN.  
As we discussed before, Kaddoura (BS8) is a business actor who has been actively engaged in 
(social) entrepreneurship since 2008. While he also supports (social) enterprises and 
                                                 
258
 Among the state institutions and business actors are the Ministry of Municipal Affairs, Ghandour and Aramex 
as well as Maher Kaddoura (Albawaba 2011b). 
259
 Personal interview with the Director of the Elia Nuqul Foundation, its Social Media Consultant and several 
social enterprises and entrepreneurs, Amman, March/April 2013. 
260
 Personal interview, Amman, April 2013. 
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entrepreneurs, his major involvement in the Jordanian SEN consists in promoting social 
entrepreneurship through the organization of events and the launch or contribution to 
initiatives that aim to support entrepreneurship. In this context, Kaddoura is, for example, a 
board member and mentor of Endeavor (SE6) and Al-Asmar (SE1) and also a mentor and 
judge in KAFD’s (RA1) Oasis500 and KAAYIA (Appendix C2). 
Finally, Umniah (BS5) has support and advice ties to several few social enterprises and 
entrepreneurs, among them central social entrepreneurs such as Asmar/Nakhweh (SE1) and 
Endeavor (SE6). These ties are hardly innovative; they manifest inter alia in sponsoring of 
and participating in events as well as the membership in the boards of these social enterprises. 
As this analysis reveals, unlike business actors in the SEN in Morocco and Egypt, Jordanian 
business actors are stronger involved in advice than in support. Having said this, there are no 
formal procedures for the establishment of partnerships. Instead, the evaluation of social 
enterprises and entrepreneurs and other potential partners is based on personal meetings, the 
quality of the project proposal and recommendations via the company’s network. The same 
holds true for other companies supporting social entrepreneurs.261 The lack of formal 
procedures and well-elaborated CSR strategies carries the risk that support takes place at an 
individual level depending on the decision of the person in charge of CSR in a company. 
Several social entrepreneurs stated that their medium- and long-term partnerships with 
companies ended once the person in charge left the company.262 Furthermore, the definition of 
CSR varies widely resulting not only in partnerships but also in exploitation. The latter 
prevails in the case of the sponsoring of events, i.e. relational events rather than relational 
states. Talking about this issue an interviewee said 
CSR is not strong in Jordan and the Arab countries in general. Few people really 
understand what it means and follow that understanding. They use CSR to show off, 
often only have short-term projects or events and many of them are rather charity. 
They spend CSR budget mainly media-focused and for marketing purposes. […] 
Sometimes companies even ask to make more advertisement for them than is 
appropriate for the money they gave, i.e. it is more expensive. This doesn’t make 
sense.263    
                                                 
261
 Personal interview with the Chief Sustainability and Compliance Manager of Aramex and several more 
representatives of companies, Amman, April 2013; for an overview of CSR in Jordan and in the MENA region, 
see also Jamali and Sidani (2012); CSR Watch Jordan (2014a); Eweje (2014).  
262
 Personal interview with social entrepreneurs, Amman, March-April 2013. 
263
 Personal interview with the Executive Director of QRCE and the Co-Founder of CSR Watch Jordan, Amman, 
April 2013. 
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Yet, the absence of formal procedures can also be regarded as an advantage. As one central 
social entrepreneurs said 
[The CEO] decided that if I need anything from [the company] I just need to write an 
email to anyone in that company and they have to immediately do it. [This CEO] 
provided me with mentorship via the team. And they provide me with financial 
support.264 
Not many social entrepreneurs benefit from such close partnerships with business actors and 
not every business actor is engaged to the same extent as the above discussed examples. 
Others offer sponsoring of events and services/products in their area of work on a case-by-
case basis or support social entrepreneurs working on specific social issues, for example 
youth employability and entrepreneurship.265 Examples are the Kawar Group (BS2), Zain 
(BS4), Jordan Ahli Bank (BS9) and Hikma Pharmaceutics (BS10) which do not focus on 
social entrepreneurship per se but as sponsors, board members or mentors support and advice 
individual social enterprises that work in the field of entrepreneurship development. Injaz and 
Endeavor are the most famous social enterprises to name in this context as they promote 
entrepreneurship and support entrepreneurs (Injaz Al-Arab 2008; Injaz Al-Arab 2014).266 As a 
result, while these actors are well-established business actors in Jordan and their support and 
advice may benefit social enterprises and entrepreneurs, they play a marginal role in the 
Jordanian SEN (Appendix C1 and C2). 
Whereas many social entrepreneurs are eager to enter into partnerships with key business 
actors and to benefit from these ties, there are also critical remarks towards these ties. As one 
social entrepreneur stated 
At the beginning, [a leading business actor] was very interested in what I am doing 
and wanted to support me. This businessman insisted a lot on being on my board of 
trustees. But I don’t want others to decide what my organization does. It was very 
difficult to reject [this person] and when I did, [this person] turned against me.267     
                                                 
264
 Personal interview, Amman, April 2013. 
265
 Personal interview with the Corporate Communications Manager and the Corporate Communications 
Supervisor of Umniah, Amman, April 2013; see also Umniah (2011); Zain (2012); Zain (2013); Zain (2014)).  
266
 See also www.endeavorjordan.org/Board_of_Directors.aspx?lang=en [15.06.2015]. 
267
 Personal interview with a social entrepreneur, Amman, March 2013. 
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Similarly, a consultant who has been working on social entrepreneurship in the MENA region 
since the early 2000s commented on the role of business actors in social entrepreneurship that 
the ‘Jordanian model is one of patronage and not doing business together’.268  
 
Collegial Ties among Social Entrepreneurs 
Social ties connect social entrepreneurs not only to other types of actors in the Jordanian SEN 
but also to other social entrepreneurs. These ties constitute predominantly advice ties such as 
co-participation in events or exchange of ideas and experiences. This being said, Figure 11 
below demonstrates that the most central social entrepreneurs are those who have numerous 
ties to core and peripheral social entrepreneurs in different parts of the SEN while the 
majority of BADIR fellows (the left part) play a marginal role.  
Figure 11: Ties among Social Entrepreneurs 
 
The social entrepreneurs in the Jordanian SEN can be grouped into core and peripheral actors. 
While several peripheral actors are connected to core actors (the middle part and the right 
part), the majority of BADIR fellows (the left part) are isolated. The most central social 
enterprises and entrepreneurs – Al-Asmar (SE1), Zureikat (SE2), Injaz (SE7), El Hassan 
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 Personal interview and Skype follow-up, Cairo, February 2012/June 2015. 
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(SE9) and Barakat (SE10) are well-connected across the Jordanian SEN. Apart from Injaz, the 
other four actors are all KAAYIA finalists and have been a fellow of at least one more support 
organization. This explains their ties to peripheral social entrepreneurs in different parts of the 
SEN. As one of them stated 
I know everyone in Jordan, but also people from other countries in the region, who is 
engaged in social entrepreneurship – social entrepreneurs, civil society, international 
actors and the private sector.269    
These key actors encourage or nominate other social entrepreneurs for awards or fellowships, 
contribute as jury members to the inclusion of new actors in the SEN, and function as mentors 
or board members of other social entrepreneurs. Bibi, the CEO of Injaz, for instance, is a 
board member of Barakat’s social enterprise Raneen. She was also on the Regional Advisory 
Committee of Synergos. This exhibits that hierarchies exist among social entrepreneurs in the 
SEN. Related to that, core social entrepreneurs feel that they are in competition with each 
other. They closely observe who among the core social entrepreneurs receives fellowships and 
awards and comment on that. They criticize the work of each other and question whether that 
person deserves the fellowship or award or simply got it due to personal contacts. This is 
particularly the case for marginal actors at the core, whereas the most central social 
entrepreneurs form a small, exclusive group of actors. 
 
3.2.3 The Generation of Resources 
The different types of social ties and their manifestations in the Jordanian SEN discussed 
above constitute sources for resources (dimension III of the analytical framework). On the one 
hand, these are tangible resources such as stipends, cash prizes, sponsorships or office 
equipment. On the other hand, ties are also sources for intangible resources such as visibility, 
recognition, control or the outsourcing of social responsibility. This section reveals that in 
particular these intangible ones have implications beyond the SEN. They manifest not only 
the embeddedness of the Jordanian SEN in the international social entrepreneurship 
community and related fields, but also signify the embeddedness of the SEN in the local 
political, economic and social context.   
 
                                                 
269
 Personal interview, Amman, March 2013. 
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3.2.3.1 The Generation of Resources through International Ties 
The engagement of international support organizations in the Jordanian SEN entails the 
generation and provision of tangible and intangible resources. These serve not only individual 
social enterprises and entrepreneurs, but the SEN as a whole. As we will see, they fulfil 
several functions. Like in Egypt and Morocco, they introduce social entrepreneurship and 
novel support mechanisms such as fellowships, awards and mentoring. Moreover, they 
provide the financial means to implement these programs in Jordan and in so doing facilitate 
the development of the Jordanian SEN and its linkages to the international social 
entrepreneurship community.   
 
Tangible Resources 
With regard to tangible resources, fellowships and awards involve stipends, cash prizes, 
investments and additional funds (e.g. for participation in events and trainings). These 
resources serve as the basis for the further development of the social enterprises and of the 
skills of the social entrepreneurs. As we will see, Ashoka and Synergos vary widely 
concerning the kind and the extent of tangible resources they provide to Jordanian social 
entrepreneurs. In contrast to Egypt and Morocco, the Skoll Foundation is present in the 
Jordanian SEN and provides the largest cash prize. 
Ashoka offers a stipend of, on average, 135.000 USD per fellow for a period of three years. 
However, the stipends Ashoka provides are not fixed but depend on the need of the respective 
fellow. Whereas some fellows receive the full amount designated for Jordanian fellows, others 
receive less or even no funding. The stipends are provided by Ashoka in order to enable 
fellows to focus full-time on their enterprise and do not cover other expenses.270 Synergos and 
the Skoll Foundation, on the other hand, provide financial awards and investments that are 
unrestricted. This means that they are not bound to the implementation of specific projects but 
aim to ensure that social entrepreneurs have the financial means and flexibility to devote 
themselves fully to their work and the growth of their enterprises. Accordingly, social 
entrepreneurs can set their own priorities concerning the use of these resources. The financial 
award provided to Synergos fellows amount to 25.000-34.000 USD per fellow for a period of 
                                                 
270
 Personal interviews with Ashoka fellows, March-April 2013; see also Ashoka (2008); Ashoka Arab World 
(2008); Ashoka Arab World (2013). 
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two years.271 The Skoll Award, by contrast, amounts to 1,25 million USD per fellow for a 
period of three years and is the highest financial support in the field of social 
entrepreneurship.272 Thus, albeit limited in amount these resources play an important role in 
the development of social enterprises. They cover expenses that project-bound funding and 
capacity development programs predominantly exclude and in so doing facilitate the growth 
and scaling of social entrepreneurs and their social enterprises.273 Furthermore, as the Director 
of Synergos’ MENA Program stated in an interview, through the Synergos fellowship, the 
social entrepreneurs in the MENA region were able to raise in total additional 3,8 billion USD 
in funding from other sources between 2008 and 2013 (Gabr 2013). Salti (Injaz), for instance, 
received the Henry Kravis Prize in Nonprofit Leadership in 2012 which amounts to 250.000 
USD.274 Thus, international ties also facilitate the access to additional tangible resources.275 
US government agencies, namely USAID and MEPI, also provide tangible resources. In 
2013, approximately 67% of its aid to Jordan was allocated to economic development and 
13% to education and social services. By comparison, in 2010 the budget for both sectors 
together did not exceed 15%.276 Thus, the Arab uprisings of 2011 resulted in a sharp increase 
of support for, in particular in the field of entrepreneurship, education and employment. 
Although they do not explicitly focus on social entrepreneurship, social enterprises who work 
on the aforementioned issues receive support. Examples are Questscope, EFE and support 
organizations like KAFD and QRCE.277  
Having said this, Jordanian social entrepreneurs and experts criticize the non-existence of 
tailored support mechanism beyond the early stage of enterprise development. Once social 
entrepreneurs have received the stipends and prizes by the international support organizations 
exclusively focusing on social entrepreneurship, no further tangible resources are available to 
                                                 
271
 Personal interview with the Program Representative of Synergos, Amman, April 2013; see also Synergos 
(2010b); Gabr (2013). 
272
 However, most social entrepreneurs in the MENA region do not fulfil the selection criteria for the Skoll 
award. For further information on the Skoll Award, see www.skoll.org/about/approach/ [01.06.2015]. 
273
 Unlike Egyptian social enterprises, the majority of social enterprises in Jordan were founded by only one 
person and therefore the fact that fellowships and awards are given to only one person and not the group of 
founders is less contested. Personal interviews, March-May 2013. On this issue, see also Chapter 2 on Egypt. 
274
 For further details, see www.kravisprize.cmc.edu/ [01.06.2015]. 
275
 The following section will discuss this issue in more detail. 
276
 The total budget for Jordan amounted to 638, 99 million USD in 2013 and to 6,58 million USD in 2011; for 
details, see www.beta.foreignassistance.gov/explore/country/Jordan [15.06.2015]. 
277
 Personal interview with the MEPI Specialist at the US Embassy, Amman, March 2013. 
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them.278 This limitation contrasts with the proclaimed sustainability of approaches and social 
enterprises these actors seek to strengthen. Partly due to these limitations in scope and 
duration of financial support, intangible resources generated through international ties are a 
strong motivation for social entrepreneurs to strive for a fellowship or an award. 
 
Intangible Resources 
International ties do not only generate tangible resources but also intangible ones. These 
facilitate, in particular, the inclusion and visibility of social enterprises and entrepreneurs in 
the international social entrepreneurship community.  
International awards and fellowships result, in the first place, in the introduction of social 
entrepreneurship as a novel concept and in the inclusion of actors in the Jordanian SEN and in 
the international social entrepreneurship community.279 By this means, select social 
entrepreneurs become part of an exclusive network that is composed of international and local 
actors who promote entrepreneurship as a development tool to address pressing socio-
economic issues. As a consequence, in the Jordanian SEN – this also applies to social 
entrepreneurship at the MENA level at large – everyone knows everyone (at least by name).280 
Reflecting upon the exclusivity of SENs in the MENA region, one representative of an 
international support organization stated that  
[t]he social entrepreneurship field is a bit of a club. Everybody knows each other. 
Yet, in slums, for example, there are for sure great projects that can be considered 
social entrepreneurship but we do not know them (and vice versa) and they often do 
not have the organizational structures to qualify for a fellowship or an award.281   
This exclusivity manifests not only with regard to the inclusion and access of actors but also 
with regard to the numbers of fellowships and awards select Jordanian social entrepreneurs 
have received. Several social entrepreneurs who made it into the Jordanian SEN reported that 
the inclusion in the SEN has eased their access to other international support organizations in 
                                                 
278
 Contrary to that, Jordanian business entrepreneurs can make recourse to financial resources in the form of 
seed funds and social venture investments in the early stage and in the growth stage. Personal interview with 
social entrepreneurs and with the Head of Research, Wamda, Amman, March 2013; see also Abdou et al. (2010) 
and the contributions in Jamali and Lanteri (2015). 
279
 Fellowships are awarded for a lifetime; however, the financial support and trainings at no cost are limited in 
time. Personal interviews with representatives of support organizations, March-May 2013.    
280
 Personal interview with social entrepreneurs and representatives of support organizations, March-May 2013. 
281
 Personal interview, May 2013. 
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the field of social entrepreneurship. This statement is reflected in the collection of several 
fellowships and awards by a select number of social entrepreneurs: Nine Jordanian social 
entrepreneurs have received at least two fellowships or awards within a short period of time, 
three of them have received three.282 As has been elaborated in section 3.2.2, the application 
processes are dominated by the nomination of social entrepreneurs for fellowships and awards 
by actors who are core actors in the Jordanian SEN. Furthermore, international support 
organizations look for potential fellows and awardees at events and among the fellows and 
awardees of other international support organizations.283 Therefore, the Jordanian SEN is not 
only an exclusive network but also displays the tendencies to revolve around a small circle of 
self-referencing key actors. 
Closely related to inclusion and access as intangible resources, social entrepreneurs also 
receive international visibility and recognition through awards and fellowships. Several social 
entrepreneurs reported that the visibility they got through an award or fellowship has eased 
their access to new actors, sources of funding and support by international support 
organizations in the field of social entrepreneurship and beyond.284 The international support 
organizations feature their fellows and award winners on their webpages and expose them to a 
broader, international audience at conferences and other events. Moreover, the Schwab 
Foundation and the Skoll Foundation, for instance, present their awardees and fellows at the 
WEF and SWF respectively.285 These annual fora gain considerable attention by governments, 
private sector actors, investors, support organizations, entrepreneurs and reach beyond the 
field of social entrepreneurship. They provide social entrepreneurs international platforms to 
present themselves and their enterprises and attract attention.286 Soraya Salti, for example, 
chaired the WEF-MENA Entrepreneurship Education Action Group in 2011. Moreover, she 
received the Henry Kravis Prize in Nonprofit Leadership in 2012. Synergos fellow Rana 
Dajani, on the other hand, participated in the 2010 Clinton Global Initiative in New York and 
was a finalist for the Library of Congress Literacy Award in 2013. Saeed Abu El Hassan took 
                                                 
282
 Personal interviews with social entrepreneurs and representatives of international support organizations, 
March-May 2013; see also Sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 on actors and social ties. 
283
 Interviews with representatives of several international support organizations, October 2011-September 2013.  
284
 Personal interviews, Amman, March-April 2013. 
285
 See for example Soraya Salti: www.archive.skoll.org/session/skoll-world-forum-2012/opening-plenary-2012-
skoll-world-forum/ [01.06.2015].  
286
 The SWF is an ‘invite-only event’ and participants are invited by the Skoll Foundation and the Skoll Centre 
for Social Entrepreneurship. However, participants can also be suggested by previous attendees and a limited 
number of spaces are allocated through an application process. Personal interviews, Amman, March-April 2013; 
see also www.skoll.org/skoll-world-forum/how-to-attend/ [01.06.2015]. 
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part in the Post-2015 Development Agenda National Consultations and was invited to the UN 
Economic and Social Council Youth (ECOSOC) Forum in New York in 2014. Also, Kamel Al 
Asmar was listed by Forbes as one of the 30 social entrepreneurs under 30 in 2014 (Synergos 
2010a; Claremont McKenna College 2012; Freeny 2013; United Nations 2013; Forbes 2014; 
The Jordan Times 2014b; see also Ashoka Arab World 2008; Ashoka Arab World 2013). 
Through these different channels, Jordanian social entrepreneurs are presented as success 
stories and role models who contribute to the solution of pressing socio-economic issues in 
their country. From this perspective, fellowships and awards can be considered not only as 
resources of inclusion, access, visibility and recognition but also as a quality seal attesting the 
credibility and socio-economic impact of social entrepreneurs. On the downside, having only 
one fellowship or award, or even none, is considered by many actors a sign of bad quality and 
may lead to the marginalization of a social entrepreneur.287  
 
3.2.3.2 The Generation of Resources Through Local Ties 
Like international ties, also local ties generate tangible and intangible resources. Owing to the 
presence of a number of different types of local actors, as discussed above, we see the 
generation of diverse tangible and intangible resources. The analysis demonstrates that a small 
number of central actors in the Jordanian SEN have capitalized on social entrepreneurship as 
a development and political tool. It facilitates, at the same time, the development of the 
Jordanian SEN and the emergence of a new generation of socio-economic leaders who are 
connected to the ‘Generation Abdallah’ and the King. Thus, contrary to Morocco where the 
most central actors seek to reach out to youth in the broader society, in Jordan they focus on a 
small group of exclusive actors.      
 
Tangible Resources  
Tangible resources in the Jordanian SEN are generated predominantly through local ties 
between either local support organizations and social entrepreneurs or business actors and 
social entrepreneurs. BADIR and KAAYIA are the main Jordanian support initiatives that 
provide tangible resources to social entrepreneurs in the Jordanian SEN. Like the international 
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support organizations, they provide stipends and cash prizes to support the development of 
social enterprises and social entrepreneurs in Jordan. While the cash prize for KAAYIA 
winners matches up with the tangible resources international support organizations provide, 
the BADIR fellowship entails a financial reward similar to what local support organizations in 
Morocco and Egypt offer.    
With a 50.000 USD designation per winner, the prize for the KAAYIA winners lies in-
between what Ashoka and Synergos provide. The main part of the grant is destined for a 
specific purpose determined by the KAAYIA fellow, e.g. related to the development of the 
social enterprise or the implementation of a project. However, 10.000 USD of the grant are 
intended for capacity building measures to enhance the skills of the fellows (KAAYIA 2015). 
Although these funds are designated only for the winners, in 2009 and 2011 all ten finalists 
received the full amount of funding; in 2013 the finalists received each 10.000 USD and the 
winners the full amount. This can be explained by the exceptional situations in these years. 
According to social entrepreneurs and experts in the Jordanian SEN, in 2009, the decision to 
financially support all ten finalists was due to the fact that KAAYIA was a new initiative. 
Therefore, King Abdullah II wanted to promote this award and to create incentives for social 
entrepreneurs to apply for the next round. In 2011 and in 2013, by contrast, they considered 
the decision to reward all ten finalists a political one related to the Arab uprisings. Amidst 
protests and transformation processes rewarding all ten finalists who contribute to socio-
economic change in the MENA region would give a positive signal and an encouragement to 
Arab youth.288 However, it is also conceivable that this decision was taken to show goodwill 
and avoid criticism in Jordan.289  
BADIR, by contrast, provides 5.000-6.000 USD per fellow as part of the one-year core 
fellowship it offers to Jordanian social entrepreneurs. Furthermore, BADIR fellows can 
compete over a share in additional 9.000 USD in support.290 Thus, the financial support 
BADIR offers resembles that of Moroccan organizations and initiatives like YEA.291 In both 
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cases the target groups differ from those of KAAYIA and of international support 
organizations. They aim to contribute to the further development of social entrepreneurial 
ideas and models and not to the scaling up of established social enterprises.   
As regards the provision of tangible resources by business actors, there is a wide variance 
among actors. Contrary to the proclaimed importance of CSR, most business actors are 
reluctant to disclose detailed information on their financial spending behaviour.292 While 
some actors include their social investments in their annual reports – either as percentage of 
their pre-tax profits, total amount spent or described in numbers of beneficiaries, projects and 
events they supported – others do not provide information at all. Therefore, it is difficult to 
estimate the overall provision of tangible resources to social entrepreneurs by Jordanian 
business actors. However, the available information gives insights into the dimensions of 
financial support and enables a comparison of the key business actors in the SENs in Jordan, 
Morocco and Egypt as data for these is available. 
Aramex, the Arab Bank and the Nuqul Group are among those key business actors who 
provide insights into their social investments. Aramex, for instance, aims to invest a minimum 
of 1% of its pre-tax profits in each Aramex location in the world into CSR activities. Between 
2010 and 2014, this ranged from 1,5% (2014) to 2,6% (2010). In Jordan, Aramex has been 
supporting select social enterprises for several years, among them Nakheweh, Raneen, Zikra, 
Injaz and Ruwwad. In addition, Fadi Ghandour also provides financial support from his 
personal assets which are listed in the annual reports of Ruwwad. In the case of Ruwwad, 
Aramex contributed between 140.000-190.000 USD annually between 2009 and 2012 and 
Ghandour between 95.000-108.000 USD. In the case of the other social enterprises, Aramex 
sponsors events and projects (e.g. a new Raneen audio book production) and provides office 
space (e.g. for Zikra Initiative). As several social entrepreneurs stated, the kind and the 
amount of support largely depend on the need of the social entrepreneurs and agreements are 
usually signed for a period of one year.293      
Similarly, the Arab Bank has invested between 2,7% (2014) and 3,2% (2012) of its pre-tax 
profits into CSR activities in Jordan annually since 2010. For 2014, this translated into 13,06 
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 Personal interviews with social entrepreneurs and with the Chief Sustainability and Compliance Officer of 
Aramex, Amman, April 2013; see also Aramex (2010); Aramex (2012); Aramex (2014); Ruwwad (2009); 
Ruwwad (2010); Ruwwad (2011); Ruwwad (2012). 
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million JOD (ca. 18,4 million USD). However, the Abdul Hameed Shoman Foundation has 
received the majority of these funds (66% in 2010 and 76% in 2012).  Furthermore, the Arab 
Bank also coordinates the donations of its customers which amounted to circa 230.000 USD 
in 2014. In so doing it eases the processes of donating money for a social cause. Among those 
social enterprises who received financial support by the Arab Bank are Injaz and Raneen. 
However, they do not give details (Arab Bank 2014: 24, 95-114; see also Arab Bank 2010; 
Arab Bank 2011; Jalbout 2014).               
 The Nuqul Group, on the other hand, has spent between 144.000 USD (2011) and 414.000 
USD (2013) annually on CSR between 2009 and 2014. As we discussed before, the Nuqul 
Group supports several Jordanian social enterprises. Since 2007, however, the Nuqul Group 
has focused in particular on Al-Koura district and allocates the majority of its funds there. It 
has implemented a pilot model of comprehensive community development there. Together 
with the Elia Nuqul Foundation, these are the main fields of CSR engagement of the Nuqul 
Group in Jordan (Nuqul Group 2009; Nuqul Group 2010; Nuqul Group 2011; Nuqul Group 
2014; Albawaba 2011a; Aloul 2014). 
Other actors are more active than the few reports that exist suggest. Umniah, for example, has 
supported TTI and Nakhweh through the provision of telecommunications solutions and the 
sponsoring of events. However, it does not disclose any information on either the amount of 
funding or the value of the services it has provided.294 Furthermore, as part of its board 
membership obligations towards Injaz, Umniah has contributed 10.000 USD annually to 
Injaz’s Endowment Fund since 2009. Similarly, the founding members and board members of 
Endeavor financed the launch of Endeavor in Jordan and contribute to its ongoing expanses. 
Thus, in both social enterprises, the board is composed of representatives of companies (e.g. 
Aramex, Arab Bank, Zara Holding, Umniah, Kawar Group, Zain) who provide a certain 
amount annually (Bibi 2012; Bibi 2014; Endeavor Jordan 2013; Endeavor Jordan 2014).295 
This being said, social enterprises convey this information more often than business actors in 
their annual reports.  
Another way of generating tangible resources, and at the same time generating intangible 
ones, is the selling of products or services. Al-Asmar, for instance, offers communication 
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strategies and solutions in particular with regard to CSR through his company Ideationbox. 
Among his clients are inter alia Aramex, the Nuqul Group, the ENF, Abdul Hameed Shoman 
Foundation but also KAFD and social enterprises such as Ruwwad and Injaz.296 Thus, Al-
Asmar benefits at the same time from financial support and access to actors and information. 
The Zikra Initiative, by contrast, offers ‘exchange tourism’ and uses the revenues generated 
through the participation fees (ca. 35 USD per Person) to finance its micro-loan programs. In 
particular among business actors, e.g. the Arab Bank and Zara Investment Holding, these 
exchange tourism activities are popular as short-term CSR activities and company retreats.297 
Thus, these actors in the SEN found innovative ways of generating resources. 
From these examples it becomes clear that business actors provide tangible resources to their 
own social projects and to a limited number of key social enterprises and entrepreneurs in the 
Jordanian SEN.298 Unlike Morocco the most central Jordanian business actors engage with 
individual, hand-picked social enterprises and entrepreneurs; they do not limit their 
engagement to entrepreneurs and enterprises who work in the field of entrepreneurship 
support and employability and thus reach out to youth in the broader society.     
 
Intangible Resources 
Local ties within the Jordanian SEN also generate intangible resources. However, intangible 
resources such as inclusion, recognition and visibility have implications beyond the SEN. As 
the analysis reveals, they relate to the creation and co-optation of a new societal constituency, 
the outsourcing of social responsibility and to aligning social entrepreneurship to the socio-
economic agenda of the Jordanian regime. Unlike Morocco, co-optation aims to create a new 
generation of socio-economic leaders and not to reach out to youth from the broader society.  
As discussed before, various local ties exist in the Jordanian SEN. Representatives of local 
support organizations, (senior) fellows and business actors are among those actors who play a 
decisive role in the inclusion of Jordanian social entrepreneurs in the SEN. In particular since 
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the establishment of the local support initiatives KAAYIA and BADIR, these function as 
stepping stones for young social entrepreneurs to enter the Jordanian SEN and have largely 
replaced the international support organizations in this respect. While local actors have copied 
the fellowship and award systems from international support organizations focusing 
exclusively on social entrepreneurship, they differ in several ways. Like local support 
organizations in Morocco and Egypt, the Jordanian ones focus on a younger target group than 
international support organizations. They target youth aged 18-30 and not adults.  Moreover, 
contrary to the application process for international fellowships and awards, BADIR and 
KAAYIA formally do not accept nominations. BADIR disseminates its calls for application 
inter alia via TV, Starbucks coffee shops, the KAFD offices at universities and the offices of 
the Ministry of Social Development to reach young Jordanian social entrepreneurs throughout 
Jordan. Similarly, KAFD spreads the call for application for KAAYIA via TV, internet, its 
offices at universities in Jordan and through universities and organizations in the MENA 
region.299 Having said this, the selection process is neither transparent nor independent from 
individual decisions and political considerations.  
Despite its regional orientation, KAAYIA is biased towards Jordanian social entrepreneurs 
which manifests in the selection of finalists. Out of the 30 finalists between 2009 and 2013, 
approximately one third was Jordanian (nine finalists, among them two winners) (KAAYIA 
2015).300 Several social entrepreneurs, representatives of international support organizations 
and experts expressed criticism towards KAAYIA’s selection process. According to them, 
several Jordanian social entrepreneurs among the KAAYIA finalists were not chosen due to 
the quality of their work but due to the ‘politics behind KAAYIA’. As one social entrepreneur 
summarized this criticism: 
There have to be Jordanians among the KAAYIA finalists. Especially after the Arab 
Spring, there had to be at least one Jordanian winner to prevent an outcry in 
society.301           
Furthermore, they expressed the impression that not necessarily the best Jordanian social 
entrepreneurs are among the finalists and winners but those who are well-connected, i.e. have 
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a strong support base, and who can function as role models and representatives of a new 
generation of socio-economic leaders.302 
While BADIR fellowships facilitate access to local actors, through KAAYIA Jordanian social 
entrepreneurs receive recognition and visibility that exceeds the local level. Social 
entrepreneurs frequently describe the KAAYIA ceremony as a ‘show-off’.  It takes place 
under the patronage of King Abdullah as part of the WEF-MENA and is accompanied by 
publicity over the internet such as videos, brochures and interviews to showcase the KAAYIA 
finalists and the work of KAFD. Also, to ensure that all ten finalists attend the WEF-MENA, 
the winners are not announced before the event.303 In the words of one of the key social 
entrepreneurs in the Jordanian SEN:    
Ashoka of course is the most prestigious fellowship internationally, but in Jordan for 
example KAAYIA is the best award; because nobody here knows Ashoka or 
Synergos, but everyone knows KAAYIA.304 
Thus, KAAYIA fulfills a bridging role in the Jordanian SEN between the local and 
international level that generates high visibility on both levels. It connects not only actors but 
also discourses on socio-economic development and in so doing links the socio-economic 
agenda of King Abdullah to the international discourse and approaches to socio-economic 
development and (social) entrepreneurship. 
Related to that, and as discussed in the previous section, business actors such as Ghandour, 
Nuqul and Hinnawi also facilitate this development and the King’s agenda and thus 
complement the engagement of these actors and initiatives. In addition to the personal 
benefits of these resources for social entrepreneurs, they also constitute a means to 
demonstrate social responsibility for business actors. As Alissa reminds us with regard to the 
‘Generation Abdallah’,  
This group of reformers has often been accused of lacking a real constituency in 
Jordanian society and being disconnected from the socioeconomic realities that the 
population faces. (Alissa 2007: 14) 
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Thus, the engagement of the ‘Generation Abdallah’ signifies that social entrepreneurship 
constitutes a political tool. Apart from this social function, their engagement in the SEN also 
enables the co-optation of this new societal constituency. Similar to Moroccan business elites, 
also the Jordanian ones want to preserve their status quo of power and dominance (Wils 
2003). However, their approach differs. Instead of reaching out to the broader society, they 
create a new generation of socio-economic leaders under their control. As jury members 
business actors are involved in the decision-making processes on the inclusion of social 
entrepreneurs in the Jordanian SEN; as mentors and board members they influence their 
development and growth. In fact, the most central social entrepreneurs seek to be co-opted 
and to become younger versions of Fadi Ghandour. Without recognition, social entrepreneurs 
stated, a social entrepreneurs remains isolated and marginalized.305 As a result, the SEN has 
developed into an exclusive Jordanian network with strong local linkages.  
 
3.3 CONCLUSIONS: THE SEN & AUTHORITARIAN RENEWAL IN JORDAN 
Since the recognition of the first Jordanian social enterprises and entrepreneurs by 
international support organizations exclusively focusing on social entrepreneurship in 2006, 
the Jordanian SEN has developed into a strong network. In particular local support initiatives 
and a select number of business actors and social entrepreneurs have come to dominate the 
SEN. Through KAAYIA, the Jordanian King has expressed his personal support of social 
entrepreneurship as an approach to address socio-economic development and has aligned it to 
his socio-economic agenda. This differs significantly from Morocco and Egypt, where rulers 
have not shown a particular interest in social entrepreneurship. Thus, with the exception of 
state institutions which are peripheral actors, all major international and local actors are 
present in the Jordanian SEN. However, international support organizations exclusively 
focusing on social entrepreneurship play a stronger role in the Egyptian SEN than in the 
Jordanian SEN. This indicates that social entrepreneurship constitutes a development and 
political tool.  
As a development tool, it addresses pressing socio-economic issues in Jordan and has 
introduced novel approaches to do so. It links the actors in the SEN, on the one hand, to King 
Abdullah’s socio-economic agenda and, on the other hand, to the international approaches and 
discourse on entrepreneurship and development. Hence, innovative support and advice ties 
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manifest themselves as fellowships, awards and mentoring in the Jordanian SEN. Together, 
this has stimulated an outsourcing of social responsibility to social and business actors.  
Related to that, business actors have capitalized on social entrepreneurship to demonstrate 
their commitment to socio-economic development, and thus, to counter the criticism of being 
disconnected from society.  
As a political tool, social entrepreneurship serves to create a new generation of socio-
economic leaders as opposed to reaching out to the broader society. Thus, through the 
engagement of the Jordanian King and the ‘Generation Abdallah’ in the Jordanian SEN, 
inclusionary and voluntary co-optation has taken place. As a result, an exclusive and small 
group of connected social entrepreneurs has emerged. Locally and internationally, the 
Jordanian SEN appears as a dynamic and entrepreneurial network.            
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4. EMPIRICAL STUDY OF MOROCCO  
4.1 INTRODUCTION: SOCIO-ECONOMIC REFORM IN MOROCCO 
King Mohammed VI ascended the Moroccan throne in 1999. He instantaneously announced a 
break with the governance style of his father, Hassan II, and emphasized the need for 
modernization, liberalization, socio-economic change and the democratization of the 
constitutional monarchy. In this endeavor, Mohammed VI has continued the neoliberal 
restructuring that had begun in the early 1980s, albeit adding a ‘social dimension’ to it; thus, 
taking account of issues such as human development, poverty reduction and social inclusion. 
This change in style and agenda bestowed Mohammed VI the title ‘King of the Poor’ during 
the first years of his reign. However, this perception has faded and evaluations of his reign 
prior to and following the Arab uprisings of 2011 attest only limited change. The ‘makhzen’ 
(the Moroccan regime) and patterns of interaction have not changed fundamentally. The King 
as neo-patrimonial ruler dominates decision-making and draws on a mix of coercion, co-
optation and stimulating competitions and rivalries among actors in politics, the economy and 
society (Cammett 2004; Zerhouni 2004; Cavatorta 2007; Boukhars 2011; Catusse 2011). 
This chapter argues that social entrepreneurship, which has been aligned to the socio-
economic agenda of the Moroccan regime in the aftermath of the uprisings of 2011, 
constitutes both a development and a political tool. Unlike Jordan, the Moroccan regime 
reaches out to youth in the broader society and seeks to co-opt them, and turns them into 
socially responsible, competitive, entrepreneurial actors. Related to that, the key Moroccan 
business actors engage in the SEN, while the Moroccan King plays a marginal role, whereas 
in Jordan, the King, the Queen and the key business actors are involved.  
Mohammed VI is surrounded by Moroccan elite families who have been aligned to the 
makhzen through formal and informal ties. Some of these families date back to the 19th 
century, i.e. prior to the establishment of the Kingdom of Morocco in 1956.306 Mohammed 
VI’s close circle includes members of these various elite families but also newcomers. Several 
among them already held key positions in politics and the economy under the rule of Hassan 
II or studied together with the King at the ‘Collège Royal’.307 They occupy now high 
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positions in politics and the economy, e.g. personal secretary of the King, counselors, chief 
executive officers (CEOs) of the state-owned Office Chérifien des Phosphates (OCP)308 or 
Société Nationale d’Investissement (SNI)309, ministers and president of the Confédération 
Génerale des Entreprises du Maroc (CGEM)310. Due to the strong presence of technocrats and 
business actors among Muhammed VI’s closest cronies and the engagement of the King as 
business actor himself, Vermeren speaks not only of a rejuvenation of the ‘makhzen’ but of 
the emergence of a ‘makhzen économique’ under Mohammed VI (Vermeren 2011: chap. 19; 
see also Zerhouni 2004; Boukhars 2011; Bogaert 2011b; Willis 2014: 231-264; Iraqi 2015). 
King Mohammed VI has launched several initiatives and social policies in particular in the 
field of human development, good governance, decentralization, poverty reduction and social 
inclusion. This also reflects an adaption to the change in discourse propagated by the 
international financial institutions such as the World Bank (WB) and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) that increasingly put emphasis on good governance and poverty 
reduction in addition to economic growth (Craig and Porter 2006; Lazarus 2008; Hanieh 
2015). The best-known Moroccan initiatives are the program Cities Without Slums (VSB), 
initiated in 2004, and the National Initiative for Human Development (INDH), launched in 
2005. Both are an immediate reaction to the suicide bombings in Casablanca in 2003 which 
highlighted the necessity and urgency to address poverty and social inequality. Whereas VSB 
addresses the problems of slum areas and the creation of decent living space, INDH aims to 
fight social exclusion and to integrate poor and vulnerable groups economically and socially. 
In this regard, INDH follows a participatory approach and encourages the formation and 
active engagement of societal actors and initiatives (for critical analyses see Berriane 2010; 
Bogaert 2011a; Bergh 2012). In the aftermath of the protests during the Arab uprisings of 
2011, the Economic, Social and Environmental Council (CESE) was established as a 
consultative body with the aim to give a new stimulus and advance socio-economic 
development further. CESE focuses on issues such as youth employment and job creation, 
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human capital formation, green economy, and regional development sees itself as an 
intermediary between society’s needs and policy development.311 Moreover, OCP and SNI 
play an increasingly central role on in socio-economic development. Since 2013 
entrepreneurship has made it on the regime’s agenda and has achieved support by the King 
and regime elites. Under the umbrella of OCP, the OCP Foundation launched the initiative 
OCP Entrepreneurship Network (OCPEN) aiming at promoting and supporting 
entrepreneurship in Morocco and by this means creating employment and economic growth 
(Office Chérifien des Phosphates 2013; Office Chérifien des Phosphates 2014). Also, the 5th 
Global Entrepreneurship Summit (GES) was held in Morocco in 2014.312 This high-level 
political event drew considerable attention to entrepreneurship as a career path and 
development tool and was attended by Moroccan ministers and key business actors in addition 
to several local support organizations and entrepreneurs.313  
In conclusion, King Mohammed VI has led Morocco into a process of political and socio-
economic restructuring, albeit not fundamentally changing the patterns of authoritarian rule 
and the Moroccan mankhzen. He puts special emphasis on social issues and created multiple 
initiatives and institutions for socio-economic development, albeit none for social 
entrepreneurship. This being said, entrepreneurship has gained traction since 2013 and 
numerous regime elites engage in entrepreneurship support, including social entrepreneurship. 
 
4.2 THE SEN IN MOROCCO 
This section is divided into three parts, each of them analyzing one of the three dimensions 
outlined in the analytical framework of this thesis. The first part (dimension I) describes the 
actors, institutions and initiatives that compose the Moroccan SEN and elaborates on the 
development of the SEN between 2006 and 2014. It shows that a small number of actors 
closely linked to the Moroccan regime dominates the SEN. The second part (dimension II) 
focuses on the characteristics of the Moroccan SEN and the different types of social ties that 
link the actors in the SEN. It highlights that social entrepreneurship has been embedded in the 
                                                 
311
 Similar social and economic councils existed before; thus CESE is not a newly found institution but a 
refurbished one; for further details, see http://www.cese.ma [15.06.2015]. 
312
 The GES was launched by Barak Obama in 2009 as an annual high-level event taking place in turn in the 
USA and Muslim countries and bringing together actors from various sectors (state, business, society) and 
countries. It aims to ‘deepen ties between business leaders, foundations, and entrepreneurs in the United States 
and Muslim communities around the world’ (Obama (2009).  
313
 For further details, see www.gesmarrakech2014.org and Mayard (2014). 
 159 
specific Moroccan context and that a combination of selected tried-and-tested and innovative 
support and advice ties manifests. The third part (dimension III) analyzes the resources 
generated through international and local ties in the Moroccan SEN. Owing to the weak 
presence of international support organizations, local ties dominate the generation of 
resources. In the final section, the findings of the analysis of the Moroccan SEN and its 
contribution to authoritarian renewal are summarized.  
   
4.2.1 Emergence & Support: Actors, Institutions & Initiatives in the SEN 
The first internationally recognized Moroccan social entrepreneurs were selected in 2007, 
shortly after social entrepreneurship gained a foothold in Jordan. Morocco, as opposed to 
Jordan and Egypt, is not a social entrepreneurship stronghold and the development of the SEN 
has taken place at a cumbersome and slow pace between 2007 and 2011. Only since 2012 
social entrepreneurship has become more popular and a plethora of local support 
organizations and social enterprises emerged. The following section (dimension I of the 
analytical framework) shows that international support organizations exclusively focusing on 
social entrepreneurship have contributed little to the development of the Moroccan SEN. 
Instead, a small number of local actors have fostered its expansion with the support of 
international support organizations that do not limit their activities to social entrepreneurship. 
While key business actors are among these actors and play an important role, state institutions 
and the King play a minor role.   
 
International & Local Support Organizations 
Since the election of the first internationally recognized Moroccan social entrepreneur in 
2007, the development of the Moroccan SEN experienced three waves. These can be broadly 
differentiated in a wave covering the time period between 2007 and 2011, a second wave that 
started in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings of 2011 and lasted until 2014 and a third wave 
that is still ongoing during which we see the emergence of numerous new actors and the 
expansion of the SEN. Similar to many other MENA countries, an ‘entrepreneurship boom’ 
can also be observed in Morocco – admittedly on a much smaller scale than for example in 
Egypt or Jordan. The presence of international and local support organization will be 
discussed predominantly in the context of the first two waves and includes those organizations 
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exclusively focusing on social entrepreneurship and others that address social 
entrepreneurship among other issues.    
During the first wave, beginning in 2006/7, international support organizations exclusively 
supporting social entrepreneurs started to promote and support social entrepreneurship as an 
approach to socio-economic development in Morocco. At that time, several local, regional and 
international social enterprises already existed in Morocco. Some of them date back to the 
1980s and 1990s like the Association Solidarité Féminine (ASF, 1985), l’Amicale Marocaine 
des Handicapés (Groupe AMH, 1992)314 and Al Jisr (1999)315 but have not become acquainted 
with social entrepreneurship as a concept until Ashoka, Synergos and the Schwab Foundation 
entered Morocco.316 Moroccan branches of international and regional social enterprises 
working in the field of entrepreneurship and employability, by contrast, were established in 
the early 2000s such as Enactus Morocco (2004)317, EFE Maroc (2006)318 or Injaz Al-
Maghrib (2007)319. The launch of Injaz Al-Maghrib and the selection of the first Moroccan 
social entrepreneur by Ashoka in 2007, finally, marked the beginning of the first wave of the 
development of the Moroccan SEN. Not surprisingly, the first fellows Ashoka awarded in this 
period were the founders of Al Jisr and ASF, Mhammed Abbad Andaloussi (2007) and Aicha 
Ech Chenna (2010) respectively (Ashoka Arab World 2008). Moreover, it was Andaloussi 
who launched Injaz Al-Maghrib and became its CEO. Both actors are well-established and 
role models in Morocco for their social engagement and Ashoka built on this fact to promote 
social entrepreneurship. A year later, in 2008 when Synergos launched its MENA social 
entrepreneurship program, Synergos included three Moroccan social entrepreneurs in its first 
class of MENA social entrepreneurs (2008-2010).320 It was not until 2010 that additional 
recognitions of Moroccan social entrepreneurs took place. Synergos selected Andaloussi as 
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 For further details, see www.groupeamh.org [15.06.2015]. 
315
 For further details, see www.aljisr.ma [10.05.2015]. 
316
 Personal interview with the founders of ASF and Al Jisr, Casablanca, May 2012/September 2013. 
317
 Enactus was founded in the USA in 1975 under the name SIFE and has nearly 40 branches across the world; 
in the MENA region it is based in Egypt (2004), Morocco (2004) and Tunisia (2008); see also 
www.enactus.org/where-we-work [18.02.2015]. 
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 EFE works in six MENA countries; several branches were launched in 2006 (Morocco, Jordan, Palestine), 
followed by EFE Egypt in 2007, EFE Yemen in 2008 and EFE Tunisia in 2012; see also www.efe.org 
[18.02.2015]. 
319
 Injaz Al-Maghrib is part of Injaz Al-Arab which was founded in 1999 by the Jordanian Soraya Salti and 
operates in 14 countries in the MENA region; see also Chapters 2 and 3 and Injaz Al-Arab (2010). 
320
 These are Saadia Zrira, founder of the Association for Sustainable Development (ASSID), Wafa Zerrouki, 
founder of the Association for Women’s Traditional Handicraft, and Younes Naoumi, founder of Association 
Action Jeunesse (2AJ). They work in the field of community development, employment generation and 
agribusiness; see also Synergos (2009).  
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senior fellow. In the same year, he was also awarded the Schwab Award (Schwab Foundation 
for Social Entrepreneurship 2012).   
Social entrepreneurship did not gain traction during this first wave of the development of the 
SEN. This is largely due to the absence of local representatives who would organize meetings 
and events to bring social entrepreneurs together and to promote social entrepreneurship. 
Despite the recognition of Moroccan social entrepreneurs by three of the leading international 
support organizations in the field of social entrepreneurship during this wave, the SEN 
remained small: seven fellowships and awards were given to five social entrepreneurs. 
Furthermore, three social enterprises with branches in other countries in the MENA region 
opened a Moroccan branch. Although Enactus and Injaz Al-Maghrib promoted (social) 
entrepreneurship at schools and universities, local support organizations and initiatives did not 
emerge during that period either. However, social entrepreneurship as a concept had been 
introduced. The absence of local representatives of these international support organizations is 
a factor that certainly contributed to this slow development of the Moroccan SEN.321    
During the second wave, which started in 2011/12 in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings, a 
social entrepreneurship ‘boom’ began and the Moroccan SEN further developed. Social 
entrepreneurship spread, in particular among young Moroccans. Having said this, this 
development was related to the local engagement of actors rather than international support by 
those organizations that dominate social entrepreneurship globally. International recognition 
by the latter is hardly visible between 2012 and 2014: Ashoka awarded one fellowship; 
Synergos, the Schwab Foundation and the Skoll Foundation did not select a single Moroccan 
social entrepreneur.322 While some argue that this is due to language barriers and the lack of 
mature social enterprises, others refer to the geographic distance of Morocco to Egypt as the 
heartland of social entrepreneurship in the region and the focus on Egypt and Tunisia as 
transition countries after the Arab uprisings.323 Thus, these international support organizations 
have not strengthened their presence in Morocco during the second wave.  
As opposed to this limited support by international organizations exclusively supporting 
social entrepreneurs between 2012 and 2014, the activities in the field of social 
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 Personal interview with social entrepreneurs and experts, Rabat/Casablanca, May-July 2012/September 2013. 
322
 The Ashoka fellow Tarik Nesh-Nash (2012) is the founder of GovRight working on political participation; 
see also Ashoka Arab World (2012). 
323
 Personal and telephone interviews with social entrepreneurs and representatives of international support 
organizations, May-June 2012/May & September 2013. 
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entrepreneurship organized by Moroccans have been proliferating. Several local support 
organizations were founded between 2012 and 2014 and have launched programs to recognize 
and support Moroccan social entrepreneurs. For example, Startup Maroc324 (2011), the 
Moroccan Center for Innovation and Social Entrepreneurship325 (MCISE, 2012), New Work 
Lab326 (NWL, 2013) and Imdad327 (2013) were newly established. Enactus, however 
developed additional entrepreneurship programs such as the Young Entrepreneurs Award328 
(YEA, 2014). In addition to supporting social enterprises and entrepreneurs through 
incubation programs and competitions, these organizations have also engaged in initiatives to 
promote social entrepreneurship in Morocco. While NWL’s ‘Pitch Labs’ offer a platform for 
entrepreneurs to present their work in Casablanca, MCISE and Startup Maroc organized 
roadshows to reach out to cities across the Kingdom and thus expanding beyond Casablanca 
and Rabat. Finally, the first Wamda Mix n’ Mentor event took place in Casablanca in 2013.329  
During this event Wamda also announced the Karim Jazouani Prize to honor young 
Moroccans who are strongly engaged in the development of an entrepreneurship community 
and environment in Morocco (Curley 2013). When MCISE was founded in 2012 with the aim 
to promote and support social entrepreneurship through research, incubation and the 
organization of events such as the Moroccan Social Entrepreneurship Summit in 2013, it was 
the first organization of its kind in Morocco. Two years later a plethora of actors had 
emerged.330 Thus, the Moroccan SEN has experienced a strong growth of local actors during 
the second wave.  
It is noteworthy that Ashoka, Synergos, the Schwab Foundation and the Skoll Foundation 
were not involved in the establishment of these new local support organizations and 
initiatives. The main supportive actors are international support organizations that do not 
exclusively focus on social entrepreneurship, namely US government agencies, the British 
Council and the Drosos Foundation, and a limited number of local business actors.331 The 
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 For further details, see www.startupmaroc.org [15.06.2015]. 
325
 For further details, see www.mcise.org [15.06.2015]. 
326
 For further details, see www.newworklab.com [15.06.2015]. 
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 Imdad existed only for a short period of time and closed in 2014. 
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 For further details, see www.enactus-morocco.org [15.06.2015]. 
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 Wamda is a Beirut-based entrepreneurship platform offering media coverage, networking, advice and 
research; see also www.wamda.com [15.06.2015]. 
330
 Personal interview with social entrepreneurs, international support organizations, the co-founder of Imdad 
and the founders of MCISE, Rabat/Casablanca, May-July 2012/September 2013; selective follow-up interviews 
via telephone  in March 2015. 
331
 Local business actors will be discussed in detail later in this section. 
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British Council and the US Department of State have been working on social entrepreneurship 
in Morocco since 2010; the Swiss Drosos Foundation, however, started to focus on this issue 
in Morocco only in 2013.332 
Furthermore, Moroccan social entrepreneurs have been awarded numerous international 
awards and prizes in fields related to social entrepreneurship such as social innovation, active 
citizenship or entrepreneurship. Examples are the Opus Prize333 (Aicha Ech Channa/ASF, 
2009), the Clinton Global Citizen Award334 (Andaloussi/Al Jisr & Injaz Al-Maghrib, 2011), 
the Fortune/US State Department Global Women’s Mentoring Partnership335 (Elattir/Anarouz, 
2011), Takreem (Slaoui/AMH, 2014) and the MIT Enterprise Forum Arab Startup 
Competition336 (Bounahmidi/Looly’s, 2013-14).337  
The Moroccan SEN entered its third wave of development in 2015. In that year we see a 
change as actors who had emerged during the first two waves expanded their engagement in 
the SEN and launched new initiatives and incubators. Enactus’ Accélérateur Empact (2015), 
Espace Bidaya338 (2015) and MCISE’s Dare Inc.339 (2015) as well as a social entrepreneurship 
program by the British Council and the World Bank financed through a Multi-Donor Trust 
Fund340 (2015) started to accompany social enterprises in 2015 and 2016. Furthermore, the 
Schwab Foundation recognized Slaoui/AMH in 2015.341 This indicates a further boom of 
social entrepreneurship in Morocco. Local support organizations in the SEN aim to reach 
several hundred social enterprises and entrepreneurs within three to five years.342  
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 While the presence of the British Council in Morocco and US-Morocco bilateral relations date back to the late 
1950s/1960s, Drosos has been present in Morocco for less than a decade. For details see www.drosos.org; 
www.britishcouncil.ma/en/about and www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5431.htm [15.06.2015]. 
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 For further details, see www.opusprize.org/#champions-for-faith-filled-change [15.06.2015]. 
334
 For further details, see www.clintonfoundation.org/clinton-global-initiative [15.06.2015].  
335
 For further details, see www.exchanges.state.gov/non-us/program/fortuneus-state-department-global-
womens-mentoring-partnership [15.06.2015]. 
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 For further details, see www.mitarabcompetition.com [15.06.2015]. 
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 Personal interviews with social entrepreneurs, Casablanca/Rabat, May-June 2012/September 2013. 
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 For further details, see www.espace-bidaya.co/ [15.06.2015]. 
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 For further details, see www.dareinc.org/ [15.06.2015]. 
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 For further details, see www.britishcouncil.ma/en/partnerships/success-stories/world-bank [15.06.2015]. 
341
 See also www.schwabfound.org/content/amina-laraki-slaoui [15.06.2015]. 
342
 This wave is not part of the following analysis of the Moroccan SEN but has been briefly addressed here to 
give an impression of the further development of the SEN beyond 2014. 
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In contrast to the cumbersome development of social entrepreneurship during the first wave 
between 2007 and 2011 and the modest support by those international support organizations 
exclusively supporting social entrepreneurs, the concept has experienced a boom since 2012 
owing to the dedication of a number of local actors and the support they received from other 
international actors such as US government agencies and the British Council social 
entrepreneurship has begun to expand considerable. In total, 32 Moroccan social enterprises 
and entrepreneurs have been recognized between 2007 and 2014, only six of them by 
international support organizations exclusively focusing on social entrepreneurship. In Jordan, 
by contrast, these support organizations recognized three times more social entrepreneurs and 
in Egypt more than 100 more than in Morocco.   
 
Social Enterprises & Entrepreneurs 
Although the social enterprises and entrepreneurs in the Moroccan SEN constitute a small 
group of actors, they differ considerable. The analysis demonstrates that two generations of 
social enterprises and entrepreneurs, an older and a younger one, exist in the Moroccan SEN 
and that they can be characterized with regard to type of social enterprise, sector of 
engagement and social background of the entrepreneurs. What unifies them, however, is that 
they do not question the King and the monarchical system but are loyal actors.    
In the Moroccan context, social enterprises have the legal status of an association, cooperative 
or company, the latter becoming increasingly popular. Unlike Jordan where individual social 
entrepreneurs dominate the SEN, in Morocco actors lay more emphasis on the social 
enterprise than on individual social entrepreneurs. In many cases, in particular since 2012, 
social enterprises were launched as a group initiative, i.e. by two or more individuals. Some 
local support organizations even make this a selection criterion.343 This partially explains this 
emphasis.   
The social enterprises in the Moroccan SEN address socio-economic issues in several areas 
with a particular focus on entrepreneurship education and support (e.g. Injaz, Al Jisr, MCISE, 
Endeavor, Enactus); economic empowerment, income generation and employability (EFE, 
Anou, Anarouz, Wafa Association, ASSID, ASF, Looly’s, AMH, Craft Draft); civic 
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 Personal interviews with social entrepreneurs and representatives of local support organizations, 
Rabat/Casablanca, May-June 212/September 2013. 
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engagement (2AJ, GovRight) and agribusiness and environment (Amendy Food, Vernet, 
Biolyayz). Having said this, many social enterprises operate across multiple fields and 
introduce, for example, marketing strategies and technologies to sectors like traditional 
Moroccan handicraft or agricultural production in order to create jobs and income in local 
communities and to connect them to international markets. Women, youth, people with 
disabilities and rural communities are not only the target group of these social enterprises but 
often are at the same time their employees or partners. Social enterprises work in both urban 
and rural areas with a concentration on Casablanca, Rabat and Marrakech.344    
As has been outlined in the previous section, social enterprises vary considerable with regard 
to their age. Some have been established in the 1980s, 1990s and early 2000s while others 
were launched between 2012 and 2014. Similarly, and to some extent related to that, there is 
also a variance in the age of the social entrepreneurs leading these enterprises. The oldest ones 
are beyond the age of 70 and launched their enterprises prior to 2007 and the youngest ones 
are below 20 and have become active more recently. The age group between 35 and 45 is 
largely absent because of the lack of attention they received from international and local 
support organizations. In Egypt and Jordan, by contrast, international support organizations 
exclusively focusing on social entrepreneurship promoted social entrepreneurship in the past 
decade and targeted predominantly social entrepreneurs aged 30 and older, while local ones 
focused on those aged 18 to 30. Thus, there is an older and a younger generation of social 
enterprises and entrepreneurs. The majority of social entrepreneurs have a university degree 
and especially the younger generation has experience abroad (studies, trainings, work) is 
proficient in English which opens up opportunities for support and partnerships with English-
speaking actors.345 They are aware of social entrepreneurship as a concept and explicitly seek 
to combine entrepreneurial activity and social impact. The older generation, by contrast, 
predominantly came across the concept during the application process for a fellowship or 
award by Ashoka or Synergos. They were oblivious of being social entrepreneurs.346  
What both generations have in common is the loyalty to King Mohammed VI and the 
monarchical system in Morocco. Their aim to contribute to socio-economic change does not 
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 Personal interviews with social entrepreneurs, Rabat/Casablanca, May-June 2012/September 2013; see also 
Ashoka Arab World (2008); Ashoka Arab World (2012); Chung and Jonsdottir (2014); Rossi and Kjeldsen 
(2015) and www.synergos.org/socialinnovators/list.htm; www.schwabfound.org/entrepreneurs [15.06.2015]. 
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 The operating language of most international support organizations is predominantly English; Ashoka also 
accepts application documents in Arab; personal and telephone interviews with the directors and representatives 
of Ashoka, Synergos and the Schwab Foundation, December 2012/March & May 2013.  
346
 Personal interviews with social entrepreneurs, Rabat/Casablanca, May-June 2012/September 2013. 
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involve questioning the makhzen but rather addressing challenges and flaws within the 
system. Social entrepreneurs and representatives of local support organizations hold the 
government and state institutions accountable for the existing socio-economic problems, 
criticize the lack of policies addressing these issues and of support of actors who do so.347   
Thus, they are not politically apathetic. 
 
State Institutions & Royal Actors 
As we will see below, state institutions in Morocco did not pay particular attention to social 
entrepreneurship prior to 2013. Although social entrepreneurship has turned into a subject of 
discussion within several ministries since then, this has not translated into supportive policies 
and regulations. Similarly, King Mohammed VI has started to attach value to (social) 
entrepreneurship as a tool for socio-economic development. However, in contrast to Jordan, 
this has not resulted in the launch of a royal initiative dedicated to entrepreneurship.   
Between 2007 and 2012 only three ministries, namely the Ministry of National Education and 
Vocational Training, the Ministry of Higher Education, Scientific Research and Training and 
the Ministry of Employment and Social Affairs, supported select social enterprises aiming to 
address youth unemployment and the mismatch between the education system and the needs 
of the job market. In 2013, ministries working on youth and on economic issues entered the 
Moroccan SEN. In addition to the Ministry of Youth and Sports, the Minister of Handicrafts, 
Social and Solidarity Economy as well as departments within the Ministry of General Affaires 
and Governance (MAGG) and within the Ministry of Industry, Trade, Investment and Digital 
Economy showed interest in social entrepreneurship. 348 Especially the Minister of Investment 
(since 2013) and business actor, Moulay Hafid Elalamy expressed the need to foster 
entrepreneurship as a development tool and career path.349  
As noted above, despite the expression of interest in social entrepreneurship by state 
institutions, a legal and regulatory framework for social entrepreneurship has not been 
elaborated. Due to that, social enterprises can adhere to three different legal frameworks. They 
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 Personal interviews with social entrepreneurs and representatives of local support organizations, 
Rabat/Casablanca, May-June 2012/September 2013. 
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 Personal interviews with consultants and social entrepreneurs, Casablanca/Rabat, May-June 2012/September 
2013. 
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 www.fr.africatime.com/maroc/articles/lentrepreneuriat-explique-par-mhe [15.06.2015]. 
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can register as associations (non-profit), as cooperatives or as companies (for-profit). 
However, none of these laws enables social enterprises to attain a hybrid status combining the 
generation of income with the benefits of a public benefit status.350 Like in Egypt and Jordan 
where a mixed status does not exist either, this is important because financial sustainability 
with regard to the social enterprise and the programs it implements is a key element of social 
entrepreneurship. Without this, social enterprises have difficulties combining the social and 
business elements that characterize social entrepreneurship and that differentiate social 
enterprises from associations and companies. This being said, social enterprises in Morocco 
do not face substantial interferences by state institutions in their work. Hence, as in Jordan, 
the major obstacles emanate from the institutional environment and the lack of recognition 
and support by state institutions.351   
As outlined in the previous section, King Mohammed VI has launched several initiatives and 
programs addressing social and economic issues such as poverty, housing and infrastructure, 
agribusiness and education since his accession to the throne. INDH is the most famous among 
them; in 2011, CESE was launched as a consultative council with the aim to expedite socio-
economic development. Only since 2013, the King has shown an increasing interest in 
entrepreneurship as a tool for the generation of employment and socio-economic 
development. This is largely a result of the entrepreneurship ‘boom’ across the MENA region 
that has also reached Morocco coupled with ongoing socio-economic challenges and 
protests.352 At the occasion of GES 2014 the King stated  
[…] Entrepreneurship and innovation are twin values; they are both springboards for 
freedom, social mobility and prosperity, provided the business environment is 
favorable and the required conditions are met.[…] The entrepreneurial society we 
look forward to should also ensure equal opportunities for all by inspiring and 
encouraging women and young people to become entrepreneurs. Their role in this 
ecosystem would be more effectively valued as a powerhouse of proposals and 
actions to boost inclusive growth and employment.353 
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 The legal texts can be accessed via www.cabinetbassamat.com [15.06.2015]; for a discussion of the legal 
framework for social enterprises in the Middle East see also Abdou et al. (2010); Jamali and Lanteri (2015); on 
Morocco seeChung and Jonsdottir (2014); Rossi and Kjeldsen (2015). 
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 Personal interviews with social entrepreneurs, local support organizations and experts, Rabat/Casablanca, 
May-June 2012/September 2013. 
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 On this issue, see also the following section on business actors and initiatives. 
353 Excerpt of King Muhammed’s message read by the Prime Minister Abdelilah Benkirane at the GES opening 
session in Marrakech, November 2014; for the full text, see 
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It is noteworthy that, contrary to similar events in Jordan which the Jordanian King Abdullah 
II personally uses to open, the Moroccan King did not personally attend GES. This underlines 
that similar to Moroccan state institutions, the King shows a limited personal interest in 
entrepreneurship.354 Social entrepreneurship has not been explicitly mentioned in this context, 
but is rather subsumed under entrepreneurship as entrepreneurship with social impact. To 
date, King Mohammed VI has not launched a (social) entrepreneurship initiative; but we will 
see that, instead, support takes place through the engagement of a number of business actors 
in the Moroccan SEN, in particular the key Moroccan business actors OCP and SNI. 
 
Business Actors & Initiatives 
In general, Moroccan business actors have shown a limited interest in social entrepreneurship 
in the past decade. Only when these actors had taken on a more active role in the promotion of 
entrepreneurship in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings, more attention has also been paid to 
social entrepreneurship. The following elaboration demonstrates that this holds true 
predominantly for state/royal companies and holdings and the Moroccan elite directing the 
Moroccan economy. Contrary to Jordanian business actors and the King, however, they hardly 
show a personal interest in (social) entrepreneurship. For the most part, social 
entrepreneurship is subsumed under CSR and exploited as a means to address socio-economic 
issues that challenge the respective business actor or, as discussed in section 4.1, Morocco in 
general.355  
A small number of prominent families and individuals have dominated the Moroccan 
economy since independence (1956). They have been closely linked to the makhzen and seek 
to preserve their status quo of power and thus to control the emergence of new economic 
                                                                                                                                                        
www.diplomatie.ma/en/DiscoursRoyaux/tabid/2893/vw/1/ItemID/11406/language/en-US/Default.aspx 
[15.06.2015] 
354
 Contrary to the engagement of other royal spouses King Mohammed’s wife Princess Lalla Salma does not 
engage in (social) entrepreneurship and plays no role in the Moroccan SEN. 
355 Small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are not among them. Those SMEs that are involved in 
entrepreneurship development are rather the recipients of support by business actors than supporters of social 
enterprises.  
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actors.356 They benefitted from various reforms, e.g. the ‘Moroccanization Laws’, investment 
codes and the privatization and liberalization of the economy in the course of structural 
adjustment between the 1970s and 1990s. They took over or established companies, holdings 
and business groups covering diverse economic sectors (i.a. banking, food industry, 
telecommunication, real estate, insurance) and consolidated their influence in Morocco’s 
economy.357 Examples are the Kettani family (Wafa Bank/Attijariwafa Bank), the Benjelloun 
family (Banque Marocaine du Commerce Extérieur, BMCE), Elalamy (Saham Group), 
Berrada Sounni (Palmeraie Holding/B Group) and Slaoui (Mafoder). Under the rule of King 
Muhammed VI, these actors have continued to play a key role. Having said this, Muhammed 
VI also included new actors, in particular technocrats, predominantly from prominent 
families. These technocrats, e.g. Mostafa Terrab, Mohammed Berrada and Hassan Bouhemou,  
direct inter alia the royal holding SNI and the OCP Group which are the key economic and 
political institutions for the regime in terms of generating rents, exercising control  and in 
terms of elite co-optation and rotation (Zerhouni 2004; Cammett 2007; Vermeren 2011).  
The above mentioned actors are present in the Moroccan SEN albeit to varying degrees. SNI 
and especially the Attijariwafa Bank and its foundation were among the first actors who 
engaged with Moroccan social enterprises in the late 1990s. Additional actors joined in 2007 
when the first social enterprises were internationally recognized. However, the engagement of 
the majority of business actors has taken place on a case-by-case basis and in specific sectors 
through the companies or their affiliated foundations.358 OCP’s presence in the SEN has 
increased since 2011 and is motivated by several objectives. In particular in 2011, OCP faced 
demonstrations and demolitions at its mining sites across Morocco, inter alia in small towns 
and villages such as Youssoufia, Safi and Khouribga. Local unemployed youth expressed their 
dissatisfaction with the decrease in employment opportunities and service provision by 
OCP.359 This posed not only a challenge to OCP but touched upon the interest of King 
Mohammed VI who holds major stakes in OCP and explains why OCP launched 
entrepreneurship initiatives and not the King personally. Shortly after, OCP launched several 
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 Personal interviews, Casablanca/Rabat, May-June 2012/September 2013; see also Attijariwafa Bank (2012); 
BMCE Bank (2012). 
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programs to address these challenges. While OCP Skills offers trainings and recruits youth, 
the OCP Entrepreneurship Network (OCPEN, since 2013) promotes entrepreneurship as an 
opportunity for self-employment and employment creation. OCPEN aims to support and 
advice entrepreneurs and social entrepreneurs and by this means to contribute to the creation 
of sustainable employment opportunities and to the development of a thriving economic 
environment (OCP 2013; OCP 2014).360 Within a year only, OCPEN has developed into a key 
initiative in the Moroccan SEN and is involved in all major events and initiatives in the field 
of entrepreneurship in Morocco. Thus, OCPEN indicates an increase in the interest in 
entrepreneurship by the makhzen.       
Several more business actors are present in the Moroccan SEN. The Moroccan branch of the 
multinational company Unilever has actively been involved in social entrepreneurship since 
2013 and aims to encourage youth to ‘find practical and innovative solutions to the major 
deficits of sustainability’.361 Unilever roots its CSR strategy mainly in the field of health and 
of environmental protection. The state-owned Caisse de Dépôt et de Gestion (CDG) and its 
CDG Foundation362 are also present in the Moroccan SEN albeit engaging to a very limited 
extent in social entrepreneurship. Furthermore, two associations representing the interests of 
business actors, Centre des Jeunes Dirigeants d’Entreprise Maroc (CJD) and CGEM engage in 
(social) entrepreneurship. The former is the Moroccan branch of an association that has 
branches in many French speaking countries in the world and promotes responsible 
entrepreneurship and an ‘economy in the service of people’ (‘une économie au service de 
l’homme’). Exchange, mentoring, the promotion of entrepreneurship among youth and social 
responsibility are key elements of its mission.363  CGEM, however, is a Moroccan association 
of business actors and is closely linked to the makhzen. In 2006, CGEM published a CSR 
Charta and bestows its CGEM CSR label upon companies as a quality seal (Sater 2002; 
Catusse 2008; CGEM 2009; CGEM 2012).364 Yet, although the CGEM CSR label aims to 
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 The OCP Foundation was founded in 2007 and focuses on human development, youth employability and 
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Charta in accordance with the Global Compact. Likewise, other business actors have expressed their 
commitment to CSR since the early 2000s, e.g. CDG (since 2003), BMCE and Attijariwafa Bank (since 2004). 
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draw more attention to the contribution of business actors to responsible action and socio-
economic development, broader CSR strategies and reporting standards are not in place. CSR 
is predominantly understood as a PR strategy to whitewash the reputation of a company or as 
an approach to solve specific issues related to the work of a company (e.g. environmental 
issues, strikes and demolitions of factories). Furthermore, it is largely confined to the elite 
level and business actors such as BMCI, several SNI subsidiaries, Ynna Holding and Saham 
Group have been labeled by CGEM.365 In 2013, the Collectif des Associations Pour 
l’Education et l’Entrepreneuriat (CAPEE) was established by business actors and local 
support organizations in the field of (social) entrepreneurship and education. CAPEE aims to 
constitute a space for exchange of ideas and for cooperation among its members and to 
function as an interface between state, business, investors, media and society.366   
With few exceptions, Moroccan business actors hardly show a personal interest in social 
entrepreneurship beyond CSR activities. Related to that, the younger generation of Moroccan 
business actors – their Jordanian counterparts are actively engaged in (social) 
entrepreneurship – is equally indifferent. As two directors of support organizations for 
entrepreneurs stated, although entrepreneurship and entrepreneurship support, e.g. mentoring, 
have become more known since 2013, it is still not well understood in Morocco. Most actors 
equate mentoring and entrepreneurship support programs with financial support rather than 
guidance and advice. What is necessary in this early stage of development is a change in 
mindset and role models who promote (social) entrepreneurship and social responsibility.367  
 
4.2.2 Relations & Interactions within the Moroccan SEN 
As we discussed before, the SEN is comparatively small. A closer look at the Moroccan SEN 
and the social ties that exist between social entrepreneurs, support organizations, state 
institutions, royal actors and business actors reveals that despite its relative small size, the 
                                                                                                                                                        
However, since 2013 the number of business actors who promote and honor social responsibility has visibly 
increased. For further details see also www.cgem.ma/fr/label-rse [15.06.2015].     
365
 Personal interviews with social entrepreneurs, company representatives and experts, Casablanca/Rabat, 
September 2013; see also www.cgem.ma/fr/label-rse [15.06.2015]. 
366
 Personal interview with the President of CAPEE, Casablanca, September 2013; for further details see 
www.capeemaroc.org [15.06.2015]. 
367
 Personal interviews, Casablanca, September 2013. 
 172 
Moroccan SEN is dominated by a comparatively large group of central actors. In that respect, 
the Moroccan SEN is not different from the Egyptian or Jordanian SEN.   
The Moroccan SEN consists of a group of core actors surrounded by peripheral actors who 
are less well-connected and engaged within the SEN (Figure 12 below). Two groups of actors 
can be differentiated at the core. The first group consists of the younger generation of local 
support organizations, social enterprises and entrepreneurs as well as business actors (the 
upper left part). The second group consists of the older generation of social enterprises and 
entrepreneurs and of business actors (the lower right part). While international support 
organizations are among both core and peripheral actors, state institutions play a marginal 
role.   
Figure 12: The Moroccan SEN 
 
Legend: coreness (color), degree (node size), eigenvector (label size), betweenness (rim size) 
 
Ties between Support Organizations & Social Entrepreneurs 
International and local support organizations and social enterprises and entrepreneurs in the 
Moroccan SEN are connected through both support and advice ties. The minority of these ties 
are true-and-tested ones; innovative manifestations of ties dominate in the Moroccan SEN, in 
particular between local support organizations and social enterprises and entrepreneurs. 
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Looking at Figure 13 below demonstrates that unlike in the Egyptian SEN where international 
support organizations exclusively focusing on social entrepreneurship play the dominant role 
in the SEN, they play a marginal role in the Moroccan SEN and do not know the actors and 
dynamics in the SEN very well.   
The international support organizations focusing exclusively on social entrepreneurship – 
Ashoka (IN1; the upper right part, Figure 13 below), Synergos (IN2; the lower left part), the 
Schwab Foundation (IN3; the lower right part) and the Skoll Foundation (IN4; the upper left 
part) – are not strongly present in the Moroccan SEN and are not among the core actors 
(Appendix B1). 
Figure 13: Ties between Support Organizations & Social Entrepreneurs 
 
This is a result not only of the limited number of fellowships and awards these support 
organizations have given to Moroccan social entrepreneurs but also a result of the absence of 
local representatives who could accompany fellows and organize events in Morocco. Thus, 
they do not strongly engage with local actors. By contrast, in Jordan where the number of 
internationally recognized social entrepreneurs is higher but local representatives are also 
absent, international support organizations exclusively focusing on social entrepreneurship 
engage more in the SEN.    
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Fellowships and awards manifest in the SEN in Morocco as innovative support and advice 
ties. They are the main component of social entrepreneurship programs.368 While there is little 
variation with regard to the design of these programs across the countries in the MENA region 
(e.g. selection criteria, duration, combination of support and advice), there is great variation 
concerning the implementation of these programs. Similar to the selection processes of social 
enterprises and entrepreneurs for fellowships and awards in the Jordanian SEN, these 
international support organizations draw on the recommendations and nominations of social 
entrepreneurs by local core actors in the Moroccan SEN. Ilham Zhiri (SE4/BS), for instance, 
was a member of Synergos’ ‘Regional Advisory Committee’ and nominated the three 
Synergos fellows who were selected in 2008 (Synergos 2010b).369 Likewise, Ashoka fellow 
Andaloussi (SE8) nominated numerous social entrepreneurs for an Ashoka fellowship, of 
which Chenna’s (SE3) nomination in 2010 was successful. Furthermore, Adnane Addioui, the 
president of MCISE (SE2) and country representative of Enactus (SE5), has been an Ashoka 
advisor since 2013. According to them and several other key social entrepreneurs in Morocco, 
the international support organizations in the field of social entrepreneurship have not been 
very accessible in Morocco. Personal contacts have been rare and Moroccan social 
entrepreneurs have not been visible often looking for support by other international 
organizations.370  
It is true that social entrepreneurship has not been well-known in Morocco in the past 
decade and therefore there have been not many entrepreneurs and only few who 
speak English and fulfill the selection criteria. But in the past two years [since 2012] 
a lot has happened here and we have young entrepreneurs who have great projects. 
But Ashoka, Synergos etc. seem to not realize that.371 
A similar opinion was expressed by the MENA director of one support organization who said 
that they do not know the social entrepreneurship landscape in Morocco well. As a 
consequence they look at the fellows of other support organizations as potential candidates for 
their own programs and in general focus more on the Middle East than on North Africa. 
Yet, the lack of social enterprises that fulfil the selection criteria of these support 
organizations is not the only reason for the limited number of fellowships and awards. The 
                                                 
368
 For further details on these programs, see Chapter 2 on Egypt. 
369
 Zhiri studied and worked in the US before returning to Morocco in the late 1990s. She is an entrepreneur and 
closely involved in mentoring and supporting women entrepreneurs in Morocco. Zhiri participated in several 
trainings and conferences organized inter alia by the US Department of State. For further details see 
www.financenews.press.ma/site/entreprise-2/6262-ilham-zhiri-un-temperament-de-leader [15.06.2015].  
370
 Personal interviews, Rabat/Casablanca, May-June 2012/September 2013. 
371
 Skype interview with the director of a social enterprise and incubator, Casablanca, September 2013. 
 175 
decision on the geographical focus is determined and driven by the donors who finance these 
social entrepreneurship programs. In the case of Ashoka and Synergos USAID has strongly 
been involved in the development of their MENA programs.372  
During the second wave of the development of the Moroccan SEN, Ashoka aimed to 
strengthen its presence in North Africa and therefore started to address its lack of visibility 
and accessibility (Ashoka Arab World 2012). Ashoka Arab World representatives and social 
entrepreneurs participated in the 2014 GES in Morocco. During that event, Ashoka had a 
‘Social Innovation Station’ offering information on their work and advice to social 
entrepreneurs. In addition, Ashoka organized a ‘nominators training’ in cooperation with Injaz 
Al-Maghrib (SE8) and CAPEE (LO5) as well as a ‘Social Innovation Hangout’ in cooperation 
with MCISE (SE2) at the facilities of NWL (LO2). Ashoka aimed to get a better 
understanding of the dynamics in the field of social entrepreneurship in the Maghreb, to 
connect to social entrepreneurs (as potential fellows) and provide information on the 
nomination and selection process (Ashoka Arab World 2014b). By engaging Inzaj Al-Maghrib 
and MCISE in this endeavor, Ashoka partnered with two of the most central actors in the 
Moroccan SEN who are also representatives of the older and the younger generation of social 
enterprises and entrepreneurs (Appendix B1).373 Synergos, the Schwab Foundation and the 
Skoll Foundation, by contrast, have not addressed this lack of visibility and accessibility.374  
The lack of presence and accessibility of international support organizations also manifests in 
the weak support and advice ties to actors in the Moroccan SEN. Personal meetings have not 
taken place on a regular basis. For the most part, Moroccan social entrepreneurs benefit from 
trainings and pro-bono services by partners of the international support organizations, e.g. 
legal advice, impact evaluations and language courses, or participate in events and trainings 
abroad. Injaz Al-Maghrib, for instance, received pro-bono consulting the Boston Consulting 
Group to improve the organizational strategy.375 Also, Moroccan Synergos and Ashoka 
fellows joined the regional meetings and special meetings, e.g. for women entrepreneurs, and 
                                                 
372
 Skype interviews, April 2012/May 2013. 
373
 For further details on this differentiation of social enterprises and entrepreneur in an older and a younger 
generation, see also the following section on collegial ties among social entrepreneurs. 
374
 Synergos even launched new programs focusing on particular countries in the MENA region where it has 
local representatives, excluding Morocco, and its AWSI program closes in 2015; 
www.synergos.org/socialinnovators/ [15.12.2015]. 
375
 Personal interview, Casablanca, May 2012/September 2013. 
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showcased their work at several occasions in the US.376 The award programs by the Schwab 
Foundation and the Skoll Foundation, however, are not designed to engage with social 
entrepreneurs on the local level; they aim to connect actors on the regional and international 
level. Therefore, they do not include personal meetings beyond the annual meetings, i.e. WEF, 
WEF-MENA and the SWF. It is through these fora that they connect social entrepreneurs to 
other actors. Schwab awardee Andaloussi, for example, participated in the WEF-MENA in 
Morocco in 2010 and in Jordan in 2013. Social entrepreneurs stated that they feel isolated as 
most activities take place in Egypt and Jordan and fellows there receive more support than 
they do.377 Thus, the promise and potential of fellowships as close longer-term relationships 
that includes financial support, mentoring and the facilitation of access to other actors does 
not materialize. As a consequence of this limited engagement, Ashoka, Synergos, the Schwab 
Foundation and the Skoll Foundation are peripheral actors in the Moroccan SEN and do not 
play a central role. Having said this, they are not all equally marginal. Ashoka is more central 
than the other three support organization with regard to the number of ties, the ties to well-
connected actors and its visibility and accessibility (Appendix B1).  
The major international support for Moroccan social entrepreneurs is provided by the US 
Department of State. It is the most central international actor in the Moroccan SEN and 
connected to peripheral and key social enterprises and local support organizations across the 
SEN (IN15; the left part, Figure 13 above; Appendix B1). The US Department of State 
engages with social entrepreneurs through several programs and initiative. In particular 
USAID and MEPI with their focus on economic development, education and youth 
empowerment provide ample opportunities for support. While social entrepreneurship 
constitutes an innovative approach in Morocco, the ties between USAID and MEPI and social 
enterprises are hardly innovative. They are for the main part tried-and-tested support ties, i.e. 
project grants and trainings (Appendix B2).378 The Fortune/US State Department Global 
Women’s Mentoring Partnership, however, constitutes an innovative advice tie. It brings 
together established entrepreneurs in the US as mentors with entrepreneurs from all over the 
world who are still at an early stage of development. Over the period of a month, capacity 
building workshops, intensive mentoring and gaining insights into the daily management of 
                                                 
376
 Personal interviews, Rabat/Casablanca, May-June 2012/September 2013; see also Synergos (2010a). 
377
 Personal interviews, Rabat/Casablanca, May-June 2012/September 2013. 
378 Personal interview with the MEPI Alumni Network Coordinator, Rabat, June 2012/September 2013; see also 
www.mepi.state.gov/about-us.html and https://www.usaid.gov/morocco/history [15.06.2015]. 
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the host company in the US aim to provide entrepreneurs with the skills and networks to grow 
their enterprises and to connect them globally. As one Moroccan participant stated, during that 
intensive mentoring program in the US she learnt a lot and advanced her enterprise more in a 
month than in several months of thinking and planning alone in Morocco. Furthermore, the 
mentoring relationship has continued beyond the duration of the program and her mentor still 
provides advice and is also among the first costumers of her social enterprise.379   
The British Council (IN11, the upper left part, Figure 13 above), despite its peripheral 
position in the Moroccan SEN, has been involved in social entrepreneurship in Morocco for 
several years and is worth mentioning.380 Since 2013, the British Council, in cooperation with 
the World Bank, has been engaging in both support and advice with actors in the Moroccan 
SEN. Their program entails various activities, including conferences, a study of social 
entrepreneurship in cooperation with MCISE in 2013/14 (Chung and Jonsdottir 2014), 
awareness campaigns and planned for 2015 also a social enterprise competition. Through this 
competition ten winners will be chosen and accompanied over a period of six months 
(mentoring and coaching) by experts from the UK. The British Council, hence, expands its 
social enterprise program with regard to both innovative manifestations of support and advice 
and reaches out to young Moroccan entrepreneurs below the age of 35.381  
With regard to local support organizations there are numerous actors and initiatives 
supporting Moroccan social enterprises and entrepreneurs. The support and advice ties 
manifest through awards, competitions, incubation, networking events and mentoring. MCISE 
(SE2), Enactus (SE5), Startup Maroc (LO4) and NWL (LO2) are the most central local 
support organizations in the Moroccan SEN and regularly co- organize events.382 While the 
social enterprises and support organizations that emerged at the beginning of the second wave 
became part of the SEN based on their founders’ own initiative and the lack of actors in that 
field, inclusion has become more competitive towards the end of the second wave. They 
                                                 
379
 Personal interview, Rabat, June 2012/September 2013; for further details, see www.vitalvoices.org/global-
initiatives/fortuneus-state-department-global-womens-mentoring-partnership [15.06.2015]. 
380
 The Project Manager in charge of the society projects of the British Council in Morocco until 2013 initiated 
the introduction of a social enterprise program in Morocco in 2010. His successor continued and expanded this 
program; personal interview, Rabat, May 2012/September 2013. 
381
 Personal interview, Rabat, September 2013; for further details see also 
www.britishcouncil.ma/en/programmes/society/social-enterprise-innovation [15.06.2015]. 
382
 Although Imdad (LO1) and CEED (LO3) are also central, the former was active in 2013 and then closed 
whereas the latter focuses on business entrepreneurs and engages in social entrepreneurship as part of its interest 
in fostering education and entrepreneurship (e.g. through CAPEE). Personal interview, Casablanca, September 
2013. 
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determine the selection procedures and criteria and design the support programs. Contrary to 
the application process and program design of international support organizations, local 
support organizations disapprove of nominations and the fellowship system. Incubation 
programs, presentations (‘pitch’)383 and competitions, in which social entrepreneurs have to 
prove themselves and demonstrate progress over time, prevail. Calls for application are 
widely publicized in the internet, at events and in the offices of incubators and support 
organizations to reach out to young Moroccans across the country. In several cases, social 
enterprises that have been recognized by local support organizations between 2012 and 2014 
were established by social entrepreneurs who participated in social entrepreneurship programs 
at school or university. Thus, the work of Injaz Al-Maghrib and Enactus during the first wave 
has paid off.384 
Local support organizations accompany social enterprises and entrepreneurs for up to one 
year.385 Social entrepreneurs benefit from support and advice in capacity building and 
enterprise development (e.g. skills, business plans, market entry) either offered by the support 
organizations themselves or by their partners within the Moroccan SEN and in several cases 
also abroad. These partners are local support organizations, social entrepreneurs and business 
actors who are experienced in enterprise development and in the sector of engagement of the 
respective social enterprise. Often, these partners fulfill several roles at the same time. They 
are partners of local support organizations and social enterprises, jury/selection committee 
members in competitions and mentors for the winners of competitions and participants in 
incubation programs.386 In these roles, they exercise considerable influence on the inclusion 
of social enterprises into the SEN and the development of the Moroccan SEN.  
As we see in Figure 13 above, contrary to the international support organizations exclusively 
supporting social entrepreneurship, local support organizations are accessible to social 
enterprises and entrepreneurs and accompany them closely. They are embedded at the core of 
the SEN and have an in-depth knowledge of the SEN and the actors and dynamics in it. 
                                                 
383
 A pitch is a short presentation of a business idea and model in front of an audience. The main aim is to 
convince the audience of the viability of the business plan and attract the attention and support of support 
organizations, investors and other potential business partners.   
384
 Personal interview with several social entrepreneurs and representatives of support organizations, 
Rabat/Casablanca, September 2013. 
385
 Until 2015, only Enactus and Startup Maroc supported social enterprises through awards, competitions and 
incubation. In 2015 MCISE opened its Dare Inc. incubation program and also started to accompany social 
enterprises. Personal & Skype interviews, September 2013/March 2015. 
386
 The remainder of this section addresses ties to business actors and to fellow social enterprises in more detail. 
 179 
Moreover, local support organizations facilitate international contacts and provide 
opportunities for social entrepreneur to engage beyond the Moroccan SEN. Startup Maroc and 
Enactus, for example, send the winners of their competitions to international competitions and 
programs such as PITME/Silicon Valley and MassChallenge. However, events, e.g. social 
entrepreneurship conferences or NWL’s ‘Pitch Labs’, predominantly take place in Casablanca 
and Rabat and are thus not easily accessible to social entrepreneurs from other parts of 
Morocco. In order to reach out to youth beyond these two cities, MCISE and Startup Maroc 
created the ‘Moroccan CISE Tour’ and the ‘Startup Maroc Roadshow’. They travel the 
country in order to promote social entrepreneurship in the major cities in the twelve 
administrative regions of Morocco.387  Thus, these local support organizations target the 
broader society and engage in as much – if not even more- in innovative advice relations as in 
support ties (Appendix B2).   
 
Ties between State Institutions, Royals & Social Entrepreneurs 
As noted above, state institutions are not strongly present in the Moroccan SEN. In the 
majority of cases, the ties between state institutions and social entrepreneurs constitute 
relational events rather than relational states and state institutions are not among the core 
actors of the SEN. Nevertheless, several institutions are connected through support and advice 
ties to a number of core social enterprises and in so doing observe the actors and interactions 
in the Moroccan SEN (Figure 14 below; Appendix B1).   
                                                 
387
 Personal interview with the director of MCISE, September 2013; see also www.startupmaroc.me/startup-
maroc-roadshow/ and www.mcise.org/index.php/en/our-work-2/awarness-raising [15.06.2015]. 
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Figure 14: Ties between Social Entrepreneurs, State Institutions & Royal Actors 
 
Several ministries, namely the Ministry of National Education (SI4), the Ministry of Higher 
Education (SI3), the Ministry of Labor (SI9) and the Ministry of Agriculture (SI6), have 
supported select social enterprises since 2007. For the most part, these ministries issue 
authorizations for social enterprises to access public institutions such as schools and 
universities to implement programs there e.g. as part of the public-private partnership between 
the Ministry of National Education and the Ministry of Higher Education with Injaz Al-
Maghrib (SE8). However, they do not take an active part in the work of social enterprises in 
Morocco. In few cases, namely in the case of Injaz, EFE (SE11) and Endeavor (SE7), 
ministers and former ministers are among the board members and thus form advice ties with 
these social enterprises. They focus on specific enterprises rather than promoting social 
entrepreneurship as a concept and the development of a social entrepreneurship policy in 
Morocco.388 The Minister of Investment, Moulay Hafid Elalamy is an exception in this 
regard. He is minister, business actor (Saham Group) and personally involved in Endeavor 
(SE7). He is not only the president of the board of directors of Endeavor but was also a 
member of its founding board and strongly influences the work of Endeavor. Moreover, he 
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 Personal interviews with social entrepreneurs and experts, Rabat/Casablanca, May-June 2012/September 
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joined GES 2014 and emphasized the need to create an enabling environment for 
entrepreneurial activity.389   
In the aftermath of the Arab uprisings, and in particular in 2013 and 2014, Moroccan 
ministries conveyed greater interest in social entrepreneurship. This manifested predominantly 
in the participation in conferences and events and in internal discussions within several 
ministries as to whether and how to design a social entrepreneurship strategy.390 In June 2013, 
for example, the Ministry of Youth and Sports (SI10) co-organized an event on social 
entrepreneurship.391 Likewise, the Minister of Handicrafts, Social and Solidarity Economy 
(SI1), Fatema Marouane, and the Minister Delegate in charge of small- and medium-sized 
enterprises and informal sector integration within the Ministry of Industry, Trade, Investment 
and Digital Economy (SI12), Mamoun Bouhadhoud, joined the International Social Enterprise 
Forum in Casablanca in March 2014 organized by the British Council and World Bank in 
cooperation with MCISE (British Council 2014). With regard to the formulation of a social 
entrepreneurship strategy state institutions have taken small steps. In 2013, two departments 
within the Ministry of General Affaires and Governance (MAGG, SI2) commissioned a 
consultant, working for the German development agency GIZ, to prepare a report on social 
entrepreneurship in Morocco. They were particularly interested in presenting a social 
entrepreneurship strategy to the government and in proposing a social entrepreneurship law 
within a short period of time.392 Social entrepreneurs have also been consulted by the MAGG; 
however, these consultations were not successful. As the director of one social enterprise 
stated, the MAGG and the representatives of social enterprises could not agree on the 
definition of social entrepreneurship in Morocco and a joint strategy.  Furthermore, the newly 
established social enterprises and incubators represent a young generation of social 
entrepreneurs and their representatives expressed the impression that state institutions regard 
them as unexperienced youth rather than experts who are at eye level with them.393 Also 
within the Ministry of Labor (SI9) discussions on social entrepreneurship have taken place. 
This ministry equally expressed its interest in mapping out a strategy and supporting the 
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 www.babson.edu/news-events/babson-news/Pages/2014-babson-thought-leaders-at-global-entrepreneurship-
summit-in-morocco.aspx [15.06.2015]. 
390
 These are the following ministries: General Affairs & Governance; Youth and Sports; Employment & Social 
Affairs; Handicrafts, Social and Solidarity Economy; personal interviews with consultants and social 
entrepreneurs, Casablanca/Rabat, May-June 2012/September 2013. 
391
 For further details, see www.silatech.com/home/news-events/silatech-news/silatech-news-
details/2013/06/10/moroccan-youth-inspired-by-leading-arab-social-entrepreneurs [15.06.2015]. 
392
 Personal interview with GIZ consultants, Rabat, September 2013. 
393
 Personal interview with the directors of two social enterprises and experts, Rabat, September 2013. 
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development of social entrepreneurship in Morocco as a new approach to socio-economic 
development. However, these discussions have trailed off and no action has been taken by 
these ministries since then.   
Both experts and social entrepreneurs question that state institutions have a genuine interest in 
social entrepreneurship. This impression also prevails among local support organizations in 
the Moroccan SEN. 394  The ties between state institutions and social enterprises in Morocco 
constitute predominantly relational events rather than relational states and do not indicate the 
existence of well-established ties. However, these ties provide an overview of the dynamics 
and actors in the Moroccan SEN and thus enable state institutions to keep an eye on its 
development.   
Ties between royal actors and social entrepreneurs are also rare. As has been outlined in the 
previous section (4.2.1), the King (RA1) has not launched an initiative dedicated to social 
entrepreneurship and his wife is equally indifferent towards (social) entrepreneurship. The 
major interactions between royal actors and social entrepreneurs consist in few cases, such as 
ASF (SE3), Enactus (SE5), Al Jisr (SE9), AMH (SE16) where social enterprises and 
entrepreneurs were either honored or royals attended the opening of a social enterprise. Al Jisr 
and Ech Chenna are exceptional cases with regard to support and recognition by royal actors. 
King Mohammed VI has been the honorary president of Al Jisr since its establishment. This is 
related to the involvement of Attijariwafa in Al Jisr and Andaloussi’s personal ties to 
Attijariwafa and SNI which provided Al Jisr visibility on the highest level. Ech Chenna 
received a medal of honor from King Mohammed VI in 2000 at a time when she received 
death threats for her work. In 2004, the King’s wife Lalla Salma attended an opening 
ceremony at ASF. Furthermore, the King provides financial support for ASF.395 Furthermore, 
despite similar objectives there are only few links between the King’s initiative INDH (RA2) 
and the Moroccan SEN. On the contrary, many social entrepreneurs regard INDH’s approach 
as inefficient and are reluctant to cooperate.396   
As the analysis reveals, the ties between state institutions and social entrepreneurs are not 
well-developed. Both support nor advice ties exist on a large scale and state institutions are 
neither at the core of the SEN nor key actors. Thus, the formal institutional environment with 
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 Personal interviews, Rabat, September 2013. 
395
 Personal interview with Ech Chenna, Casablanca, September 2013. 
396
 Personal interviews with social entrepreneurs, Rabat/Casablanca, May-June 2012/September 2013. 
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regard to regulatory frameworks, social entrepreneurship policies and the like is not 
supportive in Morocco. Similarly, ties between royal actors and the Moroccan SEN are also 
weak and only few cases of recognition of social enterprises and entrepreneurs exist.  Thus, 
state institutions and the King are not among those actors who actively bind the SEN to the 
regime.       
 
Ties between Business Actors & Social Entrepreneurs 
The Moroccan business actors introduced in the preceding section are connected to social 
entrepreneurs in the Moroccan SEN through both support and advice ties. Between 2007 and 
2014, business actors have become more active and present in the Moroccan SEN. At the 
same time, the manifestations of social ties have become more diversified and innovative. The 
analysis of ties between business actors and social enterprises and entrepreneurs reveals that a 
number of prominent business actors who are closely linked to the Moroccan makhzen are 
among the core actors in the Moroccan SEN. They engage in the SEN through both support 
and advice ties in tried-and-tested and in innovative ways. Yet support ties are slightly 
stronger than advice ties. In particular OCP and SNI, occupy outstanding positions among the 
business actors at the core of the SEN. They are not only the most central business actors 
who, together, reach all the core social enterprises and entrepreneurs as well as local support 
organizations. Overall, the engagement of business actors is still limited.       
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Figure 15: Ties between Business Actors, Social Entrepreneurs 
 
If we look at Figure 15, we can see that several of the central business actors at the core of the 
Moroccan SEN – SNI (BS2), Attijariwafa (BS2a), BMCE (BS4) (Figure 15 above; Appendix 
B1) – have been engaged in social entrepreneurship as part of their CSR activities early on 
and entertain long-term strategic partnerships. In these partnerships, social enterprises rather 
than individual social entrepreneurs are in the foreground. In several cases this engagement 
dates back prior to 2007 when Moroccan social entrepreneurs were internationally recognized 
for the first time. BMCE, for example, has been supporting Enactus Maroc (SE5) and EFE 
Maroc (SE11) since their establishment in 2003 and 2006 respectively. The Attijariwafa Bank 
is a founding member of Al Jisr (SE9); thus the bank’s engagement dates back to the late 
1990s. Furthermore, SNI co-founded Injaz Al-Maghrib (SE8) in 2007 and has mobilized its 
subsidiaries in support of Injaz. As a result, between 2007 and 2014 the number of Injaz’s 
partnerships with business actors in diverse sectors raised to over 80. Having said this, Injaz 
Al-Maghrib engages in strategic partnerships with business actors. The latter implement, as 
volunteers, Injaz’s programs at schools and universities, e.g. trainings, mentoring, and 
contribute to bridging the gap between the education system and the job market (Attijariwafa 
Bank 2012; BMCE Bank 2012; Injaz Al-Maghrib 2014a).397 Thus, long-term partnerships 
between these key business actors and social enterprises have developed.398 In the case of the 
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Attijariwafa Bank and SNI the partnerships with Injaz Al-Maghrib and Al Jisr developed due 
to the personal initiative of Andaloussi, who founded these social enterprises and had been a 
bank executive for the Attijariwafa Bank for over 30 years and the director of the Attijariwafa 
Foundation prior to his retirement. He is well-connected in the Moroccan business elite and, 
as a result, can resort to a vast network of actors and involve them in his social enterprises and 
projects.399 Likewise, business actors engage in strategic partnerships with the social 
enterprise and entrepreneurship accelerator Endeavor (SE11). Even though Endeavor 
Morocco was launched only in 2013 representatives inter alia of OCP (BS1), Attijariwafa 
Bank (BS2a), Mafoder (BS6), Saham Group (BS7), Palmeraie Group (BS8) and CGEM 
(BS11) are among its board members and partners. The active support of local business elites 
is a prerequisite of Endeavor’s approach and without this support the organization does not 
establish a branch in a country.400  
Support ties cover a wide range of interactions. Financing projects, events or social 
entrepreneurs participating in an event and providing equipment such as computers or office 
space is part of these partnerships. Yet, what differentiates these strategic ties among the core 
actors in the Moroccan SEN from other support ties between business actors and social 
enterprises are the more innovative manifestations of support ties. Similar to the engagement 
of business actors in the Jordanian SEN, Moroccan business actors, e.g. executives of SNI and 
its subsidiaries – in particular the Attijariwafa Bank –, BMCE and Unilever, support the work 
of social enterprises also as volunteers and trainers who are involved in the design of 
programs and trainings to enhance the skills of young Moroccan and better prepare them for 
the job market. Representatives of SNI, for instance, constitute approximately 30% of all 
volunteers who conduct Injaz’s programs at schools and universities across Morocco.401 
BMCE and EFE Morocco, however, have designed a tailored training curriculum for 
unemployed youth; BMCE not only financed these trainings but also committed itself to 
hiring the graduates who have completed the training.402 Thus, these ties are mutually 
beneficial rather than an act of corporate philanthropy.         
                                                 
399
 Personal interview, Casablanca, May 2012/September 2013. 
400
 Personal interview with the Director of Endeavor Morocco, Casablanca, September 2013; see also 
www.endeavor.org/approach/model/ [15.07.2015]. 
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 In 2013-2014 479 volunteers and mentors supported Injaz Al-Maghrib; in total the cumulative number of 
volunteers and mentors for the period 2007-2014 is at over 1200 (Injaz Al-Maghrib 2014a: 12). 
402
 Personal interview with the CEOs of Injaz Al-Maghrib and EFE Morocco, Casablanca, May 2012/September 
2013; see also BMCE Bank (2012); Injaz Al-Maghrib (2014a). 
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The engagement of OCP (BS1) in the Moroccan SEN through the OCP Foundation and the 
Alliance des Hors Cadres (ACO) illustrates another manifestation of ties between business 
actors and social entrepreneurs. Rather than focusing solely on the support of select social 
enterprises, OCP aims to promote and dominate entrepreneurship in Morocco, in the big cities 
and rural areas alike and thus has established a plethora of ties in the Moroccan SEN. Social 
entrepreneurs are, among other actors, partners in the implementation of programs and 
recipients of project grants. There are three ways of establishing ties; societal actors can apply 
for financial support on an ongoing basis or as part of a specific call. OCP, however, also 
directly calls on select actors, among them several social entrepreneurs, to cooperate and 
implement projects (OCP 2013; OCP 2014). Yet, the latter has taken place on a case-by-case 
basis, mainly owing to personal contacts, as an immediate reaction to calm down the 
demonstrations and demolitions mentioned previously.403 Although OCP emphasizes that its 
programs do not exclusively target the regions in which OCP works, i.e. the communities who 
live close to the factories and mining areas of OCP, the societal actors OCP supports 
predominantly implement projects in the field of employability and entrepreneurship in these 
regions. In the partnerships with local support organizations and social enterprises, OCP 
provides the financial means and infrastructure. Social enterprises implement projects to 
enhance the skills of Moroccan unemployed youth and women and in so doing facilitate their 
employability (in OCP and beyond). Furthermore, OCP supports the development of social 
enterprises that promote entrepreneurship as an opportunity for self-employment, e.g., 
Enactus (SE5), Injaz Al-Maghrib (SE8) and AMH (SE16) or that directly offer employment 
and income-generating opportunities in marginalized communities such as  Anou (SE13), 
Looly’s (SE15) and Amendy Food (SE20). The sponsoring of the participation in training 
programs in Morocco and abroad and of events on entrepreneurship, e.g. the Global 
Entrepreneurship Summit and the MIT Global Startup Workshop in Marrakech (2014) or the 
Startup Cup Morocco (2013), is an integral part of OCP’s support.404 In fact, since the launch 
of OCPEN in 2013, OCP has been involved in all major (social) entrepreneurship events and 
core enterprises in Morocco and thus has become omnipresent in the Moroccan SEN. As a 
result, OCP has become the most central business actor in the Moroccan SEN (Appendix B1). 
OCP follows a different strategy than SNI, the second most central business actor in the 
Moroccan SEN, which limits its engagement in the Moroccan SEN to relations to central 
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 Personal interview with social entrepreneurs involved in these projects, Rabat/Casablanca, September 2013. 
404
 Personal interviews, Rabat, September 2013; see also OCP (2013); OCP (2014); Roussel (2014). 
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social enterprises largely excluding the younger generation of social enterprises that has 
emerged since 2012.    
The multinational company Unilever (BS3) is the only foreign business actor among the core 
actors in the Moroccan SEN and is well-connected within the SEN. While it supports several 
social enterprises as part of its CSR activities, Unilever is particularly known for its 
partnership with Enactus (SE5).405 Since 2014, it supports the award Prix Développement 
Durable Des Jeunes Entrepreneurs (YEA) which offers financial and technical support for six 
months to three awardees.406 The other business actors in the Moroccan SEN (BS5-BS13) 
have been involved sporadically, either based on an understanding of CSR as short-term 
support such as sponsoring and donation, or due to personal ties to social entrepreneurs.407 
They are not core actors in the SEN and play a minor role (Appendix B1 and B2). 
With regard to advice ties, the core business actors in the Moroccan SEN entertain several 
types of advice ties. Some of these are tried-and-tested connections, such as board 
membership, while others are more innovative such as mentoring and participating in the 
selection committees or juries for awards and incubation programs. Several of the core 
business actors, as outlined above, have been involved in the formation and development of 
social enterprises. In addition to providing financial and technical support these business 
actors have also been involved as decision-makers and mentors. The boards of directors of 
Enactus, EFE and Endeavor, for instance, are composed exclusively of Moroccan business 
actors assembling some of the most prominent Moroccan business actors, including all the 
business actors discussed so far.408 In so doing, they strongly influence the decision-making 
processes in these social enterprises and link them to the regime. Yet, they are among the few 
social enterprises that have a board; most other social enterprises do not. This is partly due to 
their development stage, i.e. they are in an early stage of development and have not (yet) 
formed a board, or due to the decision to exclude external actors in decision-making processes 
and thus remain as independent as possible.409 They predominantly resort to competitions, 
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 Unilever supports not only Enactus Morocco but has been a long-term partner of Enactus worldwide and 
implements the YEA in several other countries, as well; see also http://www.unileverenactuspartnership.org/ 
[15.06.2015]. 
406
 Personal interview with the Country Leader of Enactus, Rabat, September 2013; see also www.enactus-
morocco.org/unileveryea/ [15.06.2015]. 
407
 The CEO of Mafoder, Ibrahim Slaoui, for instance, is the husband of Amina Slaoui, founder of AMH.  
408
 Personal interviews, Casablanca, September 2013. 
409
 Personal interviews with social entrepreneurs, Rabat/Casablanca, May-June 2012/September 2013. 
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incubation programs and mentoring for advice. Local and international competitions and 
incubation programs in the field of (social) entrepreneurship commonly include a tailored 
advisory component, e.g. one month incubation in Silicon Valley (PITME Labs), six months 
mentoring by business actors in Morocco (Unilever-Enactus) or the access to mentoring 
opportunities through OCPEN. Similarly, Endeavor provides mentoring opportunities through 
its local network of business actors and international network of Endeavor mentors for 12-18 
months (Mayard 2015). However, mentoring as a concept is relatively new in Morocco. As 
the director of an organization offering incubation and mentoring explained, mentoring and 
networking are often misunderstood by entrepreneurs and business actors alike. In particular 
among the younger generation of entrepreneurs it is considered as ‘something negative very 
often, e.g. wasta, patronage and clientelism, and not as an asset that can be used 
differently’.410 While social entrepreneurs and enterprises are receptive to networking among 
their peer group (e.g. through Enactus or MCISE) and with support organizations, they are 
more critical towards ties to local business actors. They prefer support through formal 
channels and by well-known business actors over the support by an individual. Yet, the 
omnipresence of OCP in the Moroccan SEN is not perceived in a negative way by social 
entrepreneurs. On the contrary, they seek to be co-opted.411 Thus, their criticism of clientelism 
and other informal ties and their interest in cooperating with OCP, SNI and other business 
elites linked to the makhzen and present in the Moroccan SEN are contradictory. 
Business actors also engage as members of selection committees in competitions over awards 
and incubation. In that capacity, they influence the decisions on which social enterprises and 
ideas receive recognition and support. Moreover, this involvement provides the opportunity to 
establish first contacts that may lead to the establishment of direct ties beyond the initial 
relational event. Looly’s, (SE15) for example, first participated in the Startup Cup Maroc in 
2013, in which OCP had been involved, and subsequently has been directly supported by the 
OCP through OCPEN (Mayard 2013; Nanaa 2013; OCP 2014). A novel platform of exchange 
constitutes CAPEE (LO5) which was established in 2013 and includes OCP and SNI and 
social enterprises (EFE, Injaz Al-Maghrib, AMH, Enactus). Yet, since its establishment 
CAPEE has not produced results beyond the development of a ‘social responsibility 
charta’.412  
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 Personal interview, Casablanca, September 2013. 
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 Personal interview with social entrepreneurs, Rabat/Casablanca, May-June 2012/September 2013. 
412
 For further details see www.capeemaroc.org/ [15.06.2015]. 
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Collegial Ties among Social Entrepreneurs 
Social enterprises and entrepreneurs are not only connected to support organizations, business 
actors and state institutions; ties also exist among social enterprises. For the most part, these 
are advice ties and interactions during events. In several few cases partnerships have been 
established among social enterprises that are positioned in the core of the Moroccan SEN to 
implement joint projects. In general, the number of social enterprises in the Moroccan SEN is 
manageable and they know each other (at least by name). The analysis reveals that there are 
several cleavages among social entrepreneurs. In particular, the split within the core group of 
the SEN is noticeable.   
 
Figure 16: Ties among Social Entrepreneurs 
 
The social enterprises in the Moroccan SEN can be divided into core and peripheral actors. 
With regard to peripheral social enterprises, we can see that these are social enterprises that 
are either connected to peripheral social enterprises who got recognized by the same support 
organization or are largely isolated (e.g. the Synergos fellows SE6, SE10, SE17; Ashoka 
fellows SE3 & SE14; Imdad fellows SE21-SE32; YEA SE18 & SE19; Figure 16 above; 
Appendix B1). They are not strongly engaged in social entrepreneurship development in 
general and have therefore few or no ties to social entrepreneurs in the core and the periphery 
of the Moroccan SEN, or they stopped working altogether. Aicha Ech Chenna and her social 
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enterprise ASF (SE3), is an exceptional peripheral social entrepreneur. Ech Chenna is well-
known and considered a role model among social entrepreneurs, and Moroccans in general. 
Yet, she is connected to few social entrepreneurs albeit including the most central Moroccan 
social entrepreneur, Andaloussi (SE8). Andaloussi encouraged and supported Ech Chenna’s 
application for the Ashoka fellowship.413 Thus, as opposed to her peripheral position in the 
Moroccan SEN Ech Chenna plays an important role for social entrepreneurship in Morocco.  
Within the core group of social enterprises a plethora of ties exist. However, two major 
cleavages exist. On the one hand, there is a cleavage between an older generation of social 
enterprises that were predominantly established prior to 2012 and a younger generation that 
has emerged since 2012 which also belongs to a younger age group (18-35 years). On the 
other hand, there are several core social enterprises that are more central and powerful than 
other core social enterprises irrespective of whether they belong to the older or younger 
generation of actors.  
The older generation (the lower right part of the core, Figure 16 above) is comprised of 
Moroccan social enterprises and entrepreneurs that have either been active since the 1990s, 
i.e. Al Jisr (SE9) and AMH (SE16), or that are local affiliations of the regional or international 
social enterprises Injaz (SE8), EFE (SE11) and Endeavor (SE7). These actors work in the 
field of education, entrepreneurship and employment.414 The ties among these actors are 
predominantly advice ties. The CEO of Injaz Al-Maghrib, for instance, is at the same time the 
founder of Al Jisr, former president and board member of EFE Maroc. Furthermore, as has 
been discussed above and in section 4.2.2, social entrepreneurs also encourage and support 
the application of other social entrepreneurs for fellowships and awards. Andaloussi 
nominated not only Ech Chenna for an Ashoka fellowship but also Slaoui.  
Finally, several social enterprises are members of CAPEE. AMH, Injaz Al-Maghrib, EFE and 
Enactus are involved in this collective. Since CAPEE was established at the end of the second 
wave, in late 2013, under the presidency of Andaloussi, it has not yet produced major results 
with regard to the interaction and joint action of its members.415   
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 Personal interviews, Casablanca, May-June 2012/September 2013. 
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 They are led by Moroccans aged 40 and above who all have considerable work experience in the private 
sector. Thus, their background differs from that of the younger generation. See also Section 4.2.1. 
415
 For further details, see www.enactus-morocco.org/unileveryea/presentation-du-prix [15.06.2015]. 
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The ties among this younger generation of social enterprises and entrepreneurs are numerous 
and consist of both advice and support ties (the upper left part of the core, Figure 16 above). 
Some of them went to university together and developed their social entrepreneurial activities 
together; others established ties when they launched their social enterprises. Accordingly, 
most actors of the younger generation individually entered the SEN rather than as part of a 
group or class of actors. In general, they promote the work of each other and exchange ideas 
on how to further develop the Moroccan SEN. Due to the limited number of actors, they co-
organized or co-participated in all the major social entrepreneurship events between 2012 and 
2014, e.g. the Moroccan Social Entrepreneurship Summit in Casablanca in 2013. Also, a 
representative of MCISE was a member of the selection committee for Enactus’ Unilever 
YEA 2014. Owing to that, the YEA winners (SE18-SE20) enjoy access to actors beyond 
Enactus.416 Similar to format of fellowships and awards of support organizations exclusively 
focusing on social entrepreneurship, Enactus facilitates the exchange and networking among 
its award winners and fellows and thus facilitates the development of a group of Enactus 
fellows.417   
As Figure 16 above shows, MCISE (SE2) and Enactus (SE5) are the most central actors 
among the younger generation which, in addition to close ties to their peers, also have ties to 
the older generation, i.e. are brokers between these two groups. Nevertheless, the ties between 
the younger generation of social enterprises and entrepreneurs and the older generation are 
weak. Only few ties exist between these two groups of core actors, mainly through the ties 
between the most central actors of each group: Enactus (SE5) and MCISE (SE2) to Endeavor 
(SE7), Injaz Al-Maghrib (SE8), EFE (SE11) and AMH (SE16).418 These ties are solely 
advisory ties that have formed during interactions at events such as the International Social 
Enterprise Forum which took place in Morocco in 2014 or the co-membership of these actors 
in CAPEE419 since 2013 (Appendix B2). The reasons for the existence of weak ties are 
twofold. On the one hand, this is due to the different areas of engagement. While the older 
generation focuses on education and entrepreneurship, the younger one established social 
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 www.enactus-morocco.org/unileveryea [15.06.2015]. 
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 Personal interview, Rabat, September 2013. 
418
 Ilham Zhiri (SE4/BS) is well-connected with both groups as a social entrepreneur, business actor and member 
of Synergos’ Regional Advisory Committee. She also launched Imdad (LO1) together with Anarouz’ founder 
Manal Elattir (SE1). However, after Forsa@Challenge in 2013/14, Zhiri has become largely inactive in the 
Moroccan SEN.    
419
 Although the SNA suggests that CAPEE is a key actor with regard to advice; in practice the interaction has 
been minimal since its establishment in 2013; Skype interview with member, February 2015.   
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enterprises in sectors such as handicraft and agriculture with a focus on the generation of 
income and employment opportunities. On the other hand, the younger generation wants to 
establish its own projects and shape the Moroccan SEN rather than following the lead of the 
older generation. Therefore, they are hesitant to establish close relations. Representatives of 
the older generation, on the other hand, stated that they want to cooperate with young social 
enterprises as they ‘have the experience and money to help implement new projects 
successfully; but these young people do not want to cooperate’. They criticize the lack of 
skills and the unrealistic goals of these young actors.420 Nevertheless, the younger generation 
expresses its respect for the older generation of social enterprises as role models; in particular 
Andaloussi and Ech Chenna are frequently mentioned in this context.  
In conclusion, actors from both the older and the younger generation are among the core and 
the most central social entrepreneurs in the Moroccan SEN. Although ties exist between these 
two groups, cooperation is rather the exception; in particular the younger generation is wary 
of domination by the older generation. In Jordan, however, the major split consists not 
between an older and a younger generation but among the central and the marginal actors at 
the core of the SEN. 
 
4.2.3 The Generation of Resources 
The different types of social ties and their manifestation in the Moroccan SEN link actors – 
within-type actors and across different types of actors – and constitute sources for resources. 
The resources generated as an output of ties are, on the one hand, tangible ones such as grants, 
stipends, cash prizes, sponsoring or equipment and, on the other hand, intangible ones such as 
recognition, inclusion, visibility, outsourcing of social responsibility and control. This output 
provides insights not only into social entrepreneurship in Morocco but also into the power 
dynamics within the Moroccan SEN and its contribution to authoritarian renewal. As this 
section demonstrates, in particular resources generated through local ties manifest the 
embeddedness of the Moroccan SEN in the local political, economic and social context. 
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 Personal interviews with social entrepreneurs, Rabat/Casablanca, May-June 2012/September 2013. 
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4.2.3.1 The Generation of Resources through International Ties 
Through international ties several kinds of tangible and intangible resources become available 
in the Moroccan SEN. These resources serve individual social enterprises and entrepreneurs 
but also the Moroccan SEN as a whole. They introduce, in the first place, new ideas and 
approaches, e.g. mentoring and incubation, and constitute financial resources to implement 
these. We will see that, similar to Egypt and Jordan, they facilitate the access to the global 
social entrepreneurship community and to new markets in Europe and the US. However, 
international ties are not equally strong in this regard owing to the weak ties between 
international support organizations exclusively focusing on social entrepreneurship and 
Moroccan social enterprises and entrepreneurs.   
 
Tangible Resources 
Tangible resources available through international ties serve as support to further develop 
social enterprises and the skills of the social entrepreneurs. Fellowships and awards include 
stipends, cash prizes and funds for work-related travels to participate in international events or 
for equipment. Ashoka, Synergos, the Schwab Foundation and the Skoll Foundation vary 
widely concerning the kind and extent of support they provide to social entrepreneurs. 
Contrary to the other three organizations, the Schwab Foundation does not provide a cash 
prize.421  
In the case of Ashoka, stipends average 135.000 USD for a period of three years but depend 
on the need of the respective fellow. The unrestricted financial award provided by Synergos, 
by contrast, amounts to 25.000-34.000 USD for a period of two years and thus is a fraction of 
that provided by Ashoka (Ashoka 2008; Synergos 2010b). The Skoll Foundation supports 
only one Moroccan social enterprise with a prize worth 10.000 USD through a cooperation 
with the MIT Pan Arab Forum’s Startup Competition. While for some social enterprises and 
entrepreneurs financial support is of minor concern, others consider it crucial. Ashoka fellow 
Andaloussi, for example, stated that he does not have any financial problems. He can make 
recourse to both his private fortune and the financial support he receives through the 
partnership with business actors. Therefore, tangible resources through a fellowship or award 
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 For an overview, see Chapter 2 on Egypt. 
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are less important to him than intangible resources.422 ASF earns 50% of its revenues through 
the social enterprise itself but is still struggling to cover all its expanses. Stipends, prizes and 
unrestricted unconditional aid are important resources for ASF, in particular in light of the 
lack of a legal and regulatory framework for social enterprises that would align the public 
benefit status with income-generation.423 Yet, many Moroccan social enterprises either do not 
generate any revenues or are at an early stage of development. For them these stipends and 
awards provide the opportunity to cover expenses that project-bound development initiatives, 
such as those by the US Department of State or Drosos Foundation, predominantly exclude. 
Having said that, the United States spent through its numerous government agencies and 
initiatives, e.g. the US Department of State, USAID and MEPI, approximately 40-75% of its 
aid to Morocco on economic development and between 2-21% on education and social 
services between 2009 and 2014.424 Injaz Al-Maghrib, for example, was granted nearly 
300.000 USD in 2013 for a period of two years. From the Drosos Foundation, Injaz Al-
Maghrib received for a period of four years 4,03 million MAD (ca. 475.000 USD) to open 
two new offices and serve approximately 4.000 young Moroccans (Injaz Al-Maghrib 2014b). 
Likewise, Drosos also supports MCISE and Bidaya with regard to opening office space and 
incubating a certain number of social enterprises over a period of two and five years, 
respectively.425  
There are also international support organizations and a company that provide financial 
support in innovative ways. The British Council together with the World Bank dedicated a 
budget of 330.000 USD for the period 2013-2015 to social entrepreneurship activities. 
Approximately one third is designated for an incubation program starting in 2015 that offers 
awards of 10.000 USD (per social enterprise). The rest is assigned for events and activities 
that benefit the whole Moroccan SEN such as conferences, research and awareness raising 
campaigns.426 The MIT Pan Arab Forum also engages in social entrepreneurship. It organizes 
annually the ‘Arab Startup Competition’. The cash prizes of this event range between 10.000 
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 Personal interview, Casablanca, May 2012/September 2013. 
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 Personal interview, Casablanca, September 2013; see also Midech (2013). 
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 In 2013, the total budget for Morocco was at 250 million USD, of which 48% were allocated to economic 
development and 13% to education and social services; for details see 
www.beta.foreignassistance.gov/explore/country/Morocco [15.10.2015]. 
425
 Skype interview with the Director of MCISE, March 2015.  
426
 Personal interview, Rabat, September 2013; see also www.britishcouncil.ma/en/programmes/society/social-
enterprise-innovation/social-enterprise-competition [15.08.2015]. 
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and 50.000 USD per enterprise and scholarships to travel to Silicon Valley.427 The most 
impressive prize given to a Moroccan social entrepreneur, however, is the Opus Prize 
amounting to 1 million USD. Like the financial award provided by Synergos the Opus Prize is 
unrestricted and thus it is up to the social entrepreneur as to how to spend the cash prize.428 
The multinational company Unilever also provides a financial award to social entrepreneurs 
in Morocco. In cooperation with Enactus, which Unilever has been supporting for several 
years, it annually awards three social enterprises with 20.000-50.000 MAD (ca. 2.000-6.000 
USD) cash prizes.429  
This section showed that, although the majority of tangible resources constitute modest 
contributions, they enable social entrepreneurs to freely use these resources for the 
development of their enterprises and spend them where most needed.  
  
Intangible Resources 
International ties not only serve to generate tangible resources but also intangible ones, 
namely inclusion, access, recognition and visibility of social enterprises and entrepreneurs on 
a global scale. The international support organizations exclusively focusing on social 
entrepreneurship have weak ties and positions in the Moroccan SEN. This has strong 
implications for the generation and provision of intangible resources and the perception of the 
Moroccan SEN internationally.      
To begin with, international fellowships and awards imply the inclusion of the fellows and 
awardees into the local SEN and in the international social entrepreneurship community. In 
the case of the Moroccan SEN, in 2007/8 when Ashoka and Synergos selected their first 
fellows, a network of different types of actors engaging in social entrepreneurship did not 
exist. Thus, the fellowships served to introduce social entrepreneurship and to establish ties 
among local actors and in so doing to create a network. The selection of the first fellows by 
Ashoka and Synergos was facilitated by actors who were well connected internationally and 
in Morocco and who could help these organizations to gain a foothold in Morocco. Yet, they 
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were not part of the international social entrepreneurship community. In the case of Ashoka, 
the Director of Programs at the International Youth Foundation (IYF) at that time, who was in 
charge of IYF’s expansion to Africa and the Middle East and in that context had established a 
partnership with Andaloussi and his organization Al Jisr, nominated him.430 In the case of 
Synergos, the Moroccan member of its advisory committee, Zhiri, was well connected both in 
the USA and in Morocco and thus proposed a selection of potential fellows to Synergos. Since 
then, nominations of social enterprises and entrepreneurs for fellowships and awards have 
predominantly been submitted by actors from inside the Moroccan SEN.431          
Yet, as the previous section on social ties has highlighted, the fellows have benefitted only to 
a limited extent from direct ties to these international support organizations as personal 
meetings were rare and events predominantly took place abroad. Capacity building trainings 
were outsourced to partners of the international support organizations such as AMIDEAST 
and Booz Allen Hamilton Consulting. Thus, despite the introduction of innovative 
manifestations of ties in the field of social entrepreneurship in general, e.g. mentoring and 
fellowships, Moroccan social enterprises and entrepreneurs experience these innovations only 
marginally. 
The main resources generated through international ties are international visibility and 
recognition. Ashoka, Synergos and the Schwab Foundation feature their Moroccan fellows 
among their other fellows on their webpages and expose them to a broader audience beyond 
Morocco. Select social entrepreneurs are also sent to conferences and events to showcase their 
work, e.g. at the US Department of State, WEF-MENA or the Global Entrepreneurship 
Summit.432 As one social entrepreneur critically remarked 
Ashoka, Synergos etc. are only interested in meetings and networking and prestige. 
Social entrepreneurship is a fashion. You sit together and talk. But what really is 
social entrepreneurship and who is an entrepreneur? The little cooperative next door? 
Elite tourism? All nothing fits into this concept. Activities should take place directly 
in communities but social entrepreneurship is an elite club: Well educated youth, 
good social background, and over and over again recognition and celebrating 
themselves.433    
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 Personal interview with Andaloussi, Casablanca, May 2012. 
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 Personal interviews, Rabat/Casablanca, may-June 2012/September 2013; see also 
www.synergos.org/socialinnovators/news201001.htm [15.06.2015]. 
433
 Personal interview, Casablanca, September 2013. 
 197 
While many social enterprises and entrepreneurs lack visibility and access to actors and 
financial resources, some are well-known in Morocco and abroad. Although Andaloussi and 
Chenna have already been known and visible for their work before becoming Ashoka fellows, 
they both stated that being an Ashoka fellow increased their visibility and facilitated access to 
other actors in the field of entrepreneurship. Andaloussi, for example, was selected by 
Synergos as senior fellow and received the Schwab Award in 2010 at the WEF-MENA and in 
the following year was also awarded the Clinton Global Citizens Award in New York. 
Nevertheless, his international ties in the field of entrepreneurship and education date back to 
the 1990s when he founded Al Jisr and participated in international meetings on these 
topics.434 Ech Chenna, by contrast, had received several prizes and recognitions – inter alia 
the Opus Prize (2009) – prior to becoming an Ashoka fellow. She was actively involved in the 
consultations for the reform of the Moroccan Family Law (Mudawwana) between 2001 and 
2003 and has received international visibility not least because of an Aljazeera interview in 
2000 in which she openly discussed many social taboos (e.g. rape, sex outside marriage, 
unmarried mothers). Subsequently, Ech Chenna received death threats and King Mohammed 
VI personally came to her rescue.435 While these events, admittedly, may not have caught 
broad international attention, they are known by those actors who work in the field of 
women’s rights in the MENA region. Overall, Moroccan social entrepreneurs have been 
marginalized in the international social entrepreneurship community. 
Since the beginning of the second wave of social entrepreneurship development, however, 
Moroccan social enterprises and entrepreneurs have been receiving more visibility and 
capacity building trainings owing to other international support organizations and events. The 
British Council in partnership with MCISE organized several social entrepreneurship 
conferences with international guests and conducted the first mapping of social 
entrepreneurship in Morocco which was published in 2014. Instead of focusing on 
internationally recognized social enterprises and entrepreneurs such as Injaz Al-Maghrib, 
EFE, Endeavor or ASF this mapping sheds light on the dynamics that have been developing 
since 2012 and covers many new social enterprises (Chung and Jonsdottir 2014).436 
Furthermore, GES took place in Morocco in 2014. As an exclusive, elitist event it attracts 
considerable media attention and brings together head of states, government officials, 
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 Personal interview, Casablanca, May 2012/September 2013. 
435
 Personal interview with Ech Chenna, September 2013. 
436
 This is the first report covering social entrepreneurship in Morocco. In general, there are only few 
publications on social entrepreneurship in Morocco and the Maghreb (e.g. Rossi and Kjeldsen 2015).  
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business actors and representatives of international and local organizations.  In addition to 
Ashoka and several Ashoka fellows from the MENA region who participated in a penal on 
social entrepreneurship in the MENA region, a number of handpicked Moroccan social 
enterprises and entrepreneurs were invited to attend this event as speakers or showcased their 
work in an exhibition space (‘Innovation Village’): Andaloussi, Endeavor and EFE but also 
social enterprises and entrepreneurs from the younger generation such as Looly’s and MCISE.  
Moreover, the programs and initiatives offered by the US Department of State, in particular 
the Fortune Global Women’s Mentoring Partnership, offer at the same time visibility, training 
and access to a plethora of different types of actors in the US and beyond. Through this 
partnership, Moroccan social entrepreneurs can establish direct business relations abroad 
rather than short-term interactions during which they showcase their work. Having said this, 
the inclusion in this program takes place through nomination and selection by the US 
embassies abroad. Thus, only a limited number of select social entrepreneurs have access to 
this program.     
 
4.2.3.2 The Generation of Resources through Local Ties 
Through local ties several kinds of tangible and intangible resources become available in the 
Moroccan SEN. These resources have implications beyond the Moroccan SEN as they are 
related to social, economic and political issues and actors. As we will see, in particular the 
most central actors in the SEN have capitalized on social entrepreneurship as a development 
and political tool. As such, social entrepreneurship enables these actors to reach out to youth 
in the broader society and co-opt them. 
     
Tangible Resources   
In the Moroccan SEN, numerous actors – local support organization and business actors – 
provide tangible resources to social enterprises. Similar to the ones generated through 
international ties, these local resources include cash prizes, scholarships and seed funding.  
Several local support organizations have been active in supporting social enterprises, as 
discussed in the previous section on social ties, and regularly organize competitions for 
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financial awards. They want to create incentives and opportunities for young Moroccans to 
realize entrepreneurial projects and grow them into the establishment of social enterprises. 
These competitions vary slightly concerning the kind and extent of support they provide. 
The local support organizations Enactus, Startup Maroc and Imdad all provide financial 
awards to the social enterprises they selected. These awards range from 2.000-12.000 USD 
(20.000-100.000 MAD). While Enactus rewards three YEA winners (20.000-50.000 MAD), 
Startup Maroc grants 100.000 MAD and a scholarship worth 10.000 USD to spend a month in 
an accelerator program in Silicon Valley. Imdad, however, selected twelve finalists and offers 
in total 100.000 MAD.437 MCISE plans to provide 30.000 MAD in seed funding and office 
space for the social enterprises incubated through Dare Inc..438 Thus, compared to the support 
by international support organizations the resources provided by local support organizations 
are far smaller. Yet, they target a different audience; they focus on the foundation phase of 
social enterprises and not on already well-established social enterprises. They aim to 
contribute to the further development of business ideas and models into investment-ready 
social enterprises.439  
Business actors also provide tangible resources. Contrary to the emphasis on CSR and the role 
of business actors in socio-economic development, business actors are reluctant to disclose 
detailed information on the budget they spend annually. Most of them either list the numbers 
of beneficiaries and causes they have been involved in or do not provide any information in 
their annual reports (e.g. (Attijariwafa Bank 2012; BMCE Bank 2012; OCP 2013b; OCP 
2014). Therefore, it is difficult to estimate the overall provision of tangible resources to social 
enterprises and entrepreneurs. Nevertheless, the available information gives insights into the 
dimensions of financial support.    
On the one hand, business actors contribute the financial means to reward social enterprises in 
competitions organized by the above mentioned local support organizations. OCPEN, for 
instance, allocated 1,5 million MAD (ca. 180.000 USD) in cash prizes in 2014 (OCP 2014: 
11). In 2014, BMCE launched its own entrepreneurship award, the African Entrepreneurship 
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 After the selection of the twelve finalists in 2013/14, Imdad has not engaged in further activities; see also 
Section 4.2.1. 
438
 Personal interview with representatives of Imdad and Enactus, Rabat, September 2013; see also Mayard 
(2013). 
439
 Personal interview with the directors and presidents of several social enterprises and local support 
organizations, Rabat/Casablanca, September 2013. 
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Award which amounts to 1 million USD shared among the winners of three categories.440 On 
the other hand, business actors finance specific projects of social enterprises and also 
contribute to the ongoing expanses of social enterprises (office space, salaries and the like). In 
2013, the OCP Foundation granted Injaz Al-Maghrib for instance 2,28 million MAD (ca. 
280.000 USD) for a period of three years to implements its entrepreneurship education 
programs in six Moroccan cities in which OCP operates. Overall, OCP allocated 213,55 
million MAD (ca. 25 million USD) to the Youth Development Program and 126,38 million 
MAD (ca. 15 million USD) to the Citizens Development Program in 2013, implemented 
through the OCP Foundation which supports also social enterprises and events related to 
social entrepreneurship (OCP Group 2013b: 69). Thus, OCP is a powerful actor in the 
Moroccan SEN allocating a considerable amount of resources to youth and local development 
initiatives. Aside from the resources provided by the US through various government 
agencies, OCP is the second major financial contributor to socio-economic development in 
Morocco. 
SNI, as a founding member of Injaz Al-Maghrib, covers nearly 20% of the organization’s 
annual budget since 2007. In 2013, SNI provided additional 800.000 MAD (ca. 100.000 
USD) to increase the Injaz Al-Maghrib personnel (Injaz Al-Maghrib 2014b; Injaz Al-Maghrib 
2014a; Haddad 2015).441 Similarly, the Attijariwafa Bank is a founding member of Al Jisr and 
annually provides financial support and in-kind contributions. In 2006, the financial support 
alone amounted to 420.000 MAD (ca. 50.000 USD) according to Ashoka.442 Endeavor is 
another example of resource generation through local ties. It receives financial resources from 
business actors, namely from its founding board and the board of directors. With the support 
of USAID, the board financed the opening of the Endeavor Morocco office in 2013.443  
In conclusion, this section has highlighted that the generation of tangible resources through 
local ties takes place to a considerable degree. The resources social enterprises and 
entrepreneurs can access through competitions and incubations programs are moderate, yet 
measured against the development stage of the enterprises, they enable the entrepreneurs to 
grow their ideas and enterprises into investment-ready enterprises. By contrast, the resources 
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 For further details, see www.africanentrepreneurshipaward.com/ [15.06.2015]. 
441
 Injaz Al-Maghrib’s budget in 2013/14 amounted to 8, 561 Mio. MAD (ca. 1 million USD) (Injaz Al-Maghrib 
2014b). 
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 See www.ashoka-arab.org/en/fellows/our-fellows/mhammed-abbad-andaloussi/ [15.06.2015]. 
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 Personal interview with the director of Endeavor, Casablanca, September 2013; see also 
www.endeavor.org/approach/model/ [15.06.2015].  
 201 
provided by business actors directly to social enterprises for the implementation of programs 
are much higher. In fact, they are much higher than those provided by international support 
organizations focusing exclusively on social entrepreneurship. Thus, regime elites provide the 
resources to spread (social) entrepreneurship programs on a large scale and to mobilize youth 
to become entrepreneurial.   
 
Intangible Resources 
In addition to tangible resources, local ties within the Moroccan SEN also generate intangible 
resources. These intangible resources have implications not only for social entrepreneurs but 
also for the SEN and beyond. Inclusion, recognition and visibility are important intangible 
resources generated not only through international but also through local ties. Yet, this 
analysis demonstrates that, in the context of local ties, these resources closely relate to 
building and influencing new societal constituencies, outsourcing social responsibility, 
aligning (social) entrepreneurship to the socio-economic agenda of the Moroccan regime.   
An increasing number of (different types of) local actors have become part of the Moroccan 
SEN since 2012 paralleled by the differentiation of the SEN into core and peripheral actors 
and a number of central and powerful core actors. Owing to the weak presence of the 
international support organizations exclusively focusing on social entrepreneurship, local 
actors dominate the SEN. Several key actors, who established themselves in the field of social 
entrepreneurship during the first and second wave, direct the adaptation of social 
entrepreneurship and related new ideas and approaches to the Moroccan context.444 Without 
exceptions, competitions and incubation programs that include pitches prevail as modes of 
including new actors in the SEN. The competitive events have also the advantage of 
generating high visibility and facilitating contacts to other actors in the SEN, inter alia 
business actors and representatives of support organizations, who are involved as mentors or 
jury members. In so doing, social enterprises and entrepreneurs become not only part of the 
SEN but can draw on a network of support by different types of actors.  
                                                 
444
 Due to their proficiency in English, experience and connections abroad, they open and link the Moroccan 
SEN to the international social entrepreneurship community rather than limiting themselves to French speaking 
circles.    
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The engagement of powerful actors like OCP and SNI implies the recognition of social 
entrepreneurship beyond the Moroccan SEN. Fixing socio-economic issues is imperative for 
the Moroccan regime, as the Arab uprisings have highlighted, and social entrepreneurs 
constitute a new societal constituency of self-responsible and proactive entrepreneurial actors 
who address many of the most pressing issues. However, as Cammett demonstrates, 
Moroccan elites want to preserve their status quo of power and dominance, i.e. have no 
interest in the emergence of new actors who could challenge that (Cammett 2004). Two 
patterns of handling this dilemma and turning the Moroccan SEN into an opportunity for 
authoritarian renewal are apparent. Business elites actively participate in the decision-making 
processes of the most central social enterprises and support organizations in the field of 
entrepreneurship education and employability (e.g. Injaz, EFE) and of entrepreneurship 
education and support (e.g. Enactus, Endeavor, Startup Maroc). As board members, mentors, 
sponsors and jury members they influence not only the development of these actors and their 
programs but also the selection of new social enterprises and thus the SEN as a whole. 
CAPEE as a platform of exchange between the key social enterprises, local support 
organizations and business actors as well as the omnipresence of OCP and the involvement of 
other key business actors in the Moroccan SEN support this argument. Yet, the engagement of 
elites in the Moroccan SEN is not only motivated by having a stake in building a new societal 
constituency that takes on responsibility for socio-economic development. Rather, it is also 
about co-opting this constituency. Given that social entrepreneurship has already drawn the 
interest of young Moroccans, it constitutes a relatively easy means to mobilize and channel 
participation. Instead of focusing on selected few social enterprises and entrepreneurs and 
creating a new generation of socio-economic leaders, the Moroccan elites engage with 
numerous support organizations to foster an increase in (social) enterprises across the 
Kingdom. They reach out to the broader society, in particular to youth and women. Through 
the combination of financial support, training and advice incentives and space for 
entrepreneurial action have been created to develop entrepreneurial ideas and launch social 
enterprises. Thus, following Ashoka’s vision of building an ‘Everyone A Changemaker 
society’ in the MENA region, in Morocco ‘everyone an entrepreneur’ has become the mantra 
(Ashoka Arab World 2013). For OCP, targeting a broader audience and supporting social 
enterprises that work in the areas where OCP operates can also be considered a problem-
fixing strategy to offer alternatives to an employment by OCP and hence to silence 
discontent.445  
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 On the challenges OCP faces in the areas where it operates see also section 4.2.1. 
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Social entrepreneurship has been aligned to the socio-economic agenda that has been 
emphasizing entrepreneurship as a catalyst for job creation, poverty reduction and economic 
development since 2013/14.446 Social entrepreneurs consider the interest and support by these 
powerful supporters of the Moroccan regime an important achievement and recognition of the 
Moroccan SEN.   
I believe that it’s thanks to organizations like OCP Entrepreneurship Network that 
this country can really move forward. Their vision and the ambitions in their 
initiatives are inspiring. They support almost every project and organization that is 
supporting entrepreneurship and employment creation in Morocco. I wish there will 
be more like OCP.447  
Similar views have been expressed by many other actors, especially the younger generation, 
in the SEN. For the most part, they ‘happily’ accept being co-opted by OCP or SNI and its 
subsidiaries. Having said that, they are very cautious and barely want to talk about OCP or 
SNI, still less discuss the support they receive, as if they are afraid of these actors and the 
consequences of questioning their engagement in the Moroccan SEN and socio-economic 
development.448 As opposed to that, they do not shy away from criticizing state institutions for 
their paucity of support and genuine interest in developing an effective (social) 
entrepreneurship policy and regulatory framework.449 
In addition to the above discussed intangible resources generated through local ties, 
international visibility and linkages generated through local ties is another resource. The 
vibrant entrepreneurial scene that has been developing in the Moroccan SEN since 2012 and 
the emergence of new actors and initiatives has not gone unnoticed internationally. Moreover, 
in many cases, local competitions include not only financial support and advice by Moroccan 
mentors but also access to mentoring, incubation and competitions abroad. The winner of the 
Startup Cup in 2013, for instance, had access to a month-long incubation program in Silicon. 
Similarly, Looly’s participated in a competition for a four-month incubation program by 
Masschallenge in Boston in 2014 (OCP 2013).   
The directors of MCISE explained 
                                                 
446
 On this issue, see also Section 4.1. 
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 Skype interview with the director of a social enterprise, March 2015. 
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 Personal interviews social entrepreneurs, Rabat/Casablanca, September 2013; follow up interviews in March 
2015; see also Bogaert (2014). 
449
 Personal interview with social entrepreneurs, support organizations and experts, Rabat/Casablanca, May-June 
2012/September 2013. 
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Within a very short period, maybe a year or a year and a half, an incredible 
development has taken place here. When we [MCISE] started in 2012, there were 
hardly competitions, mentoring programs and a lack of support. But now there are a 
lot more activities. CSR was, and still is, not strong in Morocco; maybe due to the 
lack of awareness of the private sector. Now, we receive so many requests from 
abroad for interviews, cooperation, meetings and the like, it is overwhelming and 
sometimes impossible to manage. But a lot of work still needs to be done and the 
current nascent field supported.450    
International visibility and linkages are not limited to isolated cases. Ashoka, the Schwab 
Foundation, the British Council, the World Bank and US government agencies are among 
those international actors who reinforce their linkages to actors in the Moroccan SEN and in 
the field of entrepreneurship in general. Ashoka, for instance, plans to ‘expand significantly’ 
in the Maghreb after having neglected Morocco and its neighboring countries (Ashoka Arab 
World 2014a: 55). Also at the governmental level, Morocco has become more visible. In 
2014, Morocco hosted the Global Entrepreneurship Summit. At this event, Moroccan 
ministers and delegates emphasize the importance of entrepreneurship for socio-economic 
development. Similarly, a statement on the selection of Morocco as the host country 
underlines  
[…] the active role that the Kingdom of Morocco plays in the overall economic 
development of the African continent, and its leadership in supporting 
entrepreneurship and integration of youth and women in the economy.451       
This contrasts with the impression of Moroccan social entrepreneurs, representatives of 
support organizations and experts on the role of state institutions and initiatives in supporting 
entrepreneurship. Despite the criticism several social entrepreneurs and experts raised on the 
elitist character of this event, it nevertheless drew international attention to (social) 
entrepreneurship in Morocco (Mayard 2014).   
In sum, the generation of intangible resources through local ties does not only facilitate the 
development of the Moroccan SEN but also closely relates to aligning (social) 
entrepreneurship to the socio-economic agenda of the Moroccan makhzen and thus turning it 
into a development and political tool.   
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 Personal interview, Rabat, September 2013. 
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 www.gesmarrakech2014.org/en/home# [15.06.2015]. 
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4.3 CONCLUSIONS: THE MOROCCAN SEN & AUTHORITARIAN RENEWAL  
As opposed to its cumbersome development between 2007 and 2011, the Moroccan SEN has 
developed into a strong network dominated by local actors between 2012 and 2014. 
Numerous local support organizations, social enterprises and key Moroccan business actors in 
addition to a limited number of international actors have become part of the SEN and promote 
(social) entrepreneurship as a means to address pressing socio-economic issues. Unlike the 
Jordanian King, the Moroccan King plays a marginal role. Entrepreneurship education and 
support, income generation and employability are among the core concerns of the actors in the 
Moroccan SEN. From this perspective, social entrepreneurship constitutes a development tool 
that turns actors into competitive, entrepreneurial actors.  
Yet, the ties among actors in the Moroccan SEN demonstrate that social entrepreneurship 
constitutes not only a development tool but also a political tool. Social entrepreneurship and 
the Moroccan SEN have been aligned to the socio-economic agenda of the Moroccan regime 
and key business actors, such as OCP and SNI, are powerful actors in the SEN and in the 
development of the SEN in general. Thus, the main regime actors present in the Moroccan 
SEN are business actors. While the above mentioned social ties manifest in innovative ways, 
they mask well-established patterns of co-optation and of authoritarian renewal in general.  
Financial support as well as inclusionary and voluntary co-optation of social entrepreneurs 
and local support organizations takes place through the social ties to business actors at the 
core of the Moroccan SEN; yet the aim is not to create a new generation of socio-economic 
leaders. Rather, the co-optation of actors in the Moroccan SEN serves to reach out to youth in 
the broader society and in so doing stimulates self-employment, income-generation and 
employability and encourages them to become entrepreneurs. Thus, Moroccans living in rural 
and urban areas across the Kingdom are the target groups. However, OCP mobilizes actors in 
the Moroccan SEN to implement projects in particular in areas where OCP has factories or 
mines. It provides considerable financial resources in this context which is closely linked to 
the conflicts OCP has faced since 2011 with the local communities of unemployed youth and 
women. Thus, the SEN contributes also to problem-fixing and outsourcing of social 
responsibility.  
Finally, the Moroccan SEN portrays itself locally and internationally as a dynamic 
entrepreneurial network composed of active entrepreneurial Moroccans and socially 
responsible, engaged business actors who are committed to advancing Morocco’s socio-
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economic development. In so doing, they link the Moroccan SEN to the international 
entrepreneurship and development discourse, approaches and actors. 
  
 207 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis has scrutinized the contribution of SENs to authoritarian renewal. It has 
conceptualized SENs as neoliberal networks composed of actors, who engage in social 
entrepreneurship, in a given geographical context. This thesis has argued that SENs are novel 
and innovative networks that draw on neoliberal approaches and ideas and in so doing 
combine tried-and-tested patterns of relations with new ones. However, this new appearance 
masks patterns and mechanisms of co-optation of a new societal constituency and young 
elites. Therefore, what we see is a new or different “packaging” rather than a new content. In 
so doing, SENs contribute to authoritarian renewal. What emerges, therefore, is not only an 
incubation of social enterprises and entrepreneurs, but the “incubation of authoritarianism”. 
From the findings of this diverse case study, several patterns of authoritarian renewal emerge. 
Rather than constituting new patterns of authoritarian renewal, they give it a new appearance, 
and thus, are masking well-established patterns as demonstrated in this thesis. Novel concepts 
and approaches have emerged in the context of the introduction of more ‘inclusionary’ 
neoliberal development approaches. Similar to the introduction of earlier neoliberal 
approaches, they interact with tried and-tested types of social ties, often in support of 
authoritarianism (Bank 2004; Rankin and Shakya 2007; Menza 2012; Wong 2012; Selvik 
2013; Elias 2015). Related to that, new societal constituencies have been created and co-opted 
through these ties in the SENs. This pattern can be further differentiated into the creation and 
the co-optation of few actors as a new generation of socio-economic leaders and of youth 
from the broader society. In both cases, these actors have been mobilized to become 
entrepreneurial actors. Third, and related to the previous point, an outsourcing of social 
responsibility to societal and business actors takes place. As a consequence, these actors 
engage in problem-fixing of some of the most pressing socio-economic issues in their 
countries such as unemployment, social inequality and the quality of education/education 
system. In particular since the Arab uprisings of 2011, business actors seek to demonstrate 
their commitment to socio-economic development. Fourth, SENs attract international 
visibility, linkages and support. These findings show that while ‘inclusionary’ neoliberal 
development approaches offer new novel concepts and ideas and aim to incubate a new 
generation of entrepreneurial actors who address socio-economic issues, authoritarian elites 
have capitalized on these approaches in another way. Similar to the incubation of social 
enterprises that entails innovative support and advice ties, e.g. mentoring and guidance, and 
hereby seeks to facilitate their growth and maturation, these elites incorporate new, innovative 
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patterns of relations into their repertoire of co-optation. By this means, they seek to exploit 
these neoliberal development approaches in support of the renewal of authoritarianism, and 
therefore, are “incubating” authoritarianism.        
In the three cases under study, we see that neither the size of the SEN nor the state type 
determines the contribution of the SENs to authoritarian renewal. It reveals that the types of 
actors who compose an SEN play the decisive role. In particular, the engagement of the key 
business actors who are closely linked to the ruler influence the SEN in terms of its 
contribution to authoritarian renewal. State institutions, by contrast, play a marginal role in all 
three cases. In the case of the Moroccan SEN, the analysis has demonstrated that the key 
business actors linked to the Moroccan regime as well as a limited number of social 
entrepreneurs and enterprises and local support organizations constitute the central actors. 
This being said, the international support organizations exclusively focusing on social 
entrepreneurship have played a marginal role in this development. Likewise, the Moroccan 
King is not among the core or central actors. In Jordan, by contrast, all these actors form the 
core of the SEN. This being said, the key business elites and the Jordanian King are 
particularly present, surrounded by a small number of social entrepreneurs. In the case of the 
Egyptian SEN, the analysis reveals that, in contrast to the huge size of the SEN and the strong 
involvement of international support organizations exclusively focusing on social 
entrepreneurship, business actors play a marginal role and the ruler has no role. As has been 
demonstrated in Chapter 2, the Egyptian SEN contributes to a much more limited extent to 
authoritarian renewal than the Moroccan or Jordanian SEN. From this, it follows that not so 
much the presence of international support organizations but the engagement of business 
elites in addition to the ruler (as in Jordan) or as his representatives (as in Morocco) is a 
crucial factor for the contribution of SENs to authoritarian renewal.     
Depending on the types of actors present in the SEN, we see a variation in the types and 
manifestations of social ties. As this thesis has demonstrated, innovative types of support and 
advice ties have emerged owing to the introduction of novel neoliberal approaches to socio-
economic development. These innovative manifestations complement and obscure tried-and-
tested types of social ties in authoritarian regimes. In particular, innovative support ties, such 
as fellowships, competitions, awards and incubation programs, and innovative advice ties, 
such as mentoring, selection committee and jury membership, have been embraced by actors 
in the SENs in all three cases. Moreover, board membership as a tried-and-tested advice tie is 
widespread. These ties mask well-established patterns of co-optation and domination. In 
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particular in Morocco and Jordan, we have seen that inclusionary and voluntary co-optation 
takes place through these innovative ties. While in Morocco, this aims to reach out to youth in 
the broader society, in Jordan this aims to create a new generation of socio-economic leaders 
closely linked to key business actors and the regime. Egypt is an outlier in this regard as 
neither of these two patterns can be observed. This being said, in the Egyptian SEN, local 
representatives of international support organizations exclusively focusing on social 
entrepreneurship have capitalized on innovative support and advice ties to control the 
development of the Egyptian SEN and to foster their own domination of this network.  
In terms of the generation of tangible and intangible resources as outputs of the social ties 
among actors, we see differences in how these approaches were adapted to the specific local 
context. Resources generated through international ties predominantly serve to introduce 
novel approaches and establish international linkages to showcase local success stories. They 
turn the SEN into a development tool. However, while they facilitate the development of the 
SEN and benefit individual actors, they do not directly contribute to authoritarian renewal. 
The contrasting examples of the Moroccan and the Egyptian SEN, in this respect, underline 
this finding. Resources generated through local ties, by contrast, play a strong role in the 
contribution of SENs to authoritarian renewal. They turn social entrepreneurship not only into 
a development tool, as also resources generated through international ties do, but at the same 
time into a political tool, as well. The engagement in the SEN offers inclusion and visibility, 
and opportunities to exercise power, to influence and control other actors in the SEN. 
Moreover, it facilitates the alignment of social entrepreneurship and the SEN to the regime’s 
socio-economic agenda as the analysis of the Jordanian and the Moroccan SENs and of the 
key actors in them have pointed out. As discussed before, the types of actors and their 
embeddedness in the local political, economic and social context are important. In the case of 
Egypt, for example, the engagement of business actors in the Egyptian SEN constitutes an 
attempt to demonstrate commitment to socio-economic development as opposed to personal 
enrichment in the aftermath of the uprisings of 2011. Thus, it is part of a restructuring of 
business-society and state-society relations. Similarly, the presence of the key business actors 
linked to the Moroccan King and the regime, as opposed to the direct involvement of the 
King, can be interpreted in the context of the protests and riots against the royal company 
OCP faced in the aftermath of the uprisings of 2011. The launch of an entrepreneurship 
initiative by the King instead of OCP most likely would not have solved the problem. In 
Jordan, by contrast, neither the King nor the business elites were challenged with either of the 
above mentioned challenges.        
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In making this argument, this thesis contributes to the literatures on neoliberalism, on 
authoritarianism, on social networks, and on social entrepreneurship. The main contribution 
(i) in relation to neoliberalism and authoritarian renewal is to provide a clearer picture of the 
role and interaction of the regime, elites and societal actors, and to demonstrate how both 
societal actors and regimes adapt and capitalize on neoliberal approaches to socio-economic 
development; (ii) in relation to co-optation is to reveal new and inclusionary mechanisms and 
patterns of co-optation that have emerged as outputs of these neoliberal approaches, and thus, 
to provide a better understanding of inclusionary co-optation; and (iii) in relation to social 
entrepreneurship is to flesh out the peculiarities of social entrepreneurship in authoritarian 
systems and to discuss the implications of different political systems for social 
entrepreneurship.  
The cases of the Egyptian, Moroccan and Jordanian SEN unanimously show that actors 
understood as people and not the state lead the processes of authoritarian renewal and through 
the SEN are “incubating” authoritarianism. The state plays a marginal role reduced to 
constituting a non-supportive regulatory framework setter and equipped with people without 
power. As the case studies have shown, the state is considered part of the problem rather than 
the solution while regime elites as core actors in the SEN appear as agents of change. From 
this we see that the regime retains its dominant role in terms of defining the access to and 
exercise of power (Fishman 1990). Power is not limited to the exercise of power, but also 
includes the access to power. Domination, control and influence are as much of interest as are 
inclusion, visibility and access to actors and resources. Through the SEN, social entrepreneurs 
are connected to regime elites and gain access to power.  
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix A1: Support and/or Advice, Egyptian SEN 
ID Type Coreness Co_Part Degree Eigenvector Between 
SE1 SE 0.066 0 0.046 0.094 0.006 
SE2 SE 0.172 1 0.138 0.244 0.020 
SE3 SE 0.069 0 0.083 0.099 0.018 
SE4 SE 0.157 1 0.171 0.221 0.070 
SE5 SE 0.074 0 0.051 0.105 0.002 
SE6 SE 0.259 1 0.217 0.356 0.050 
SE7 SE 0.192 1 0.124 0.269 0.007 
SE8 SE 0.185 1 0.143 0.263 0.015 
SE9 SE 0.117 1 0.083 0.166 0.006 
SE10 SE 0.139 1 0.092 0.199 0.004 
SE11 SE 0.145 1 0.097 0.204 0.008 
SE12 SE 0.131 1 0.074 0.184 0.000 
SE13 SE 0.131 1 0.074 0.184 0.000 
SE14 SE 0.098 1 0.051 0.138 0.000 
SE15 SE 0.163 1 0.138 0.229 0.052 
SE16 SE 0.088 0 0.092 0.127 0.027 
SE17 SE 0.312 1 0.387 0.408 0.262 
SE18 SE 0.053 0 0.037 0.076 0.001 
SE19 SE 0.146 1 0.092 0.206 0.004 
SE20 SE 0.185 1 0.124 0.260 0.016 
SE21 SE 0.179 1 0.120 0.253 0.007 
SE22 SE 0.026 0 0.078 0.039 0.013 
SE23 SE 0.039 0 0.083 0.057 0.017 
SE24 SE 0.047 0 0.092 0.068 0.027 
SE25 SE 0.043 0 0.101 0.064 0.024 
SE26 SE 0.030 0 0.037 0.044 0.011 
SE27 SE 0.025 0 0.028 0.037 0.001 
SE28 SE 0.079 0 0.180 0.115 0.080 
SE29 SE 0.019 0 0.051 0.028 0.007 
SE30 SE 0.017 0 0.032 0.025 0.002 
SE31 SE 0.008 0 0.009 0.012 0.000 
SE32 SE 0.007 0 0.005 0.010 0.000 
SE33 SE 0.007 0 0.005 0.010 0.000 
SE34 SE 0.099 1 0.055 0.140 0.005 
SE35 SE 0.104 1 0.055 0.147 0.002 
SE36 SE 0.007 0 0.005 0.010 0.000 
SE37 SE 0.009 0 0.014 0.014 0.000 
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SE38 SE 0.018 0 0.023 0.027 0.003 
SE39 SE 0.007 0 0.005 0.010 0.000 
SE40 SE 0.007 0 0.005 0.010 0.000 
SE41 SE 0.007 0 0.005 0.010 0.000 
SE42 SE 0.007 0 0.005 0.010 0.000 
SE43 SE 0.007 0 0.009 0.011 0.001 
SE44 SE 0.007 0 0.005 0.010 0.000 
SE45 SE 0.007 0 0.005 0.010 0.000 
SE46 SE 0.019 0 0.023 0.028 0.002 
SE47 SE 0.007 0 0.005 0.010 0.000 
SE48 SE 0.007 0 0.005 0.010 0.000 
SE49 SE 0.007 0 0.005 0.010 0.000 
SE50 SE 0.007 0 0.005 0.010 0.000 
SE51 SE 0.007 0 0.005 0.010 0.000 
SE52 SE 0.007 0 0.005 0.010 0.000 
SE53 SE 0.007 0 0.005 0.010 0.000 
SE54 SE 0.007 0 0.005 0.010 0.000 
SE55 SE 0.007 0 0.005 0.010 0.000 
SE56 SE 0.007 0 0.005 0.010 0.000 
SE57 SE 0.007 0 0.005 0.010 0.000 
SE58 SE 0.033 0 0.014 0.046 0.000 
SE59 SE 0.007 0 0.005 0.010 0.000 
SE60 SE 0.007 0 0.005 0.010 0.000 
SE61 SE 0.007 0 0.005 0.010 0.000 
SE62 SE 0.007 0 0.005 0.010 0.000 
SE63 SE 0.007 0 0.005 0.010 0.000 
LO1 LO 0.140 1 0.323 0.200 0.303 
LO2 LO 0.037 0 0.041 0.053 0.007 
LO3 LO 0.023 0 0.041 0.035 0.024 
LO4 LO 0.038 0 0.060 0.055 0.009 
LO5 LO 0.032 0 0.065 0.046 0.030 
LO6 LO 0.019 0 0.046 0.028 0.006 
LO7 LO 0.005 0 0.055 0.007 0.082 
IN1 IN 0.277 1 0.272 0.381 0.109 
IN2 IN 0.246 1 0.304 0.333 0.099 
IN3 IN 0.059 0 0.046 0.084 0.005 
IN4 IN 0.015 0 0.018 0.021 0.000 
IN5 IN 0.022 0 0.014 0.032 0.000 
IN6 IN 0.019 0 0.032 0.028 0.016 
IN7 IN 0.032 0 0.018 0.044 0.001 
IN8 IN 0.073 0 0.055 0.105 0.005 
IN9 IN 0.017 0 0.014 0.026 0.000 
IN10 IN 0.035 0 0.023 0.049 0.000 
IN11 IN 0.057 0 0.051 0.081 0.005 
IN12 IN 0.019 0 0.023 0.027 0.000 
IN13 IN 0.075 0 0.046 0.106 0.004 
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IN14 IN 0.070 0 0.055 0.101 0.014 
IN15 IN 0.053 0 0.051 0.075 0.003 
IN16 IN 0.010 0 0.009 0.014 0.000 
IN17 IN 0.002 0 0.009 0.003 0.000 
BS1 BS 0.031 0 0.046 0.045 0.004 
BS2 BS 0.060 0 0.055 0.087 0.009 
BS3 BS 0.007 0 0.014 0.010 0.001 
BS4 BS 0.025 0 0.014 0.036 0.000 
BS5 BS 0.073 0 0.055 0.104 0.008 
BS6 BS 0.019 0 0.032 0.029 0.003 
BS7 BS 0.016 0 0.028 0.024 0.002 
BS8 BS 0.020 0 0.023 0.030 0.001 
BS9 BS 0.005 0 0.009 0.008 0.000 
BS10 BS 0.024 0 0.028 0.036 0.001 
BS11 BS 0.008 0 0.009 0.011 0.001 
BS12 BS 0.012 0 0.014 0.018 0.000 
BS13 BS 0.005 0 0.009 0.008 0.000 
BS14 BS 0.023 0 0.028 0.035 0.002 
BS15 BS 0.005 0 0.009 0.008 0.000 
BS16 BS 0.008 0 0.018 0.013 0.000 
BS17 BS 0.010 0 0.023 0.015 0.001 
BS18 BS 0.004 0 0.009 0.006 0.000 
BS19 BS 0.004 0 0.005 0.006 0.000 
BS20 BS 0.006 0 0.014 0.010 0.000 
BS21 BS 0.004 0 0.005 0.006 0.000 
BS22 BS 0.013 0 0.023 0.019 0.001 
BS23 BS 0.016 0 0.014 0.024 0.000 
BS24 BS 0.023 0 0.018 0.033 0.001 
BS25 BS 0.003 0 0.009 0.004 0.000 
BS26 BS 0.021 0 0.018 0.030 0.000 
BS27 BS 0.021 0 0.018 0.030 0.001 
BS28 BS 0.042 0 0.028 0.059 0.002 
BS29 BS 0.017 0 0.018 0.024 0.001 
BS30 BS 0.015 0 0.009 0.023 0.000 
BS31 BS 0.005 0 0.014 0.007 0.000 
BS32 BS 0.024 0 0.032 0.035 0.003 
BS33 BS 0.042 0 0.032 0.061 0.002 
BS34 BS 0.018 0 0.018 0.027 0.001 
SI1 SI 0.037 0 0.037 0.056 0.003 
SI2 SI 0.009 0 0.009 0.014 0.000 
SI3 SI 0.001 0 0.005 0.002 0.000 
SI4 SI 0.005 0 0.009 0.008 0.000 
SI5 SI 0.034 0 0.014 0.047 0.000 
SI6 SI 0.005 0 0.009 0.008 0.000 
SI7 SI 0.007 0 0.005 0.010 0.000 
SI8 SI 0.002 0 0.005 0.003 0.000 
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SI9 SI 0.010 0 0.014 0.015 0.003 
SI10 SI 0.017 0 0.028 0.025 0.001 
SI11 SI 0.044 0 0.041 0.065 0.006 
SI12 SI 0.038 0 0.032 0.055 0.004 
SI13 SI 0.004 0 0.018 0.005 0.001 
SE64 SE 0.028 0 0.014 0.038 0.000 
SE65 SE 0.027 0 0.009 0.036 0.000 
SE66 SE 0.027 0 0.009 0.036 0.000 
SE67 SE 0.027 0 0.009 0.036 0.000 
SE68 SE 0.027 0 0.009 0.036 0.000 
SE69 SE 0.027 0 0.009 0.036 0.000 
SE70 SE 0.027 0 0.009 0.036 0.000 
SE71 SE 0.029 0 0.014 0.040 0.000 
SE72 SE 0.027 0 0.014 0.037 0.007 
SE73 SE 0.032 0 0.018 0.044 0.000 
SE74 SE 0.027 0 0.009 0.036 0.000 
SE75 SE 0.027 0 0.009 0.036 0.000 
SE76 SE 0.028 0 0.014 0.038 0.001 
SE77 SE 0.043 0 0.032 0.061 0.002 
SE78 SE 0.027 0 0.009 0.036 0.000 
SE79 SE 0.027 0 0.009 0.036 0.000 
SE80 SE 0.027 0 0.009 0.036 0.000 
SE81 SE 0.033 0 0.014 0.046 0.000 
SE82 SE 0.027 0 0.009 0.036 0.000 
SE83 SE 0.066 0 0.060 0.099 0.006 
SE84 SE 0.098 1 0.069 0.144 0.004 
SE85 SE 0.027 0 0.009 0.036 0.000 
SE86 SE 0.027 0 0.009 0.036 0.000 
SE87 SE 0.027 0 0.009 0.036 0.000 
SE88 SE 0.035 0 0.018 0.048 0.000 
SE89 SE 0.027 0 0.009 0.036 0.000 
SE90 SE 0.044 0 0.028 0.061 0.005 
SE91 SE 0.027 0 0.009 0.036 0.000 
SE92 SE 0.027 0 0.009 0.036 0.000 
SE93 SE 0.027 0 0.009 0.036 0.000 
SE94 SE 0.035 0 0.023 0.048 0.000 
SE95 SE 0.041 0 0.037 0.058 0.046 
SE96 SE 0.028 0 0.014 0.039 0.001 
SE97 SE 0.027 0 0.009 0.036 0.000 
SE98 SE 0.027 0 0.009 0.036 0.000 
SE99 SE 0.034 0 0.018 0.048 0.001 
SE100 SE 0.027 0 0.009 0.036 0.000 
SE101 SE 0.027 0 0.009 0.036 0.000 
SE102 SE 0.029 0 0.014 0.040 0.000 
SE103 SE 0.027 0 0.009 0.036 0.000 
SE104 SE 0.027 0 0.009 0.036 0.000 
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SE105 SE 0.013 0 0.023 0.019 0.003 
SE106 SE 0.001 0 0.009 0.001 0.000 
SE107 SE 0.002 0 0.009 0.002 0.000 
SE108 SE 0.049 0 0.046 0.074 0.002 
SE109 SE 0.078 0 0.051 0.114 0.000 
SE110 SE 0.069 0 0.065 0.103 0.001 
SE111 SE 0.091 0 0.088 0.144 0.005 
SE112 SE 0.063 0 0.055 0.094 0.001 
SE113 SE 0.044 0 0.037 0.064 0.000 
SE114 SE 0.032 0 0.028 0.048 0.001 
SE115 SE 0.053 0 0.041 0.079 0.000 
SE116 SE 0.061 0 0.055 0.094 0.001 
SE117 SE 0.065 0 0.060 0.097 0.002 
SE118 SE 0.078 0 0.065 0.116 0.001 
SE119 SE 0.082 0 0.074 0.123 0.002 
SE120 SE 0.087 0 0.078 0.137 0.000 
SE121 SE 0.100 1 0.078 0.148 0.001 
SE122 SE 0.069 0 0.060 0.108 0.000 
SE123 SE 0.091 0 0.078 0.140 0.001 
SE124 SE 0.129 1 0.111 0.199 0.004 
SE125 SE 0.116 1 0.092 0.171 0.002 
SE126 SE 0.064 0 0.041 0.095 0.001 
SE127 SE 0.105 1 0.083 0.152 0.004 
SE128 SE 0.080 0 0.078 0.127 0.007 
SE129 SE 0.074 0 0.060 0.112 0.000 
SE130 SE 0.056 0 0.055 0.088 0.000 
SE131 SE 0.079 0 0.069 0.118 0.001 
SE132 SE 0.068 0 0.060 0.108 0.000 
SE133 SE 0.058 0 0.051 0.084 0.004 
SE134 SE 0.081 0 0.069 0.120 0.002 
SE135 SE 0.073 0 0.060 0.109 0.001 
SE136 SE 0.015 0 0.028 0.022 0.000 
SE137 SE 0.012 0 0.028 0.018 0.003 
SE138 SE 0.015 0 0.032 0.021 0.001 
SE139 SE 0.000 0 0.005 0.000 0.000 
SE140 SE 0.000 0 0.005 0.000 0.000 
SE141 SE 0.000 0 0.005 0.000 0.000 
SE142 SE 0.000 0 0.005 0.000 0.000 
SE143 SE 0.000 0 0.005 0.000 0.000 
SE144 SE 0.000 0 0.005 0.000 0.000 
SE145 SE 0.000 0 0.005 0.000 0.000 
SE146 SE 0.000 0 0.005 0.000 0.000 
SE147 SE 0.000 0 0.005 0.000 0.000 
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Appendix A2: Support or Advice, Egyptian SEN (Multiplex) 
ID Type Cor_S Cor_A Deg_S Deg_A Eig_S Eig_A Bet_S Bet_A 
SE1 SE 0.038 0.066 0.014 0.041 0.058 0.093 0.003 0.000 
SE2 SE 0.092 0.168 0.046 0.111 0.140 0.238 0.013 0.010 
SE3 SE 0.080 0.062 0.046 0.060 0.124 0.088 0.015 0.007 
SE4 SE 0.196 0.132 0.092 0.129 0.284 0.188 0.072 0.048 
SE5 SE 0.033 0.072 0.014 0.041 0.051 0.102 0.001 0.000 
SE6 SE 0.181 0.246 0.074 0.180 0.263 0.341 0.028 0.039 
SE7 SE 0.050 0.203 0.009 0.124 0.074 0.283 0.000 0.007 
SE8 SE 0.095 0.190 0.032 0.134 0.145 0.270 0.003 0.014 
SE9 SE 0.037 0.118 0.023 0.065 0.060 0.167 0.006 0.000 
SE10 SE 0.050 0.148 0.009 0.092 0.074 0.212 0.000 0.004 
SE11 SE 0.042 0.142 0.018 0.083 0.065 0.199 0.005 0.003 
SE12 SE 0.022 0.139 0.005 0.074 0.033 0.196 0.000 0.000 
SE13 SE 0.022 0.139 0.005 0.074 0.033 0.196 0.000 0.000 
SE14 SE 0.050 0.103 0.009 0.051 0.074 0.145 0.000 0.000 
SE15 SE 0.075 0.169 0.028 0.138 0.114 0.236 0.019 0.070 
SE16 SE 0.036 0.083 0.028 0.069 0.054 0.120 0.019 0.014 
SE17 SE 0.198 0.311 0.083 0.378 0.287 0.407 0.033 0.261 
SE18 SE 0.043 0.054 0.018 0.037 0.063 0.078 0.000 0.001 
SE19 SE 0.050 0.156 0.009 0.092 0.074 0.220 0.000 0.005 
SE20 SE 0.097 0.192 0.023 0.120 0.138 0.271 0.007 0.018 
SE21 SE 0.054 0.192 0.014 0.120 0.081 0.269 0.001 0.007 
SE22 SE 0.069 0.020 0.069 0.074 0.110 0.030 0.016 0.030 
SE23 SE 0.075 0.026 0.069 0.065 0.121 0.038 0.015 0.017 
SE24 SE 0.114 0.038 0.078 0.088 0.174 0.054 0.027 0.029 
SE25 SE 0.088 0.022 0.083 0.055 0.142 0.033 0.027 0.007 
SE26 SE 0.049 0.025 0.028 0.023 0.074 0.036 0.011 0.010 
SE27 SE 0.039 0.022 0.014 0.018 0.058 0.032 0.001 0.001 
SE28 SE 0.155 0.059 0.147 0.157 0.249 0.085 0.075 0.083 
SE29 SE 0.020 0.015 0.014 0.032 0.033 0.022 0.002 0.011 
SE30 SE 0.015 0.012 0.018 0.023 0.024 0.018 0.002 0.003 
SE31 SE 0.042 0.008 0.009 0.009 0.056 0.012 0.000 0.000 
SE32 SE 0.034 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.044 0.009 0.000 0.000 
SE33 SE 0.034 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.044 0.009 0.000 0.000 
SE34 SE 0.057 0.102 0.014 0.051 0.080 0.145 0.007 0.002 
SE35 SE 0.056 0.108 0.009 0.055 0.077 0.153 0.004 0.003 
SE36 SE 0.034 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.044 0.009 0.000 0.000 
SE37 SE 0.041 0.007 0.009 0.009 0.056 0.011 0.000 0.000 
SE38 SE 0.039 0.017 0.014 0.023 0.052 0.025 0.003 0.003 
SE39 SE 0.034 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.044 0.009 0.000 0.000 
SE40 SE 0.034 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.044 0.009 0.000 0.000 
SE41 SE 0.034 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.044 0.009 0.000 0.000 
SE42 SE 0.034 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.044 0.009 0.000 0.000 
SE43 SE 0.037 0.006 0.009 0.009 0.049 0.009 0.001 0.001 
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SE44 SE 0.034 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.044 0.009 0.000 0.000 
SE45 SE 0.034 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.044 0.009 0.000 0.000 
SE46 SE 0.044 0.016 0.009 0.018 0.060 0.024 0.000 0.002 
SE47 SE 0.034 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.044 0.009 0.000 0.000 
SE48 SE 0.034 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.044 0.009 0.000 0.000 
SE49 SE 0.034 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.044 0.009 0.000 0.000 
SE50 SE 0.034 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.044 0.009 0.000 0.000 
SE51 SE 0.034 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.044 0.009 0.000 0.000 
SE52 SE 0.034 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.044 0.009 0.000 0.000 
SE53 SE 0.034 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.044 0.009 0.000 0.000 
SE54 SE 0.034 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.044 0.009 0.000 0.000 
SE55 SE 0.034 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.044 0.009 0.000 0.000 
SE56 SE 0.034 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.044 0.009 0.000 0.000 
SE57 SE 0.034 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.044 0.009 0.000 0.000 
SE58 SE 0.056 0.034 0.009 0.014 0.077 0.047 0.004 0.000 
SE59 SE 0.034 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.044 0.009 0.000 0.000 
SE60 SE 0.034 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.044 0.009 0.000 0.000 
SE61 SE 0.034 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.044 0.009 0.000 0.000 
SE62 SE 0.034 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.044 0.009 0.000 0.000 
SE63 SE 0.034 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.044 0.009 0.000 0.000 
LO1 LO 0.437 0.122 0.309 0.309 0.531 0.174 0.331 0.308 
LO2 LO 0.098 0.037 0.041 0.041 0.140 0.053 0.015 0.007 
LO3 LO 0.044 0.021 0.037 0.041 0.073 0.032 0.029 0.024 
LO4 LO 0.087 0.034 0.055 0.060 0.136 0.050 0.031 0.012 
LO5 LO 0.070 0.026 0.055 0.051 0.112 0.036 0.007 0.025 
LO6 LO 0.081 0.017 0.046 0.046 0.123 0.025 0.011 0.006 
LO7 LO 0.010 0.004 0.051 0.055 0.016 0.006 0.081 0.078 
IN1 IN 0.365 0.287 0.267 0.272 0.488 0.393 0.297 0.126 
IN2 IN 0.277 0.258 0.300 0.304 0.404 0.346 0.355 0.095 
IN3 IN 0.113 0.027 0.046 0.009 0.175 0.037 0.033 0.000 
IN4 IN 0.037 0.000 0.018 0.000 0.060 0.000 0.001 0.000 
IN5 IN 0.027 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.043 0.000 0.000 0.000 
IN6 IN 0.023 0.019 0.032 0.032 0.037 0.027 0.030 0.017 
IN7 IN 0.043 0.030 0.018 0.014 0.068 0.042 0.002 0.000 
IN8 IN 0.123 0.023 0.055 0.014 0.186 0.032 0.015 0.001 
IN9 IN 0.028 0.016 0.014 0.014 0.045 0.024 0.000 0.000 
IN10 IN 0.083 0.032 0.023 0.023 0.122 0.045 0.002 0.001 
IN11 IN 0.120 0.054 0.051 0.051 0.177 0.077 0.009 0.005 
IN12 IN 0.019 0.000 0.023 0.000 0.031 0.000 0.001 0.000 
IN13 IN 0.086 0.051 0.023 0.032 0.125 0.071 0.001 0.012 
IN14 IN 0.113 0.000 0.055 0.000 0.169 0.000 0.023 0.000 
IN15 IN 0.027 0.051 0.023 0.046 0.043 0.072 0.001 0.004 
IN16 IN 0.013 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.021 0.014 0.000 0.000 
IN17 IN 0.002 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.001 0.000 
BS1 BS 0.095 0.023 0.041 0.037 0.141 0.034 0.010 0.004 
BS2 BS 0.133 0.028 0.051 0.028 0.195 0.041 0.018 0.003 
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BS3 BS 0.014 0.001 0.014 0.005 0.023 0.001 0.000 0.000 
BS4 BS 0.048 0.025 0.014 0.014 0.073 0.036 0.001 0.000 
BS5 BS 0.153 0.035 0.055 0.037 0.225 0.051 0.019 0.006 
BS6 BS 0.063 0.012 0.023 0.018 0.093 0.017 0.004 0.002 
BS7 BS 0.035 0.009 0.028 0.018 0.058 0.013 0.005 0.001 
BS8 BS 0.067 0.016 0.018 0.018 0.097 0.024 0.002 0.002 
BS9 BS 0.018 0.004 0.009 0.009 0.030 0.006 0.000 0.000 
BS10 BS 0.068 0.022 0.028 0.028 0.106 0.032 0.005 0.003 
BS11 BS 0.016 0.000 0.009 0.005 0.025 0.000 0.001 0.000 
BS12 BS 0.011 0.001 0.014 0.005 0.019 0.001 0.000 0.000 
BS13 BS 0.017 0.004 0.009 0.009 0.030 0.006 0.000 0.000 
BS14 BS 0.080 0.011 0.028 0.018 0.119 0.017 0.005 0.001 
BS15 BS 0.017 0.004 0.009 0.009 0.030 0.006 0.000 0.000 
BS16 BS 0.033 0.007 0.018 0.018 0.054 0.010 0.000 0.000 
BS17 BS 0.036 0.008 0.023 0.023 0.059 0.012 0.001 0.001 
BS18 BS 0.016 0.003 0.009 0.009 0.026 0.004 0.000 0.000 
BS19 BS 0.003 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.006 0.000 0.000 
BS20 BS 0.010 0.002 0.014 0.009 0.016 0.002 0.001 0.000 
BS21 BS 0.012 0.003 0.005 0.005 0.021 0.004 0.000 0.000 
BS22 BS 0.035 0.007 0.023 0.018 0.058 0.010 0.002 0.002 
BS23 BS 0.055 0.007 0.014 0.009 0.077 0.011 0.001 0.000 
BS24 BS 0.074 0.023 0.018 0.018 0.102 0.033 0.002 0.002 
BS25 BS 0.006 0.001 0.005 0.005 0.010 0.002 0.000 0.000 
BS26 BS 0.055 0.020 0.018 0.018 0.085 0.029 0.002 0.001 
BS27 BS 0.053 0.019 0.018 0.018 0.083 0.028 0.003 0.001 
BS28 BS 0.078 0.041 0.028 0.028 0.120 0.057 0.005 0.003 
BS29 BS 0.042 0.017 0.018 0.018 0.063 0.024 0.003 0.001 
BS30 BS 0.042 0.015 0.009 0.009 0.055 0.023 0.000 0.000 
BS31 BS 0.023 0.004 0.014 0.014 0.036 0.007 0.000 0.000 
BS32 BS 0.063 0.009 0.023 0.014 0.092 0.013 0.002 0.001 
BS33 BS 0.081 0.033 0.032 0.028 0.118 0.048 0.004 0.004 
BS34 BS 0.052 0.000 0.018 0.000 0.074 0.000 0.003 0.000 
SI1 SI 0.051 0.036 0.037 0.037 0.083 0.055 0.006 0.004 
SI2 SI 0.015 0.003 0.009 0.005 0.026 0.004 0.000 0.000 
SI3 SI 0.004 0.001 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.002 0.000 0.000 
SI4 SI 0.008 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.000 0.000 
SI5 SI 0.064 0.033 0.014 0.014 0.089 0.047 0.000 0.000 
SI6 SI 0.013 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.022 0.000 0.000 0.000 
SI7 SI 0.034 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.044 0.009 0.000 0.000 
SI8 SI 0.007 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.000 0.000 
SI9 SI 0.041 0.006 0.014 0.009 0.055 0.009 0.004 0.006 
SI10 SI 0.024 0.013 0.023 0.018 0.039 0.019 0.001 0.000 
SI11 SI 0.056 0.025 0.037 0.014 0.078 0.035 0.008 0.001 
SI12 SI 0.048 0.003 0.028 0.009 0.076 0.004 0.005 0.002 
SI13 SI 0.010 0.001 0.018 0.018 0.016 0.002 0.001 0.009 
SE64 SE 0.025 0.029 0.009 0.014 0.039 0.040 0.001 0.000 
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SE65 SE 0.022 0.028 0.005 0.009 0.033 0.038 0.000 0.000 
SE66 SE 0.022 0.028 0.005 0.009 0.033 0.038 0.000 0.000 
SE67 SE 0.022 0.028 0.005 0.009 0.033 0.038 0.000 0.000 
SE68 SE 0.022 0.028 0.005 0.009 0.033 0.038 0.000 0.000 
SE69 SE 0.022 0.028 0.005 0.009 0.033 0.038 0.000 0.000 
SE70 SE 0.022 0.028 0.005 0.009 0.033 0.038 0.000 0.000 
SE71 SE 0.024 0.030 0.014 0.014 0.037 0.042 0.007 0.000 
SE72 SE 0.022 0.028 0.005 0.009 0.033 0.038 0.000 0.000 
SE73 SE 0.034 0.032 0.014 0.018 0.053 0.044 0.001 0.001 
SE74 SE 0.022 0.028 0.005 0.009 0.033 0.038 0.000 0.000 
SE75 SE 0.022 0.028 0.005 0.009 0.033 0.038 0.000 0.000 
SE76 SE 0.022 0.029 0.005 0.014 0.033 0.040 0.000 0.003 
SE77 SE 0.072 0.041 0.023 0.028 0.103 0.057 0.008 0.002 
SE78 SE 0.022 0.028 0.005 0.009 0.033 0.038 0.000 0.000 
SE79 SE 0.022 0.028 0.005 0.009 0.033 0.038 0.000 0.000 
SE80 SE 0.022 0.028 0.005 0.009 0.033 0.038 0.000 0.000 
SE81 SE 0.056 0.034 0.009 0.014 0.077 0.047 0.004 0.000 
SE82 SE 0.022 0.028 0.005 0.009 0.033 0.038 0.000 0.000 
SE83 SE 0.024 0.071 0.009 0.060 0.038 0.106 0.002 0.007 
SE84 SE 0.073 0.105 0.060 0.069 0.113 0.154 0.015 0.004 
SE85 SE 0.022 0.028 0.005 0.009 0.033 0.038 0.000 0.000 
SE86 SE 0.022 0.028 0.005 0.009 0.033 0.038 0.000 0.000 
SE87 SE 0.022 0.028 0.005 0.009 0.033 0.038 0.000 0.000 
SE88 SE 0.022 0.035 0.005 0.018 0.033 0.049 0.000 0.001 
SE89 SE 0.022 0.028 0.005 0.009 0.033 0.038 0.000 0.000 
SE90 SE 0.062 0.045 0.023 0.018 0.093 0.062 0.009 0.000 
SE91 SE 0.022 0.028 0.005 0.009 0.033 0.038 0.000 0.000 
SE92 SE 0.022 0.028 0.005 0.009 0.033 0.038 0.000 0.000 
SE93 SE 0.022 0.028 0.005 0.009 0.033 0.038 0.000 0.000 
SE94 SE 0.038 0.034 0.014 0.018 0.060 0.046 0.001 0.000 
SE95 SE 0.076 0.039 0.028 0.028 0.108 0.054 0.069 0.044 
SE96 SE 0.022 0.030 0.005 0.014 0.033 0.041 0.000 0.001 
SE97 SE 0.022 0.028 0.005 0.009 0.033 0.038 0.000 0.000 
SE98 SE 0.022 0.028 0.005 0.009 0.033 0.038 0.000 0.000 
SE99 SE 0.059 0.035 0.014 0.018 0.083 0.049 0.006 0.001 
SE100 SE 0.022 0.028 0.005 0.009 0.033 0.038 0.000 0.000 
SE101 SE 0.022 0.028 0.005 0.009 0.033 0.038 0.000 0.000 
SE102 SE 0.024 0.028 0.009 0.009 0.037 0.038 0.001 0.000 
SE103 SE 0.022 0.028 0.005 0.009 0.033 0.038 0.000 0.000 
SE104 SE 0.022 0.028 0.005 0.009 0.033 0.038 0.000 0.000 
SE105 SE 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.018 0.017 0.014 0.000 0.002 
SE106 SE 0.002 0.001 0.005 0.009 0.003 0.001 0.000 0.000 
SE107 SE 0.002 0.001 0.005 0.009 0.003 0.002 0.000 0.000 
SE108 SE 0.002 0.051 0.005 0.046 0.003 0.078 0.000 0.002 
SE109 SE 0.028 0.083 0.005 0.051 0.040 0.122 0.000 0.000 
SE110 SE 0.034 0.073 0.009 0.065 0.050 0.110 0.000 0.001 
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SE111 SE 0.039 0.095 0.018 0.078 0.058 0.151 0.005 0.000 
SE112 SE 0.033 0.065 0.009 0.051 0.047 0.098 0.000 0.000 
SE113 SE 0.028 0.047 0.005 0.037 0.040 0.069 0.000 0.000 
SE114 SE 0.033 0.033 0.009 0.023 0.047 0.048 0.000 0.000 
SE115 SE 0.034 0.057 0.009 0.041 0.050 0.085 0.000 0.000 
SE116 SE 0.028 0.066 0.005 0.055 0.040 0.102 0.000 0.001 
SE117 SE 0.028 0.070 0.005 0.060 0.040 0.105 0.000 0.001 
SE118 SE 0.028 0.085 0.005 0.065 0.040 0.126 0.000 0.001 
SE119 SE 0.034 0.088 0.009 0.074 0.050 0.133 0.000 0.001 
SE120 SE 0.034 0.092 0.009 0.078 0.050 0.146 0.000 0.000 
SE121 SE 0.028 0.107 0.005 0.078 0.040 0.160 0.000 0.001 
SE122 SE 0.032 0.074 0.009 0.060 0.047 0.116 0.000 0.000 
SE123 SE 0.032 0.098 0.009 0.078 0.047 0.151 0.000 0.001 
SE124 SE 0.051 0.131 0.023 0.101 0.077 0.204 0.002 0.002 
SE125 SE 0.044 0.123 0.014 0.092 0.066 0.181 0.000 0.003 
SE126 SE 0.075 0.064 0.018 0.041 0.104 0.096 0.001 0.002 
SE127 SE 0.035 0.111 0.014 0.078 0.052 0.161 0.001 0.003 
SE128 SE 0.037 0.086 0.014 0.078 0.056 0.137 0.004 0.007 
SE129 SE 0.028 0.079 0.005 0.060 0.040 0.120 0.000 0.000 
SE130 SE 0.033 0.059 0.009 0.051 0.047 0.092 0.000 0.000 
SE131 SE 0.034 0.084 0.009 0.069 0.050 0.127 0.000 0.001 
SE132 SE 0.028 0.073 0.005 0.060 0.040 0.115 0.000 0.000 
SE133 SE 0.030 0.059 0.009 0.046 0.043 0.086 0.002 0.003 
SE134 SE 0.034 0.087 0.009 0.069 0.050 0.128 0.000 0.002 
SE135 SE 0.041 0.072 0.014 0.055 0.061 0.109 0.001 0.001 
SE136 SE 0.019 0.012 0.009 0.023 0.030 0.018 0.000 0.000 
SE137 SE 0.007 0.012 0.009 0.023 0.012 0.018 0.003 0.000 
SE138 SE 0.016 0.015 0.014 0.032 0.026 0.022 0.000 0.001 
SE139 SE 0.001 0.000 0.005 0.005 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
SE140 SE 0.001 0.000 0.005 0.005 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
SE141 SE 0.001 0.000 0.005 0.005 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
SE142 SE 0.001 0.000 0.005 0.005 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
SE143 SE 0.001 0.000 0.005 0.005 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
SE144 SE 0.001 0.000 0.005 0.005 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
SE145 SE 0.001 0.000 0.005 0.005 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
SE146 SE 0.001 0.000 0.005 0.005 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
SE147 SE 0.001 0.000 0.005 0.005 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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Appendix B1: Support and/or Advice, Moroccan SEN 
ID Type Coreness Co_Par Degree Eigenvector Between 
SE1 SE 0.147 1 0.169 0.221 0.061 
SE2 SE 0.267 1 0.325 0.374 0.178 
SE3 SE 0.070 0 0.084 0.102 0.031 
SE4/BS SE 0.126 1 0.205 0.189 0.129 
SE5 SE 0.351 1 0.349 0.466 0.115 
SE6 SE 0.072 0 0.084 0.107 0.007 
SE7 SE 0.163 1 0.193 0.239 0.051 
SE8 SE 0.354 1 0.386 0.467 0.206 
SE9 SE 0.124 1 0.157 0.183 0.012 
SE10 SE 0.044 0 0.108 0.068 0.037 
SE11 SE 0.281 1 0.313 0.386 0.128 
SE12 SE 0.104 0 0.096 0.155 0.031 
SE13 SE 0.113 1 0.096 0.168 0.002 
SE14 SE 0.007 0 0.024 0.010 0.024 
SE15 SE 0.129 1 0.133 0.191 0.026 
SE16 SE 0.174 1 0.181 0.249 0.072 
SE17 SE 0.022 0 0.048 0.035 0.000 
IN1 IN 0.086 0 0.084 0.126 0.052 
IN2 IN 0.047 0 0.060 0.070 0.004 
IN3 IN 0.071 0 0.048 0.103 0.001 
IN4 IN 0.010 0 0.012 0.015 0.000 
LO1 LO 0.047 0 0.193 0.074 0.270 
LO2 LO 0.137 1 0.145 0.203 0.011 
LO3 LO 0.203 1 0.157 0.289 0.008 
LO4 LO 0.133 1 0.120 0.197 0.007 
IN5 IN 0.058 0 0.036 0.084 0.000 
IN6 IN 0.062 0 0.072 0.095 0.002 
IN7 IN 0.137 1 0.108 0.203 0.006 
IN8 IN 0.005 0 0.012 0.008 0.000 
IN9 IN 0.072 0 0.048 0.104 0.000 
IN10 IN 0.013 0 0.012 0.020 0.000 
IN11 IN 0.096 0 0.084 0.143 0.003 
IN12 IN 0.026 0 0.024 0.039 0.002 
IN13 IN 0.069 0 0.036 0.099 0.000 
IN14 IN 0.020 0 0.012 0.030 0.000 
IN15 IN 0.196 1 0.169 0.282 0.150 
IN16 IN 0.058 0 0.036 0.084 0.000 
IN17 IN 0.021 0 0.024 0.033 0.000 
RA1 RA 0.102 0 0.084 0.149 0.005 
RA2 RA 0.017 0 0.024 0.026 0.002 
RA3 RA 0.001 0 0.012 0.001 0.000 
BS1 BS 0.229 1 0.193 0.326 0.033 
 222 
BS2 BS 0.159 1 0.133 0.230 0.019 
BS2a BS 0.142 1 0.108 0.205 0.009 
BS3 BS 0.122 1 0.096 0.176 0.007 
BS4 BS 0.151 1 0.120 0.216 0.012 
BS5 BS 0.058 0 0.036 0.084 0.000 
BS6 BS 0.102 0 0.060 0.146 0.001 
BS7 BS 0.040 0 0.024 0.057 0.000 
BS8 BS 0.012 0 0.012 0.019 0.000 
BS9 BS 0.021 0 0.012 0.031 0.000 
BS10 BS 0.026 0 0.024 0.039 0.000 
BS11 BS 0.091 0 0.060 0.130 0.004 
BS12 BS 0.053 0 0.036 0.077 0.001 
BS13 BS 0.067 0 0.048 0.099 0.002 
LO5 LO 0.155 1 0.108 0.222 0.004 
SI1 SI 0.047 0 0.024 0.068 0.000 
SI2 SI 0.020 0 0.012 0.030 0.000 
SI3 SI 0.075 0 0.048 0.108 0.000 
SI4 SI 0.073 0 0.060 0.107 0.006 
SI5 SI 0.040 0 0.024 0.058 0.000 
SI6 SI 0.013 0 0.024 0.021 0.000 
SI7 SI 0.020 0 0.012 0.030 0.000 
SI8 SI 0.021 0 0.012 0.031 0.000 
SI9 SI 0.021 0 0.012 0.031 0.000 
SI10 SI 0.063 0 0.048 0.095 0.002 
SI11 SI 0.027 0 0.012 0.038 0.000 
SI12 SI 0.043 0 0.036 0.065 0.002 
SI13 SI 0.003 0 0.012 0.006 0.000 
SE18 SE 0.094 0 0.084 0.139 0.001 
SE19 SE 0.094 0 0.084 0.139 0.001 
SE20 SE 0.110 1 0.096 0.163 0.001 
SE21 SE 0.004 0 0.012 0.006 0.000 
SE22 SE 0.004 0 0.012 0.006 0.000 
SE23 SE 0.004 0 0.012 0.006 0.000 
SE24 SE 0.004 0 0.012 0.006 0.000 
SE25 SE 0.004 0 0.012 0.006 0.000 
SE26 SE 0.004 0 0.012 0.006 0.000 
SE27 SE 0.004 0 0.012 0.006 0.000 
SE28 SE 0.004 0 0.012 0.006 0.000 
SE29 SE 0.004 0 0.012 0.006 0.000 
SE30 SE 0.004 0 0.012 0.006 0.000 
SE31 SE 0.004 0 0.012 0.006 0.000 
SE32 SE 0.004 0 0.012 0.006 0.000 
 
 
 223 
Appendix B2: Support or Advice, Moroccan SEN (Multiplex) 
ID Type Cor_A Cor_S Deg_A Deg_S Eig_A Eig_S Bet_A Bet_S 
          SE1 SE 0.113 0.098 0.157 0.060 0.183 0.147 0.056 0.054 
SE2 SE 0.228 0.151 0.277 0.120 0.338 0.226 0.191 0.076 
SE3 SE 0.080 0.037 0.060 0.048 0.119 0.057 0.001 0.027 
SE4/BS SE 0.148 0.124 0.193 0.108 0.228 0.187 0.108 0.062 
SE5 SE 0.389 0.326 0.325 0.193 0.508 0.443 0.108 0.081 
SE6 SE 0.075 0.001 0.108 0.012 0.114 0.001 0.032 0.000 
SE7 SE 0.242 0.180 0.205 0.133 0.342 0.265 0.060 0.082 
SE8 SE 0.386 0.346 0.325 0.217 0.504 0.460 0.141 0.140 
SE9 SE 0.120 0.155 0.108 0.096 0.180 0.229 0.048 0.022 
SE10 SE 0.023 0.050 0.048 0.072 0.038 0.077 0.000 0.103 
SE11 SE 0.296 0.301 0.265 0.193 0.408 0.414 0.079 0.107 
SE12 SE 0.052 0.036 0.060 0.024 0.086 0.055 0.004 0.000 
SE13 SE 0.055 0.042 0.060 0.024 0.090 0.061 0.001 0.000 
SE14 SE 0.008 0.008 0.024 0.012 0.013 0.012 0.021 0.000 
SE15 SE 0.117 0.063 0.133 0.060 0.181 0.096 0.030 0.025 
SE16 SE 0.152 0.090 0.084 0.084 0.217 0.133 0.002 0.068 
SE17 SE 0.023 0.001 0.048 0.012 0.038 0.001 0.000 0.000 
IN1 IN 0.091 0.065 0.084 0.048 0.137 0.095 0.048 0.030 
IN2 IN 0.023 0.006 0.048 0.036 0.038 0.010 0.000 0.044 
IN3 IN 0.000 0.076 0.000 0.036 0.000 0.114 0.000 0.002 
IN4 IN 0.010 0.008 0.012 0.012 0.016 0.012 0.000 0.000 
LO1 LO 0.061 0.055 0.205 0.181 0.102 0.086 0.241 0.249 
LO2 LO 0.095 0.147 0.096 0.072 0.145 0.215 0.016 0.006 
LO3 LO 0.236 0.106 0.169 0.060 0.336 0.156 0.023 0.013 
LO4 LO 0.105 0.095 0.072 0.048 0.157 0.142 0.002 0.011 
IN5 IN 0.031 0.070 0.048 0.060 0.050 0.109 0.000 0.003 
IN6 IN 0.072 0.139 0.072 0.072 0.111 0.205 0.002 0.004 
IN7 IN 0.063 0.048 0.072 0.036 0.102 0.072 0.010 0.000 
IN8 IN 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.000 
IN9 IN 0.014 0.065 0.012 0.036 0.022 0.094 0.000 0.022 
IN10 IN 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.017 0.000 0.000 
IN11 IN 0.094 0.072 0.084 0.036 0.146 0.108 0.004 0.003 
IN12 IN 0.000 0.022 0.000 0.024 0.000 0.036 0.000 0.005 
IN13 IN 0.052 0.096 0.024 0.036 0.076 0.139 0.000 0.003 
IN14 IN 0.000 0.018 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.028 0.000 0.000 
IN15 IN 0.016 0.248 0.024 0.157 0.027 0.352 0.000 0.323 
IN16 IN 0.068 0.096 0.036 0.036 0.099 0.139 0.001 0.001 
IN17 IN 0.022 0.026 0.024 0.024 0.037 0.042 0.000 0.001 
RA1 RE 0.130 0.023 0.072 0.012 0.187 0.034 0.004 0.000 
RA2 RE 0.000 0.017 0.000 0.024 0.000 0.027 0.000 0.004 
RA3 RE 0.001 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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BS1 BS 0.179 0.301 0.120 0.181 0.260 0.414 0.019 0.135 
BS2 BS 0.186 0.219 0.120 0.108 0.268 0.312 0.015 0.054 
BS2a BS 0.178 0.194 0.108 0.084 0.257 0.277 0.011 0.016 
BS3 BS 0.123 0.198 0.060 0.096 0.176 0.282 0.002 0.018 
BS4 BS 0.164 0.190 0.120 0.108 0.238 0.271 0.037 0.051 
BS5 BS 0.058 0.077 0.024 0.024 0.083 0.110 0.000 0.000 
BS6 BS 0.126 0.129 0.060 0.048 0.179 0.183 0.000 0.009 
BS7 BS 0.053 0.063 0.024 0.024 0.077 0.091 0.000 0.001 
BS8 BS 0.020 0.021 0.012 0.012 0.031 0.033 0.000 0.000 
BS9 BS 0.031 0.036 0.024 0.012 0.047 0.052 0.001 0.000 
BS10 BS 0.020 0.032 0.012 0.024 0.031 0.050 0.000 0.002 
BS11 BS 0.110 0.150 0.060 0.060 0.159 0.215 0.004 0.007 
BS12 BS 0.098 0.135 0.048 0.048 0.139 0.192 0.001 0.002 
BS13 BS 0.075 0.080 0.048 0.048 0.114 0.120 0.001 0.010 
LO5 LO 0.152 0.000 0.084 0.000 0.219 0.000 0.003 0.000 
SI1 SI 0.052 0.008 0.024 0.012 0.077 0.012 0.000 0.000 
SI2 SI 0.019 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.031 0.000 0.000 0.000 
SI3 SI 0.080 0.104 0.036 0.036 0.113 0.148 0.000 0.000 
SI4 SI 0.072 0.126 0.036 0.060 0.104 0.183 0.000 0.026 
SI5 SI 0.033 0.011 0.012 0.012 0.046 0.017 0.000 0.000 
SI6 SI 0.000 0.021 0.000 0.024 0.000 0.033 0.000 0.004 
SI7 SI 0.019 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.031 0.000 0.000 0.000 
SI8 SI 0.025 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.037 0.000 0.000 0.000 
SI9 SI 0.025 0.036 0.012 0.012 0.037 0.052 0.000 0.000 
SI10 SI 0.067 0.015 0.048 0.012 0.105 0.024 0.004 0.000 
SI11 SI 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
SI12 SI 0.052 0.021 0.036 0.012 0.082 0.033 0.003 0.000 
SI13 SI 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.000 
SE18 SE 0.091 0.084 0.072 0.048 0.136 0.125 0.004 0.001 
SE19 SE 0.091 0.084 0.072 0.048 0.136 0.125 0.004 0.001 
SE20 SE 0.091 0.121 0.072 0.060 0.136 0.177 0.004 0.004 
SE21 SE 0.005 0.007 0.012 0.012 0.009 0.011 0.000 0.000 
SE22 SE 0.005 0.007 0.012 0.012 0.009 0.011 0.000 0.000 
SE23 SE 0.005 0.007 0.012 0.012 0.009 0.011 0.000 0.000 
SE24 SE 0.005 0.007 0.012 0.012 0.009 0.011 0.000 0.000 
SE25 SE 0.005 0.007 0.012 0.012 0.009 0.011 0.000 0.000 
SE26 SE 0.005 0.007 0.012 0.012 0.009 0.011 0.000 0.000 
SE27 SE 0.005 0.007 0.012 0.012 0.009 0.011 0.000 0.000 
SE28 SE 0.005 0.007 0.012 0.012 0.009 0.011 0.000 0.000 
SE29 SE 0.005 0.007 0.012 0.012 0.009 0.011 0.000 0.000 
SE30 SE 0.005 0.007 0.012 0.012 0.009 0.011 0.000 0.000 
SE31 SE 0.005 0.007 0.012 0.012 0.009 0.011 0.000 0.000 
SE32 SE 0.005 0.007 0.012 0.012 0.009 0.011 0.000 0.000 
 
 225 
Appendix C1: Support and/or Advice, Jordanian SEN 
ID Type Coreness Co_par Degree Eigenvector Between 
SE1 SE 0.297 1 0.316 0.401 0.123 
SE2 SE 0.280 1 0.265 0.380 0.039 
SE3 SE 0.176 1 0.143 0.248 0.005 
SE4 SE 0.194 1 0.173 0.272 0.016 
SE5 SE 0.028 0 0.041 0.043 0.003 
SE6 SE 0.142 1 0.173 0.206 0.061 
SE7 SE 0.247 1 0.286 0.343 0.059 
SE8 SE 0.104 0 0.092 0.151 0.001 
SE9 SE 0.235 1 0.245 0.327 0.087 
SE10 SE 0.246 1 0.204 0.339 0.016 
SE11 SE 0.171 1 0.143 0.243 0.023 
SE12 SE 0.114 0 0.143 0.168 0.015 
SE13 SE 0.157 1 0.143 0.224 0.014 
SE14 SE 0.086 0 0.092 0.126 0.005 
SE15 SE 0.004 0 0.010 0.007 0.000 
SE16 SE 0.014 0 0.020 0.022 0.000 
SE17 SE 0.094 0 0.071 0.136 0.000 
SE18 SE 0.158 1 0.143 0.228 0.018 
SE19 SE 0.112 0 0.122 0.163 0.012 
SE20 SE 0.078 0 0.092 0.115 0.006 
SE21 SE 0.047 0 0.041 0.068 0.000 
SE22 SE 0.047 0 0.041 0.068 0.000 
IN1 IN 0.158 1 0.133 0.226 0.005 
IN2 IN 0.168 1 0.153 0.240 0.008 
IN3 IN 0.238 1 0.255 0.355 0.034 
IN4 IN 0.052 0 0.041 0.076 0.000 
RA1 RA 0.195 1 0.184 0.275 0.038 
RA2 RA 0.066 0 0.102 0.104 0.035 
LO1 LO 0.156 1 0.571 0.229 0.600 
LO2 LO 0.159 1 0.122 0.227 0.003 
IN5 IN 0.091 0 0.102 0.131 0.014 
BS1 BS 0.264 1 0.286 0.362 0.053 
BS2 BS 0.050 0 0.041 0.073 0.000 
BS3 BS 0.073 0 0.061 0.104 0.005 
BS4 BS 0.063 0 0.051 0.092 0.001 
BS5 BS 0.071 0 0.061 0.103 0.000 
BS6 BS 0.035 0 0.020 0.050 0.000 
BS7 BS 0.032 0 0.031 0.047 0.000 
BS8 BS 0.082 0 0.092 0.119 0.004 
BS9 BS 0.057 0 0.051 0.084 0.004 
BS10 BS 0.019 0 0.020 0.029 0.000 
BS11 BS 0.107 0 0.082 0.154 0.012 
SI1 SI 0.017 0 0.020 0.027 0.002 
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SI2 SI 0.033 0 0.031 0.050 0.004 
SI3 SI 0.028 0 0.031 0.041 0.000 
SI4 SI 0.034 0 0.031 0.049 0.001 
SI5 SI 0.027 0 0.041 0.041 0.001 
SI6 SI 0.011 0 0.010 0.016 0.000 
SI7 SI 0.019 0 0.010 0.027 0.000 
RA3 RA 0.180 1 0.153 0.255 0.013 
IN6 IN 0.032 0 0.031 0.046 0.000 
IN7 IN 0.064 0 0.061 0.095 0.001 
IN8 IN 0.134 1 0.133 0.197 0.040 
IN9 IN 0.064 0 0.051 0.092 0.001 
SE23 SE 0.052 0 0.041 0.077 0.000 
SE25 SE 0.079 0 0.061 0.115 0.000 
SE24 SE 0.076 0 0.061 0.112 0.004 
SE26 SE 0.073 0 0.051 0.107 0.001 
SE27 SE 0.029 0 0.020 0.042 0.000 
SE28 SE 0.010 0 0.010 0.015 0.000 
SE29 SE 0.015 0 0.020 0.022 0.004 
SE30 SE 0.030 0 0.031 0.045 0.002 
SE31 SE 0.010 0 0.010 0.015 0.000 
SE32 SE 0.010 0 0.010 0.015 0.000 
SE33 SE 0.010 0 0.010 0.015 0.000 
SE34 SE 0.010 0 0.010 0.015 0.000 
SE35 SE 0.026 0 0.020 0.038 0.002 
SE36 SE 0.010 0 0.010 0.015 0.000 
SE37 SE 0.010 0 0.010 0.015 0.000 
SE38 SE 0.010 0 0.010 0.015 0.000 
SE39 SE 0.077 0 0.071 0.112 0.008 
SE40 SE 0.010 0 0.010 0.015 0.000 
SE41 SE 0.010 0 0.010 0.015 0.000 
SE42 SE 0.052 0 0.051 0.078 0.007 
SE43 SE 0.010 0 0.010 0.015 0.000 
SE44 SE 0.010 0 0.010 0.015 0.000 
SE45 SE 0.010 0 0.010 0.015 0.000 
SE46 SE 0.025 0 0.020 0.037 0.000 
SE47 SE 0.010 0 0.010 0.015 0.000 
SE48 SE 0.015 0 0.020 0.023 0.002 
SE49 SE 0.010 0 0.010 0.015 0.000 
SE50 SE 0.010 0 0.010 0.015 0.000 
SE51 SE 0.010 0 0.010 0.015 0.000 
SE52 SE 0.031 0 0.031 0.046 0.000 
SE53 SE 0.010 0 0.010 0.015 0.000 
SE54 SE 0.010 0 0.010 0.015 0.000 
SE55 SE 0.010 0 0.010 0.015 0.000 
SE56 SE 0.010 0 0.010 0.015 0.000 
SE57 SE 0.016 0 0.020 0.024 0.000 
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SE58 SE 0.010 0 0.010 0.015 0.000 
SE59 SE 0.010 0 0.010 0.015 0.000 
SE60 SE 0.010 0 0.010 0.015 0.000 
SE61 SE 0.010 0 0.010 0.015 0.000 
SE62 SE 0.010 0 0.010 0.015 0.000 
SE63 SE 0.010 0 0.010 0.015 0.000 
SE64 SE 0.032 0 0.031 0.048 0.004 
SE65 SE 0.010 0 0.010 0.015 0.000 
SE66 SE 0.010 0 0.010 0.015 0.000 
SE67 SE 0.010 0 0.010 0.015 0.000 
 
Appendix C2: Support or Advice, Jordanian SEN (Multiplex) 
ID Type Cor_S Cor_A Deg_S Deg_A Eig_S Eig_A Bet_S Bet_A 
SE1 SE 0.358 0.338 0.173 0.286 0.458 0.452 0.081 0.158 
SE2 SE 0.341 0.318 0.143 0.235 0.440 0.430 0.041 0.039 
SE3 SE 0.086 0.213 0.041 0.133 0.127 0.302 0.003 0.009 
SE4 SE 0.152 0.232 0.061 0.153 0.208 0.326 0.002 0.026 
SE5 SE 0.062 0.003 0.041 0.010 0.099 0.005 0.015 0.000 
SE6 SE 0.049 0.126 0.031 0.122 0.079 0.186 0.001 0.018 
SE7 SE 0.225 0.244 0.122 0.214 0.315 0.344 0.058 0.050 
SE8 SE 0.106 0.077 0.041 0.061 0.147 0.115 0.000 0.001 
SE9 SE 0.201 0.259 0.092 0.204 0.292 0.364 0.100 0.089 
SE10 SE 0.258 0.255 0.112 0.153 0.349 0.355 0.023 0.006 
SE11 SE 0.214 0.138 0.082 0.092 0.298 0.201 0.025 0.020 
SE12 SE 0.079 0.080 0.061 0.071 0.126 0.120 0.018 0.021 
SE13 SE 0.154 0.099 0.071 0.071 0.221 0.144 0.013 0.025 
SE14 SE 0.029 0.084 0.041 0.051 0.043 0.123 0.022 0.000 
SE15 SE 0.009 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.000 0.000 
SE16 SE 0.026 0.008 0.020 0.010 0.039 0.012 0.000 0.000 
SE17 SE 0.021 0.013 0.010 0.010 0.031 0.020 0.000 0.000 
SE18 SE 0.135 0.154 0.071 0.102 0.209 0.225 0.041 0.013 
SE19 SE 0.053 0.126 0.041 0.092 0.081 0.187 0.009 0.003 
SE20 SE 0.073 0.056 0.061 0.051 0.113 0.083 0.029 0.002 
SE21 SE 0.021 0.062 0.010 0.041 0.031 0.091 0.000 0.000 
SE22 SE 0.021 0.062 0.010 0.041 0.031 0.091 0.000 0.000 
IN1 IN 0.213 0.165 0.102 0.112 0.292 0.238 0.044 0.016 
IN2 IN 0.188 0.167 0.112 0.133 0.268 0.243 0.067 0.035 
IN3 IN 0.264 0.040 0.133 0.051 0.410 0.066 0.043 0.019 
IN4 IN 0.025 0.051 0.010 0.031 0.037 0.075 0.000 0.000 
RA1 RA 0.232 0.196 0.122 0.122 0.319 0.282 0.053 0.055 
RA2 RA 0.077 0.044 0.061 0.031 0.113 0.066 0.038 0.000 
LO1 LO 0.212 0.173 0.500 0.531 0.344 0.262 0.621 0.547 
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LO2 LO 0.077 0.184 0.041 0.122 0.108 0.263 0.006 0.020 
IN5 IN 0.064 0.092 0.020 0.092 0.094 0.139 0.013 0.014 
BS1 BS 0.236 0.305 0.102 0.265 0.318 0.416 0.027 0.100 
BS2 BS 0.000 0.058 0.000 0.041 0.000 0.086 0.000 0.000 
BS3 BS 0.082 0.099 0.031 0.061 0.111 0.143 0.005 0.006 
BS4 BS 0.054 0.056 0.020 0.041 0.078 0.083 0.000 0.001 
BS5 BS 0.024 0.081 0.020 0.051 0.037 0.118 0.001 0.000 
BS6 BS 0.038 0.023 0.010 0.010 0.051 0.034 0.000 0.000 
BS7 BS 0.003 0.033 0.010 0.020 0.005 0.049 0.000 0.000 
BS8 BS 0.056 0.102 0.041 0.082 0.080 0.151 0.006 0.005 
BS9 BS 0.000 0.068 0.000 0.051 0.000 0.103 0.000 0.013 
BS10 BS 0.000 0.023 0.000 0.020 0.000 0.036 0.000 0.003 
BS11 BS 0.069 0.138 0.020 0.082 0.094 0.202 0.000 0.020 
SI1 SI 0.032 0.000 0.020 0.000 0.055 0.000 0.005 0.000 
SI2 SI 0.032 0.006 0.020 0.010 0.055 0.010 0.005 0.000 
SI3 SI 0.032 0.000 0.031 0.000 0.049 0.000 0.011 0.000 
SI4 SI 0.061 0.000 0.031 0.000 0.089 0.000 0.001 0.000 
SI5 SI 0.016 0.018 0.031 0.010 0.026 0.026 0.001 0.000 
SI6 SI 0.024 0.011 0.010 0.010 0.035 0.016 0.000 0.000 
SI7 SI 0.000 0.026 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.036 0.000 0.000 
RA3 RA 0.028 0.116 0.020 0.071 0.042 0.168 0.002 0.003 
IN6 IN 0.055 0.000 0.031 0.000 0.078 0.000 0.001 0.000 
IN7 IN 0.102 0.000 0.061 0.000 0.152 0.000 0.008 0.000 
IN8 IN 0.219 0.023 0.122 0.010 0.324 0.034 0.193 0.000 
IN9 IN 0.008 0.080 0.010 0.051 0.013 0.117 0.000 0.001 
SE23 SE 0.026 0.030 0.010 0.020 0.037 0.044 0.000 0.000 
SE25 SE 0.041 0.053 0.020 0.031 0.062 0.077 0.000 0.000 
SE24 SE 0.049 0.061 0.020 0.041 0.078 0.090 0.006 0.005 
SE26 SE 0.049 0.039 0.020 0.020 0.078 0.058 0.006 0.000 
SE27 SE 0.024 0.039 0.010 0.020 0.040 0.058 0.000 0.000 
SE28 SE 0.024 0.013 0.010 0.010 0.040 0.021 0.000 0.000 
SE29 SE 0.033 0.021 0.020 0.020 0.053 0.033 0.010 0.004 
SE30 SE 0.032 0.032 0.020 0.020 0.053 0.049 0.013 0.003 
SE31 SE 0.024 0.013 0.010 0.010 0.040 0.021 0.000 0.000 
SE32 SE 0.024 0.013 0.010 0.010 0.040 0.021 0.000 0.000 
SE33 SE 0.024 0.013 0.010 0.010 0.040 0.021 0.000 0.000 
SE34 SE 0.024 0.013 0.010 0.010 0.040 0.021 0.000 0.000 
SE35 SE 0.024 0.032 0.010 0.020 0.040 0.049 0.000 0.003 
SE36 SE 0.024 0.013 0.010 0.010 0.040 0.021 0.000 0.000 
SE37 SE 0.024 0.013 0.010 0.010 0.040 0.021 0.000 0.000 
SE38 SE 0.024 0.013 0.010 0.010 0.040 0.021 0.000 0.000 
SE39 SE 0.056 0.101 0.031 0.071 0.087 0.152 0.017 0.015 
SE40 SE 0.024 0.013 0.010 0.010 0.040 0.021 0.000 0.000 
SE41 SE 0.024 0.013 0.010 0.010 0.040 0.021 0.000 0.000 
SE42 SE 0.038 0.040 0.031 0.031 0.063 0.061 0.016 0.006 
SE43 SE 0.024 0.013 0.010 0.010 0.040 0.021 0.000 0.000 
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SE44 SE 0.024 0.013 0.010 0.010 0.040 0.021 0.000 0.000 
SE45 SE 0.024 0.013 0.010 0.010 0.040 0.021 0.000 0.000 
SE46 SE 0.024 0.033 0.010 0.020 0.040 0.050 0.000 0.000 
SE47 SE 0.024 0.013 0.010 0.010 0.040 0.021 0.000 0.000 
SE48 SE 0.032 0.013 0.020 0.010 0.053 0.021 0.010 0.000 
SE49 SE 0.024 0.013 0.010 0.010 0.040 0.021 0.000 0.000 
SE50 SE 0.024 0.013 0.010 0.010 0.040 0.021 0.000 0.000 
SE51 SE 0.024 0.013 0.010 0.010 0.040 0.021 0.000 0.000 
SE52 SE 0.024 0.040 0.010 0.031 0.040 0.062 0.000 0.000 
SE53 SE 0.024 0.013 0.010 0.010 0.040 0.021 0.000 0.000 
SE54 SE 0.024 0.013 0.010 0.010 0.040 0.021 0.000 0.000 
SE55 SE 0.024 0.013 0.010 0.010 0.040 0.021 0.000 0.000 
SE56 SE 0.024 0.013 0.010 0.010 0.040 0.021 0.000 0.000 
SE57 SE 0.024 0.020 0.010 0.020 0.040 0.032 0.000 0.000 
SE58 SE 0.024 0.013 0.010 0.010 0.040 0.021 0.000 0.000 
SE59 SE 0.024 0.013 0.010 0.010 0.040 0.021 0.000 0.000 
SE60 SE 0.024 0.013 0.010 0.010 0.040 0.021 0.000 0.000 
SE61 SE 0.024 0.013 0.010 0.010 0.040 0.021 0.000 0.000 
SE62 SE 0.024 0.013 0.010 0.010 0.040 0.021 0.000 0.000 
SE63 SE 0.024 0.013 0.010 0.010 0.040 0.021 0.000 0.000 
SE64 SE 0.027 0.021 0.020 0.020 0.045 0.033 0.010 0.015 
SE65 SE 0.024 0.013 0.010 0.010 0.040 0.021 0.000 0.000 
SE66 SE 0.024 0.013 0.010 0.010 0.040 0.021 0.000 0.000 
SE67 SE 0.024 0.013 0.010 0.010 0.040 0.021 0.000 0.000 
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